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Abstract 
The  emergence  of  the  human  rights  of  individuals  defined  as  lesbian,  gay,
bisexual,  transgender  and  intersexual  (LGBTI)  has  caused  a  questioning  of  the
reliability of a system of protection of human rights resting on heteronormativity and
the enforcement of a strict male-female dichotomy. It has also pushed scholars to ask
who is the contemporary subject of human rights. 
This thesis builds on the acknowledgement of this tension in order to investigate,
in the context of the Council of Europe, the process by which LGBTI individuals are
created as subjects of human rights. It is argued that law and politics play a concerted
productive role in constituting the subjects that they wish to protect, thus promoting
adherence to rigid identity categories in order to become intelligible before the law. This
endeavour will be carried out by analysing both outstanding case law from the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning sexual orientation and gender identity, as
well as using ethnographic observation carried out at the Office of the Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe in 2010.
The thesis analyses the process by which the subject of human rights is produced
and granted legal intelligibility in Strasbourg. Simultaneously, it  also explores viable
alternatives to the categorisation of individuals in terms of sexual orientation and/or
gender identities in the socio-juridical field. In this regard, citizenship represents the
privileged domain of inquiry, where identities are articulated, rights are allocated and
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exclusionary practices are enacted.  The concept of “multisexual citizenship” serves to
explore models of citizenship that can transcend national borders, also encompassing
multiple forms of identification and socio-political and cultural allegiances. As a result
of this process of transformation of citizenship, an inevitable and radical metamorphosis
of human rights is also anticipated, beyond the current narrow framework of formal
equality and freedom.
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Introduction
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual (LGBTI) persons have for a long
time been labelled as being “against nature” (Foucault 1998) or as “gender outlaw(s)”
(Bornstein  1994).  Increasingly,  however,  discourse  concerning  the  rights  associated
with  individuals'  sexual  orientation  and/or  gender  identity  are  proliferating  and
intensifying  in  various  geo-political  and  legal  contexts.  Social,  legal,  and  political
recognition of the legitimacy of these rights claims is happening both at the level of
nation-states and in international fora.
Structural invisibility, and political, social, and economic marginalisation of this
heterogeneous – and fictitious – group of individuals have for a long time been the
norm. It could be argued that, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  the
typical rights-holder in the collective imaginary was not just  male,  white, and middle-
class,  he  was  also  heterosexual and  cisgendered.  Same-sex  sexual  and  sentimental
attractions, as well as the defiance of gender norms, have been enshrouded in silence,
shame, and reprobation in different social,  cultural,  and political contexts. While the
legacy of this transversal stigma has far from vanished, many of the claims advanced by
LGBTI persons in the past few decades,  starting from the late seventies, have been
legitimately included into  the  “repertoire” of  human rights  both at  the  national  and
international level.
Although with different aims and intensity, international organisations such as
the United Nations,  the European Union,  and the Council  of Europe have officially
started  to  include  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity  among  the  “human  rights
issues” in need of being addressed. Furthermore, especially in Europe, and in some of
the  countries  of  the  American  continent,  national  legislation  has  moved  from  the
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criminalisation  of  homosexuality  and  gender  non-conformity  to  the  enactment  of
provisions that allow LGB persons to marry, to become adoptive parents, and protect
individuals  from discrimination  in  the  workplace  and in  other  contexts  such as  the
provision of services, healthcare, education, and so forth. Similarly, legislative measures
aimed at allowing individuals to have their preferred gender legally recognised are in
place in various legal systems, although the terms by which this  recognition can be
achieved may vary significantly from one country to another. Lastly, there is also an
intensification of debates concerning the rights of individuals whose hormonal, gonadal,
or  anatomical  characteristics  at  birth  may  not  be  in  line  with  expected  notions  of
masculinity or  femininity and who come to  be defined,  in  medical  terms,  as  being
“intersexual” (Fausto-Sterling 2000). 
This process of increased recognition of rights of a formerly stigmatised and
marginalised group of individuals, however, is not deprived of grey areas that directly
call into question the interrelationship between law and politics. LGBTI-friendly human
rights policies promoted both at  the level of nation-states and at  the level of supra-
national international organisations, engender, to some extent, the suspicion that such an
enthusiasm may well hide more subtle political purposes pursued by these actors, for
instance  in  connection  with  the  promotion  of  a  specific  concept  of  nationhood  or
citizenship. In a context in which human rights may lose their aura of almost sacred
universality and become the object of various political  negotiations (Douzinas 2000;
Dembour  2006),  the  emergence  of  rights  claims  concerning  individuals'  sexual
orientation and gender identity represents a unique opportunity to explore the ways in
which the boundaries of human rights can be stretched and new rights-holders can be
created.
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The Focus of this Research
By focusing on the European continent – and more specifically on the work of
the Council of Europe (CoE), the largest and most influential intra-governmental human
rights organisation – this thesis tries to read the process of creation and recognition of
LGBTI  socio-legal  subjectivities  as  being  partly  informed  by  complex  political
motivations that span across different dimensions.  On the one hand, the emergence of
these rights claims, and their consequent recognition on the part of institutional actors,
has  led  to  the  creation  of  new lines  of  exclusion  between  “respectable”  and  “non-
respectable” LGBTI individuals. In becoming included into societal institutions such as
the army or marriage, the former  outcasts have been assimilated and normalised, and
their claims have lost their allure as occasions for intense and radical social and political
critique (Duggan 2003; Stychin 2004). Furthermore, this process of formal inclusion
into mainstream societal structures has also led to the substitution of old lines of socio-
political and economic marginalisation with new lines of exclusion that target a smaller,
but still  significant,  sub-group of individuals (such as gender non-conformists, sado-
masochists, people living with the social stigma of HIV, people living in marginalised
socio-economic conditions or subject to racial,  ethnic, and religious discrimination).  
On the other hand, issues relating to the human rights of LGBTI persons have
been  transferred  to  the  international  arena  and  deployed  as  part  of  civilisational
discourses targeting presumably homo- and transphobic countries. A phenomenon such
as  “homonationalism”  (Puar  2007),  by  which  a  racialised  segment  of  the  queer
population is mobilised for narrow nationalist purposes, calls into question the role of
nation-states, but also of supra-national entities, in the articulation of political strategies
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for the promotion of specific human rights issues. The deployment of “LGBTI rights” as
the  most  advanced  benchmark  of  civilisation  (Stychin  2004,  951)  is,  therefore,
problematic, as it can produce effects that are detrimental for the individuals concerned,
by  objectifying  them  and  exposing  them  to  further  vulnerability,  violence,  and
discrimination. 
What has Been Done Already?
Particularly during the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the
process by which human rights claims advanced by LGBTI persons have been discussed
and addressed in various legal fora. In the context of Europe, scholars have specifically
focused on the historical evolution of the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights  (ECtHR),  the  main  institution  of  the  CoE,  on  issues  concerning  sexual
orientation (Heinze 1995; Waaldijk 1992 and 2005; Wintemute 1995 and 2001; Johnson
2012) and gender identity (Whittle 2002). Although this immensely valuable strand of
scholarship has been of primary importance in mapping out the developments in this
field and in helping the LGBTI activists to navigate the complex process of litigation in
Strasbourg, at the same time, it presents important limitations. These limitations appear
even more obvious after the sedimentation of the consistent body of case law produced
on these issues by the ECtHR in the last  few decades.  The most  apparent  of these
limitations  is  represented  by  the  fact  that  this  body of  work  tends  to  describe  the
progressive recognition made by the ECtHR of the various human rights claims made
by LGBTI persons, as a neutral process, deprived of political connotations. 
Recently, Johnson (2012) has attempted to overcome the limitations of a purely
legalistic  approach by providing a  socio-legal  analysis  of  the ECtHR's  case law on
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sexual orientation. The achievement of this objective, however, has been partial, as the
author's arguments rested entirely within the space of a “liberal” human rights agenda
for  LGB persons,  formally based  on the  assimilation  of  LGB persons  into  societal
institutions, such as marriage or the army, rather than on a critical questioning of the
patterns of exclusion that these institutions may continue to foster in the first  place.
Equally, while critical voices concerning the socially and legally “conservative” role of
the ECtHR in relation to issues concerning gender identity (Sandland 2003; Dembour
2005) have slowly started to emerge, the predominant framework of analysis for the
ECtHR's case law on issues concerning gender identity seems to remain one which still
takes for granted the necessity of a binary organisation of gender around the normative
categories of male and female. 
An Alternative Framework of Analysis of LGBTI Rights 
This  research  acknowledges  the  inadequacy  of  the  predominant  descriptive
approach to the ECtHR's case law on sexual orientation and gender identity.  In this
regard it posits the necessity of highlighting the hidden dynamics leading to the creation
of specific LGBTI socio-legal identities visible in the case law of the ECtHR. However,
the thesis also introduces a further layer of complexity, as it is not limited to a mere re-
interpretation  of  the  case  law  from  a  different  perspective.  It  seeks,  rather,  to
redimension the current predominant role ascribed to the ECtHR as the main voice that
articulates continental views on a vast array of human rights issues. By complementing
the analysis of the case law with participant observation carried out at the Office of the
Commissioner  for Human Rights of the CoE, this  project  seeks to demonstrate  that
there are other actors, not necessarily judicial,  who contribute to the shaping of the
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CoE's agenda on human rights.  More specifically,  the project  seeks to compare and
contrast the partially different approaches that inform the work of the ECtHR and that of
the Commissioner on issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. Bringing
to the surface the differences between these two approaches helps to demonstrate how
pervasive political considerations are in the process of the construction of LGBTI socio-
juridical  identities  and  how  complex  negotiations  about  the  meaning  and  reach  of
certain rights claims may be.  
Connected to this endeavour of critical comparison between these two internal
institutions of the CoE, however, is also a further dimension of this work. What this
thesis also tries to do is transfer the discussion on the specific human rights of LGBTI
persons into the terrain of citizenship, a terrain, it is argued, that is in a relationship of
ideal contiguity to that concerning the protection of human rights in general. Among the
many functions it fulfils, citizenship acts as the main access gate for the enjoyment of
human  rights  protected  by  the  state  (Bhabha  1999,  12).  Individuals  resort  to
international human rights institutions only if they have not been able to obtain redress
for  human  rights  violations  in  their  domestic  legal  and  political  system.  Different
scholars have debated the extent to which citizenship represents a crucial domain where
important symbolic battles on human rights can be carried out by LGBTI persons (Bell
and Binnie 2000;  Richardson 2000;  Phelan 2001;  Grabham 2007).  Nonetheless,  the
concept of “citizenship” employed here transcends the dimension of the nation-state and
refers more broadly to dynamics of supra-national citizenship such as those proposed by
authors such as Soysal (1994), Balibar (2004), and Stychin (2004). 
Because  of  the  European  perspective  that  it  adopts,  this  project  requires  an
engagement  with  broader  forms  of  communitarian  identification  which  transcend
national borders. It is suggested, therefore, that in the context of the emerging debates
16
on  “European  citizenship”,  there  is  space  to  debate  and  frame  different  ways  of
conceiving the human rights of LGBTI persons, ways that are less prone to political
instrumentalisation  and  break  with  the  pattern  of  the  “normalisation”  of  certain
individuals into mainstream social institutions, with the exclusion and stigmatisation of
others. 
Because of  its  predominant  focus  on human rights,  rather  than on economic
integration, the Council of Europe, rather than the European Union, has been identified
in this context as the crucial actor in the process of the creation of a European notion of
“human rights”, characterised by a complex synthesis of national juridical and socio-
political traditions. The focus on the Council of Europe, however, is not deprived of
problematic aspects. In fact, notwithstanding the institution's predominant focus on the
respect,  promotion  and  dissemination  of  human  rights  principles  in  the  European
continent,  the  institution  has  relatively  limited  power  in  enforcing  human  rights
standards in the various member states. While the “moral” influence of the ECtHR's
judgements may be recognised by the various member states, the political impact of
these judgements often remains limited. This is firstly because the CoE was born as a
result of a political decision by various European states and, as such, cannot escape the
Realpolitik of human rights as pawns used by states in order to keep in check other
national entities and influence their  actions.  Secondly,  although the decisions of the
ECtHR are binding on member states, parties sometimes refuse to comply to the Court's
decisions or put into question the legitimacy of the Convention in the first place. The
current debate in the UK on opting out the ECHR is a paradigmatic example of the
existing challenges to the legitimacy of the work of the CoE in the field of human
rights.  As  a  “creature”  of  nation  states,  therefore,  the  CoE  suffers  a  fundamental
weakness: it can be destroyed by those same actors from which it originated.
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 As a result of the CoE's fundamental weakness as a political product of World
War Two aftermath, the politics of human rights largely remains in the hands of nation
states which have strong leverage in deciding how to adjust the ECHR's principles in a
way that is compatible with their own legal systems. This, however, does not completely
downplay the importance of this unique human rights institution. Notwithstanding the
important limitations outlined above, the CoE nonetheless fulfills an important function,
insofar as it carries out the utopian objective of creating and strengthening a “European”
model of human rights. Because of this peculiar function, it  is the privileged terrain
where to investigate the emergence of new subjects of human rights, such as LGBTI
rights-holders. In the context of the CoE, in fact, the contradictions between the theory
and the politics of human rights converge, and the creation of new subjects of human
rights – such as LGBTI rights-holders – represents a fascinating opportunity to both
observe  these  contradictions  and  unveil  the  productive  processes  by  which  some
individuals  are  endowed  with  entitlements,  while  others  are  sealed  off  the  political
community.  The  research  focus  on  the  CoE,  therefore,  reflects  the  researcher's
awareness of the highly political  nature of  this  institution and it  is  in  line with the
necessity  of  highlighting  the  crucial  ideological  function  that  the  work  of  the  CoE
fulfills  in  contributing  to  the  creation  of  seemingly  homogeneous  conceptions  of
“human rights” which can be framed as crucial elements of an emerging “European
identity”.   
In this regard, therefore, by acknowledging the limitations that the setting of the
CoE offers,  this  research,  therefore,  aims to  investigate  the extent  to  which LGBTI
identities in Europe can be understood as being legal, political, and social fictions, and
what implications this process presents in relation to the existence of specific forms of
gendered and sexual citizenship, both at the level of the various member states of the
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CoE and at the continental level. Far from being conceived as a mere critical reappraisal
of the work of the CoE, this project seeks to problematise the notion of “LGBTI rights”
in  the  European  context,  in  order  to  provide  alternative  models  of  non-national
citizenship, such as “multisexual citizenship”, based on active political participation and
challenges given to normative categories of sexual orientation and gender identity. The
ideal terrain for discussion is one in which it is possible to unpack these claims in order
to transcend the rhetoric of “equality” and “freedom”,  which may often hide discourses
of normalisation of difference and neutralisation of political challenges coming from the
periphery of the multifarious plethora of human rights actors and subjects. 
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The Structure of this Thesis
The thesis is introduced by a tripartite literature review which delves into the
complex  interrelationship  between  three  core  terms:  humanness,  identity, and
citizenship. The discussion of this multi-layered theoretical framework is followed by an
exploration of the methodological approach used for this research. The bulk of the work
is constituted of four chapters containing the substantial analysis of the jurisprudential
material as well as an account of the ethnographic observation. Each chapter revolves
around a particular set of sub-themes. Three of these chapters  pertain to human rights
claims relating to  sexual  orientation.  The fourth chapter  is  entirely dedicated to the
discussion  of  various  issues  touching  on  gender  identity  and  intersexuality.  The
concluding chapter builds on a synthesis of the material discussed in order to trace a
new trajectory that connects the protection of the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe to
the emerging and fascinating debate on “European citizenship”.
Chapter one provides a discussion on the relationship between the definition of
humanness and the relevance that  this  debate has  for the creation and definition of
rights-holders.  “What  counts  as  human?” is  a  recurring  and inescapable  ontological
question that has a pivotal importance for the definition of those who are deserving of
human rights. By discussing both the socio-legal (Baxi 2000; Douzinas 2000; Donnelly
2003; Dembour 2006) and the philosophical (Arendt 1976; Agamben 1998 and 2000;
Butler 2004 and 2009) constructions of  humanness, this chapter maps out the various
ways in  which rights-holders  can be constituted through exclusionary methods.  The
chapter, therefore, questions the extent to which human rights can be solely based on the
assumption  that  all  human  beings  possess  human  rights  by the  sole  virtue  of  their
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humanness.  In  relation  to  the  claims  of  LGBTI  persons,  it  is  argued  that  these
exclusionary dynamics in the creation of the human being can go as far as justifying the
complete erasure of some socio-legal subjectivities at the advantage of others, hence
foreclosing the possibility of enjoying fundamental human rights to significant groups
of individuals. 
Chapter  two  begins  with  the  idea  that  humanness is  not  sufficient  to  claim
human  rights  and  explores  the  importance  of  identity  in  the  process  of  becoming
intelligible  social  and  legal  subjects.  In  the  first  instance,  the  chapter  explores  the
constructed character of sexual (Foucault 1998) and gendered identities (Butler 1990
and 2004) and the importance that these fictional constructions have for the obtainment
and recognition of human rights claims. The discussion then is broadened to encompass
an overview of the different ways in which identities are mobilised instrumentally for
political purposes (Spivak 1988; Hall 1990 and 1996; Bernstein 1997). Complementary
to  this  overview  is  a  critical  assessment  of  the  limitations  of  this  identity-based
approach  to  human  rights,  building  on  Nietzsche's  (1967  and  2003)  notion  of
ressentiment and  Brown's  (1995)  later  discussion  of  the  German  philosopher's
contentious concept. 
Chapter three builds on the interrelationship between  humanness,  identity, and
human rights in order to introduce a further layer of analysis: the one concerning the
domain of citizenship. Citizenship, it is argued, represents the site where human rights
and LGBTI identities intersect. This is presented as the sphere in which human rights
claims of LGBTI persons can be reconfigured by positing new forms of what Evans
(1993)  described  as  “sexual  citizenship”.  While  the  chapter  highlights  the  intrinsic
tension existing between citizenship and human rights (Isin and Wood 2000; Tambakaki
2010), it also considers emerging models of non-national citizenship in the context of
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Europe (Soysal 1994; Balibar 2004; Stychin 2004) as a unique opportunity to rethink
exclusionary  practices  in  the  allocation  of  political  membership  and  human  rights
entitlements  in  the  European  continent.  The  chapter  also  considers  the  issue  of
belonging to a national community from the perspective of “homonationalism” (Puar
2007),  as  a  phenomenon by which  some queer  identities  become mobilised for  the
purpose of portraying and promoting national liberal values, to the detriment of other
sexual and racial identities. This last theoretical chapter has the broad goal of opening
up the question of how the “LGBTI other” is constructed in Europe through the active
deployment of intertwined concepts such as humanness, identity, and citizenship. 
Chapter four lays out the methodological framework for this analysis. Starting
from a discussion concerning my positioning as a researcher, as well as the motivations
that have led me to investigate this topic, the chapter delves deeply into the preliminary
question  concerning  the  possibility  of  researching  queerly  in  the  field  of  law.  The
limitations  of  Queer  Legal  Theory  (Fineman,  Jackson  and  Romero  2009)  are  then
explained and a  justification for the chosen methodological  tools  is  provided in  the
remainder of the chapter. In particular, the chapter contains a discussion on the rationale
for  combining  a  critical  deconstruction  of  the  ECtHR,  informed  by  Critical  Legal
Theory, with participant observation carried out at the Office of the Commissioner for
Human Rights of the CoE. In the last section, the chapter will analyse the way in which
power  relations  are  played  out  in  the  context  of  empirical  research  conducted  in
institutional settings, as well as provide considerations on the role of the researcher in
these types of settings. 
Chapter five is the first of four chapters in which both the case law and the work
of the Commissioner, on issues concerning sexual orientation and gender identity, are
analysed.  The  chapter,  focusing  in  particular  on  sexual  orientation,  contains  a
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preliminary semiotic exploration of the language employed to define the socio-legal
subjectivities of LGBTI persons by the ECtHR and the Commissioner. The first half of
the chapter is also complemented by a discussion on authorship and narration from the
part  of  LGBT(I)  plaintiffs  before  the  ECtHR in  order  to  illustrate  how language is
crucial  in  shaping  socio-legal  subjects.  This  set  of  observations  will  serve  as  an
important tool of interpretation for both the jurisprudential and the ethnographic data.
The second part of the chapter analyses some of the issues the ECtHR has dealt with,
particularly those concerning the criminalisation of same-sex consensual sexual activity,
sado-masochistic practices, and the issue of discrimination of LGB personnel in the
armed  forces.  The red  thread  connecting  these  issues  is  the  emergence  of  a  strong
narrative of respectability which comes to represent the focus of the institutional actors
such  as  the  ECtHR or  the  Commissioner,  but  it  is  also  the  predominant  narrative
adopted by the plaintiffs in order to be successful with their claims in Strasbourg. 
Chapter  six  is  entirely  dedicated  to  the  discussion  of  the  work  of  the  two
institutions  of  the  CoE  concerning  the  recognition  of  the  family  life  of  same-sex
couples.  In  the  first  instance,  the  chapter  contextualises  the  increasing  importance
acquired by this human rights issue, in both national and international contexts, within
the framework of neoliberal pushes towards the autonomy and self-sufficiency of family
structures and kinship arrangements. Both the case law of the ECtHR and the work of
the  Commissioner  are  read  through  the  lens  of  this  growing  dynamics  of
“homonormativity” (Duggan 2003) by which same-sex couples are encouraged to sign
up to institutions such as marriage in order to gain formal equality and inclusion within
society.  Both  recent  debates  on  the  interpretation  of  Article  12  of  the  European
Convention on Human Rights protecting the “right to marry and found a family” and
the possibility to  adopt for same-sex couples will  be used as an illustration of this
23
growing tendency both in political and judicial fora. As it was for the previous chapter,
the role of narratives of  respectability for LGB persons appear to be fundamental in
shaping  claims  made  by  stakeholders  and  engendering  responses  from institutional
actors. 
Chapter seven is the last of the chapters in which issues relating to the human
rights of LGB persons will  be considered.  This  chapter  focuses in  particular  on the
relationship  between  nationalism,  belonging,  and  identity,  expressed  in  the  form of
“homonationalist” tendencies cross cutting both the politics of human rights in member
states of the CoE, and also at  the level of the institution itself.  By analysing issues
relating to the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association
for LGBTI persons, specifically in the context of Eastern Europe, this chapter analyses
the way in which a geography of queer-friendly versus homo- and transphobic member
states of the CoE is created both in the case law of the ECtHR and, to a different extent,
in  the  context  of  the  political  work  of  other  bodies  of  the  CoE.  Additionally,  the
emerging  debate  and  jurisprudential  data  concerning  the  asylum  claims  of  LGBTI
applicants in member states of the CoE is used to demonstrate how LGBTI issues can
be instrumentalised politically in order to create narratives about human rights building
on a dichotomy between a queer-friendly European continent and a presumably homo-
transphobic non-Western “rest of the world”. Lastly, the chapter analyses the limitations
of  the  current  human  rights  strategies  aimed  at  sanctioning  and  preventing  the
occurrence of  hate-motivated  acts  and speeches.  In  particular  it  seeks  to  show how
limited these approaches can be in addressing the structural conditions that favour the
emergence of these violent phenomena. Taken together, these three strands of analysis
contained in  the chapter highlight  the difficult  process by which LGBTI socio-legal
subjectivities  are  productively  created  as  subject-positions  which  strongly  limit  the
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individuals'  possibilities in expression and articulation of rights claims regardless of
political negotiations and interests. 
Chapter eight has a predominant focus on gender identity and the rights claims
arising  on  the  part  of  transgender  and  intersexual  persons.  While  rights  claims
concerning intersexuality are only recently developing, the ECtHR has issued several
judgements  on  the  recognition  of  one's  preferred  gender,  the  right  to  marry  for
transgender persons, discrimination in the welfare and healthcare sectors, as well as on
the  issue  of  compulsory  divorce  for  married  individuals  who  wish  to  have  their
preferred gender recognised in countries in which same-sex unions are not recognised.
This complex range of issues presents many challenges for both the ECtHR and the
Commissioner. Many of these challenges are analysed here, particularly in relation to
the temptation to frame the human rights claims of transgender persons as claims to
“normalisation” within cisgendered and heterosexual society. The chapter will, in fact,
discuss the current limited possibilities existing for opening up a radical deconstruction
of gender in these fora. At the same time, however, it will also highlight the existence of
an  important  shift  from  a  medicalised  model  of  transgender  identity  to  a  more
empowering model that emphasises the self-determination of the individual. As for the
rights  claims  of  intersexual  persons,  the  chapter  contains  some  reflections  on  the
emerging debate at the level of the CoE, as well as a discussion on the possible future
developments in this field. 
The concluding chapter starts from the discussion of the case law of the ECtHR
and the work of the Commissioner in order to trace alternative routes for the discussion,
configuration and recognition of rights claims concerning sexual orientation and gender
identity  beyond  the  framework  of  formal  equality  and  freedom.  In  particular,  in
transferring the terms of the debate into the field of citizenship, this chapter seeks to
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demonstrate that opening up the current predominant model of national citizenship to
dynamics of a layering of allegiances, modes of belonging, and forms of identification
permits a radical challenge in the current framework of European protection of human
rights for LGBTI persons, but also to the concept of human rights more broadly.  In
proposing a  model  of  “multisexual  citizenship”,  this  chapter  tries  to  bridge  the  gap
between the single-issue approach to human rights currently dominating both judicial
and political  practice,  and the often conflicting multiple  forms of identification that
individuals possess, and that they may have to give up in order to acquire socio-legal
subjectivity. The chapter discusses the possibility of re-framing citizenship in order to
render it more flexible, open-ended, and apt to contain different layers of identification
and belonging, and the subsequent modifications that this change of approach would
entrain in the way in which human rights, and rights-holders, are constructed. Hence,
the  European “multisexual  citizen”,  described in  the  final  section  of  the  chapter,  is
presented as a citizen who is able to simultaneously mobilise multiple sexual, gendered,
ethnic, religious, political and cultural allegiances in order to make human rights claims
as an active agent, rather than a passive recipient of protection on the part of a national
or supra-national politico-legal authority. 
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Chapter One - LGBTI Persons and the Protection of Human Rights: a 
Socio-legal and Political Challenge 
Human  rights  can  be  seen  as  participating  in  the  ambitious  promise  of
eudaimonia1, the  effort  to  encourage  the  full  flourishing  of  human  happiness.  This
promise  rests,  however,  on  the  straightforward  assumption  that  humanness is  a
characteristic proper to all individuals, the recognisable marker of a distinct “form of
life”. From an historical perspective, however, the notion of the human may prove to be
the artificial product of specific intellectual, political and social phenomena. Slavery,
colonialism,  imperialism,  religious  wars,  the  position  of  women across  cultures  and
historical eras, could be listed as examples of how certain individuals can systematically
be excluded from the notion of humanness. In the context of this research investigating
the sociological significance of the process of recognition of the human rights of LGBTI
persons in Europe, the question of what counts as  human appears inescapable, as this
concept has often been used in order to distinguish members of the political community
from outsiders. 
While it has currently become more difficult than in the past to recognise forms
of arbitrary exclusion from humanness, the there still are countless situations in which
this  happens.  Entire  groups  of  individuals  remain  at  the  margins  of  this  definition,
regardless  of  the  formal  constraining  web  of  international  norms  guaranteeing
fundamental  human  rights.  The  discrimination  and  social,  political  and  economic
marginalisation often experienced by LGBTI persons clearly exemplifies what shape
this dynamic of exclusion can take. Indeed, the tortuous legal and social history of the
1 Ackrill (1974, 7) describes the Aristotelian concept of  eudaimonia as “(...) not, […], the result of a
lifetime's effort,  (…) not something to look forward to (like a contented retirement),  [but]  a  life,
enjoyable and worthwhile through”.
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recognition  of  the  rights  of  LGBTI  persons  is  a  demonstration  of  the  significant
theoretical and practical limitations of contemporary human rights in ensuring that all
individuals are treated as having the same – presumably – inalienable human rights.
International Human Rights Law is one of the crucial domains in which the idea
of the human is formulated and acquires a material dimension. However, the meaning
and reach of this juridico-philosophical concept is far from being absolute. As far as
LGBTI persons are concerned, it can be argued as a provocation, that the number or
type of rights recognised are directly proportional to the degree of humanness ascribed
to these individuals. At the same time, whenever rights are recognised, this process is
predominantly framed in terms of a “check list” whose items have to be ticked off.
Some of the most popular items to be found on this ideal list would be the so-called gay
marriage, adoption for same-sex couples, the possibility for non-heterosexual persons
to openly serve in the army,  the possibility to change one's name and/or gender for
transgender persons, and so forth. 
Nonetheless, framing the issue of the human rights of LGBTI persons in terms
of  a  check-list  hides  a  deeper  problem concerning  the  actions  of  most  mainstream
LGBT organisations,  which  may predominantly focus  on the acquisition of  specific
rights  (for  instance  same-sex  marriage),  therefore  reducing  the  discourse  of  human
rights to a mere issue of granting inclusiveness into extant societal institutions. Little is
usually  said,  on  the  contrary,  about  structural  inequality,  poverty,  and  the
marginalisation  of  LGBTI  persons  as  phenomena  that  require  a  questioning  of  the
viability and fairness of these institutions for some individuals in the first place. In this
sense, the framework of human rights can be used in a complaisant way, in order to
strengthen state institutions, such as the army or marriage, rather than as a potential
instrument  of  critique  of  the  role  of  institutions  in  encouraging  more  people  to  be
28
included in order to share and embody the status quo. 
Looking into the creation of seemingly universal categories, such as that of the
human, is a necessary endeavour in order to analyse the way in which human rights
function and have an impact in people's lives and accounts of themselves. Similarly to
the concept of the human, sexual orientation and gender identity are not absolute trans-
historical and trans-cultural concepts. Their genesis is part of that relatively recent effort
of  systematisation  of  sexual  knowledge  suggested  by  Foucault  (1998),  by  which
personages with specific sexual characteristics, traits and behaviours are created. The
recognition  of  the  socially  constructed  character  of  these  concepts,  which  will  be
thoroughly  addressed  in  this  research,  casts  doubts  on  the  crystallisation  of  certain
identities in the context of human rights and well beyond that normative sphere. For
instance, the process by which individuals are artificially regrouped under the “LGBTI”
acronym2, or the deployment of terms such as “sexual minorities” (Phelan 2001), signal
a  certain  understanding  of  sexual  and  gender  arrangements  within  society  as  being
organised  around  the  binary  of  heterosexuality/homosexuality  and
femininity/masculinity.  Hence,  the  fact  of  labeling  non-heterosexual  and gender-non
conforming persons as  a  “minority”  already points  to  the  existence  of  a  process  of
anthropological  and  sociological  allocation  of  powerful  conceptual  categories  to
individuals, which almost take the form of taxonomies.
Starting from the contingent  character of both  sexual orientation and  gender
identity as specific socio-historical concepts, it is interesting to investigate how, and to
what extent, the circulation, development and reinforcement of human rights principles
in  Europe  affect  not  only  the  inclusion  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender  and
2  Efforts to reject these labels and adopt alternative terms, such as queer, go in the direction of refusing
such categorisation. This endeavour, however, in some respects still participates to the logic of the
attribution of labels to individuals since a similar process of  “reification” of personal characteristics
are put into place. The queer subject becomes as identifiable as the “gay” or “homosexual” subject,
and therefore,  in a  sense,  perpetuates symbolically the significance of the sharp division between
normative and non-normative identities. 
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intersexual  persons  into  mainstream  human  rights  discourses,  but  shape  the  very
“creation” of these individuals as intelligible socio-legal subjects. Apart from Johnson's
(2012) recent work “Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights”, which
will be critically addressed in this research, to date there has not been an extensive study
of  the  case  law of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR),  as  well  as  the
practices  of  the  Council  of  Europe (CoE),  from a socio-legal  standpoint.  While  the
Court's decisions have been analysed from a legal perspective (Heinze 1995; Wintemute
1997; Beger 2009), there has not been a systematic effort of linking them to the social
notions of LGBTI identities and their intersections with issues of citizenship from both
a national and supra-national perspective. 
This research explores the extent to which international regimes of human rights,
such as the European one established under the aegis of the Council of Europe, can
work in order to co-opt into the system the respectable segments of LGBTI individuals,
while leaving outside those who do are not willing to ascribe to societal institutions, or
are prevented from doing so for various socio-economic reasons. This sub-category of
“others within the others” does not make it into the colourful posters of human rights
campaigns  that  depict  healthy,  happy and  respectable  LGBTI  persons.  Hence,  it  is
important to recognise how the lines of demarcation between those who can and those
who cannot become intelligible before the law, and more specifically the law of human
rights,  are  often  disregarded  in  the  assessment  of  the  evolution  of  the  system  of
protection of the human rights of LGBTI persons.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of the human in the context
of human rights, to show how the human rights system bears a precise responsibility in
the definition of intelligible subjects who can subsequently seek and enjoy protection.
Within the Western/European socio-legal arena, human rights definitions subtly promote
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the delineation of proper “gay”,  “lesbian”,  and “transgender” persons as specifically
white and middle-class. Notable exceptions to this capability to adhere to liberal(ised)
LGBTI identities are the cases of LGBTI asylum seekers, as the individuals struggle to
inhabit simultaneously the domain of  respect and  respectability without being entirely
recognised as bearers of full human rights.
Unveiling  the  “Human”  of  Human  Rights:  the  Case  of  LGBTI
Persons
Dramatic changes have occurred since issues concerning the protection of the
rights of LGBTI persons first emerged in the legal, social and political  arena in the
second half of the XX century. Events such as the Stonewall Riots of 1969 in New York
certainly  paved  the  way  for  this  process,  insofar  as  they  allowed  hundreds  of
individuals, both in the United States and in Europe, to gain consciousness about the
violations of fundamental rights that they had been experiencing. The decriminalisation
of  same-sex  sexual  activity,  the  adoption  of  anti-discrimination  legislation,  the
introduction of gender-neutral marriage or different forms of registered partnership, as
well  as  access  to  gender  confirmation surgery  for  transgender  persons,  are  a  few
examples  of  the  rights  that  have  been  claimed  and  obtained  in  many  countries
worldwide. Considering the socio-political and legal developments around these issues
as a linear trajectory of progress, however, downplays the extent to which human rights
always imply a prior definition of a well-defined subject bearer of rights and the extent
to  which  LGBTI  persons'  humanness,  whether  directly  or  indirectly,  has  been
extensively scrutinised and critically questioned. 
It  is  difficult  to  detach  human  rights  as  aspirational  principles  from  their
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articulation  as  social  and  political  artifacts.  Habermas  (1998,  91)  has  proposed  an
interesting  synthesis  of  the  underlying  tension  existing  between  human  rights,  the
individual and the political entity responsible for their protection:
Human rights are Janus-faced, looking simultaneously toward morality
and the law. Their moral content notwithstanding, they have the form of
legal rights.  Like moral norms, they refer to every creature 'that bears a
human countenance', but  as legal norms they protect individual persons
only  insofar  as  the  latter  belong  to  a  particular  legal  community  –
normally the citizens of a nation state (Habermas 1998, 91).
It  is  tempting to  trace back human rights  to moral  imperatives,  as Habermas3 does.
Morality,  however,  already  presupposes  individuals,  the  existence  of  that  “human
countenance”. Moreover, morality also presupposes the existence of a natural order of
things,  as  proper  to  the  doctrine  of  “natural  law”  which  leaves  little  margin  of
manoeuvre to  understand how these presumed over-arching,  everlasting,  unalienable
entitlements of individuals have been interpreted as encompassing only limited portions
of the population across times and places throughout history. 
Furthermore, its etymological derivation, from the Latin word “mos” for “one's
disposition, humour, custom4” (Barhart, 1988), also indicates how the use of morality
can be a double-edged sword: on the one hand it can be used  in order to indicate the
existence of a “higher order”, but on the other it can foster confusion between “rules”
and customs which, for their very role, are far from being universal and are, instead,
3 Habermas, defined by Fraser (1985, 177 ) as “a non-utilitarian humanist”,  has engaged with such
issues in a critique on Foucault's anti-humanism.
4 Even  the  Ancient  Greek  corresponding  word  for  “moral”,  ēthikós,  ultimately  derives  from  éthos
(custom) (Barhart 1988).
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relative  in  meaning,  reach  and validity.  Hence,  when Habermas  traces  back  human
rights to moral norms he makes a difficult claim to sustain, since a definition of morality
as the product of a commingling between natural and social prescriptions constitutes a
shaky basis on which to ground presumably timeless and absolute rights claims. While
he  rightly recognises  the  extent  to  which  the  possession  of  rights  can  only happen
within the borders of a political community, he seems to privilege the idea for which
human rights have, indeed, a specific inborn character that can be attributed to a vague
form of trans-cultural or trans-historical “morality”. 
To this extent, a narrow focus on the dichotomy between either a legal or a moral
legitimation  of  human  rights,  risks  to  divert  attention  from  the  political  dynamics
underlying the allocation of humanness that is at play in specific settings. For instance,
the  definition  of  the  subject  bearer  of  rights  as  a  legitimate  member  of  a  political
community  (and  therefore  a  citizen),  always  entails  a  theoretical  and  practical
exclusionary process which constantly reshapes  what  it  means to be  human.  In  this
regard, LGBTI persons often undergo that process of  cauterization5 of the other that
Simmons describes, insofar as they are rendered inoffensive, non-treathening: 
“the other is branded as beneath humanity, below those who deserve rights. Then
those that are deemed inferior or rightless are sealed off from the polis or the
courtroom, in effect treating the voice of the rightless as an infection that must
be stopped from spreading” (Simmons 2011, 10).
In an  ambivalent  way it  can  be maintained that  LGBTI persons are  simultaneously
5 Simmons describes “cauterization” as a concept with a threefold meaning: in the first place that of
branding an individual (from the ancient Greek kauteriazein); secondly that of removing a part of the
body with the intention of stopping an infection and thirdly as a way to render one's desensitised to the
suffering of someone else (Simmons 2011, 10).
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sealed off  the polis  as “others”,  but also included into the institutions and rendered
invisible  as  “equals”.  On  the  one  hand,  contentious  statements  such  as  that  of
associating “gay marriage” to bestiality, or incest, or polygamy, that is to say facts that
are all ascribed outside the acceptable dimension of the human, work in the direction of
creating an idea of radical otherness, an otherness that is not informed by humanness.
On the other hand, Simmons' process of cauterisation also takes the form of a process
of normalisation: rendering institutions more inclusive also contributes to the erasure of
the  specificity  of  LGBTI  experiences.  Such  has  been  the  claim of  authors  such  as
Stychin (2000) and Duggan (2003) who have talked about the de-politicisation of the
gay movement following the focus on the obtainment of the recognition of same-sex
relationships. The recognition of  humanness, therefore, is far from a fully transparent
process by which rights are allocated to individuals by virtue of their status qua human
beings. It is, rather, the product of a social, political and legal negotiation concerning the
place to assign to different categories of individuals within a hierarchical architecture of
human rights. 
As it has already been hinted at, the process of allocation and the guarantee of
human  rights  presents  an  inescapable  ontological  dimension.  Legislators  define  the
endowments and characteristics of the individual, in order to evaluate the circumstances
in which the dignity of the subject, both physical and psychological, has been infringed.
Therefore,  the  conceptual  categories  adopted  to  define  what  (or  who)  is
human/inhuman, act as  access gates. To decide on  humanness  implies the capacity to
shape  and  articulate  ideas  on  whom  to  protect,  victimise  or  neglect.  Hence,  the
definition  of  this  ephemeral  subject  of  human rights  oscillates  between humanism's
passionate  articulations  of  the  sentient  and concrete  being  and postmodernism's  de-
constructed and fluid perceptions of the individual.
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The “Human” as a Socially and Legally Constructed Concept 
The point of departure to address the question of what counts as  human in the
context  of  human  rights  entails  a  discussion  of  the  presumed  natural  derivation  of
human rights as inalienable principles, as scholars such as Douzinas (2000 and 2007) or
Baxi  (2008)  have  done.  In  particular,  while  sceptical  of  the  practical  usefulness  of
human rights,  their  critiques are founded mostly upon the hypocritical  enactment of
human rights principles in national and international politics. Douzinas, for instance, is
adamant  in  maintaining  that  humanity does  not  lay at  the  origins  of  human rights:
“humanity cannot act as an a priori normative principle and is mute in the matter of
legal and moral rules” (Douzinas 2000, 188). There is no prior mythological humanity
from which every entitlement to rights is said to originate (Douzinas 2007, 290). For the
author, humanity does not have an essence, it is rather characterised as a non-essence,
that is to say, an effort of constant redefinition which is simultaneously meant to escape
fixed determination (Douzinas 2007, 290). In this regard, there is an evident tension
between human rights as a fragile and volatile entity and human rights as an extremely
flexible and accommodating legal instrument. Therefore, as a unit that is not  unified,
human rights are a field in constant change in which different notions of both socio-
political and legal subjectivity are played out. 
Adopting a post-colonial perspective, Baxi also questions the presumed “robust
ontological  validity”  (Baxi  2008,  81)  of  human  rights  and  the  existence  of  a  fully
recognisable subject of human rights. In the author's view the presence of “exclusionary
criteria” represent the constant characteristics of modern human rights (Baxi 2008, 42),
having gone as far as providing a justification for all sorts of colonialist and imperialist
endeavours – the “unjustifiable” (Baxi 2008, 42). Precisely on this contentious point he
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comments  that  the  “monoculture  of  human  rights”  is  continuing  the  “cultural
imperialism of Colonialism” (Baxi 2008, 142). Here Baxi refers to the fact that human
rights  can  be used  (or  better  used instrumentally)  as  the  banner  under  which  other
violations  are  perpetrated  and  other  neo-imperialist  projects  can  be  carried  out.
Similarly  to  Douzinas,  Baxi  does  not  recognise  the  existence  of  a  presumed  ideal
“bearer of right”. He posits, instead, that such a figure is “born with a right to invent
practices of identification” (Baxi 2008, 149). For these authors, therefore, human rights
subjects are not primordial sentient beings to whom rights are naturally ascribed, but the
creatures of social, political and juridical intervention. 
Douzinas' and Baxi's arguments offer important hints to reflect on the process by
which the allocation of humanness to LGBTI persons falls outside the borders of the
domain  of  “universally  given  human  rights”.  If  human  rights  applied  equally  and
universally  to  all  human  beings  by  virtue  of  one's  belonging  to  “humanity”,  the
presumed immorality of gay marriage could be swiftly overcome by using the “natural
rights” argument.  This  expectation is,  however,  a fallacy engendered by legally and
socially constructed fiction for which all individuals have, from the outset, the same
entitlements. The reliance on a paradigm of the “natural” derivation of human rights
has, however, strengthened rather than weakened the process by which individuals have
been placed into a hierarchy and arranged fictitiously into categories and taxonomies.
Indeed, the acceptance of the existence of an “immutable superior order” has for a long
time made it easier for individuals to accept their position within it, accounting for an
almost fatalistic view of their  existence.  In the case of the “gay” marriage,  this has
practically  been  translated  into  the  idea  that  the  natural model  of  kinship  is  the
heterosexual one codified by means of marriage. Those falling outside that model have,
for  a  long time,  accepted their  different  role  in  the ecology of  the world  and have
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accepted, or more poignantly internalised, their “fate” of not having sentimental bonds
and attachments that could be held legitimate. 
Donnelly (2003) has also engaged with the analysis  of the “raw material” of
human rights, although he reaches a different conclusion from Douzinas and Baxi. The
author seems uncomfortable with taking for granted notions such as “human needs” or
“human nature” and describes the latter  as the “(...)  prescriptive  [original emphasis]
moral account of human possibility”. (Donnelly 2003, 14). This expression is framed as
a threshold concept: it is not possible to go beyond the descriptive terms of humanity
without creating a detriment to people's dignity. Donnelly's definition, therefore, does
not completely rule out the existence of a “core” upon which human rights are founded
and he assigns a crucial  importance to the concept of “man's moral nature” (Parekh
2008, 126), thus echoing Habermas in this regard. One criticism of Donnelly's position
could  be  that  he  still  places  a  significant  emphasis  on  concepts  of  “morality”  and
“dignity”  which  have  an  unavoidable  subjective  dimension  that  cannot  account  for
human rights' presumed universality. “Morality” and “dignity” may rest on inaccurate
descriptions  of behaviours,  acts  and facts  that are  evaluated on the basis  of relative
cultural or social presumptions but that are masked as having universal applicability and
validity. 
Questioning human rights in their presumed universal validity, however, requires
a thorough engagement with the politics of human rights in the first place.  Another
author that has contributed to this debate has been Dembour (2006), who has expressed
her scepticism in relation to the concreteness and tangibility of human rights. For this
scholar, human rights would almost have a  ghostly appearance, as they can be said to
exist only to the extent to which they are talked about and represent an “article of faith”
(Dembour 2006, 2). Hence, human rights cannot be legitimised on the grounds of that
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presumed universality, they do not exist outside social recognition. Insofar as the author
talks about an almost religious “belief” in human rights, her arguments echo Ignatieff's
(2001) claim of human rights as “idolatry”. The author's self-proclaimed position is one
endorsing  a  nihilist  account  of  human  rights.  Here,  a  sort  of  Weberian  process  of
disenchantment is  at  work: in  a  world  in  which  human  rights  have  often  failed  to
achieve  their  goals,  the  “magic”  aura  that  human  rights  possessed  when they were
originally inscribed into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, has been
stripped away and the world has seen the limits of a system in which victims and their
executioners are often difficult to distinguish. The world has become disenchanted with
the effectiveness of human rights in redressing injustice, but it is not clear what course
of action should be undertaken in order to counter this disappointment. 
However, it is necessary to consider to what extent the possibility that human
rights may lack a natural legitimation could weaken the role that human rights as an
intellectual  product  and practical  tool  of  action.  While  the  negotiation  around what
constitutes a human being can easily become a political operation, it can also represent a
fascinating enterprise in the direction of pushing the boundaries beyond the idea of an
unchangeable entity. If there is no such thing as a natural justification for human rights,
there may be in principle more danger associated with the manipulation of human rights
principles, but also more freedom to imagine life arrangements, more freedom to break
those categories that have been held as universal conventions, more freedom to reshape
and abandon allegiances,  identities  and labels.  In  this  regard,  it  is  possible  to  echo
Rorty's (2001, 244) question when he maintains that increasingly the question of “what
is our nature?” is being substituted by the question “what can we make of ourselves?” 
If one wants to retain human rights as a useful tool that helps addressing and
redressing injustice, a mere description of human rights as “highly artificial constructs”
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(Douzinas 2007,  55),  will  obviously not  suffice.  How can the claims of the above-
mentioned authors be supported without lapsing into a sterile philosophical exercise on
the foundations of human rights? Is it possible to advocate for the respect of the rights
of LGBTI persons by stressing their belonging to the category of the  human? If so,
which difficulties does this inclusion present? One way to build a bridge between non-
humanist  and humanist  accounts of human rights,  would be that of emphasising the
vulnerability of human beings as a common trait that confers to everyone the status of
humanness. While this possibility is also addressed by Douzinas (2007, 62) and Baxi
(2008, 26), it nonetheless gives rise to a problem of definition and quantification of the
concept  of “vulnerability” that,  similarly to “morality” and “dignity”, may prove to be
an unstable source on which to ground the ontology of the human.
A useful illustration of how difficult it is to define “vulnerability”, is the fact that
article 3 on the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, of
the European Convention of  Human Rights (ECHR) has always been considered in
connection to the degree to which the violence was perpetrated. From this descends the
De  minimis rule,  under  which  the  ill-treatment  of  an  individual,  in  order  to  be
considered as such, has to attain a “minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the
scope of article 3” (Reidy 2003, 10). Another example, that directly relates to torture, is
Puar's discussion (2007) of US soldiers' assumptions, during the 2003 war in Iraq, that
humiliating prisoners in Abu Ghraib by asking them to perform homosexual practices
could be considered as the highest degree of torture ever attainable in that particular
cultural  and  religious  context.  Here,  again,  what  is  deemed  to  be  proper  to  human
dignity,  to  be  (un)bearable,  is  entirely  subjected  to  human  scrutiny.  Similarly  what
amounts to a breach of one's dignity – in extenso of one's humanity – seems to be part of
a process of measurement which assigns various thresholds that can or should not be
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franchised. The concept of “vulnerability”, therefore, becomes quantifiable and subject
to  various  social  and  cultural  interpretations.  If  connected  to  human  rights,  this
combination clearly shows how difficult it becomes to frame humanness if notions of
vulnerability may shift  and individuals'  suffering  may be considered  not  to  attain a
“minimum degree” of severity as to require action and redress.
Does Vulnerable Stand for Human? 
The works of some authors, such as Arendt (1976), Agamben (1998 and 2000)
and  the  later  works  of  Butler  (2004  and  2009),  help  to  explore  the  boundaries  of
humanism and its  complicated  relationship  to  notions  of  “vulnerability”.  In  general
terms Davies (1997) traces back the origin of modern humanism to the revolutionary
discourses on rights. There seems to be, therefore, a direct link between the need to
establish human rights and that of coextensively defining the notion of the human. As
has already been discussed, however, the law is far from adopting a neutral stance in
relation  to  the  question  of  what  counts  as  human and  plays,  instead,  an  eminently
productive role in relation to it.
Writing about the painful experience of the various refugees in the aftermath of
the  First  World  War,  Arendt  (1976)  expressed  strong  doubts  about  the  presumed
equation between the “rights of man” and the notion of the human. While the aspiration
governing human rights was to be that of attaining the highest possible moral goal in
order  to  reach  an  optimum of  universality,  the  system  easily  met  its  limits  when
confronted with the reality of refugees, who fell outside the category of the “citizen”
(Arendt 1976, 295-296). For Arendt the refugee should be the perfect subject of human
rights  due  to  the  vulnerability  experienced,  which  subsequently  would  entail  the
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protection  of  his  humanness.  The  figure  of  the  refugee,  however,  came to  embody
precisely the incongruity of the system of human rights based on the “abstract6 man”
(Arendt 1976, 291), but was incapable of protecting human life as such. Refugees, who
have  only  preserved  their  humanness  and  have  lost  any  other  supplementary
characteristics (such as the fact of belonging to a state or their national identity) directly
challenged what it meant to be human. 
Humanity for Arendt (1976, 297), therefore, is tightly connected to the realm of
the political, as expulsion from the polity entails exit from humanity. Nonetheless one
does  not  cease  to  be human  tout  court.  In  Arendt's  formulation  there  is  a  paradox:
refugees have preserved only their humanness but, because of their exclusion from the
polity,  they  have  irremediably  lost  it  at  the  same  time.  There  is  a  sort  of  circular
reference,  in  Arendt's  account,  that  somehow links  the  acquisition  of  humanness  as
being guaranteed by humanity itself.  Arendt describes this as a dynamics by which:
“(...) the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity,
should be guaranteed by humanity itself7” (Arendt 1976, 298). Ultimately, this “right to
have rights” is configured for Arendt as a right to belong to a community (Parekh 2008,
29), which is radically different from merely holding civil or political rights as a citizen.
Parekh (2008, 69) proposes an analysis of Arendt's theory of human rights as being
informed by a phenomenological approach that posits human rights in relation to their
sphere of manifestation and embodiment, rather than in their presumed transcendental
dimension. 
Although sceptical on the practical usefulness of the system for the protection of
human rights because of its ineffectiveness both within and beyond national borders,
6 In the definition of the abstract man she  echoes Burke, by referring to the “abstract nakedness of
being human” (Arendt 1976, 299). 
7 Ingram (2008),  commenting on Arendt's  enigmatic “right  to  have  rights”,  points  out  how mutual
recognition between human beings, is the basis of Arendt's politics of rights (Ingram 2008, 410). This
“active practice of those who recognise each other as equals” (Ingram 2008, 410) would be antecedent
to the state, the law, and morality. 
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Arendt  focuses  nonetheless  on  the  concept  of  the  human.  Her  Weltanschauung
contemplates the existence of a quid of humanness, a quid that is lost once a person is
relegated outside the sphere of belonging to a political community and, as an extension,
the possibility of being active in the world. Birmingham (2006) however, maintains that
Arendt traces back the ontological foundation of human rights not to the existence of a
common humanity, but to the event of “natality” as a universal common experience. In
general, Arendt's theory of human rights can be said to privilege the political over the
juridical  sphere,  where  the  possibility  of  action  is  more  crucial  than  the  mere
entitlement.  While  extremely lucid and poignant,  her  analysis  presents  an important
limit,  since it  rests on the assumption that political  participation,  in the form of the
possibility of action, automatically implies the full inclusion in the political community.
Her thought-provoking contribution, therefore, seems to be too optimistic, insofar as it
looks  at  politics  as  the  domain  in  which  those  who  are  included  into  the  polity
automatically enjoy the possibility of action in order to form their identities beyond
their mere  humanness, although, in practice within the citizenry, this opportunity may
be foreclosed to some. 
In relation to inclusion into the polity as a pre-requisite to become the bearer of
human rights,  it  is  possible  to read Arendt's  work through the lenses of the current
debate on the rights of LGBTI persons. In most member states of the CoE, LGBTI
persons are not formally denied the right to political participation. Their formal political
participation, however, does not necessarily entail a capability of action aimed at having
their rights guaranteed. The marginal position they occupy, within society, as a “sexual
minority”,  is  shaped according to  precise  political  negotiation  which  neutralises  the
potentially  subversive  character  of  their  requests  and  assimilates  them  within  a
reassuring framework of existing and consolidated institutions. 
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Individuals who refuse to comply with this sort of reassuring image of LGBTI
persons, as non-white, non-middle class persons, polyamorous, BDSM practitioners, or
individuals who refuse any gender categorisation,  end up occupying a dimension of
non-humanness:  they are simultaneously included in and excluded from the juridical
and political realm. Far from representing the standard “gay” plaintiff in Strasbourg,
they stand for  the  exception,  the  eccentric  case.  Hence,  the possibility to  act  one's
humanness, as Arendt seems to suggest within the polity, may not necessarily imply an
equal membership into the polity itself. Political action may well remain structured and
informed  by  external  constraints  which  are  decided  prior  the  admission  of  the
“newcomers”.  Formal  political  inclusion may,  therefore,  go as  far  as  representing a
symbolic instrument that overshadows the existence of structural limitation to the access
to claim and exercise one's rights, both at the national and international level. 
If Arendt's arguments on the relationship between the concept of the human and
law and politics appear to maintain a focus on the possibility of action in the polis,  the
work of Agamben (1998) aims at analysing the role of the law in defining what counts
as human, according to dynamics of arbitrariness. In contrasting Agamben's work with
Arendt's thought, Lechte and Newman (2013, IX) suggest that the mere inscription into
the polis, as Arendt had maintained, was by no means a guarantee that the individuals
will  be  protected. In  order  to  establish  the  link  between  humanness and  the
pervasiveness of legal power, Agamben devotes some time to the definition and history
of what he calls the “politicisation of bare life8” (Agamben 1998, 4) or, in other words,
“the entry of zoē into the sphere of the polis” (Agamben 1998, 4). Man, while being in
the sphere of politics, differentiates himself from, but also entertains a relationship with,
his bare life, in what Agamben calls an “inclusive exclusion” (Agamben 1998, 8). The
8  “Bare life” does not describe the concept of a natural life, but rather a notion of life already at the
border of the political (Agamben 1998, 9).
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concept of “bare” life comes to represent, therefore, the naked essence of the human,
not  deprived of  political  connotations.  A crucial  event  in  Agamben's  analysis  is  the
instatement of the so-called “state of exception” (Agamben 1998, 17) which suspends
the rule  of  law and exposes  the  bare life  of the subject  more  overtly to  the state's
discretion in deciding what falls inside/outside the legal order (Agamben 1998, p. 19).
In this state of exception what violates the norm and what reinforces the law becomes
indistinguishable and the existence of a “subject” before the law is not a prerequisite for
the validity of the rule. The law comes in a pure form in the state of exception and self-
sustains and reinforces its own structure (Agamben 1998, 27). The power of the law
becomes omni-pervasive as in Kafka's story of the doorkeeper (Agamben 1998, 52) and
human rights participate to this inscription of “bare life” into citizenship (Lechte and
Newman 2013, IX),  thus reinforcing the powerlessness of the individual  in front  of
sovereign power. 
In his analysis, Agamben introduces the central concept of  sacredness9 which
acts as a defining feature for the allocation of the status of  humanness to a subject.
Compared  to  Arendt's  concept  of  the  abstract  essence  of  the  human,  Agamben's
discussion  assigns  more  prominence  to  the  impact  that  the  law has  in  defining  the
essence  and  fate  of  individuals.  The  law  assumes  almost  an  anthropomorphic
dimension.  It  is  hulking,  overwhelming,  it  almost  seems  to  be  informed  by  a
transcendental force. Agamben, however, is not interested in “mere factual existence”.
Humanity is articulated and considered to be co-essential,  to a certain extent, to the
political understanding of natural life. “Bare life” is, at the same time, immersed and
taken out from humanity, it is indeed a cursed state. 
9 In its classical meaning (descending from Roman law), the sacredness of life is a twofold concept
representing both the life that has the capacity of being killed and, on the other hand, a life that cannot
be sacrificed (Agamben 1998,  73). The word sacer means both “sacred” and “doomed” (Agamben
1998, 75) and this implies that the man who is defined as such lives in his own skin a double fate: he
embodies both the paradox of the law and his reinforcement through its very suspension. 
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Arendt's and Agamben's arguments present points of contiguity in the intention
of establishing a link between the subject and the political authority and, at the same
time, they posit the existence of an ambivalent pre-political dimension of  humanness.
The refugees, as well as the homo sacer, deprived of their political potential to act in the
world, are acted upon by politics (Arendt) and by politics and law (Agamben) because
they are not deemed to be human. However, at the same time, they can never cease to be
human as such. In this there is almost a sense of eternal possibility. Taking the example
of non-heterosexual kinship, and forms of kinship that go even beyond the concept of
“family” as such, the concept of “kinship” does not cease to exist because it has been
denied a legitimate status. It continues to have its course; bonds and ties are still formed
between individuals. Only they constitute an invisible texture in the social world, they
are  not  human in  the  social  sense,  but  in  their  manifestation,  in  the  value  and
concreteness that they have in the actors' lives, they are human as such. While they are
formally denied humanness, they never cease to be human as such, if one wants to adopt
Arendt's  phenomenological  perspective  as  Parekh  (2008)  has  suggested.  They
participate in the definition of what is by tacit agreement of the individuals recognised
as human, without being publicly recognised as officially contributing to this definition. 
The  paradox  of  the  denied  –  yet  overwhelming  –  humanness  of  some
individuals, described by Arendt and Agamben with different outcomes, also comprises
the object of Judith Butler's recent works, such as “Precarious Life” (2004) and “Frames
of War” (2009). In these books, Butler shows a certain fascination with themes cognate
to  humanism.  While  discussing  the  so-called  “war  on  terror”,  she  touches  on  the
mechanisms regulating  the  process  of  creation  and recognition  of  humanness as  an
ontological status. For Butler, two core concepts are interconnected and participate in
the very definition of the human: that of grievability (Butler 2004,  20 and 2009, 2) and
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that of vulnerability (Butler 2004, 20 and 2009, p. 2). The link between grievability and
vulnerability is  established  by  means  of  the  word  loss (Butler  2004,  20).  Loss is
understood as a common human experience implying grief, but it is also the symptom of
our  physical  and  bodily  vulnerability  (Butler  2004,  20).  If  someone's  death  is  not
recognised as  grievable (Butler uses the example of Guantanamo prisoners), then the
subject is deprived of fundamental humanness and therefore can disappear10. 
Butler's arguments seem to suggest that vulnerability is a pre-requisite for the
allocation of humanness, as the author considers it to precede the formation of the “I”
(Butler  2004,  31).  Such an  understanding of  the  concept  of  vulnerability,  however,
seems  in  partial  dissonance  with  the  arguments  of  Butler's  seminal  works  on  the
performative nature of gender and the radical possibility of its deconstruction (Butler
1990). If the body, in all its physical precariousness, loses the public character of its
construction, the whole idea of the “person” evaporates. But since neither sexuality nor
gender are considered by Butler to be primary endowments of individuals, how can the
notion of “vulnerability” escape this logic? In “Precarious Life”, Butler retains a notion
of the “human” that is never a singular one11 (Butler 2004, 90) while at the same time
attributing  to  it  a  full  ontological  status  which  nonetheless,  can  be  paradoxically
perpetually in flux. 
In the difficult endeavour to make sense of humanness and vulnerability, Butler
discusses directly the situation of LGBTI persons who may face violence because of
their supposed challenge to what counts as “normatively human”12 (Butler 2004, 33).
10 In her words: “(...) the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject can be
grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary
conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as a livable life?” (Butler, 2004 XIV-XV).
11 Later on, in “Frames of War” she comes back to this notion by stating that human can be considered
as”  [a]  value  and  a  morphology  that  may  be  allocated  and  retracted,  aggrandized,  personified,
degraded and disavowed, elevated and affirmed" (Butler 2009, 76).
12 Butler (2004, 33) describes the effort to combat this violence is in affinity with the broader aim of
“counter[ing] the normative human morphologies and capacities that condemn or efface those who are
physically challenged”.
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Butler starts from the assumption for which homo/transphobic violence often fails to be
considered as a social emergence, let alone as violence as such in the first place. This
lack of recognition amounts to a radical denial of humanness of LGBTI persons who
challenge the idea of the respectable “body”. Violence inflicted to certain “bodies” such
as to transgender persons, gay couples holding hands in public or the bodies of sex
workers, seems to be less deplorable, less immediate than the same kind of violence
inflicted to a middle-aged middle-class white woman. This is not because these two
“categories” differ in any objective way. The effect of violence on bodies can be said to
be fairly similar. It is the symbolic amount of violence that the person is expected to be
able to bear and undergo that differ.  Some bodies, the  queer bodies, are inexplicably
expected to receive a higher amount of symbolic or, in some cases physical, violence
than heterosexual bodies. For Butler bodies are grieved differently, giving rise to a sort
of hierarchy of victimisation.
The works of the authors presented so far seem to share a common pessimistic
undertone regarding the interplay between power and the allocation of humanness. Both
those who trace back the notion of humanity to socio-legal constructs such as Dembour,
Douzinas,  Donnelly  or  Baxi  or,  on  the  other  hand,  those  who  try  to  envisage  the
existence of a “core” of humanity – for how problematic and abused by politics this
may be – such as Arendt, Agamben or Butler; all have in common the acknowledgment
of the existence of a possible discrepancy between an idealistic view on human rights
and the actual reality of them. Either the stance of considering the human as a fiction, or
that  of believing it  to be the inescapable and fundamental  essence of human rights,
imply a recognition of the fact that the achievements of human rights are fragile and
precarious,  needing  a  constant  supporting  political  and  legal  apparatus  in  order  to
function and be continuously guaranteed and preserved.
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Humanness is Not Enough: the LGBTI Subject of Human Rights 
Beyond Ontology
The articulation of the different authors' positions presented in this chapter has
allowed for discussion of the extent to which the concept of the human can be used to
advocate universal, inalienable human rights. Far from depicting a rosy picture of the
status of human rights today, all the authors acknowledge the extent to which human
rights often fall short of delivering the promised results. Although the explanations for
this  failure  to  realise  equality  and justice  differ,  the  common element  among these
authors is the recognition of a mismatch between the ideal dimension of human rights
principles, and their concrete legal and political articulation. It has been argued here that
LGBTI persons represent a perfect example of such a failure of human rights to be truly
universal, as their recognition as human may be problematic or their inclusion may be
framed  in  terms  of  an  exception  to  the  heteronormativity  and  the  male/female
dichotomy. A discussion on the ontology of the human in human rights, therefore, has
served  the  purpose  of  stripping  away  the  aura  of  naturalness  that  human  rights
possesses, in order to consider how human rights are political, legal and social artifacts. 
An exegesis of the concept of the human, however, does not explain how LGBTI
persons  become  simultaneously  inscribed  and  excluded  from  the  social,  legal  and
political arena. In order to acquire the instruments that will allow a thorough analysis of
the judicial and non-judicial work of the CoE on issues of sexual orientation and gender
identity, it is necessary to sketch a much more complicated picture. Such an overview is
one that takes into account different dimensions, such as processes of identity formation
in  relation  to  one's  sexual  orientation  and/or  gender  identity  and the  recognition  or
denial  of  one's  right  to  membership  into  a  national  community through citizenship.
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While  the  discussion  on  what  describes  a  human  being  remains  as  an  underlying
theoretical discussion, this research moves on to consider the practical inscription of
such humanness into human rights and elaborates on it, in order to take into account the
formation  of  (LGBTI)  identities  and  the  participation  of  individuals,  as  citizens,  in
political  life.  Through  a  combined  analysis  of  concepts  of  humanness,  identity and
citizenship, this research tries to overcome a merely theoretical discussion of how the
subjects of human rights are talked about, and seeks to explain how to change the way
in which human rights are employed, at least in the context of Europe, to translate the
law into judgments, legislation and policy measures.
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Chapter Two - LGBTI Identities and Human Rights: Mobilisation or
Rejection of Labels?
Building on the discussion relating to the artificial character of the concept of the
human in  the  context  of  human  rights,  it  is  possible  to  broaden  the  theoretical
framework as to encompass a discussion on the creation of LGBTI identities in the
social, political, and juridical sphere. This endeavour is crucial in order to understand
how identity traits connected to one's sexual orientation and/or gender identity do not
arise as natural manifestations of a pre-existent human subjectivity, but are rather the
specific product of the interaction between various cultural, social, and juridical factors.
It is, therefore, possible to ask whether LGBTI identities represent the crystallisation, in
temporal, spatial, socio-political, and juridical terms, of contingent subjective positions
that are functional to the preservation of the heteronormative and cisgendered societal
structures.  A related  question  is  how  the  law,  and  particularly  human  rights  law,
enhances this process of preservation by helping to create, foster, and perpetuate these
identities in the juridical field and beyond it. 
A preliminary and central observation,  to be made in relation to the ways in
which LGBTI identities emerge in modernity, is the one concerning the pervasive role
of power in its broadest meaning. In this regard, the work of Foucault (1998) and Butler
(1990) are crucial to understanding that the presumably natural identity categories of
“gay”, “lesbian”, “transgender” or “man” and “woman”, may be the product of a subtle
productive operation. It seems obvious to locate these authors' contributions in the field
of queer theory because of their fundamental anti-identitarian theoretical framework.
While, following Halperin, queer theory can be defined as “an identity without essence”
(Halperin in Jagose 1996, 96), it can also become bridled in the form of an identity
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whenever it tries to give voice to individuals who reject the normative identitarian labels
of “LGBTI”. It could be argued, therefore, that processes of identification may become,
in many cases, inescapable since they represent the pre-requisite for the acquisition of
political, social, and juridical intelligibility and the possible recognition and allocation
of specific rights. 
This chapter will touch on the intricate process of identity construction relating
to the individual's sexual orientation and gender identity. It proposes a vision of identity
as a fundamental instrument by which the Arendtian capability to act is mediated in the
social,  political,  and juridical  sphere,  thus  enabling  individuals  to  make meaningful
claims and statements from often multiple, even conflicting, subjective positions. At the
same time,  the chapter  has  the goal  of  critically assessing the limitations  of  human
rights strategies based on the existence of discrete identity categories that acquire a
semi-prescriptive character. It is argued that the very process of the recognition of these
identities in the juridical field is built on a process of the creation of the subjects that
human rights seek to protect. The critical appraisal of these dynamics helps to prepare
the terrain for the substantive analysis of this research, which builds on the hypothesis
that  in  the  context  of  the  Council  of  Europe specific  LGBTI identities  are  created,
reinforced, and promoted both in the activity of the ECtHR and in the work of the
Commissioner. 
Sexuality, Gender and the Possibility of Deconstruction
It  would not be possible to debate the process of the construction of LGBTI
identities in the socio-juridical sphere without first exploring the hypothesis that notions
such  as  sexuality and  gender  are  socio-cultural  artefacts.  The  endeavour  of
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deconstructing  these  presumably natural  concepts  represents  the  initial  step  towards
understanding the current limitations of the existing framework for the protection of
human rights. These limitations, as has already been hinted at, relate to the process of
the ascription of identity labels to right-holders, thus limiting the possibility of having
intersecting – or sometimes conflicting – forms of identification in terms of sexuality,
gender, age, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and disability status. This, in turn, limits the
possibility of mobilising these multifarious forms of identification in order to claim
one's rights. 
Michel Foucault and the Homosexual as Personage
Foucault's “The History of Sexuality” (1998) has shed an entirely new light on
the  construction  of  modern  sexuality  in  Western  culture  and  history.  Foucault
maintained that, from the nineteenth century onwards, a new conception of sexuality
arose.  The  acquisition  of  a  specific  sexual  identity  was  not  due  to  the  individual's
recognition of a presumably true self, but to the productive operation of power by which
the subject was created in the first place. As Wilkins (2004, 48) has commented,  in
Foucault's work the individual is considered as a “conduit of power, something it acts
on and through”. Refusing the premises of humanism (Fraser 1999, 6), Foucault was
determined to demonstrate that individuals did not possess an “essence”, but that they
came to be constructed through discourse and that sexuality was a central element of
this operation. Thus, for instance, the “homosexual” was created as a personage as the
direct result of the workings of a specific configuration of power: “bio-power”. Bio-
power,  is  “(...)  what  brought  life  and  its  mechanisms  into  the  realm  of  explicit
calculations  and  made  knowledge-power  an  agent  of  transformation  in  human life”
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(Foucault 1998, 143).  
Foucault's crucial intuition, therefore, is considering sexuality not as the locus of
primordial transgression and the liberation of unleashed instincts and desires. Rather, it
is  the  crucial  site  in  which  power  can  unfold,  in  order  to  create  an  intelligible,
systematised, and controllable sexuality that effectively serves economic and political
purposes;  it  is  functional  to  societal  needs  and it  is  disguised as  being  natural  and
spontaneous. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to describe Foucault's theory as
suggesting the existence of a merely passive subject acted upon by bio-power. In his
words: “(…) the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise
of power. The individual (...) is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies,
multiplicities,  movements,  desires,  forces”  (Foucault  1980,  73-74).  It  is  through the
process of  assujettisement (subjectification) that Foucault  explains the way in which
power  works  in  order  to  create,  and  simultaneously  displace,  any  form  of
individualisation, ruling out the possibility of a pre-existent self (Fraser 1999, 8-9). 
Sexuality plays the crucial  role of catalysing power relations (Foucault  1998,
103), by means of the enforcement of norms and legal regulations controlling licit/illicit
behaviours and actions, but also through the deployment of disciplinary measures. Early
in  life,  individuals  are  socialised  in  terms  of  what  constitutes  appropriate  and non-
threatening sexual behaviour with respect to peers and adults. The ability to distinguish
between  appropriate  or  inappropriate  behaviours  relating  to  sexual  and  gender
expression is internalised from an early age, to the point that the individual becomes
capable of policing her/his own acts and thoughts in order to avoid social stigma and
disapproval.  It  is  precisely  this  process  of  internalisation  that  Foucault  sought  to
highlight in order to demonstrate how pervasive operations of power could be in the
very moment in which they, modern sexual identities, were created. 
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It would be wrong to maintain, however, that for Foucault (1998, 10-12) sexual
expression has been subjected to constant repression. On the contrary, he suggested that,
from the XVII century onwards, there has been an encouragement of the proliferation of
discourses about sex (Foucault 1998, 18). In particular, the multiplication of discourses
about sex led to the creation of “peripheral sexualities” of which the “homosexual” as a
personage is  an example. The identification  of  the homosexual  as  a  personage fell
within the context of a process of accumulation of sexual knowledge as the privileged
way to exercise power and regulate lives. This could be achieved thanks to a crucial
intellectual shift from ars erotica to the so-called scientia sexualis (Foucault 1998, 67),
which then employed story-telling techniques that resembled to the Christian confession
as the privileged method to create a truth on sex (Foucault 1998, 68). The narratives of
these  personages were  not  self-evident,  and  they  needed  to  be  framed  in  order  to
become visible and be recognised (Foucault 1998, 39). 
The  scientific  creation  of  these  personages helped  to  craft  a  new  kind  of
knowledge on sexuality, rather than merely registering the existence of given forms of
identification. As Dabhoiwala (2012) points out, referring to Foucault's work: 
Rather than as sinful actions, they were increasingly likely to be
viewed as the marks of a deviant personality […]. The typology
of 'natural' or 'unnatural' behaviour thus came to be mapped on to
a  medicalized  pathology  of  character-types  –  the  homosexual
'invert',  the  'nymphomaniac',  the  'criminal  woman'  and  so  on
(Dabhoiwala 2012, p. 358). 
Dabhoiwala's observation suggests that identity – and in particular sexual identity as
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homosexual – arose as a result of this effort of specification, rather than stemming from
a self-ascription,  from the part  of the individual concerned, of a specific label.  This
connects  directly  to  Foucault's  theory,  for  whom  the  cognation  between  sexual
behaviour and identity seemed to respond to a logic of regimentation of individuals with
the purpose of ensuring a much stringent and effective form of social  control.  This
social control, however, was not exercised solely by external agents. The novelty in this
modern conception of sexuality resided in the fact that the individuals controlled their
own  behaviours.  As  Wilkins  (2004,  52)  has  commented  on  Foucault's  work,  this
scientific approach to sexuality took the form of “(...) a new form of self-knowledge that
burdened each of us with a sense of our selves as harboring an inner drive that must be
watched, explained and understood”.
Foucault, Law, and Sexuality 
Foucault's  account  of   the  creation  of  homosexuality  as  a  category  helps  in
assessing the process by which homosexuality is created as a socio-legal category in
Strasbourg,  both  by  judicial  and  non-judicial  bodies  of  the  Council  of  Europe.
Furthermore, his interest in the role of the law in producing knowledge about sexuality
and gender is crucial in this context, as it contributes to clarify how socially established
truths on sexuality and gender come to acquire a normative status. 
In  particular,  Foucault  (1998,  85)  identified  five  ways  in  which  power,
understood in its juridical form, has acted as a productive force in relation to the sphere
of sexuality. In the first instance, power and sex are placed in a dialectic relationship of
negation which entails  refusal  and denial  of  pleasure as the standard rule  (Foucault
1998, 83). Secondly, sex has been deeply intertwined with legal reasoning, having been
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constructed according to the dichotomy licit/illicit (Foucault 1998, 83), in which the law
has a central position in regulating “access” to the domain of sexuality.  At the same
time, a strong pattern of prohibition, induced and sustained by the threat of punishment,
has  emerged,  leading  to  a  self-suppression  of  sexuality  for  fear  of  disappearing
(Foucault 1998, 84). Fourthly, a strong logic of censorship exists creating a paradox by
which, contemporaneously, sex does not exist, does not appear, and is enshrouded by
silence (Foucault 1998, 84). Lastly, these mechanisms are all applied with a high degree
of homogeneity in all domains (Foucault 1998, 84). 
The numbering of the ways in which the law acts on sexuality in order to foster
compliance  to  norms  of  acceptable  sexual  behaviours  and  acts,  serves  as  a  useful
guidance for the interpretation of  case law of the European Court of Human Rights
concerning sexual orientation and gender identity. The theme of the  licit/illicit sexual
behaviour, for instance, is recurrent and could relate both to the case law concerning the
age of consent for same-sex sexual acts, to the case law concerning the legalisation of
consensual same-sex sexual acts, and to the  case law on consensual same-sex sado-
masochistic practices (whose regulation seems to differ with regard to BDSM practices
by heterosexual individuals)13. The distinction between licit and illicit sexual activities
may also be understood as enforcing those “hierarchies of sexual values” indicated by
Rubin (2011, 152-155). Other forms of suppression or denial of sexuality concern, for
instance, the gendered and sexual(ised) bodies of transgender and transsexual persons,
heavily subjected  to  that  normalising gaze  which ensures  tacit  compliance with the
norm without  the  need  to  articulate  publicly  the  proposition  of  sexual  and  gender
“normality”. These and other instances in which these five techniques are deployed will
become evident in the analysis of the case law in which language performs a crucial role
in policing the gates of socio-legal intelligibility and subtly guarantees a reproduction of
13 Laskey, Jaggard an Brown v. United Kingdom, 1999.
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narratives of assimilation and normalisation of individuals. 
Performing Gender: Judith Butler and the Question of Identity
The  creation  of  modern  forms  of  sexuality  is  deeply  intertwined  with  the
question of  what is gender? As the work of Judith Butler (1990 and 2004) suggests,
there is a conflation between the de-construction of gender and the process by which
identities  are  formed.  In  “Gender  Trouble”  (Butler  1990)  the  author  is  adamant  in
refusing the idea that gender and sex would be primary endowments of individuals. Sex
and gender would stem, rather, from a “violent circumscription of reality” (Butler 1990,
XXVI). The allocation of gender, therefore, would serve the purpose of constructing a
gendered being in harmony with some bodily and anatomical  characteristics  (Butler
1990, 11). 
In  her  famous  discussion  on  the  performativity  of  gender,  that  is  to  say  a
“reenactment  and  reexperiencing  of  meanings  already  socially  established”  (Butler
1990,  191),  Butler  clearly  identifies  the  existence  of  a  normative  dimension.  The
question of intelligibility (Butler 2004, p. 35) comes to the forefront. The inscription of
gender in one's body guarantees access into society.  In turn gender becomes a norm
(Butler 2004, 41), and it is transformed into an apparatus: “[…] by which the production
and  normalisation  of  the  masculine  and  the  feminine  take  place  along  with  the
interstitial  forms  of  hormonal,  chromosomal,  psychic,  and  performative  that  gender
assumes” (Butler  2004, 42).  Performing one's  gender is  an operation that  cannot  be
escaped. Everyone seems to be compelled to have one (and only one!) gender. Butler,
however, does not think that gender is imposed upon the individual (Butler 1988, 526).
Neither does she think that the gendered body pre-exists the cultural conventions that
57
give meanings to them. Performing gender is akin to a theatre performance in which
“the gendered body acts its part in a culturally restricted corporeal space and enacts
interpretations within the confines of already existing directives” (Butler 1988, 526). 
The  performance  of  gender  brings  to  the  surface  the  existence  of  social
conventions,  it  “renders social  laws explicit”  (Butler 1998, 526).  Performing gender
correctly requires constant effort on the “stage” on the part of the individual. Thus, for
instance, the anxiety connected to the allocation of gender is one of the earliest concerns
parents have when a child comes into the world. Children who are born with ambiguous
genitalia are subject to so-called “normalising surgical practices” aimed at bringing their
bodies in line with standard anatomical standards of masculinity or femininity.  It is
possible to consider the proactive attitude of medical practitioners and parents as an
illustration of the crucial importance assigned to a correct performance of gender. A
child with ambiguous genitalia defies the social norm and cannot be read as a member
of either the male or female group. The act of performing one's gender, therefore, could
appear as a grotesque form of masquerade and plays a crucial role in opening up the
gate of social intelligibility.  The “mask” however,  as Lawler (2008, 114) comments,
does not hide, in Butler's intention, a real subject. There is no subject behind the mask
for Butler, as the mask itself is constitutive of the individual. 
The Normative Implications of Sexual and Gendered Identities
Although a definition of the concept of “identity” may be difficult to attempt
(Lawler 2008, 1), Stuart Hall's (1990, 225) contribution may be helpful in this context.
In his discussion of the cultural identities of the Caribbean as being informed by the
colonial legacy, he describes identities as being “the names we give to the different
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ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past”.
Central to his definition is the concept of  positioning, connected to a crucial process
through which the acquisition of identity can take place: identification (Hall 1990, 226).
Positioning  oneself  in  order  to  embrace  an  identity  is  an  act  by  which  both  one's
difference and one's sameness with regards to different types of groups or individuals
are proclaimed. 
Starting from Hall's contribution, it is possible to reflect on the ways in which
identities are constructed in order to ensure uniformity and simplify the complexity of
subject positions or positionings. In this regard, it is possible to suggest that identities
such  as  lesbian,  gay, or  transgender  are  not  merely  descriptive.  They  contain  an
undeniable  normative  dimension  pertaining  to  the  existence  of  certain  gender
characteristics, performance of sexual acts, and socio-cultural forms of identification.
What is missing from these categories, however, is the acknowledgement of the fact that
bodies, feelings, desires, and fantasies can be said to change at different times, ages, or
circumstances, or that individuals may not subscribe to all the aspects of a particular
identity (Lawler 2008, 2). Desire, for instance is multifarious and difficult to harness as
a coherent entity. Hocquenghem (in Weeks 1991, 30) has gone as far as arguing that
homosexual desire “like hetero desire is [an] arbitrary division of desire which in itself
is polyvocal and undifferentiated, so that the notion of exclusive homosexuality is a
fallacy of the imaginary”. Bodies can also be multiple, incoherent, and non-congruent
within a given notion of masculinity or femininity, and defy societal norms on sexual
dimorphism.  To  this  extent,  therefore,  identities  already  contain  in  themselves  the
possibility of the transgression of their own limits, because they work as a framework
within which the individual has to situate herself/himself. 
The process of harnessing the individual into specific identities entails important
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consequences in the field of human rights. In fact, while human rights principles are
considered to equally apply to all individuals, in many cases they are obtained through
the  mobilisation  of  identity  categories.  As  will  be  discussed  in  the  context  of  the
analysis  of  the  data  for  this  research,  the  mobilisation  of  LGBTI  identities  for  the
purpose of obtaining human rights may not always prove to be beneficial to the rights-
holder. The motivation could relate to the fact that, in becoming intelligible before the
law  as  having  a  specific  identity,  individuals  subscribe  to  the  judicial  authorities’
creation  of  these  legal  categories  in  the  first  place  and  are  placed  into  a  narrow
conceptual box. 
One notable example of the limited usefulness of the mobilisation of LGBTI
identities,  which  will  be thoroughly addressed  at  a  later  stage,  is  the  imposition  of
divorce for those transgender persons who are married and wish to have their preferred
gender  legally  recognised14.  This  example  well  illustrates  how  categories  of
“transgender” or “homosexual” limit the possibility of having one's rights recognised
regardless of the identity category to which one could belong in principle. In particular,
the aut aut between marriage/recognition has a double function. Apart from reinstating
marriage as the core societal institution, it is also functional to the narrow description of
what a “transgender” is expected to be. For instance, one of the relevant taxonomies
would  include  the  labels  of  MtF (male  to  female) and  heterosexual.  Changing  the
person's  legal gender  without requiring the person to end a  “heterosexual marriage”
would entrain, as a consequence, a transformation of the marriage itself, now between
two individuals  of  the  same gender.  This  conflict  between two distinct  identities  is
solved by asking the plaintiff to give up one of these controversial aspects of her/his
14 This happens mostly in countries which do not recognise same-sex partnerships in any form. In fact,
in  the  absence  of  the  possibility  of  marrying  for  individuals  who  belong to  the  same  gender,  a
marriage between a transgender person who has amended his/her legal  gender and his/her spouse
would be considered in breach of the national laws that only allow persons of the opposite gender to
be married. 
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identity,  in  order  to  ensure  the  coherence  of  the  legal  system.  This  process  of  the
reduction  of  multiplicity  into  unity  ensures  the  regularity  of  the  law  and  brings
coherence and systematicity in the socio-juridical sphere. 
The  Political  Promises  and  Deceptions  of  Identity:  Using  it
Strategically?
If  gendered  and  sexual  identities,  as  Foucault  and  Butler  suggest,  are  not
primordial endowments of the individual, can they be used as instruments to claim one's
fundamental human rights? Does the adoption of fictional categories only lead to the
acquisition of equally fictional human rights? This question opens up another field of
inquiry crucial to this research, since the social movements based on shared collective
sexual or gendered identities have acted, during the last three decades, as pivotal actors
in the process of the articulation of rights claims. Although tensions obviously exist
between  the  different  “letters”  of  the  LGBTI  acronym  (Monro  2005),  there  is,
nonetheless, a sense of unity acquired through experiences such as common stigma,
discrimination,  marginalisation  for  one's  sexual  behaviour,  sentimental  or  emotional
attachment, gender presentation or gender representation. 
Plummer (in  Weeks 1991, 75) has suggested that while  on the one hand the
identity formation process may have elements of control, restriction, and inhibition, at
the  same  time  identities  provide  “comfort,  security  and  assuredness”  (Plummer  in
Weeks 1991, 75). However, the appropriation of identity categories in the context of the
formulation  of  human  rights  claims  corresponds  to  another  specular  process.  In
particular, judicial institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, allow the
subject  to  speak  only  from  some  specific  subject  positions  (“homosexual”,
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“transsexual” plaintiff), further fostering the idea that the primary access gate to one's
entitlement is the preliminary possession of an “identity”.
Hall: the Necessity and the Impossibility of “Identity”
In asking “who needs 'identity'”, Stuart Hall (1996, 1) has suggested that, so far,
there has not been a satisfying substitute for the concept of “identity”. Hence, in his
opinion,  the  concept  should  be  retained  and  placed  within  the  context  of  a
“subjectification of discourse practices” (Hall 1996, 1). What this entails, in practice, is
formulating an alternative to the effort of radical  deconstruction which scholars such as
Foucault  have  embarked  on.  For  Hall,  identities  have  a  character  of  contingence:
'identities  are  (...)  points  of  temporary  attachment  to  the  subject  positions  which
discursive practices construct for us' (Hall 1996, 19). The use of identity, therefore, is
not  entirely  rejected,  but  becomes  embedded  in  a  much  narrower
temporal/spatial/cognitive  framework.  Hall  advocates  for  a  strategic  use  of  identity
which, nonetheless is far from being grounded in a specific notion of the “self”. There
are,  on  the  contrary,  multiple  and  sometimes  conflicting  “discourses,  practices  and
positions” (Hall 1996, 4) that characterise identities as being fundamentally open-ended
and fragmented.
In his attempt to understand identities as “positional” (Hall 1996, 4), the author
engages with a critical appraisal of Foucault's process of radical de-construction which,
ultimately, seems to deny the existence of the body (Hall 1996, 11). In pursuing this
endeavour,  Hall  has  in  mind  Foucault's  quote  from  “Nietzsche,  Genealogy  and
Morality” (Foucault 1984) in which the French theorist affirms: “nothing in man – not
even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for
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understanding other men”. Hall is not persuaded that the subject is completely incapable
of articulating a response to discursive formations. Rather, he is convinced that Foucault
has not provided an explanation for those instances in which individuals articulate a
response to discursive formations. 
Hall's  (1996,  16)  engagement  with  the  work  of  Judith  Butler  is  equally
fascinating. In interpreting Butler's work, Hall  argues that she has gone further than
Foucault  on  the  issue  of  identity  formation,  because  of  the  introduction  of  a
psychoanalytical framework of analysis. Butler's important contribution highlights, on
the one hand, the fact that identities inevitably lead to forms of  exclusion and require
the existence of the “discursive construction of a constitutive inside” (Hall 1996, 15).
On the  other  hand,  however,  Hall  is  convinced that  Butler  does  not  totally dismiss
identity politics because of this theoretical weakness. Ultimately, therefore, Hall (1996,
16) uses both Foucault's and Butler's work in order to demonstrate that, regardless of the
theoretical limitations, the framework of “identity” is at the same time necessary and
impossible in the domain of politics. 
Spivak's “Strategic Essentialism” and its Limits
Similar to the “strategic” understanding of identity supported by Hall, Spivak's
(1988)  famous  concept  of  “strategic  essentialism”  represents  another  important
contribution to the debate on the usefulness of “identity”. While the author maintains
that  this  concept  seems  to  have  often  been  misunderstood  as  a  “union  ticket  for
essentialism” (Spivak in Danius and Jonsson 1993, 35), her theory has sparked intense
debate. At the core of Spivak's reasoning is the idea that identity can be temporarily
appropriated – as a known constructed object – for political  purposes or to enact  a
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“strategic use  of  positivist  essentialism  in  a  scrupulously  visible  political  interest”
(Spivak 1988, 13).
Danius and Jonsson (1993, 34) who interviewed Spivak, pointed out that the
strategic character of essentialism in her work resides in the fact that the process of
being  understood  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  “community  of  listeners”.  In  this
concept,  implicitly,  the notion of  intelligibility comes back.  Intelligibility is  here in
association  with  a  strategic  –  not  utilitarian  or  instrumental  per  se –  notion  of
essentialism  which  exists  in  relationship  with  the  possibility  for  entrance  into
hegemony. In this regard, Spivak comments: “[...] the arena of the subaltern's persistent
emergence into hegemony must always and by definition remain heterogeneous to the
efforts of the disciplinary historian” (Spivak 1988, 16). The subalterns' appropriation of
essentialism therefore, seems to preserve them from entering hegemony  de facto,  but
allows them, nonetheless, to advance their political claims. 
“Strategic Essentialism” and LGBTI Identities
Reading  LGBTI  identity  politics  with  the  lenses  of  Spivak's  “strategic
essentialism” or Hall's conception of identity as “positioning”, seems to suggest that
lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender,  and  intersexual  persons,  while  refusing  the
hegemonic discourse attached to the production of the identities by which they come to
be  defined,  can  nonetheless  make  use  of  them  by  engaging  openly  with  their
connotations  and  limitations.  What  specifically  are  the  terms  of  essentialism  for
sexuality and gender? Epstein (Stein 1992, 241) describes essentialists as “(...) treat[ing]
sexuality as a biological force and consider sexual identities to be cognitive realisations
of  genuine,  underlying  differences  (...)”.  Under  these  terms,  sexual  orientation  and
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gender identity could be used “strategically” insofar as they can be presented as being at
the core of the process  of  subject  formation.  The ramifications of this  process  may
extend as far as implying a conflation of identities with biological theories on gender
and sexuality. This possibility, however, is not deprived of ambiguous connotations, as it
could  also  function  as  an  instrument  to  justify  the  “radical  difference”  of  LGBTI
persons with regard to the gender-conforming and heterosexual majority. 
Commenting on the use of “strategic essentialism” in relation to the quest for
viable  political  strategies  to  counter  the  political  right,  Lisa  Duggan  has  expressed
doubts on the usefulness of this  concept.  A strategic deployment of identities would
reinstate  sexual  differences  and  queer  desires  in  “homosexualised  bodies”  (Duggan
1994, 6). She has suggested that queer interventions in the domain of politics should
become more systematic and not only limited to “(...) claiming public and cultural space
in imaginative new ways (...)” (Duggan 1994, 6). For Duggan, “strategic essentialism”
is a  way backwards,  rather  than forwards,  as  it  crystallises  the subject  into a  static
position, ruling out the possibility of real political empowerment. 
Mary Bernstein (1997) has also contributed to the analysis of the strategies used
by lesbian and gay movements to claim human rights. She has focused on the strategic
deployment of identities to an extent which can be said to be contiguous to Spivak's.
Bernstein (1997, 533) defined identities as characterised by “(...) the goals they seek,
and the strategies they use, as by the fact that they are based on shared characteristics
such as ethnicity or sex”. Identities, therefore, can be mobilised for different purposes.
On  the  one  hand,  identity  can  be  used  for  empowerment; on  the  other,  identity  is
configured as a goal (Bernstein 2002, 539). In addition to these two traditional forms,
Bernstein has also suggested a third form: identity as strategy (Bernstein 2002, 539). In
this instance, identity could be used both for carrying out a  critique or for  education
(Bernstein 2002, 539). In the first case its deployment shows the differences between
the majority and the minority, while in the second it seeks to highlight the similarities
between the majority and the minority (Bernstein 2002, p. 539). Bernstein, therefore,
has dismissed the claim for which the recourse to the so-called “identity politics” has
impeded the realisation of fruitful alliances or has led the movements into a substantial
subscription  of  the  status  quo (Bernstein  2002,  570).  Her  position  indicates  an
inclination to consider the appropriation and deployment of identity as harbouring a
transformative potential, possibly beyond the specific articulation and content that these
identities  may have.  What  Bernstein  might  have  underestimated  in  her  analysis  of
lesbian and gay identity politics is the extent to which, in some circumstances, the act of
appropriating an LGBTI identity may be seen as requiring an implicit act of surrender to
that  same system of  sexual  and gender  categorisation  that  individuals  may want  to
subvert.
Precisely  on  the  eminent  political  reach  of  identities,  Young  (1990,  98)  has
considered the reductio ad unum enacted by “the logic of identity” as giving rise to a
fundamental repression of difference. In positioning herself against the predicament of
identity politics,  Young (1990,  157) has  suggested instead a  focus  on a  “politics of
difference”, by which it is possible to adopt a fluid and relational approach to diversity
without creating sharp divisions for the sole purpose of creating systematicity and unity.
This vision of politics for the achievement of justice is based on a possibility of enacting
different treatment for disadvantaged groups (Young 1990, 158), at the expense of a
formal view of equality which promotes 'assimilation'. 
Young's reflections highlight the tight relationship existing between the process
of identity formation and the acquisition of human rights,  especially for individuals
considered to be “vulnerable” (Young 1990, 169). At the same time, she has emphasised
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how  difference  should  be  reappropriated  beyond  essentialist  temptations.  This
perspective,  however,  seems  to  underestimate  the  terrain  of  “identity  politics”  as  a
terrain of antagonism, in which the actors are neither innocent nor politically naïve. It is
for this reason that an over-reliance on the role of the law in guaranteeing protection to
the most vulnerable, as Young seems to suggest, may leave out the antagonist dimension
of identity formation in which the so-called “vulnerable individuals” may play a crucial
role in the definition of a notion of equality that may be based more on resentment,
rather than on a true interest in the pursuit of justice. 
LGBTI Persons, Human Rights and the Politics of Resentment?
As  partly  illustrated  by  the  above-sketched  debate,  the  terrain  of  “identity
politics” is a slippery one. Incongruities between narratives of equality and narratives of
difference  for  LGBTI  persons  powerfully  come  to  the  forefront  and  lead  to  an
interrogation  of  the  dynamics  by  which  rights  claims  are  formulated.  This  section
explores the inclusion of LGBTI persons into the so-called mainstream social, political,
cultural, economic, and legal domain from the perspective of an  opposition between
resentment and belonging. The aim is that of exploring the relationship existing between
a push towards integration of 'sexual minorities' into the domain of politics and the law,
and  the  strategies  of  resistance  employed  in  order  to  escape  assimilation  and
normalisation. As Wendy Brown phrased it: “even as the margins assert themselves as
margins, the denaturalising assault they perform on coherent collective identity in the
centre turns back on them to trouble their own identities” (Brown 1995, 53). The tension
between “becoming part” and “being the other”, therefore, inevitably impacts on groups'
and individuals' identity formation.
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A corollary to this is the observation concerning the different roles of various
human rights actors. The depiction of human rights as an instrument through which the
“weak” can speak, be heard, and become recognised socially and politically builds on
the  existence  of  powerful and  powerless actors.  While  Spivak  argues  that  it  is  not
possible to apply Social Darwinism to the redress of injustices, by which “(...) the fittest
must shoulder the burden of righting the wrongs of the unfit (...)” (Spivak 2003, 169); it
is nonetheless true that narratives of sharp divisions between victims and perpetrators
still strongly permeate the rhetoric of human rights. This sharp division, however, may
go as far as suggesting the existence of a process of political colonisation of the domain
of human rights in which the quest for power, rather than the creation of a just and equal
society, may be the ultimate objective. 
Nietzsche's (2003) notion of  resentment and Wendy Brown's (1995) discussion
of it in “States of Injury”, shed light on the possible, and controversial, enmeshment of
politics  and  human  rights.  The  concept  of  resentment is  the  expression  of  what
Nietzsche, in the 'Genealogy of Morals', called a  slave morality (Nietzsche 2003, 19).
This  would  consist  in  the  superior  moral  stance  that  slaves,  or  those  subjected  to
someone else's power, articulate in relation to those by whom they are dominated. These
individuals who are weak, under the yoke of a master, become morally superior to the
aristocratic, to the noble, by virtue of their suffering. The notion of resentment, which
Nietzsche traced back to Judaism and Christianity, is akin to the feeling of “revenge”.
Resentment  is experienced by “(...) creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper
outlet  of  action,  are  forced  to  find  their  compensation  in  an  imaginary  revenge”
(Nietzsche 2003, 19). The philosopher described the  resentful man  as a man who is
powerless and that makes use of morality in order to elevate himself above the powerful
to whom he is subjected. Nietzsche suggested that the claims to justice advanced by
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these subjugated individuals are not the manifestation of a profound and sincere desire
to achieve the just. Rather, they are motivated by the will to seize that very portion of
power which is foreclosed to them. To this extent, therefore, resentment gives rise to a
sort of symbolic revenge with strong moral contours. 
Nietzsche (1967) explored further  the concept  of  resentment  in  “The Will  to
Power” where he argued that the idea of the weak as being willing to renounce their
share of power is deceitful. The weak do not despise power in Nietzsche's opinion. On
the one hand, morality has pushed this category of individuals to hate their “will to
power” (Nietzsche 1967, 37). On the other hand, however, morality has allowed this
“will to power” to emerge under another form, notably under the form of the concept of
“justice” (Nietzsche 1967, 40). Hence, the “will to power” is considered as a drive. For
Nietzsche the very act of claiming rights participates in the deployment of this will: it is
part of an attempt, from those who are in a position of inferiority, to prevent those who
are  stronger  to  grow  in  power  even  more  (Nietzsche  1967,  53-54).  By  reading
Nietzsche,  it  would  appear  that  the  esprit  de  corps of  minorities  is  shaped  by an
underlying feeling of frustration,  a  latent  dissatisfaction with their  minority status –
hence of powerlessness. 
After having heard what Nietzsche has to say on the notion of “justice” in the
mind of the oppressed, is it still possible to think about the appropriation of identity, as a
political tool, beyond the framework of resentment? The Nietzschean idea of resentment
has  found some space  in  contemporary discussions  on  minorities'  rights.  Chambers
(2003, 149) describes resentment as 
the claim for rights [that] is understood not as a specific political demand,
but as a moralising claim, which is based on a history of prior injury. This
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claim, quite paradoxically, serves not to contest a larger political battle,
but merely to instantiate in the law the very minority status of the group
(Chambers 2003, 149). 
Wendy Brown (1995) has explored the question of identity politics, also touching on
lesbian  and gay social  movements,  through  the  Nietzschean  concept  of  resentment.
Brown (1995,  26-27)  has  suggested  the  existence  of  a  sort  of  “moralising  politics”
which deviates from the pursuit of freedom. One example would be the inscription of
social  phenomena  such  as  sexism,  racism,  and  homophobia  in  the  law  as  being
“heinous”.  The process by which these phenomena come to be proscribed thanks to
“anti-discrimination” or “hate-crime” legislation, for Brown (1995, 27), could be seen
as being influenced by a Nietzschean understanding of  resentment. The way in which
resentment is articulated, in this case, is through a fixation of identities into dichotomic
positions: “it fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions, and
codifies as well the meanings of their actions against all possibilities of indeterminacy,
ambiguity,  and  struggle  for  resignification  or  repositioning”  (Brown  1995,  27).
Resentment politics, instead of allowing the discarding of those dynamics of subjection
that hamper the enjoyment of one's rights, crystallises the positioning of the actors in
terms of either passive or active agents. 
Furthermore,  in  this  context,  the  resolution  of  the  conflict  is  completely
subtracted  from  the  socio-political  sphere  of  action  and  entirely  delegated  to  the
competent  legal  authority.  This  delegation  to  law,  Brown  (1995,  27)  has  argued,
deprives the subject of the possibility of political action. The implications of Brown's
position,  however,  appear  quite  problematic.  If  the law is  not  the privileged terrain
where these (political) claims can be formulated, what is the legitimate area to do so? Is
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citizenship the ideal arena to carry out this crucial negotiation? Or could the request to
fully become part of the citizenry, as is the case for LGBTI persons (Phelan 2001), be
informed by an equal resentful stance towards “society” at large? This thorny question
still remains at the centre of discussion as the current framework for the recognition of
human rights remains profoundly permeated by a legalistic approach, rather than being
part of a broader political discourse in which the right-holders themselves play a role. It
is, therefore, precisely in the sphere of citizenship, the space where rights are concretely
articulated and guaranteed, that a thorough investigation needs to be carried out. This
would  permit  exploration  of  the  extent  to  which  a  possible  transformation  of  the
founding principles, methods, and linguistic performances of human rights is possible,
in order to overcome the rigid categorisation of the subjects of human rights. 
So far, the discussion on the creation of gendered and sexual identities has been
organised along two main axes. Firstly, an exploration of the ways in which identities
can be considered to  be political,  social,  and legal  artefacts  which  are  grounded in
equally artificial concepts such as 'gender' and 'sexuality'. Secondly, there has been an
attempt to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of mobilising identities in order to
claim and obtain human rights. This overview will help to describe the role of identity
in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as implying a complex process
of specification of individuals that takes place in the juridical domain, by which the
fictitious  socio-legal  categories  of  “LGBTI”  are  recognised  as  possessing  legal
intelligibility by virtue of specific characteristics ascribable to them. At the same time,
the concept of “identity” also plays an important role in the work of the Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe on issues concerning sexual orientation and
gender  identity.  In  particular  this  overview  will  be  helpful  in  assessing  the  use  of
LGBTI  identities  in  the  work  of  this  independent  body of  the  Council  of  Europe.
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Furthermore, it will also prove to be useful in the endeavour of describing the process
by which encounters and exchanges between the Commissioner and activists and human
rights practitioners can help in modifying rigid socio-legal codifications of sexual and
gender identities, beyond the rigid sphere of action of the law. 
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Chapter  Three  -  Identity,  Human  Rights  and  Citizenship:  at  the
Crossroad of a Difficult Negotiation
Negotiating Human Rights Between Identity and Citizenship 
This chapter explores the domain of citizenship as the privileged site in which
human rights and LGBTI identities intersect. It also presents a discussion of the extent
to which new forms of citizenship – such as the concept of “European citizenship” –
may  contribute  to  radically  transforming  not  just  the  current  notion  of  national
citizenship  but  also  human  rights.  The  contributions  from  authors  across  several
disciplines will help to provide an overview of the rapid process of change that the
concept of “citizenship” is currently undergoing, and assess the extent to which this
transformation can impact the recognition of the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe.
This  overview  will  provide  a  solid  theoretical  background  for  understanding  the
different layers of complexity informing the social, political, and judicial practices of
the Council of Europe in relation to the creation of LGBTI identities and of the rights of
LGBTI persons. 
Choosing Between Citizenship and Human Rights?
In “The Origins of Totalitarianism” Arendt (1976) presented human rights as a
paradox:  universally  proclaimed,  yet  only  applicable  to  those  who  had  a  form  of
belonging to the polity. Those who needed human rights the most (the stateless refugees
of World War I), Arendt argued, were the first to be excluded from their enjoyment.
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Arendt's compelling argument still has profound reverberations in the current analysis
of the critical  interplay between citizenship,  politics,  and human rights.  The authors
included in this  review have all  engaged,  from different  perspectives,  with Arendt's
thought-provoking argument in order to appraise the contemporary configurations of
this interplay between political membership and universal principles of protection of the
human being.  In  this  section  of  the  chapter,  different  accounts  of  the  intricate
relationship  between  political  membership  and  the  enjoyment  of  human  rights  are
explored.  On the one hand, Tambakaki's (2010) reflections on the possible mutually
exclusive relationship existing between human rights and citizenship; on the other hand,
Dembour and Kelly's (2011) investigation on the extent to which human rights can be
said to fully apply to migrants. These two perspectives shed light on the existing tension
between these two spheres and help to open up a discussion on how to overcome this
problem. 
In “Human Rights or Citizenship?”, Tambakaki (2010, 6) has sought to explore
the  tension  existing  between  human rights  and citizenship.  This  tension,  the  author
argues, is due to the different positions that these inhabit with regard to politics. While
citizenship is embedded in the context of the creation of political community, human
rights  are  conceived  precisely  as  a  way to  overcome  the  limitations  of  politics  in
guaranteeing entitlements and protection to all human beings (Tambakaki 2010, 7). It
would be possible, therefore, to give in to the temptation of privileging human rights
over citizenship, because their codification into international law would assign them a
supranational status. Tambakaki (2010, 4) argues, however, that thinking in terms of
mutual  exclusion  would  have  significant  –  negative  –   implications  for  democratic
political practice. 
Tambakaki  (2010,  11)  further  identifies  another  crucial  aspect  of  the tension
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between human rights and citizenship. Notwithstanding the fact that they operate on two
distinct  levels  (the  former  on  the  level  of  symbolism and  the  latter  on  the  level  of
exercise),  the  promise  of  maximum  individual  freedom  implicit  in  human  rights
hampers  the  unity  of  common  intents  required  by  citizenship.  In  turn,  however,
citizenship could also be seen as constraining individual  freedom (Tambakaki 2010,
11). The solution the author hopes for is, therefore, a re-appropriation of the agonistic
role of citizenship within politics. Hence, it would be the political arena, rather than the
Courtroom,  that  is  the  privileged  site  to  enhance  and  promote  participation  in
democratic processes.
Dembour  and  Kelly  (2011)  have  explored  the  intricate  relationship  between
human rights and citizenship from a different perspective. By asking “are human rights
for migrants?”, the authors have sought to demonstrate the existence of a gap between
the universal proclamation of human rights principles and their  concrete recognition
within the borders of nation-states. Contrarily to what Arendt had suggested, Dembour
and Kelly do not  think  that  the possibility of  mere political  membership  entails  an
automatic enjoyment of human rights for the individual.  There are, rather, dynamics of
exclusion from the enjoyment of human rights that fall entirely within the sphere of
citizenship (Dembour and Kelly 2011, 9-10). Migrants, therefore, may not solely be
vulnerable  because  they  lack  citizenship,  but  also  because  of  political  and  social
marginalisation. While the paradox described by Arendt is still valid for Dembour and
Kelly, citizenship loses that ideal role that the German philosopher had attributed to it as
the privileged sphere where individuals can act. 
In the context of this research, it will be possible to establish a parallel between
Dembour  and  Kelly's  analysis  and  the  citizenship  status  of  LGBTI  persons.  More
specifically,  building  on  the  acknowledgement  of  the  internal  dynamics  of  the
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hierarchisation of rights-holders within the borders of the nation-states (but also at the
level of the Council of Europe), it is possible to trace back the process by which LGBTI
individuals  are  constructed  as  human  rights  subjects  in  ways  that  ensure  their
normalisation and assimilation. The existence of blurred lines between the inside and
outside of human rights within nation-states, as Dembour and Kelly suggest (2011, 9)
could help to explain how LGBTI persons may be constituted,  at  the same time, as
being both members and outcasts of political communities. It will be argued, however,
that it is not only in the context of nation-states that this process takes place, as it can be
observed,  although with a different configuration,  in the context of the work of the
Council of Europe on human rights. This supra-national dimension inevitably implies
the existence of new models of citizenship which transgress the boundaries of national
sovereignty but which, nonetheless, are informed by exclusionary practices, rather than
by the accomplishment of a universal application of human rights across the European
continent. 
Before delving into the possible alternative forms of non-national citizenship
within which human rights can or cannot be realised, it is necessary to pay attention to
another important facet. More specifically, it is necessary to ask what role does identity
play in this existing interplay between citizenship and human rights. To do so, the idea
of “group rights” will be briefly discussed in order to assess the extent to which LGBTI
persons can,  for  the  purpose of  having  their  rights  recognised,  be  considered  as  a
'group' and what consequences this would entail.
Citizens with an Identity: LGBTI Persons and Political Membership
Although citizenship implies specific forms of identities,  or “positionings” as
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Hall (1996) would describe them, not all  forms of identification are viable within a
polity.  Isin  and  Wood  (1999)  have  explored  the  interplay  between  citizenship  and
identity, specifically in relation to the question of “group rights”. Group rights represent
a cornerstone of the heated debates on multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1994; Okin 1999;
Kukathas 2003; Modood 2007). Contested by many for privileging the collective, rather
than the individual, group rights may be said to rest on the assumption that common
features constitute the ground for the definition of certain entitlements. 
The question to ask in this context is whether “LGBTI rights” can be said to
possess a collective dimension akin to that of “groups”. The answer to this question
would seem to be negative since, ultimately, the rights of LGBTI persons are the rights
of individuals. It is necessary, however, to question whether understanding the “LGBTI”
acronym as akin to a group may have some relevance in relation to the formulation of
specific  human  rights  within  the  polity.  While  Isin  and  Wood  (1999,  20)  consider
identity  and  citizenship  as  both  being  “group  markers”,  they  recognise  the  often
exclusionary character of citizenship. For this reason, they consider the emergence of a
“diasporic  citizenship”  (Isin  and  Wood  1999,  48)  as  a  solution  to  the  problem  of
multiple, sometimes perceptively conflicting, personal allegiances. In the opinion of the
authors,  in  fact,  this  change  would  facilitate  the  adoption  of  a  radical  practice  of
citizenship that would eschew both questions of “accomodation” or “belonging” (Isin
and Wood 1999, 48). 
Isin and Wood's model of citizenship interrogates directly the role of identity in
the  process  of  obtaining  political  membership.  This  concept  seems  particularly
interesting  as  far  as  LGBTI  persons  are  concerned.  On  the  one  hand,  people  with
various  sexual  orientations  and/or  gender  identities  have  used  the  umbrella  term
“LGBTI” in order to engage with identity politics strategically; on the other hand there
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is an entire constellation of other identities that differentiate each and every participant,
relating  to  ethnicity,  age,  religion,  disability,  or  other  personal  conditions.  Isin  and
Wood's suggest that  citizenship is  strongly influenced by the ways identities – both
individual and collective – are shaped in relation to the rights claims they advance.
Building on this assumption, it is necessary to address the specific patterns of sexual
and gendered forms of citizenship of LGBTI persons in the context of Europe, and how
these dynamics are also the product of specific narratives on human rights originating
from the Council of Europe.   
Seen as being either the product of essentialism saturated with power (such as in
the analysis of Foucault or Butler) or as a relational concept entailing the recognition of
the other (Isin and Wood 1999, 19); identities directly inform the very notion of human
rights from the start,  resting on prior assumptions of what is  human.  In the case of
LGBTI  persons,  the  question  of  identity  is  also  connected  to  a  history  of
marginalisation. This shared history of political and social marginalisation, as well as
other  contributing  social  factors,  establish  identities  that  represent  an  important
framework  through  which  individuals  read  their  entitlements  to  rights  and  their
participation to politics. Although the viability of “LGBTI” identities can be dismantled
by  adopting  the  lens  of  Queer  Theory,  the  point  here  is  on  emphasising  how  the
“LGBTI” acronym still plays a relevant role as a social and political signpost. It can be
considered as a liminal concept that can be de-constructed, criticised, and polemically
embraced or contested. Moreover, while the promises of queer theory are fascinating, its
ability to concretely establish a dialogue with the legal field, characterised by notions of
regularity  and  systematisation,  has  proven to  be  weak up until  now.  The “LGBTI”
acronym,  therefore,  remains  the  predominant  framework  for  the  articulation  of
discourses on the rights pertaining to one's sexual orientation or gender identity both in
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the national and in the international arena. 
Sexual Citizenship: a Resistant Integration
The role of gender and sexuality in the definition of citizenship has not always
been  recognised.  Increasingly,  however,  scholars  in  different  fields  have  started  to
explore and study the gendered and sexual dimensions of citizenship. Mosse (1997) for
instance, has given an interesting account of the entanglement between sexuality and
nationalism in Europe. Stychin (1998, 8) has argued that gender represents one of the
“historically central relations of domination in the construction of national identity”.
Pateman (1988) has read the “social contract” from a feminist perspective, highlighting
the way in which women were radically excluded from this original pact. The gendered
and  sexual  dimensions  of  citizenship,  therefore,  are  of  enormous  importance  in
understanding political  participation; they are also significant to having fundamental
rights guaranteed, for both citizens and non-citizens alike for.
 As  suggested  in  the  previous  sections,  the  polity  contains  hierarchies  of
citizenship  which  are  established  according  to  forms  of  sexual  and  gender
categorisation. Phelan (2001) has suggested, for instance, that LGB individuals inhabit a
sub-optimal  form  of  citizenship  as  “second-class  citizens”.  While  being  asked  to
contribute to the national community – by means of economic obligation or political
participation – these individuals are excluded from the enjoyment of a full  array of
entitlements. Their political membership, therefore, seems to imply an unequal balance
between the duties they are required to fulfil and the rights they are granted.  Precisely
on  the  issue  of  citizenship  for  LGB  persons,  Brandzel  (2005,  176)  has  made  an
interesting point:
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Citizenship [...] functions as a double discourse: it serves as a source of
political organising and national belonging and as a claim to equality, on
the  one  hand,  while  it  erases  and  denies  its  own  exclusionary  and
differentiating nature, on the other (Brandzel 2005, 176). 
As early as 1993, the concept of “sexual citizenship” was formulated by Evans
(1993) in  order  to  describe  the  connection  between citizenship  and the  structure  of
capitalism,  which  entailed  a  commodification  of  sexual  and  gender  identities  while
maintaining the exclusion of some individuals from the full  enjoyment of the rights
connected to their membership into the polity. Far from seeing citizenship as a positive
instrument for the construction of an inclusive community, Evans (1993, 9) looked at
the history of citizenship as a history of 
fundamental  formal  heterosexist  patriarchal  principles  and  practices
ostensibly progressively 'liberalised' towards and through the rhetoric of
'equality' but in practice to effect unequal differentiation (Evans 1993, 9).
The citizenship of these minorities for Evans (1993, 8) is only expressed in relation to
the commodification of their sexual/gender identities, aimed at creating specific market
niches for  the  immoral  individuals  within  “(…)  segregated,  privatised  social  and
economic territories (…)”. Bell and Binnie (2000, 11) see Evans' work as fundamentally
requiring a split between morality and legality, which entails the fact that individuals are
granted rights while being, at the same time, subject to a moralising gaze. The existence
of  legitimate  spaces  of  expression,  as  well  as  sites  where  capitalist  desire  can  be
fulfilled, contribute to this dynamics, thus fostering the illusion that one is really taking
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part in the liberal system. The process of the commodification of sexual and gendered
identities may take different forms15, some of which will be explored in this context.
Evans' work, however, has encountered the criticism of several scholars, such as
Richardson (2000, 262) who condemns Evans for obliterating the “lesbian citizen”. In
her work on sexual and lesbian citizenship, Richardson employs lesbian and feminist
theory to indicate sexual citizenship as both a site of normalisation and of stigmatisation
for some individuals. In particular the author describes the way in which definitions of
bad and good citizenship are framed, specifically in relation to the adherence to the
model of the heterosexual family (Richardson 2000, 269). 
Bell  and Binnie  (2000,  26),  in  continuity  with  Richardson's  argument  about
bad/good  citizenship,  have  pointed  out  the  danger  of  fostering  a  notion  of
“respectability”  within  the  domain  of  citizenship.  The  heterosexual  matrix  of
citizenship, in fact, seems to be strengthened by the inclusion of sexual “dissidents”
within  the  national  community,  by  their  very  determination  to  adhere  to  certain
institutions, such as the family or the army, for instance. Weeks (in Bell and Binnie
2000, 27), echoed also by Grabham (2007) among others, has described the tension
existing  around the  strategies  of  acceptance or  of  subversion that  sexual  minorities
adopt. In particular, he has maintained that strategies of acceptance are characterised by
a moment of citizenship, while   strategies of subversion are enacted through a moment
of transgression (Weeks in Bell and Binnie 2000, 27). 
In relation to the process of categorisation that citizenship entails, Stychin (1998,
13) has asked: [can] “national identity […] be reconceived in a contingent and flexible
fashion that  does  not  depend on the construction  of  the  other?” His  answer  to  this
interrogative is  ambivalent  because if  rights  represent  a  way to absorb and validate
15 One interesting example in this regard is Grabham's (2007, 44) description of intersex corporeality
and how it relates to the medicalisation of intersexual persons as a commodified relationship with
medical practitioners. 
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minorities  “in  terms  of  prevailing  national  norms”,  at  the  same  time,  they  allow
minorities to participate in imagining another nation (Stychin 1998, 13). This research
will address Stychin's question and there will be an attempt to explore alternative ways
in which rights and political membership can be configured as to allow an open-ended
and dynamic appropriation of contingent subjective positions. 
The Council of Europe: LGBTI Identities and Models of “European
Citizenship”
The Council of Europe (CoE) is considered the most successful and effective
human rights supranational institution at the international level. Since its creation after
the Second World War, the CoE has succeeded in creating and fostering the idea of a
common European culture of human rights which is also shared by the member states of
the European Union (EU). Specifically in relation to the rights of LGBTI persons, the
CoE, and especially the European Court of Human Rights, has played a pioneering role,
having addressed several issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity far
more often than any other human rights institution worldwide. 
Because of  the  significant  number  of  member  states  (47),  the  CoE is  also a
crucial site to investigate the ways in which domestic perspectives on human rights in
the European continent participate in the production of international standards, and also
to  the  dissemination  of  human  rights  principles  back  in  its  member  states.  This
investigation is not limited to the analysis of the case law of the Court. Rather, it also
takes  into  account  the  work  of  the  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  in  order  to
investigate how diplomacy and national politics enter the forum of discussion on human
rights  and allow the  construction  of  specific  discourses  of  human rights  of  LGBTI
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persons to the detriment of others. 
The  necessity  of  embarking on a  multi-dimensional  analysis  stems  from the
swift  changes  occurring  in  the  field  of  human  rights  for  LGBTI  persons  that  also
pervade  the  sphere  of  citizenship.  Bell  and  Binnie  (2000,  5)  maintain  that  sexual
citizenship needs to be re-evaluated in the light of several phenomena such as 1) the
“Europeanisation” of human rights law; 2) the regulation of immigration policies; and
3) the globalisation of gay identities. To bear in mind the centrality of citizenship – and
of sexual citizenship in particular – while both analysing the case law of the ECtHR and
the activities of the CoE on LGBTI rights, helps to move understanding beyond the
literal meaning of each judgement and to evaluate the extent to which the European
system  of  protection  of  human  rights  perpetuates  limited  normative  definitions  of
LGBTI subjects as substantially domesticated as sexual citizens. 
The Council of Europe at the Heart of the Protection of Human Rights
in Europe
Compared to the 28 member states of the European Union, the 47 member states
of  the  Council  of  Europe  share  a  much  broader  notion  of  “Europe”  in  terms  of
geographical,  socio-political,  and  cultural  configuration.  Benoît-Rohmer  and  Klebes
(2005, 37) have argued that the expansion of the Council of Europe has been grounded
in  a  criterion  of  membership  based  on  the  “sense  of  belonging  to  Europe”.  The
implications are significant: eight hundred million people from the coasts of Iceland to
the  seashore  in  Vladivostok,  Russia  are  nominally  protected  under  the  European
Convention on Human Rights. Potentially these numbers are even higher, since non-
nationals are also afforded a certain degree of protection under the ECHR. 
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The European Court of Human Rights prides itself for being the “conscience of
Europe” (CoE 2010),  and Jacobson (1996,  81)  sees in  the Court  the “realisation of
human rights in Europe”. It can also be suggested, moreover, that the Court's work has
an  impact  well  beyond  its  European  borders,  acting  as  a  reference  for  many other
regional human rights systems. For LGBTI persons, and their right claims, this has a
tremendous impact: it provides them with a tool to oppose their nation states which may
be engaging in human rights violations against them and it also works in the direction of
establishing  a  common culture  of  human rights  on  LGBTI  rights  in  Europe.  Some
commentators, however, express scepticism of the fact that the CoE represents such a
thrilling  example  of  the  practical  achievement  of  human  rights  in  the  continent.
Douzinas (2007), for instance, is convinced that the case law of the Court, rather than
being the product of the independent process of adjudication, is better understood if one
refers to the political positioning of the judges:
(...) barristers appearing before international bodies such as the ECtHR
quickly  learn  that  it  is  better  preparation  to  research  the  political
affiliations of the government-appointed judges rather than to read the
Court's case law (Douzinas 2007, 25). 
Is Douzinas too pessimistic in relation to the role of the ECtHR? Is he exaggerating the
extent to which politics influences the orientation of the Court? His analysis induces
thought  about  the  interplay  between  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  potential
political interferences in this process. Why should an inter-governmental human rights
organisation  be  exempt  from  Realpolitik?  Dembour  (2006)  has  adopted  a  similarly
sceptical  approach,  expressing  affinities  with  Douzinas  on  the  effectiveness  of  the
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institution.  One example  she  mentions  is  the high  rate  of  applications  rejected  in  a
preliminary phase, as much as 90% of the total (Dembour 2006, 13), together with the
significant  loopholes  existing  in  the  implementation  of  such  rights,  such  as  the
substantial  by-passing  of  women or  the  derogation  from the  rights  protected  in  the
Convention that states have in case of emergencies (Dembour 2006, 13). In exposing
her self-proclaimed nihilism on the effectiveness of human rights, Dembour endorses a
sort of Nietzschean position, for which a connection can be said to exist between human
rights and the will to power (Dembour 2006, 275). 
This research takes into account Douzinas' and Dembour's criticisms but, at the
same  time,  tries  to  identify  the  extent  to  which  human  rights  can  be  radically
transformed beyond political appropriation. In this regard, citizenship could represent
the crucial domain in which new meanings of human rights, as well as new practices,
can be negotiated. To effect this change, however, citizenship itself has to be re-founded
on a more egalitarian and non-elitist basis in order to be transformed from an instrument
serving nationalist  projects,  to  an  element  that  can  affect  political  participation  and
identification in a community. Trans-national challenges to citizenship, especially in the
context of Europe, provide an interesting point of departure for this investigation. 
Human Rights and Citizenship: “the European Way”? Challenges to
National Understandings of Citizenship
Human rights have increasingly become the yardstick to measure the presumed
morality  of  nation-states’ hierarchy and,  to  this  extent,  they perform an undeniably
important  ideological  function in  the context  of  international  relations.  Furthermore,
deployed at the international level, human rights discourses transmit the illusion that an
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effective  supra-national  moral conscience  exists  and  it  informs  the  actions  of  the
international community. 
To say that  a  common shared  notion  of  moral  duty to  protect  human rights
worldwide is a socio-political construction is a tautology. It is more interesting, rather,
to explore the ways in which human rights expose the frailty or the strength of nation-
states and the consistency of the process of the creation of the “other”, the “alien”, the
“outsider”. Is it possible to talk about a non-national conception of citizenship that puts
into question – and possibly into crisis – the nation-state? Do Europe and European
institutions in this sense foster and promote a non-national concept of citizenship based
on broader shared values? Do LGBTI persons participate in the deployment of these
presumably unbound notions of citizenship? 
The  creation  of  otherness  and  its  compatibility  with  modern  notions  of
citizenship, which surpass or challenge nation-states on the one hand, and the influence
of  an  international  rhetoric  of  human  rights  on  the  other,  are  equally  parts  of  this
analysis. Jacobson (1996, 76) has asked whether it is possible for individuals to make
demands on the states by grounding their requests on international rights codes. If this
happens and is successful, Jacobson maintains, it is possible to witness a change in the
structure  of  international  society,  with  states'  legitimacy  less  rooted  in  popular
sovereignty  and  more  in  “transnational  human  rights”  (Jacobson  1996,  76).
Furthermore, he posits that, after the waves of immigration during the seventies and the
eighties,  the  radical  distinction  between  national and  alien has  been  weakened
(Jacobson 1996, 73). 
Dembour and Kelly (2011, 9), in trying to understand why migrants do not have
access to rights in Europe, maintain, instead, that human rights seem to be more at the
service of the powerful, rather than an instrument in the hands of the powerless. The
86
situation of  migrants  in  accessing rights  is  embedded in  a  system of  hierarchies  of
access to entitlements (Dembour and Kelly 2011, 9). While for Jacobson the  other is
becoming progressively an insider thanks to human rights, for Dembour and Kelly this
figure, particularly embodied by the migrant, is still framed as a radical outsider. For the
latter,  therefore,  citizenship  still  seems  to  possess  a  discriminatory  character  which
narrowly limits access to the enjoyment of rights. 
Scholars interested in alternative configurations of citizenship have tried to solve
the enigma of how to conceptualise and reduce the exclusionary dynamics of citizenship
in order to ensure a more universal guarantee of human rights. Butler and Spivak's essay
“Who sings the nation state?” (2007) as well as the works of Soysal (1994) and Balibar
(2004), are particularly interesting in this regard. Butler and Spivak (2007, 40) begin
with the Arendtian notion of  statelessness in order to analyse the ways in which the
nation-state  instrumentalises  citizenship  against  individuals.  One  of  the  core
assumptions is that nation-states create the premises for their legitimation by creating
the nation in the first place (Butler and Spivak 2007, 31). States, therefore, create both
the  conditions  for  belonging  and  for  dispossession.  This  twofold  dynamics  is
contextualised, by the authors, within the broad framework of European governance,
which they see as creating further borders and boundaries (Butler and Spivak 2007, 86).
The  creation  of  these  fractures,  furthermore,  increasingly  responds  to  logics  of
neoliberal  economic  globalisation  rather  than  global  democratisation  of  the  states
(Butler and Spivak 2007, 84-85). Butler and Spivak, therefore, explore the exclusionary
character of citizenship without, however, suggesting that decoupling citizenship from
the nation-state would entail a radical configuration of the dynamics of belonging to the
political community.
While  Butler  and  Spivak  only  briefly  touch  on  the  existence  of  new
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configurations of citizenship beyond the framework of the nation-state, the works of
Soysal  (1994)  and  Balibar  (2004)  constitute  a  direct  interrogation  of  the  limits  of
national citizenship and engage with the possibility of alternative configurations not
limited  to  the  sphere  of  the  nation.  The  conclusions  reached  by  the  two  authors,
however,  significantly  differ.  In  particular,  Soysal  (1994,  3)  articulates  a  notion  of
“postnational citizenship” centred around the idea that there are effective ways to by-
pass the state sovereignty in allocating human rights to individuals. The author gives the
example of guestworkers in Europe in order to demonstrate how the guarantee of rights
does not always necessarily require an inclusion of the individuals into the national
community (Soysal 1994, 3).  This is rendered possible, according to Soysal (1994, 3)
by virtue of a change in the process of the legitimisation of rights: from a legitimisation
founded in the nation to a legitimisation rooted in the concept of personhood. 
In the discussion on the notion of the human, it has already been discussed how
unstable  it  can  be  to  rely on  notions  of  humanity –  hence  of  personhood –for  the
guarantee of human rights. Soysal's argument, therefore, can be said to rest on a false
tautology,  as  personhood  can  still  be  subjected  to  those  exclusionary  criteria  that
continue to mark the allocation of rights to different “minorities”. Soysal seems to be
confident in the fact that universalistic discourses will be used in positive terms in order
to foster inclusiveness. What is left out of this picture are the ways in which individuals
are allowed to inhabit national spaces; but they are, nonetheless, in a liminal position. 
Balibar (2004) has analysed the current dynamics of democratisation in Europe
and has  proposed a  model  of  “transnational  citizenship”.  This  model  of  citizenship
differs from both postnational and supranational models, because of the lack of concrete
structures  and anticipations  on the outcomes (Balibar  2004, VIII).  One fundamental
point of departure for Balibar is the idea that borders are dispersed everywhere, rather
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than being solely located at the “limit” (Balibar 2004, 1). The “displacement” of the
border,  Balibar  maintains,  plays  a fundamental  role  in  the construction of European
citizenship configured as a “citizenship of borders” (Balibar 2004, 6). More precisely
for the author, this implies that the deployment of “European citizenship” in order to
foster a united continent, inevitably creates another inclusion/exclusion divide (Balibar
2004, 44 and 47). This divide concerns those that are not considered European and it
amounts to a form of “European racism”. In this regard, therefore, European citizenship
would  be  “(…) a  development  of  quasi-apartheid  social  structures  and institutions”
(Balibar 2004, 116). In comparison to Soysal, Balibar appears clearly less convinced
about the possibility of by-passing citizenship in order to guarantee human rights for
those currently excluded from their enjoyment within the polity.
The establishment of (new) borders, therefore, is considered by Balibar to be
still crucial to the creation of a trans-national model of citizenship. The only way in
which “European citizenship” could be disjointed from the process of creating “others”,
would be in the case of a process of the “democratisation of justice” (Balibar 2004,
121). What is meant by Balibar with this expression is the possibility of overcoming
exclusionary practices by broadening the sphere of transnational democracy in which
more individuals can actively participate to the detriment of the power of the nation-
states.  While  Soysal  seems  more  optimistic  on  the  transformation  of  human  rights
beyond  national  borders,  Balibar  analyses  the  way  in  which  the  creation  of  a
transnational  political  community,  such  as  “Europe”,  can  still  powerfully  create  its
“others”. In this regard, the use of human rights as a rhetorical instrument to create a
divide between compliant and non-compliant states cannot be overlooked. In the case of
the  rights  of  LGBTI  persons,  this  instrumentalisation  seems  to  be  increasingly
connected  to  the  creation  of  a  “European  queer  friendly”  continent  opposed to  the
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homophobic and transphobic “others”. It is interesting, therefore, to discuss the extent to
which  discourses  on  the  rights  of  LGBTI  persons  in  Europe  participate  in  the
reproduction of new borders both at the level of single nation-states and,  more broadly,
in the context of a regional human rights institution such as the Council of Europe.
The  “Pink  Agenda”:  Promoting  LGBTI  Rights  Beyond  European
Borders
In June 2010 Judith Butler refused the “Civil Courage Prize” at the Christopher
Street Day in Berlin because of the racist tones used by spokespersons of the German
LGBT movement. Commenting few weeks later she explained: 
So if we fight for the rights of gay people to walk the street freely, we
have to realize first that some significant number of those people are also
in jeopardy because of anti-immigrant  violence -  this  is  what  we call
"double jeopardy" in English. Secondly, we have to consider that if we
object  to  the  illegitimate  and subjugating  use  of  violence  against  one
community, we cannot condone it in relation to another! In this way, the
queer movement has to be committed to social equality, and to pursuing
freedom under conditions of social equality. This is very different from
the new libertarianism that cares only for personal liberty, is dedicated to
defending individualism, and often allies  with police and state power,
including new forms of nationalism, European purity, and militarism.16
16 From  “AVIVA-Interview  with  Judith  Butler”,  available  at:  http://www.aviva-
berlin.de/aviva/content_Interviews.php?id=1427323 , accessed on 26th November 2012.
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Butler's statement raises interesting questions in relation to the often unacknowledged
process by which the promotion of specific human rights is advocated through a process
of scapegoating that fosters further forms of discrimination and marginalisation of some
groups  or  individuals.  In  this  regard,  the  work  of  Puar  (2007)  is  interesting  in
illustrating the process by which sexual identities become inscribed within the nation
and are actively deployed in the construction of the racial  and sexual “other”.  Puar
(2007, 2) has coined the term homonationalism in order to describe a form of “sexual
exceptionalism” that functions at the level of normative inscription of both sexual and
racial  norms into sexual subjects.  In terms close to Said's  anti-orientalist  critique,  it
could  be  argued  that  Puar  describes  the  depiction  of  the  exotic  (sexual)  other  as
successfully serving nationalist purposes. This process by which some queer sexualities
become legitimate within the nation-state, together with the production of a Manichean
discourse about liberal and illiberal countries (these latter often identified with Islamic
traditions), obviously obliterates the existence of individuals who are subtracted from
the hegemonic aesthetics and ontogenesis of gayness and queerness. Homonationalism
would be aligned, therefore, to a (c)overt racist discourse. 
The rise of this sort of “homonormative Islamophobia” that Puar describes as a
phenomenon of the global North,  is accompanied by similar processes described by
authors such as  Massad (2007) or Altman (1996). In coining the term of the “Gay
International” Massad (2007, 160) describes a process of the global transposition of
Western  gay  identities  outside  of  the  West.  For  the  author  this  enterprise  has  an
important missionary dimension (Massad 2007, 190). Seen at a glance, therefore, Puar's
and Massad's work highlight the existence of multiple trajectories in the deployment of
sexuality as an instrument to create sharp divisions and borders, and to exert cultural
and political influence on non-Western countries. 
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While Puar and Massad depict the rise of these phenomena as having a global
reach, it is important to recognise that it is at the micro-level, at the level of national(ist)
rhetoric,  that  the  deployment  of  these  arguments  is  possible  in  the  first  place.
Zangherlini (2012) offers a specification of Puar's arguments. Far from dismissing the
analytical  framework  of  homonationalism,  he  is  not  convinced  that  all  the
representations  of  Muslim  queerness  are  subject  to  the  same  degree  of  hegemonic
discourse (Zangherlini 2012, 366). For the author it is not possible to regroup under the
banner of  homonationalism all the critical engagements which involve Islam and the
'radical' others, since they cannot all uncritically be the outcome of an outright hostility.
Zangherlini's  contribution  challenges  Puar's  work,  insofar  as  it  seems  to  ask  for  a
nuanced approach to the analysis of the process by which different categories of sexual
subjects are created as being antithetical to one another. Puar's argument, nonetheless,
remains powerful and challenging, insofar as it deprives human rights discourses in the
West,  about  the  rights  of  LGBTI persons,  of  an  aura  of  idealism that  often  masks
unavowed political objectives.  Homonationalism, therefore, could be said to function
both as an omni-comprehensive corollary to human rights rhetoric,  and, at  the same
time,  as  an  undeniable  ideological  glue,  which  allows  nation-states  to  proactively
promote their values abroad. 
There  are  some  illustrations  of  the  way  in  which  homonationalism may  be
practically  articulated  at  the  level  of  the  nation-state.  The  first  is  the  case  of  the
Netherlands, often cited in relation to the prominent place of discourses on gay rights
and sexual freedom in the country (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010, 963).
Jivraj and de Jong (2011, 143) define this proactive promotion of the rights of LGBTI
persons both in domestic and international politics as the “Dutch homo-emancipation
policy” (Jivraj and de Jong 2011, 143). With this term, the authors want to emphasise
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the  way  in  which  tolerance  of  homosexuality  has  gained  legitimacy  into  Dutch
nationalist discourse and identity (Jivraj and de Jong 2011, 145). What they describe is
the way in which strategies for promoting this  tolerance strongly target the Muslim
population, who are considered to be homophobic by default. 
Mepschen,  Duyvendak  and  Tonkens  (2010,  966)  read  this  process  of  active
promotion of  the rights  of LGBTI persons in  the Netherlands in  the context  of the
'rampant  secularisation'  that  the  country  is  undergoing.  Moreover,  they  also
contextualise the image of the gay man in the Dutch narrative of human rights as the
“ideal citizen of neoliberal modernity” (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010, 970)
because of his autonomy. Dutch Nationalism, therefore, has managed to appropriate the
rhetoric of human rights for LGBTI persons in order to create the  homophobic other.
Jivraj and de Jong (2011, 148) define it as “capitalisation of sexuality in relation to the
perceived multicultural crisis”. It is possible to read the Dutch example, therefore, as
generating  two outcomes:  on  the  one  hand  the  domestication  of  formerly  dissident
sexualities and gender(s);  on the other hand, the racial  stigmatisation of presumably
illiberal segments of the political community. 
Collateral  to  homonationalism,  although placed in  a somewhat  different  geo-
politically specific context, is the phenomenon of pinkwashing applied to the creation of
a gay-friendly image of Israel which stands in opposition to a presumed “Palestinian
Homophobia” (Puar 2011, p. 137). Pinkwashing strategies are broadly framed in terms
of a re-branding of Israel (Schulman 2011) whose aim would be that  of concealing
Israel's violations of the rights of the Palestinians behind an image of a tolerant, open
country for gay persons. This phenomenon has undeniable and complex implications in
the  context  of  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.  While  the  exploration  of  these
ramifications is obviously beyond the scope of this analysis, what is interesting in this
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context is the omni-presence of the nation-state as the promoter or obstacle to human
rights. The re-branding of Israel as gay-friendly, therefore, is problematic because of the
process of essentialisation of the Palestinians as homophobic, and also in the context of
the process of the construction of a national identity. 
Both the case of the Netherlands and the case of Israel, therefore, illustrate the
thin line existing between a selfless defence of universal human rights principles and the
danger  of  instrumentalising  the  rights  of  some  individuals  in  order  to  potentially
exclude  and  marginalise  others.  In  the  context  of  this  research,  the  framework  of
homonationalism will be applied, in an experimental way, to a non-national context, that
of the Council of Europe. The objective is that of investigating the extent to which there
may be a form of undetected “European racism”, as Balibar has suggested, that fosters
the creation of the “other” in terms of sexual and gender identities, and functions not at
the level of each and every member state of the organisation,  but is structured as a
powerful supranational meta-narrative on human rights. 
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Chapter Four -  Researching Critically Human Rights between
Actions and Meanings
It could provocatively be argued that human rights have become one of the most
sophisticated  discourses  of  modernity.  Because  of  the  ever-growing  importance  of
'human rights'  in political  discourse,  the meaning associated with this  concept often
seems to be taken for granted. Individuals and states seem to tacitly agree on both the
general idea and intrinsic value of human rights, to the point that those who refuse to
speak the language of 'human rights' or who doubt their legitimacy or efficacy are often
labelled as illiberal  or  reactionary.  However,  the meaning of  the concept  of  'human
rights' is far from being fixed. In this regard, the incessant proliferation of rights claims
and  new  forms  of  entitlements,  constitute  fascinating  material  for  critical  analysis.
Against the background of unproblematic endorsement and promotion – and sometimes
exportation – of  “universal  human rights”,  the adoption  of  a  critical  outlook in the
analysis of human rights law and practice appears crucial, as it can both help to appraise
the  social  component  of  law  and  law-making,  as  well  as  shedding  light  on  the
inconsistencies underpinning contemporary human rights discourses. 
In the context of this research, which engages with the existence of a productive
process  at  the  Council  of  Europe,  whereby  specific  LGBTI  identities  are  created,
circulated and reinforced, a critical approach to the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights seems the most suited. In fact, a critical approach fits best with the task
of unveiling the unspoken ways in which some individuals are framed as legitimate
rights-holders, while others are symbolically expelled from the courtroom,  the juridical
sphere and – by extension –the social and political sphere. 
The chosen methodological framework for this research will combine a critical
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deconstruction of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, with an
account  of  a  period  of  participant  observation  carried  out  at  the  Office  of  the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe in 2010. The combination of
these two methods certainly presents some challenges, as the textual analysis occupies a
much more central place in comparison to the account deriving from the participant
observation.  The decision to allocate unequal space to these two methods, however,
reflects the current overwhelming importance of judicial discourses on human rights
with respect to political, diplomatic, sociological and philosophical discourses on the
same  topics  and  issues.  In  the  context  of  this  project,  the  rampant  process  of
juridification  of  LGBTI  identities  will  be  acknowledged  in  conjunction  with  a
discussion of the negative implications that this over-legalisation of LGBTI identities
entails for the rights-holders. 
Contextually, a critical analysis of the various forms that the recognition of the
human rights of LGBTI persons currently takes in the European continent presents other
challenges. Firstly, because of the potential of human rights to engender compassion,
empathy and understanding, it is important to discuss the researcher's positioning – and
questions of reflexivity – with respect to the object of inquiry. Secondly, socio-legal
research on LGBTI issues requires a discussion of the possibility of “queering the law”
and  the  implications  and  potentialities  that  this  methodological  approach  entails.
Thirdly, the decision to conduct participant observation in an institutional setting such
as the Council of Europe requires a discussion of the power relations at play during this
process and the influence that a possible power imbalance may have on the researcher's
positioning  and  outlook.  Seen  together,  these  three  challenges  are  crucial  corollary
aspects of the description of the methodological approach and the methods adopted for
this research. A detailed discussion of the chosen methods of investigation (a critical
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deconstruction of relevant case law and participant observation) will be complemented,
in this chapter, by a critical engagement with the theoretical problems arising from the
choice of these methods, as well as a description of the research setting, the Council of
Europe and the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights. 
The Researcher's Positioning 
Describing the positioning of the researcher with regard to the object of this
research is essential. For someone who endorses a socio-political identity as a lesbian
woman, doing research from the “inside”, or doing research in a familiar field, can be
problematic. In engaging in a continuous dialogue with “partial truths”, one could be
tempted to agree with personal convictions or intellectual sensibilities with regard to
some of the arguments presented. While a significant distance is established between the
researcher and the object of the research in order to minimise biased interferences, it
would be incorrect to disregard the influence that the researcher’s identification as a
lesbian woman has on her outlook on issues of equal rights and justice. My research
was motivated partly by the need to understand how it is possible for a lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender or intersexual person to be excluded from the enjoyment of human
rights through the articulation of legal and political reasoning, but it also stemmed from
the fact that identities do not originate entirely from within the subject. 
Moreover, my personal experiences have endowed me with interesting material
for reflection on what it means to be a subject of “human rights”. As a lesbian woman
with a disability who comes from an Italian middle-class family,  I  have always felt
characterised by different sub-identities. However, it is not the mere awareness of these
multiple intersecting lines that has been important for me. My experience has, rather,
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been  shaped  by  recognition  of  the  fact  that,  at  various  stages  of  my  life,  these
identitarian  traits  have  played  different  roles  in  the  construction  of  my  social  and
political identity. In the context of socialisation with my peers during my school years
and in my choice of employment, my disability has given me occasion to reflect on my
rights and entitlements. When I “came out”, I realised that this new “identity” implied
the existence of a limitation to my rights that had not seemed relevant to me before.
Later on, when my family underwent important changes in its financial situation, I had
the time to reflect on my class and on the rights and privileges attached to a certain
economic  status.  Still  today  the  socio-political  position  from which  I  speak  is  not
always the same, and does not necessarily always encompass all of the characteristics
that define me. The combination of these different parts, which endow me with a social
and political awareness, have pushed me to think about how it is difficult to detach
different sets of rights and requests attributed to the same person, as many of these
rights  and  requests  are  often  deeply  intertwined  and  intersect  with  one's  gender,
sexuality, class, ethnicity, and so forth. 
I decided to focus on issues pertaining to the sphere of gender and sexuality
because of their peripheral position within human rights scholarship and because of the
profoundly fascinating challenges that these issues present for different human rights
actors. I carried out this research while bearing in mind the often-conflicting identities
that each person possesses and valuing the social  and political  significance of these
complex combinations. 
In order to investigate the socio-legal construction and reproduction of LGBTI
identities  in  the  political  and legal  arena  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  questions  arise
regarding  the  appropriate  methods  to  employ.  In  order  to  gain  “entrance”  into  the
juridical field a set of highly sophisticated skills is needed. This renders problematic
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access to both legal texts and rhetorical devices, as well as the pre-existing body of legal
literature and case law specific to the sub-field object of the research. Therefore, the
complexity of the position in which the socio-legal researcher finds her/himself cannot
be solely unravelled and explained by means of the reflexive approach.
To Queer or Not to Queer the Law? Methodological Dilemmas
Far  from  aiming  to  reveal  an  immanent  universal  truth  regarding  legal
constructions of LGBTI identities, this research tries to shed light on existing patterns of
the crystallisation of identities in the juridical field that are also inextricably connected
to the political  articulation of these same identities in other domains.  This research,
therefore,  is  informed  by an  attempt  to  move  beyond  the  narrow concepts  of  both
structure and  fluidity, which are typical of the polemical interaction between the Law
and Queer Theory, in order to explore the opening up of alternative – yet not completely
oppositional – ways in which sexual orientation and gender identity may be framed
beyond rigid normative prescriptions. 
 Going beyond the framework of Queer Theory in social  research concerning
LGBTI identities is, to some extent, risky. Applying Queer Theory as a methodology to
a highly institutionalised and structured context such as the juridical one is – at best –
problematic. Kepros' (in Fineman et al. 2009, 5) definition of Queer Theory as trying to
“foster [...] social change by keeping its own status as a theory undefined, its techniques
post-modern, and its membership open”, evidences how difficult it can be to establish a
dialogue between legal discourses and Queer Theory.
“Queer Legal Theory” has been conceived as a synthesis between the normative
domain and the open network of extremely diversified queer experiences. Queer Theory
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Scholars engaging with this very ambitious project of synthesis, however, consider it to
harbour a certain degree of criticality amounting, to a certain extent, to a paradoxical
juxtaposition of terms. On the one hand, there is the rejection of dominant social norms
regarding sexuality, gender, intimacy and kinship; on the other hand there is the legal
articulation of these same predominant social norms (Romero in Fineman et al. 2009, p.
190). The result is a partial overcoming of the respective weaknesses of the two, which,
in turn, may disorient the researcher and fail to provide practical analytical tools for the
study of both the theory and practice of human rights concerning LGBTI persons.
This project, however, does not depart entirely from Queer Theory, as it adopts
the theoretical perspectives of authors such as Judith Butler and Michel Foucault. This
is  not  seen  as  being  contradictory,  since  the  attempt  at  deconstruction  and
problematisation of sex,  sexuality and gender is  conceived here,  not as the point of
arrival, but rather as the point of departure, in order to carry out a further deconstruction
and critique of the law. In this sense, tenets of Queer Theory are deployed strategically
rather than systematically.  This strategic deployment can help to avoid the insidious
loop  of  endless  dematerialisation  and  deconstruction  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,
transgender or intersexual identities that Queer Theory could encourage. In this regard,
Morgan (1995) has proposed an interesting analysis of Queer Theory's relationship with
legal scholarship. In dismissing the hypothesis that Queer Theory may take an interest
in legal reform(s), Morgan claims that the ultimate goal of Queer encounters with the
legal  domain  is  that  of  operating  “transgressive  readings  of  the  corpus  of  legal
knowledge; its tenets and other forms of discourse” (1995, 40). Hence, Morgan (1995,
41)  conceives  of  “deconstruction”  as  a  method  as  an  analytical  tool,  rather  than  a
synthesising tool. This last aspect of Queer Theory's problematic relationship with the
legal sphere represents precisely the reason while tenets of Queer Legal Theory are
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deployed strategically rather than systematically in the context of this research. While
sharing most of the assumptions made by Queer (Legal) Theory about the productive
role  of  the  law  with  respect  to  sexual  and  gendered  identities,  a  mere  process  of
deconstruction is insufficient to imagine alternative ways in which human rights can be
radically reconfigured and re-appropriated by rights-holders themselves. In this regard,
therefore,  queer  vocabulary  and  concepts  will  be  employed  in  the  context  of  this
analysis, which considers human rights as potentially useful instruments of protection,
rather than solely artificial political proclamations whose nature and features cannot be
radically altered.  Furthermore,  the strategic deployment of the fundamental tenets of
Queer Legal Theory and Queer Theory allows more freedom in exploring the ways in
which  'human  rights'  can  be  reworked,  radically  altered  and  modified,  rather  than
simplistically being dismissed as useless and obsolete devices of power. 
Mixing Methodologies for Studying Human Rights between Texts 
and Practices
 Researching human rights from a socio-legal perspective requires more than a
mere engagement with the black letter of the European Convention on Human Rights or
the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights. It would be reductive to think
that a purely textual analysis of the case law of the ECtHR is sufficient to unveil the
social component of human rights law and practice that actively shapes and somehow
constrains legal LGBTI subjectivities in the context of the Council of Europe. On the
contrary, this operation requires a multi-layered methodological approach that can allow
the research to simultaneously expose and analyse the crucial textual subtleties present
in the legal texts contributing to the creation of specific LGBTI identities, as well as
describing similar productive processes happening in the extra-legal sphere within the
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Council of Europe. 
Therefore,  for  this  research,  a  critical  deconstruction  of  the  case  law of  the
ECtHR on issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity is combined with
participant observation carried out in 2010 at the Office of the Commissioner of Human
Rights of the Council of Europe. The participant observation, which lasted four months,
took place at a crucial moment in which the Commissioner was carrying out what could
somehow  be  defined  as  “pioneering  work”  on  the  rights  of  LGBTI  persons.  The
implications  of  the  innovative  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  Commissioner  will  be
thoroughly addressed in the remainder of this  research.  The combination of the two
chosen methodological components is aimed at offering a multi-faceted account of the
various ways in which some LGBTI rights-holders are legitimated through the language
and practice of human rights, while others are silenced and framed as outsiders. In this
regard, therefore, while the critical deconstruction of the ECtHR case law brings to the
forefront  the  question  of  legal  language as  being  inherently productive,  rather  than
merely descriptive, the participant observation enables the observation of the related
ways in which non-judicial actors within the Council of Europe – and in particular the
Commissioner – contribute to fostering specific models of LGBTI rights-holders, which
are fundamentally attuned to the descriptions offered by the case law of the ECtHR.
Critical Legal Theory, Human Rights and the Deconstruction of 
ECtHR Case Law
When discussing the appropriate method for undertaking a critical analysis of
the social and political components of the case law of the ECtHR on sexual orientation
and gender identity, it is not possible to eschew a discussion of the researcher's choice
of  jurisprudential  approach.  The  researcher  is  implicitly  asked  to  choose  between
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relying  on a  liberal  conception  of  jurisprudence,  attuned with  the  tradition  of  legal
positivism (Hunt  1986,  4),  or  espousing the  critical  legal  approach of  the  so-called
“Critical Legal Theory” movement, which emerged in the late 1970s in the United States
as  an  alternative  to  the  liberal  tradition  of  legal  thought  and  scholarship.  Legal
positivism, based on the “scientific” study of the law, as advocated by leading scholars
such as Kelsen and Hart (Douzinas and Gearey 2005, 6), is premised on the idea that the
legitimacy of the law is beyond discussion, as it is based on formal reason and deprived
of ethical concerns (Douzinas and Gearey 2005, 6). Hunt (1986, 4) describes the key
features  of  legal  positivism  as  encompassing  the  claim  to  law's  uniqueness  in
comparison to other forms of “social control”; the claim that law is made up of rules
that also define the domain in which they need to be applied; the affirmation of the
inherent  legitimate  and  objective  character  of  legal  rules;  and  the  possibility  of
predicting the result of a legal process based on the application of specific rules. 
Critical Legal Theory emerges in sharp contrast to this depiction of the law as
inherently  objective,  legitimate  and  characterised  by  rationality  and  predictability.
Echoing  the  intuition  of  American  legal  pragmatists  such  as  Dewey  (Ward  1998),
Critical Legal Scholars (CLS) propose an alternative model of jurisprudence that breaks
with the liberal legal tradition,  insofar as they depict  the law as a domain in which
principles of indeterminacy and contingency characterise the legal process and inform
legal outcomes. The idea of indeterminacy refutes the assumption that legal disputes can
be  solved  without  controversy  or  with  absolute  certainty.  A  “false  sense  of
determinacy”,  instead,  can  be  said  to  be  conveyed  whenever  reference  is  made  or
implied from the existence of a presumable societal consensus on specific topics, issues
or values (Kairs 1982, 3). The concept of contingency, instead, refers to the fact that the
law has to take into account the situated, the particular and the existence of innumerable
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differences  between  individual  cases  and experiences.  The  acknowledgement  of  the
existence of differences that cannot be ignored in the legal field gives rise to the fact
that it is not possible to attribute “absolute stable meaning” to any concept – such as
“law” or “justice” – within the legal domain (Ward 1998, 178) as their interpretation
may differ  depending  on  the  context  (be  it  social,  political,  historical  or  so  forth).
Hence, the principles of indeterminacy and contingency are intended as instruments to
undermine the claim to the (political)  neutrality of the law that  characterises liberal
jurisprudence.  As  will  be  illustrated  in  the  remainder  of  this  section,  this  operation
becomes possible through the process of “deconstruction” of the legal text, which is
analysed  beyond its  self-evident  character  and is  symbolically  dissected in  order  to
reveal  rhetorical  artifices  and  devices  that  hide  fundamental  social  and  political
productive operations of legal language. 
Generally  speaking,  while  Critical  Legal  Theory  cannot  be  described  as  a
coherent body of scholarship (Gordon 1982, 642), the idea that the law, as has been
briefly  hinted  at,  does  not  possess  the  characteristics  of  objectivity,  aprioristic
legitimacy and predictability as legal positivists would suggest, represents a cornerstone
of Critical Legal Theory. On the contrary, the law can be said to “manufacture (...) its
own conditions of legitimacy and then attempts to legislate them as a priori universals
that have a legitimising effect through their appeal to reason” (Douzinas and Gearey
2005, 40). Hiding behind its presumed neutrality and objectivity, the law for CLS is
inevitably political. In this regard, therefore, Critical Legal Theory seeks to bring to the
surface the dynamics of selection and suppression of specific legal principles, which can
be used to legitimise, uphold and preserve the status quo (Gordon 1982, 650-651). 
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Critical Legal Theory and Human Rights
As Ward (1998, 156) has observed, many CLS have concerned themselves with
the question of “human rights” and in particular have attempted a “critique of the rights
thesis”. It is easy to understand why the question of human rights represents such an
appealing object  of  interest  for Critical  Legal  Theory:  promoted as being objective,
universal and the product of a presumed collective morality, human rights represent the
perfect target for those who wish to critically engage with one of the most paradigmatic
products of liberalism. In his critique of rights, Tushnet (1984) has engaged with both
the question of indeterminacy and contingency. With regard to the former, the author
has claimed that the language of rights can be used interchangeably by both those who
wish  to  promote  and  those  who  oppose,  human  rights,  in  virtue  of  the  open  and
indeterminate character of this specific form of legal language (Tushnet 1984, 1364). As
for  the  concept  of  contingency,  Tushnet  has  affirmed  that  the  meaning  of  “human
rights” is unstable, because it depends on the specific setting, rather than on abstract
formulations (Tushnet 1984, 1363). His suggestion, therefore, is to abandon altogether
the language of rights, given its inability to emphasise the importance of individuals'
experiences as opposed to abstract human rights proclamations. 
Among CLS, Unger  (1983) has  also engaged with the question of rights.  In
pointing out the necessity of finding an alternative “proper” relation between law and
society, Unger has described human rights as an area in which democratic reform can be
carried out, by means of what he calls “superliberalism” (Unger 1983, 41). In contrast to
other CLS, who advocate the “trashing” of liberal legalism (Ward 1998, 156), Unger's
work contains a call to engage with liberalism, not by dismissing it, but by overcoming
its  current  form.  The  distinction  between  those  advocating  “trashing”  any  existent
liberal legal framework and those advocating reform from within, pushes us to reflect
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on Critical Legal Theory's ability to combine a critique with measures to address and
redress the status quo. In this regard, Douzinas and Gearey (2005, 179) have argued that
one of the problematic aspects of critical theory has been precisely that of conciliating
the  necessity  of  criticising  the  current  system of  human rights  with  what  they call
“radical lawyering”, which resorts to the language of human rights. This inability has
been  pointed  out  more  extensively  by  Critical  Race  Theory  scholars,  such  as  the
American legal scholar Patricia Williams, who maintains that the complete dismissal of
the language of human rights proposed by radical critiques of human rights may in the
end be detrimental to the interests of subordinate groups, as it  may deprive them of
protection (Gordon 1982, 657). 
Seen in the context of this research, the dialectic confrontation between Critical
Legal Theory and Critical Race Theory on the question of human rights, appears to be
of crucial importance, as the adoption of a Critical Legal Theory approach could suggest
that the language of human rights should be abandoned altogether in favour of other
forms of political engagement with individuals and communal needs and requests for
protection. The reality is, however, more nuanced, as this research seeks to retain the
concept of human rights without remaining within the domain of liberalism as Unger's
“superliberalism” suggests. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to adopt a critical
methodological approach aimed at highlighting the productive – political and social –
processes hidden in human rights discourses and language. The following section will
illustrate  the  central  interest  of  CLS  in  the  deconstruction  of  legal  texts  as  a
methodological  tool  to  expose  the  social  and political  components  of  law and law-
making. The limitations and implications of this methodological approach will also be
addressed in relation to its adoption in the context of this research. 
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Critical Legal Theory and the Deconstruction of Legal Texts: the
Politics of Legal Language
For CLS the question of legal language is inescapable: the law is  made up  of
linguistic  utterances.  Furthermore,  the  law  also  possesses  a  highly  specialised
vocabulary (Baron and Epstein 1982, 662). In this regard, Goodrich (1987, 126) has
maintained that, as a form of social discourse, the law, like religion, heavily relies on
writing for the “interpretation and control of social practice in relation to a series of
texts”. This acknowledgement of the crucial importance of the linguistic element of the
law by CLS, leads to a critical engagement with questions of legal hermeneutics. The
law is  seen  as  encompassing  values  and  principles  as  well  as  a  “rich  thesaurus  of
meanings” (Douzinas and Gearey 2005, 7). Paying attention to the structure, forms and
specific linguistic choices in legal contexts – following what can be called a “linguistic
turn” – serves to understand how the legal language both “embod[ies] and implement[s]
power”  (Baron and Epstein  1982,  673).  The  inextricable  relationship  between legal
language and power crucially involves individuals who may possess or who may be
deprived of the linguistic abilities to access the law or master legal language (Baron and
Epstein 1982, 673; Douzinas and Gearey 2005, 72). Without the necessary linguistic
endowments,  therefore,  individuals  may  become  subjected  to  the  law,  rather  than
subjects of law. 
The theory of interpretation of legal language, which will be adopted for this
research,  draws  on  the  work  of  Ronald  Dworkin.  Although  Dworkin  cannot  be
numbered among CLS, his theory of interpretation – particularly the idea that legal rules
are informed by ethical values – has been accepted by Critical Legal theorists (Altman
1986, 189) and can, therefore, be useful to understand how to critically deconstruct the
legal text. In contrast to what was held by the legal positivist scholar Hart, for whom the
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law was purely descriptive (Coleman 2002, 314),  Dworkin characterised the law as
being an interpretive concept in which principles and values occupy an important role
(Dworkin 1982, 179).  Dworkin's position descended from his consideration of law as a
“political enterprise” (1982, 194), which serves various purposes, among which are the
resolution of disputes,  the coordination of  individual  efforts  and the adjudication of
justice. 
Dworkin's theory of interpretation of law is premised on the idea that judges
confront one another not only on “empirical disagreements” but, more significantly, on
the ground of “theoretical disagreements” (1986, 1), which concern the very concept of
what  the  law is.  Contrary  to  the  positivist  assumption  that  the  law cannot  contain
disagreements of the latter sort, Dworkin maintained that judges' decisions (specifically
referring to common law) are informed by a number of factors, among which their own
understanding of what the law is plays an important role (1986, 1). In undertaking their
duties, judges embark on an interpretative process that draws from their own ethical and
moral considerations, as well as from their own conception of integrity and coherence in
the  legal  field  (Dworkin  1982,  195).  In  order  to  illustrate  his  argument,  Dworkin
resorted to literary critique. For him, in the context of common law, the judge is asked
to interpret what was done by his predecessors (other judges), as if he were to write a
chapter of a novel in a chain (Dworkin 1982, 192). In interpreting what has already been
written, the judge makes an evaluation, which implicitly refers to his own opinion about
what ensures that the integrity and coherence of the law are preserved. 
Dworkin,  however,  ultimately  appeared  in  opposition  to  CLS  because  he
presumed that judges can make use of their interpretive criteria in order to arrive at a
“correct” notion of law's integrity and coherence. Hence, while Dworkin's emphasis on
the role of principles and rights can be seen in opposition to positivist jurisprudence
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(Douzinas and Gearey 2005, 15), at the same time, his work is seen as an attempt to
“rescue legal determinacy” (Altman 1986, 189). In this regard, the dispute between CLS
and Dworkin shows the different expectations held by the representatives of the two
fronts: while Dworkin was convinced of the possibility of interpreting the law as the
“best work (…) that it  can be”, CLS point out the ultimate irreconcilability between
different principles and ideals as the illustration of the necessity of undertaking a radical
deconstruction of legal texts. Seen in the context of this research, the question of how to
critically deconstruct a legal text without lapsing into a nihilist exercise that ultimately
denies the possibility of retaining the concept of “human rights” can be configured as a
methodological  challenge.  The  remainder  of  this  section  will  address  the
methodological usefulness of the concept of “deconstruction” of the legal text by also
indicating  how  such  a  process  of  deconstruction  is  compatible  with  a  radical
reconfiguration  of  the  concept  of  “human  rights”  beyond  its  current  liberal
characterisation. 
While Minkinnen (2013, 120) maintains that it is not possible to talk about a
unified “critical legal method” and that it is more appropriate to talk about a “critical
attitude”  in  legal  research,  the  deconstruction  of  legal  texts  is  one  of  the  methods
commonly associated with Critical Legal Theory. The usefulness of this method in the
context of critical legal analysis descends from the fact that, by unveiling the politics of
language in legal texts, deconstruction simultaneously reveals the politics of the law,
thus  calling  into  question  the  presumed  universality  of  concepts  such  as  “ethics”,
“morality” or “justice” (Ward 1998, 179). In radically calling into question notions and
concepts that were taken for granted by legal positivists, deconstruction represents a sort
of Nietzschean hammer,  by means of which the multiplicity and contingency of the
legal text is revealed and the intricacy of political motivations within the legal text itself
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is exposed. Adopting deconstruction as a methodological approach, therefore, requires a
willingness to systematically identify the hidden narratives of existing power relations
within the legal text, or to “de-sediment(..) the superstructures of law that both hide and
reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of society” (Douzinas
and Gearey 2005, 70). 
The most significant proponent of deconstruction as a critical method for legal
research is  Jacques  Derrida (1992).  Derrida  associated  himself  with  CLS and made
central to his speculation the question of deconstruction of legal texts in connection with
the  question  of  justice.  Crucial  to  his  analysis  was  the  concept  of  “différance”,  a
neologism that he coined to highlight the way in which language is essentially made up
of  differences  that  are  also  present  in  the  legal  domain.  More  specifically,  Derrida
intended to address the question of the “foundation of law” and affirmed that the law is
fundamentally  deconstructible  because  it  is  constituted  by  “interpretable  and
transformable textual strata” (1992, 14). Hence, the crucial recognition of the différance
of the law is  what  rendered,  in Derrida's  opinion, the possibility of justice feasible:
justice can only be achieved by recognising the constructed character of the legal text
or, as the French author put it, “deconstruction is justice” (Derrida 1992, 15). 
Derrida's concept of deconstruction fits very well the purpose of this research,
which seeks to highlight the socially and politically constructed character of the case
law of the ECtHR on sexual orientation and gender identity. By highlighting the way in
which each legal  case  is  different and  requires  a  different interpretation (1992,  23),
Derrida exposes the role of legal language as the fundamental instrument through which
the law appears to be neutral and to possess an autonomous “foundation” but also, as the
instrument that reveals the impossibility that such a foundation exists in the first place,
given the inevitable traces of différance that language contains in the first place. The
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process  of  deconstruction  of  legal  texts,  therefore,  acquires  a  prominent  political
dimension, insofar as it aims to deny the existence of a presumed “political neutrality”
of legal language (Ward 1998, 179). Once legal language has been stripped of this aura
of “neutrality”, it is possible to analyse the ways in which this form of language can
both reflect power relations and be deployed to articulate specific moral views. 
For the purpose of this research, the method employed to critically deconstruct
the judgements of the ECtHR consists of a thorough examination of the terminology
and lexicon employed by the ECtHR to describe LGBTI plaintiffs, and their experiences
and identities. Particular attention, for instance, will be paid to the choices operated by
the ECtHR in order to “describe” a specific sexual orientation and/or gender identity, in
conjunction with both the use of other specific legal terms, as well as in connection with
the consolidated case law of the ECtHR regarding these specific issues. Furthermore,
attention will be paid to the ways in which the ECtHR narrates the plaintiffs' stories,
since the judgements contain a synthesis, operated by the ECtHR itself, of the parts'
submissions  to  the Court.  In this  regard,  therefore,  it  will  be important  to  highlight
similarities  and  differences  existing  between  different  judgements  of  the  ECtHR
concerning issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. These comparisons
can shed light not only on the possibility that the language employed by the ECtHR on
these matters may have evolved over time, but also on the possibility that the ECtHR
may deploy some terms strategically depending on the specific  legal outcome for a
given judgement. Unveiling the existence of these dynamics will help to demonstrate
the productive role played by the judges in Strasbourg in actively defining and shaping
LGBTI legal subjectivities in the European human rights arena. 
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Queering Critical Legal Theory? 
As has already been argued, this research deploys Queer theory in a strategic
way:  in  trying  to  deconstruct  the  legal  texts  it  also  attempts  to  imagine  alternative
modalities of formulation of human rights principles. In relation to the methodological
choice to use the deconstruction of the ECtHR's judgements, it is important to highlight
the intersections between Critical Legal Theory and Queer Legal Theory. Among those
who have attempted to “queer” the law, one interesting contribution is Moran's (1996)
critical legal analysis of the Wolfenden Report – a report issued in 1957 by the British
Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, which contained
some recommendations for the decriminalisation of homosexual behaviour in the UK.
Moran, who described his affiliation with Critical Legal Theory, devised in his research
a  sophisticated  analysis  of  the  Committee's  deployment  of  the  term “homosexual”,
following  a  Foucaultian  approach.  In  analysing  the  ways  in  which  the  linguistic
formulations employed by the Committee contributed to the institutionalisation of the
term “homosexual” – and by extension homosexual identities – Moran's work represents
an interesting example of a critical deconstruction of legal texts focusing on the issue of
sexual orientation. In this regard, therefore, it is very pertinent to this research. Moran's
work sheds light on the ontological construction of the “homosexual” subject by the
law, by virtue of a delimitation of possible meanings attributed to the terms (1996, 4). 
Furthermore,  Moran's  contribution appears very important in the light of this
research, because it emphasises the role of legal language in producing the identities
that  it  seeks  to  describe.  In  particular,  Moran claims that  the  Wolfenden Report,  in
extensively resorting to the term “homosexual”, had a twofold productive effect: on the
one hand it established who was allowed to utter the term “homosexual”; on the other
hand,  it  permitted  the  emergence  of  specific  linguistic  codes  associated  with  a
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homosexual identity (1996, 102). Moran's conclusion about the productive role of the
Wolfenden Report appears strikingly important in this context, as a similar approach to
the strategic deployment of specific words (“homosexual”, “transsexual”, etc.) together
with other linguistic elements that do not mark aspects of gender or sexuality will be
adopted in order to highlight the existence of productive processes of LGBTI identities
taking place at  the Council of Europe, and within the ECtHR and the Office of the
Commissioner for Human Rights more specifically. In this context, therefore, Moran's
work, can be referred to as an example of how to analyse legal documents concerning
sexual orientation and/or  gender identity by bringing to  the forefront  the productive
potential of legal language. 
A last observation within this context should be made in connection with the
work  of  Francisco  Valdes  (1999  and  2009).  Valdes  is  interested  in  showing  what
“Outcrit” scholars can bring to the field of Critical Legal Studies. Defined as scholars
who  are  aligned  with  “outgroups”,  which  broadly  encompass  all  sorts  of  outsiders
(sexual or gender dissidents, members of ethnic minorities and so forth), “Outcrits”, for
Valdes, have the objective of overcoming what he calls “Euroheteropatriarchy” (1999,
840). Valdes'  work emphasises the necessity of resorting to critical  legal analysis  in
order  to  overcome  subordination  and  showing  the  limitation  of  legal  practices  by
introducing new tools for analysis such as the concepts of multiplicity, intersectionality,
and multidimensionality (2009, 103). These concepts, Valdes argues, are working tools
that  help  to  break  with  a  monolithic  and  mono-dimensional  reproduction  of  legal
cultures (2009, 102). Furthermore, they appear crucial for scholars who are interested in
questioning “the racialised and ethnicised dynamics of sexual orientation and issues”
(2009, 93). 
This current project acknowledges the importance of Valdes' contribution, as it
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employs an analytical framework of the case law of the ECtHR based on the concept of
multiplicity  and  multi-dimensionality  of  sexual  and  gendered  identities,  in  order  to
highlight the current limitations of the definitions of the identities of LGBTI rights-
holders by this judicial institution. Furthermore, this research deploys the categories of
multiplicity and multi-dimensionality in connection with the analysis of the ways in
which  the  contemporary  (European)  sexual  citizen  is  constructed.  Valdes'  work,
therefore, can be referred to as an important working tool to be employed in the context
of the present analysis in order to bring to the forefront the lack of representation of
multiple LGBTI realities and experiences within the field of human rights in Europe. 
Ethnography and the Law: Encounters at the Borders of the Normative
A complex phenomenon like the European theory and practice of human rights
on sexual  orientation and gender  identity cannot be investigated by relying only on
textual analysis. As Goodrich points out:
”(...) the study of law as discourse is only ever a partial analysis of law; it
would be erroneous in the extreme to suppose that the entire ambit of
legislation, legal institutions and juridical practice could, in their entirety
be reduced to an analysis of discourse” (1987, 158).
Actions  are  fundamental  parts  of  the  promotion  and  circulation  of  human  rights
discourses and ethnography is grounded in the observation of actions and the meanings
that actors attribute to them. Institutional actors, such as those working in the Council of
Europe,  are  constantly confronted  with issues  of  interpretation,  re-appropriation  and
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promotion of both the founding texts and the case law on human rights. Their actions,
therefore, are informed by political, social and cultural factors. As an object of research,
moreover,  these actions outside of the juridical field are  fascinating,  insofar as they
permit one to discover spaces in which actors make sense of their work and express
both  their  doubts  and  their  convictions  regarding  the  usefulness  of  their  work  in
redressing  and  raising  awareness  of  human  rights  violations.  Furthermore,  the
peculiarity of the specific setting of the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights
of  the  Council  of  Europe provides  a  unique  perspective  on  European human rights
discourses on sexual orientation and gender identity. Ethnography can help to describe
the intersection between political, diplomatic, social, cultural and economic factors in
the negotiation of specific narratives of human rights. At the same time, however, due to
existing constraints relating to access to the various decisional processes at the Office of
the Commissioner, the analysis contained in this research cannot be described as a full-
blown ethnography, but rather as a form of participant observation. While the researcher
had access to the field and interacted with various actors at the Office, the ability to
become fully immersed in  the  work of  the  institution  was somehow limited  by the
hierarchical  structure of  the  Office.  As far  as  possible,  therefore,  observations  were
carried out on the actions and behaviours of the various actors involved, while trying to
overcome  the  negative  impact  caused  by  the  limited  access  to  various  decisional
processes and respect for the code of confidentiality between the parts. 
Describing the Setting: the Council of Europe and the Commissioner 
for Human Rights
The  Council  of  Europe  (CoE)  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  international
organisations for many reasons. Established in the aftermath of the Second World War
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(1949), the institution was created to promote democracy and the rule of law and create
unity  among  its  member  states.  However,  it  was  the  product  of  different  political
interests. On the one hand it continued, to some extent, on European soil, the idealist
tradition of Woodrow Wilson and presented an “ideological stance against communism”
(Steiner,  Alston  and  Goodman,  2007,  936).  On  the  other  hand,  however,  it  was
conceived as an instrument to contain the aspirations of post-war Germany (Steiner,
Alston and Goodman, 2007, 933). 
To date the Council of Europe has 47 member states in Europe, with nearly 800
million people from Reykjavik to Vladivostok under the European Court  of Human
Rights'  jurisdiction.  The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental
Freedoms (ECtHR) was drafted and adopted in 1950 (but officially entered into force on
3 September 1953) and it protects a series of fundamental rights and freedoms (which
were later extended by the introduction of additional Protocols) such as: 
the right to life (Article 2); 
the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (Article 3);
freedom from slavery (Article 4);
the right to liberty, security of person (Article 5), and due process of law
(Article 6);
the right not to be held guilty for acts that were not criminal offences at the
time of their perpetration (Article 7);
the right to a private and family life (Article 8);
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9);
freedom of expression (Article 10) and of peaceful assembly and association
(Article 11);
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the right to marry and to found a family (Article 12);
a non-autonomous clause on non-discrimination (Article 14);
The Convention is binding in its entirety on the contracting parties and, under
Article 19, two institutions (the Commission of Human Rights and the European Court
of  Human  Rights)  were  created  to  observe  compliance  with  the  above-mentioned
standards.  These  adjudicatory  bodies,  however,  were  ineffective  due  to  the  steadily
increasing number of applications they received over the years; in 1998, Protocol 11
substituted them with a new full-time European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In
fact,  the  “new” ECtHR became the  only adjudicatory body in  charge  of  all  of  the
competences of both the Commission and the “old” ECtHR (De Salvia 2006, 62). The
fulcrum of the Council of Europe is, indeed, the ECtHR. Its prestigious and influential
role is  not  only  quantitatively,  but also  qualitatively  determined. The Court  saw the
amount of applications increase enormously and exponentially to nearly 90,000 pending
cases in 2006 (Steiner, Alston and Goodman, 2007, 964), and the range of human rights
issues  that  it  has  dealt  with  thus  far  constitutes  the  really  interesting  aspect  of  its
activity:
“(...)  in  qualitative  terms,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  now  spans  a
diverse array of cultural contexts, political systems, social perspectives
and levels of economic development.  (…) today it  is  confronted on a
daily basis with virtually the full range of human rights challenges of the
utmost importance within the societies concerned” (Steiner, Alston and
Goodman 2007, 964).
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The other main bodies of the Council of Europe are the Committee of Ministers (CM)
(the decisional and executive organ), the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) (a forum of
discussion  for  member  states  without  binding  powers),  and  the  Commissioner  for
Human  Rights  (a  non-judicial  institution  established  in  199917 and  elected  by  the
Parliamentary Assembly every six years). 
The figure of the Commissioner for Human Rights represents the focal point of
inquiry for this participant observation. The first Commissioner, Mr. Álvaro Gil Robles,
held the post from October 1999 to March 2006. He was followed, in April 2006, by
Mr.  Thomas  Hammarberg18.  Resolution  (99)  50  defines  the  mandate  of  the
Commissioner by establishing his independence and setting his tasks in the promotion
of education, awareness and respect of human rights. As a non-judicial institution, the
Commissioner cannot deal with individual cases but can establish strong and ongoing
contacts with national governments in order to provide advice and information on the
protection  and  prevention  of  human  rights  violations,  as  well  as  identifying
shortcomings in the implementation of human rights standards by member states set by
the Council of Europe. Although he does not systematically engage in monitoring each
member state, he can make visits and missions, draft reports, and offer opinions and
viewpoints concerning specific issues, either for a specific member state or based on a
theme. The Office of the Commissioner is of a relatively small size in comparison with
the  staff  allocated  to  other  bodies  such  as  the  Committee  of  Ministers  or  the
Parliamentary Assembly. The staff, at the end of 2010, comprised 36 persons, 24 of
whom were advisers, each of whom worked on specific member states and on specific
themes (children's rights, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity, or the rights
17 Committee  of  Ministers  of  the Council  of  Europe,  Resolution (99) 50 on the Council  of  Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, adopted on 7 May 1999.
18 The third Commissioner, currently in office, is Mr. Nils Muižnieks and he was nominated on 1 st April
2012. 
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of Roma persons, for instance). The Office is a very dynamic environment and its small
size lessens the impression that it is part of a bigger bureaucratic apparatus involving
different levels of decision-making.
Conducting  participant  observation  at  the  Office  of  the  Commissioner  was
interesting for four main reasons. Firstly, it is an innovative and recent institution whose
mandate is largely promotional and preventive, and, therefore, it is highly dynamic in
the interpretation and dissemination of human rights principles and the priorities of the
Council  of  Europe  in  different  political  and  diplomatic  contexts.  Secondly,  as  an
“independent”  figure,  the  Commissioner  has  a  different  way of  articulating  human
rights concerns and raising the awareness of the political bodies of the institutions such
as the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. The differences and the
interactions between the political/non-political practices of human rights are fascinating
in  the  context  of  the  protection  and/or  promotion  of  the  rights  of  LGBTI  persons,
because they reveal the contradictory patterns of emergence, in the legal arena, of the
rights of LGBTI persons as human rights. Thirdly, given the relatively small size of the
office,  it  is  suitable  for  ethnographic  research  in  which  the  researcher  and  the
“researched”  are  in  close  proximity;  establishing  relations  with  the  “researched”  is
particularly important and becomes more difficult if the research environment presents
large groups of individuals to be observed. 
Lastly, the reason why it was also  most interesting is that during his mandate
Mr.  Hammarberg  has  devoted  significant  energy to  the promotion of  specific  rights
issues concerning LGBTI persons. He has, in fact, published several documents on the
topic,  which, while non-binding due to the non-judicial  nature of his mandate,  have
been increasingly influential in shaping the European debate on various LGBTI persons'
human rights issues and claims. This effort reached its peak in 2011 with the publication
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of the first  pan-European report  on homophobia and transphobia in  the 47 member
states. The process of editing and revising this report was part of the observed activity in
the Commissioner’s office during this research and it generated extremely valuable data
to be analysed. It is important to note that, as a general trend, the Council of Europe has
proven to be more responsive to the emergence of rights claims on the part of LGBTI
persons in  comparison with other  human rights  systems,  such as  that  of  the United
Nations (Tahmindjis 2005, 17). The developing body of case law, as well as other non-
strictly “legal” practice,  within the context of such a highly important human rights
institution, constitutes, therefore, a perfect object of analysis for socio-legal research
aimed at discovering the patterns of the creation of LGBTI identities in the international
human rights arena. 
Participant Observation: Estranged Intimacy and the Creation of a 
Reflexive Institutional Self
One of the most important challenges of ethnographic research is the question of
“access” to the fieldwork. Issues of trust are fundamental (Brewer 2001, 84), as gaining
respect  as  an  “insider”  can  be  hard  and  may require  lengthy  negotiation.  In  some
contexts, access can be granted on the basis of perceived affinity or belonging to the
“natives”19. In other settings, the process can be formal and it may even be that skills,
competences and credentials are required in order to gain access. The latter is the case
for research carried out in institutional contexts, such as government agencies (either
political or judicial) and international organisations, as well as in the corporate sector. In
the case of socio-legal research conducted with ethnographic methods, the likelihood of
being denied access needs to be taken into account.  In the case of this  project,  the
19 see Muñoz's research on queer Latina/o communities in Los Angeles (Muñoz 2010, p. 55)
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original research design (in relation to the fieldwork) was modified precisely because of
a “denial” of access. The original planning of the fieldwork included a three-month
internship  at  the  Permanent  Representation  of  Italy  at  the  Council  of  Europe  in
Strasbourg, followed by a three-month internship at the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which is part of the Council of Europe. The rationale
for this was based on the idea of splitting the fieldwork into two phases: the first was
aimed at analysing the process leading to the formulation and shaping of a national
human rights agenda in relation to international developments in the field of human
rights for LGBTI persons. The second phase was based on a contrasting move, that is to
say starting from the institution in order to verify whether the dynamics informing the
Italian human rights agenda applied to the ECRI, or whether the lack of systematic
address of the violation of rights of LGBTI persons within the Council of Europe was
motivated by different reasons. 
The change in the above-described planning occurred because of a failure to
obtain  access  at  the  Permanent  Representation  of  Italy,  which  led  me  to  send  a
speculative application as a visiting scholar to the Council of Europe. The success of my
application was, to a large extent, due to the fact that the Office of the Commissioner for
Human Rights was at the time working on the above-mentioned report on homophobia
and transphobia in Council of Europe member states, and they were happy for me to
collaborate with them in order to carry out tasks in the finalisation and quality-checking
of the outcomes of the research. When my time as a visiting scholar ended (the end of
October 2010), I was offered the possibility of continuing to work on the project as a
temporary staff member for a period of two months (November-December 2010). 
Reflections on ethnographic practice shaped my access to the field, as well as
my expectations. Aware of the necessity of becoming “immersed” in the context of the
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Council of Europe, I had to devise an ethnographic practice that achieved three main
objectives.  Firstly,  it  had to be non-invasive and discreet,  as the institutional setting
required a high level of integration in the highly dynamic and fast-paced environment of
the office. Secondly, it had to be compatible with the creation of a bond of trust with the
actors involved. Formal and invasive interviews were likely to create more distance than
proximity. I considered that interviews, in particular, provided too rigid and systematic a
way of arranging “meanings” expressed by actors regarding their actions as opposed to
the more spontaneous and natural observation of the actors' daily activities.
As  a  practice,  ethnography –  and  in  this  case  more  specifically  participant
observation  –  can  involve  the  use  of  different  methods.  There  is,  however,  an
understanding of ethnography as fundamentally involving the active presence of the
researcher in a specific site, or “field”. In this regard, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995,
1) have offered a general, and well-known, description of the practice of ethnography
as:
involv[ing] the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people's
daily  lives  for  an  extended  period  of  time,  watching  what  happens,
listening to what is said, asking questions – in fact collecting whatever
data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the
research. 
With this definition in mind, it is possible to say, therefore, that the ethnographer has a
wide choice of methods to collect the data in the field. As for my research, I opted for
participant  observation  with  the  objective  of  being  as  discreet  as  possible  and  to
“observe with a focus”, as Palmer (2010, 141) has suggested. In particular, given the
122
limited opportunities that I had to access all meetings, my strategies for gathering data
included  participation  in  meetings  whenever  possible  and  note-taking,  informal
conversations with the members of staff involved in the report – as well as gathering
insights from those not directly involved – together with detached observation of their
actions and public performances in the context of meanings with third parties (when I
was allowed to assist with events). I did not engage systematically in note-taking, as on
some occasions this was not possible. However, at the end of the day, if there significant
events had occurred at the office, I made a note of what had happened and added my
personal reflections on the episode. In collecting the data I was always extremely aware
of the necessity of not breaching the confidentiality agreement that I had signed. This
constituted, in fact, an important factor in the choice of the material to be included in
this research. Although it did not dramatically impact the quality of the data provided in
this context, it did, nonetheless, shape my interactions in the field. 
In  entering  the  field,  therefore,  I  tried  to  immerse  myself  in  the  “emic
perspective” (Fetterman cited in Brewer 2009, 39); that is I tried to adopt the insiders'
perspective – in this case the standpoint of the members of the Commissioner's office
and the Commissioner himself – in order to describe the observed phenomena as if I
were a permanent member of staff. In taking an active role in the work of the office, I
tried to gain proximity in order to acquire a privileged standpoint so that I could observe
participants' decisions, statements and behaviours. 
As has already been hinted at, this research is not traditionally “ethnographic”,
insofar  as  it  contains  a  relatively  limited  set  of  ethnographic  observations.  It  is,
therefore, more correct to define it as employing participant observation as a method in
order to gain insights into the actions of the actors at the Office of the Commissioner,
and  trying  to  bypass  the  difficulties  engendered  by  the  lack  of  full  access  to  the
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activities of the observed actors. Of the four levels of participation in the field identified
by Gold (in Brewer 2001, 84), the one chosen here was the  participant-as-observer,
through which  the  researcher  conducts  their  investigation  without  concealing  it  and
fully participating in the field. In the context of the Office, this level of participation
was  beneficial  because  it  allowed  me  to  obtain  first-hand  material  concerning  the
operational  and  decisional  processes  regarding  the  actions  of  the  Commissioner  on
LGBTI issues, by means of direct collaboration. While, of course, I had to sign, upon
my arrival, a statement of confidentiality, which implied a strong ethical positioning
with regard to both the “researched” and the object of my research, at the same time
building a trusting relationship was facilitated to some extent  by my relative degree of
expertise on LGBTI issues. This determined a high degree of acceptance of my presence
and my role and also influenced the actors in the way that they perceived me as an
“external” researcher. 
From the start, I was not perceived as a dangerous outsider interfering with the
office's activities, but as a member of staff and a valuable asset in the revision of the
report. This created a sort of intimate relationship, which, according to Brewer (2001,
11),  is  an  important  attribute  of  ethnographic  research.  A  form  of  intimacy  in
institutional settings, although it may seem unlikely, can be established whenever the
researcher and the “researched” establish a fruitful dialogue and cooperate on certain
daily  activities.  The  intimate  character  of  the  relationship  can  be  fostered  by  the
attainment of a common operational goal, or by participation in events or activities to
which both sides attribute meaning.
The concept of  intimacy in the field, however, is also complex, and requires a
sort  of  detachment  from  the  object  of  research  and  from  personal  values  or  the
positioning of the researcher. For this reason, intimacy must, in a way, be estranged, by
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means of a reflexive consideration of the researcher's interactions in the field. In fact, a
strong reflexive stance is also present in this research in relation to issues of validity and
the  reliability  of  the  data.  While  on  the  one  hand  ethnographic  research  is  more
ideographic than nomothetic (Steier 1991; Brewer 2001) in the sense that it focuses on
the specific exploration of a case rather than aiming at theoretical abstraction or general
statements, it is also true that issues of reliability and validity are always present in the
process.  To this  extent,  it  is  important to understand in  what  way engaging in self-
reflection can enhance the validity of the data. In the case of this research, the position
adopted is that of the “validity-as-reflexive-accounting” (Denzin and Lincoln in Brewer
2001, 130). 
The  reflexive  outlook  of  the  research,  therefore,  helps  in  identifying  those
patterns  of  interpretation  and observation  of  the  phenomena in  the  field,  which  are
informed  by  the  researcher's  own  positioning.  Dewalt  (2010,  68)  observes,  in  this
regard, that what constitutes the object of observation in the field is also “shaped by the
interests  of  the  researcher”.  In  particular,  both  the  fact  of  having  a  background  in
International Relations and the fact of identifying as a lesbian woman had an impact on
my way of entering the field and carrying out my research. These elements obviously
pertain  to  two  different  spheres  (one  professional  and  the  other  more  “personal”).
However, I have never underestimated the impact that my background could have on
my method of conducting research. 
My background in International Relations shaped my attitude in approaching the
field in relation to a sort of latent disenchantment with the usefulness of international
cooperation  beyond  the  framework  of  Realism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  international
institutions  could  be  seen  as  mainly  promoting  the  mere  national  interests  of  the
contracting parts in a quest for power. This classic Realist tenet was likely to remain
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dormant in my considerations about the effectiveness in promoting human rights for an
institution like the Council  of Europe.  On the other hand the fact of identifying as,
somehow, belonging to the “L” segment of the LGBTI acronym,  also had an important
role  in  my positioning in  the  field.  In  the collection  of  essays  Queer Methods and
Methodologies (ed. Browne and Nash 2010), several authors discuss the extent to which
it is possible to talk about “queer methods” and how they are used practically in social
research.  Their  point of departure (queer methods) and the point of arrival (a queer
object of study) therefore coincide and are congruent. 
While this research cannot be defined as being “queer” in a straightforward way,
this  reasoning  still  applies.  While  I  prefer  to  identify as  a  lesbian  for  cultural  and
political affinities with the term, I also think that a queer approach to ethnography does
not collide with my own identity in terms of sexual orientation. The problem arises,
however, in connection to the question of how to research “queerly” a non-queer (and
therefore fictitiously straight by default) environment like the Council of Europe. Such
a question has a tight and, hence, fundamental connection to the issue of reflexivity
because being able to cast a queer gaze on the activities of the Commissioner could be
both an advantage in terms of grasping very subtle details and aspects of his work, and
also a drawback if this ultimately affects the capability of the researcher to evaluate with
detachment the actions and processes observed. Valocchi (in Browne and Nash 2010,
10) draws a line of continuity between ethnography and queer theory, since ethnography
“enables  the  intersections  of  sociological  and  queer  theories,  (...)  allow[ing]  for
openness, flexibility and change”. 
As a methodology,  therefore,  ethnography – and participant  observation as  a
method – is  already cognate to  queer  theory due to its  exploratory and open-ended
nature and practice. However, the question stretches beyond these terms and forces one
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to take into account the way in which the researcher perceives her/his being queer as
somehow constituting a “lens” through which phenomena are observed, or the way in
which personal positioning is also shaped and changed once in the field. The dilemma
with which the participant observer is confronted concerns the risk of leaning back on a
safe and already secure sense of self. In entering a highly institutional setting like the
Council of Europe, I had in mind a code of conduct that did not allow the expression of
queerness. At the same time, however, I was a lesbian researcher willing to do research
on how actors in the field of human rights approach issues concerning the rights of
LGBTI persons. While I was striving to position myself in a sort of objective way, I was
aware that I had expectations regarding the way in which these issues would be tackled
and I somehow foresaw the existence of an almost prim way of addressing these issues.
The reality of the field, of course, proved to be much more nuanced and complex than
this and, as a result, the way I conceived of my role as an outsider was modified during
the period I spent in Strasbourg. 
Abandoning  my  subjective  position,  therefore,  was  not  required,  let  alone
desirable. On the contrary, the approach adopted corresponds to what Donna Haraway
calls a “doctrine of embodied objectivity” (Haraway 1988, 581), for whom the body and
the position of the subject with regard to the research acquire central importance. For
Haraway,  objectivity  is  achieved  only  in  terms  of  an  awareness  of  one's  point  of
observation,  because  it  is  precisely  such a  point  of  observation  that  guarantees  the
possibility of embracing “vision”. Vision is conceived of not as an all-encompassing
passive endeavour aiming at disembodiment (Haraway 1988, 582), but more as a critical
encounter with embodied realities. Objectivity is to be found in the particular and in the
specific embodiment (Haraway, p.582) and, as for the form of knowledge for which the
researcher should strive, Haraway defines this form of knowledge as a form of “situated
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knowledge” (Haraway 1988, 590). 
The questions of objectivity and self-reflection, however, are also connected to
the creation of an institutional self; that is to say the construction of a credible status as
an  insider  in  the  Council  of  Europe.  If  “going  native”  in  ethnographic  research
(especially in anthropology) often requires adopting (partially and sympathetically) the
customs and routines of the social groups that are the object of the study, the same is
true in highly institutionalised contexts, where there are no customs as such to adapt to,
but in which one has to learn how to negotiate a dual position as both a researcher and a
member of staff, therefore learning conventions, symbols of power and hierarchies, and
modes of interaction with peers and superiors. Both the position of visiting scholar and
that  of  administrative  assistant  at  the  Council  of  Europe  implied  a  high  level  of
commitment and daily work. I had to learn in order to make the best of my research
process,  find time to construct my professional self,  establish collaborative relations
with  the  members  of  the  staff,  and,  at  the  same time,  observe  those processes  and
interactions with the eye of the researcher. 
In  this  endeavour  there  is  also a  need to  overcome the  imbalance  of  power
relations.  Whilst  these  are  usually  established  in  favour  of  the  researcher  in
ethnographic  fieldwork,  in  institutional  settings  they can  instead  favour  the  persons
positioned high in the hierarchy. My superiors could choose, given their authority, not to
disclose information or to deny me access to some events or meetings. These verbal
exchanges (or lack thereof) participate in the definition, in terms of power, of linguistic
relations proposed by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). For them, linguistic relations “are
always  relations  of  symbolic  power  through  which  relations  of  force  between  the
speakers and their respective groups are actualised in a transfigured form” (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 1992, 142). In this context, therefore, the persons in the institution have
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the power to exercise the “statutory ability” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 146), which
is  understood  as  a  linguistic  ability.  The  creation  of  an  institutional  self  (and  its
coexistence  with  the  self  of  the  researcher)  ultimately  depends  on  these  linguistic
relations  because  they  act  as  a  point  of  access  to  participation  in  the  setting  and
therefore  influence  the  extent  to  which  the  researcher  can  effectively  carry  out
participant observation. 
The methodological framework illustrated above is complex and articulated. It
was necessary to present a varied array of instruments in order to explore the different
dimensions of a phenomenon such as the protection of human rights for LGBTI persons
in Europe, which still occupies an eccentric position in the scholarship on human rights.
While it could be argued that a “hierarchy” for human rights violations is, at best, an
underlying  symptom of  a  partial  failure  of  international  human  rights  law to  fully
include all individuals, at the same time it is the product of specific political and social
processes  that  need to  be  thoroughly investigated.  Even when the  rights  of  LGBTI
persons  are  recognised  and  addressed,  heteronormativity  –  and  to  some  extent
homonormativity (Duggan 2003) – as well as the binary organisation of gender still
strongly permeate these discourses. 
By deploying  the  methods  discussed  above,  it  is  possible  to  investigate  the
macro-dynamics regulating the expression of sexuality and gender,  and the interplay
between them, and the creation of identities in a highly hierarchical and regulated space
like the juridical one. To analyse in depth the social constructions behind the current
framework of protection of the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe, it is necessary to
resort to instruments that allow one to discover the concealed workings of dominant
institutions and societal arrangements that work in the direction of the normalisation of
multifarious expressions of sexuality and gender. 
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Chapter  Five  -  Against  Nature:  Defining,  Discussing  and  Judging
Homosexuality in the Legal Context
Current human rights discourses tend to approach the complex web of injustices
and human rights violations following a “single-issue” strategy. In 2008 the famous US
gay magazine The Advocate, put on the cover the following title: “Gay is the new black.
The  last  great  civil  struggle”20.  This  title  shows  an  investment  in  a  temporality  of
tangible progress in the field of human rights struggles (as if one could say “we are
done  with  racism,  let's  tackle  homophobia now”)  and dismisses  all  the  interrelated
issues such as class, ethnicity, and religion, as Eng (2010) has also observed. Although
this  is  still  the  prevalent  –  and  problematic  –  model  for  framing  human  rights
discourses,  it  is  necessary  to  ask  whether  it  represents  a  satisfying  framework  for
redressing violations and protection from abuse and injustice.
In his 2012 analysis of the case law of the ECtHR relating to sexual orientation,
Johnson (2012, 1) has maintained that the role of the law has significantly shifted from
discouraging the perpetration of homosexual acts, to the protection and enhancement of
the “sexual citizenship” of  homosexuals21.  In this passage, it  can be argued, the role
played by respectability22 is crucial. Respectability has framed the entrance of former
outlaws  into  a  domain  made  of  normalised  identities,  viable  alternative  kinship
20 The Advocate, Gay is the New Black?, available at : http://www.advocate.com/news/2008/11/16/gay-
new-black , accessed 16 April 2013. 
21 Johnson defends his use of this essentialist vocabulary, the same employed by the Court, by defining it
as an “analytical expediency” (Johnson 2012, 15). The adoption of such language, however, cannot be
taken as a mere “expediency”. On the contrary it seems to be more of an “analytical complacency”
with the Court. Johnson mildly recognises the limitations of such language. Nonetheless, he is not able
to distance himself from it thereby adopting a substantial critical standpoint: a questioning of such
language would have added a layer of complexity to his analysis. This lack of discussion is also due to
the fact that one of the conclusions that Johnson reaches is that the essentialist strategies have had,
over the years, the advantage of having led to substantial success in the rights campaign and of the
complaints on grounds of sexual orientation. 
22 Beger (2004, 95) discusses human rights and respectability as being interrelated: human rights confer
respectability to  individuals  who are recognised  to  have undergone violation of  their  rights.  This
aspect, he maintains, is important in lobbying for gay rights but it is also characterised by a high
degree of instability. 
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arrangements to heterosexual marriage, and non-threatening forms of sexual expression.
It is common to look back and see how “gay”, “lesbian”, or “bisexual” individuals have
been defined:  outlaws,  perverts,  criminals, but what have they  become? This analysis
will suggest that the creation of LGB identities at the Council of Europe coincides, to a
significant extent,  with the definition of the liberal  European subject as a free, self-
determined, and autonomous citizen simultaneously attached to, and emancipated from,
the nation-state. 
The ambiguous positioning of LGB persons with respect  to the political  and
social  structure,  however,  needs  to  be  analysed  beyond  the  framework  of
heteronormativity.  An  equally  powerful  framework  by  which  LGB  individuals'
citizenship is defined is that of “homonormativity”. Duggan (2003, 50) has coined the
term “homonormativity” to describe a politics that on the one hand supports the existing
institutions (such as marriage, the army, and so forth), instead of challenging them; and
on the other clearly de-politicises gay culture. Heteronormativity and homonormativity,
therefore, are not antithetical. It is ironic that the two can coexist together and operate
within the same structures, sometimes in the legal system, as a double-binding system
of  regimentation  for  individuals.  Standards  of  behaviour,  identities,  and  social
arrangements concerning sexuality are produced in the domain of the utterance of the
norm, but also within the abstract space of the unsaid. The hetero- and homonormative
frameworks  operate  in  a  condition  of  distant  synchronicity,  trying  to  achieve,  by
different  means,  the  same  underlying  objective  of  normalisation  and,  consequently,
uniformity. 
A preliminary discussion on the language chosen by the actors/objects of this
research, the ECtHR and the Commissioner for Human Rights, is aimed at investigating
how LGBTI identities are constructed in the first place by linguistic choices and infused
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with meaning(s) that may vary from actor to actor. The chapter will then consider the
narratives of LGB identities and discrimination related to the expression of one's sexual
orientation, including the age of consent for consensual sexual activity, criminalisation
of  homosexuality,  the  criminalisation  of  sado-masochistic  sexual  practices,  and  the
discrimination of LGB individuals in the armed forces. 
Words  Matter:  Legal  Understanding  of  Embodied  Sexualities  and
Identities
To enter  the space of  the law means to  speak and master  its  language.  It  is
important  to  point  out  that  the  authoritativeness  of  the  law can  be  transmitted  and
reinforced by the content itself, and not merely by its formal structures. Some linguistic
choices enhance and preserve this authoritativeness in the legal field, and for this there
are two main levels of analysis. The first level concerns the linguistic choices made by
the institutional  actors,  such as the judges of the ECtHR and the Commissioner for
Human  Rights,  in  relation  to  the  vocabulary  employed  in  the  definition  of  issues
relating to sexual orientation and/or gender identity. The second level of analysis is that
of authorship as a  crucial  aspect  in the process of the allocation or endorsement of
specific LGBTI identities.
What's in a Name? Nouns and Adjectives for Describing Sexuality and
Gender
The line between a derogatory or neutral use of a term can be thin. The word
homosexual is a paramount example of this. Notwithstanding the attempts of freeing it
132
from  its  original  medical  connotations,  the  word  has  substantially  retained  its
pathologising aura. Yet, the term is still commonly used and, in relation to this analysis,
it  appears  as  the  privileged  term  employed  by  the  ECtHR  when  referring  to  an
individual  with  a  specific  sexual  orientation  (either  ascribed  or  self-assumed).  It  is
striking that since the first complaints in the fifties relating to the criminalisation of
same-sex sexual acts in the Federal German Republic, the vocabulary of the ECtHR has
not been transformed at all. From their part, complainants have substantially subscribed
– if not encouraged in the first place, as Johnson argues (2012, 33) – to the circulation
of the essentialist view of homosexuality, leading to the creation of a direct link between
the humanness of the homosexual plaintiff and the humanness of the subjects of human
rights. 
The  ECtHR,  however,  is  not  the  only  body  at  the  CoE  involved  in  the
negotiation of vocabulary concerning sexual orientation and gender identity. During the
drafting of the 2011 report on homophobia and transphobia in the member states of the
CoE,  the  choice  of  words  was  a  crucial  problem  for  the  team  at  the  office  of
Commissioner Hammarberg. In its preliminary phase, the process of editing required an
effort  to  bring  linguistic  coherence  to  the  text.  The  team  sought  to  carry  out,  in
particular,  a process of de-essentialisation of homosexuality,  in favour of a different
understanding of the interplay between sexuality and personhood. In the few instances
in which the term had been retained in the report, the word homosexual was used as an
adjective, rather than as a noun. The same applied to lesbian (a lesbian woman), as well
as to  bisexual (a  bisexual person / man / woman) or  transgender and  intersexual (a
transgender / intersexual person). While the difference between homosexual (noun) and
homosexual (adjective)  may seem trivial,  it  has,  instead,  a  profound  impact  on  the
construction of the arguments: homosexual as a noun is self-sufficient and self-standing.
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It may work in order to promote an essentialist conception of sexual orientation. Zwicky
(in Livia and Hall 1997, 22) attributes the preference for adjectives rather than nouns to
the  fact  that  nouns  reduce  the  individual  to  that  single  property,  while  adjectives
designate  one  characteristic  out  of  many.  Homosexual (or  lesbian,  bisexual, and  so
forth)  as  an  adjective,  therefore,  is  used  as  an  addition,  a  non-essential  part  of  the
speech, not a substitute for the individual himself. 
As  for  the  work  of  the  Commissioner,  complementary  to  this  effort  of  de-
essentialisation has been the decision to prefer the word persons rather than people after
adjectives such as  LGBT /  gay /  lesbian /  bisexual /  transgender and  intersexual. The
persons v.  people issue here signals an important move: from a collective anonymous
and unspecified  group of  subjects,  to  an empowering depiction  of  active  individual
agents. Perfectly fitted with the demands of liberal human rights rhetoric, the persons v.
people  issue  signals  the  need  to  move  from  an  essentialist  conception  of  sexual
orientation and/or gender identity to a non-essentialist conception. It is aimed at putting
at the forefront the individual in all her/his humanness. At the same time, this process
implicitly reduces the symbolic significance and powerfulness of a term that stands for
collective  empowerment  such  as  “people”.  The  effects  of  this  linguistic  choice  are
controversial, since it contemporaneously de-materialises LGBTI identities as collective
and re-materialises them as individual positions with  relatively weaker communal and
cultural ties. 
There are significant differences between the language in use at the ECtHR and
at the Office of the Commissioner. In the work of the latter, there has been almost a
complete substitution of the word  homosexual with the word  gay (always used as an
adjective, as in gay man or gay men). Zwicky (In Livia and Hall 2007, 22) sums up the
difference by pointing to the behaviour v. identity dichotomy. In the case of the ECtHR,
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the Peircean interpretant for the word homosexual is the taxonomic description of the
medicalised homosexual, the Foucauldian personage. The Commissioner's choice to use
homosexual rather  than  gay, seems  to  suggest  the  abandonment  of  a  taxonomic
description. Gay points to different relations with other fields of life rather than simply
sexual  desire  or  behaviour.  More  specifically,  it  is  linked  to  the  existence  of
relationships  with  the  public  sphere,  to  cultural  phenomena and understandings  and
appropriations  of  homosexuality.  While  gay is  not  the  same as  queer,  as  for  all  its
disruptive  potential  it  is  still  immersed  in  the  (hetero)normative  framework,  it
nonetheless has significant political connotations. 
Power relations play a significant role in the choices adopted by different actors
at the CoE. Contrarily to the austere image of the ECtHR, the role of the Commissioner
is a dynamic institution and his dialogue with NGOs, as well as national authorities,
represents a vital  element of his  work.  He has no interest  in employing “scientific”
(hence  reliable,  neutral,  objective)  terms,  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  the  ECtHR.  The
Commissioner's  authority  derives  not  from  rigorous  legal  reasoning,  but  from  his
capability of interpreting with empathy the requests of those with whom he interacts.
The success of his work resides in persuading his interlocutors (members of national
governments,  ambassadors,  Ombudsmen)  by crafting  convincing  arguments  about  a
specific human rights issue.  The Commissioner's  work, moreover,  can be said to be
partly informed by an “epidermic approach” to human rights, by which emotions are
mobilised  with  the  objective  of  raising  awareness  and  persuading  the  intended
audiences. Therefore, a linguistic choice such as that of using the word gay can be said
to  work  in  the  direction  of  building  a  bridge  between  the  aseptic  version  of
homosexuality produced by the ECtHR, and the kaleidoscope of sexual expression.
In his 2011 report, the Commissioner goes further in trying to connect the legal
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and social  domains.  The acronym “LGBT” is  widely employed throughout  the text,
including a preliminary reference to the possibility of including “Q” for queer and “I”
for intersexual. This choice signals a relative interest and familiarity, on the part of the
Commissioner,  with  the  world  of  human  rights  activism  as  well  as  an  interest  in
communicating  the  existence  and  worth  of  these  organised  networks  to  his  main
intended audience: national authorities.  The language adopted by the Commissioner,
therefore, seems to stand partially in opposition23 to choices made by the ECtHR which
seeks to achieve a rhetoric and style that are immaculately objective. While the language
of the ECtHR remains strictly confined to the legal domain, the Commissioner seeks
precisely to overcome this rigid articulation of language by broadening his vocabulary
and looking at different human rights actors. 
The  differences  between  the  linguistic  choices  of  the  ECtHR  and  the
Commissioner are not limited, however, to words concerning sexual orientation. There
is,  instead,  an  interesting  point  to  be  made  about  the  different  uses  of  the  terms
transgender /  transsexual (either  as adjectives  or nouns).  While  the former is  more
inclusive in terms of persons who can fall within the process of crossing gender lines,
the latter, highly medically connoted, defines a much narrower group of individuals24
who have undergone some form of gender reassignment procedure in order to cross the
“line”  of  sex.  All  the  case  law of  the  ECtHR  to  date  has  invariably  adopted  this
“psychomedical construction” (Roen 2002, 502). Even in  Goodwin v. the UK  (2002)
considered by many a landmark case25 of  ECtHR's  case law on gender identity,  the
23 In addition to that it can be added that the political bodies of the institution, namely the Parliamentary
Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, tend to adopt the language adopted by the ECtHR (mainly
the use of homosexual  as a noun) but that occasionally it slips into a language more similar to the one
employed by the Commissioner. 
24 Both  Bornstein  (1995)  and  Stryker  (2008)  problematise  the  two  terms  from  a  postmodernist
perspective.
25 In this case, the ECtHR had conceded that the “biological criteria” in the definition of the gender of
the  spouse  had  to  be  overcome,  thus  allowing transgender  persons  to  marry  to  someone  of  the
opposite gender. 
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language employed is heavily connoted in medical terms. In considering the “applicant's
situation as a transsexual” (Goodwin v. the UK, 2002: para. 76) the ECtHR reinstates the
importance of  passing and, indirectly, of  respectability. This is in accordance to what
Roen (2002, 502) defines as part of “liberal transsexual politics” for which: 
(...) legal rights to access medical services are central issues. (…) One
does not proclaim oneself proudly as a lifelong 'transsexual'. One moves
into  progressively  less  threatening  identity  states  such  as  'formerly
transsexual' and, ultimately, 'woman' or 'man'. Here, it is assumed that the
transsexual person will want to seek sex reassignment surgery, that s/he
will want to pass full time as a woman or as a man, and that s/he deserves
the  legal  rights  (such  as  access  to  identification  papers  and  marriage
licenses) of any other woman or man (Roen 2002, 502).
“Liberal transsexual politics” appears to be the dominant framework in human rights
discourses,  standing  in  opposition  to  forms  of  transgression  and transcendence  that
could be defined as “radical politics of gender transgression” (Roen 2002, 502). The
ECtHR, therefore, by exclusively employing the word transsexual as a noun, promotes
a strong objectification of individuals who cross the lines of sex and/or of gender, thus
re-inscribing individuals into the framework of “transsesuxual liberal politics”.  
The work of the Commissioner on issues relating to gender identity seems to be
informed by a non-essentialist, although cautious, approach with respect to the case law
of the ECtHR. In both his 2009 Issue Paper on “Human Rights and Gender Identity”
and  in  the  above-mentioned  2011  report,  the  Commissioner  has  questioned  the
requirement, in many member states of the CoE, of undergoing gender reassignment –
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and  complete  sterilisation  –  in  order  to  have  one's  preferred  name  and/or  gender
recognised.  Nonetheless,  in  both  these  Commissioner's  documents,  the  emphasis
remains on the crucial importance of having an appropriate allocation of gender. The
impression is that a substantial departure from the male/female binary has not happened
in this context. Documents are central in allowing individuals to have autonomy and
freedom of movement. Nonetheless, they also stand for the most immediate form of
legitimation before authorities and the law. Absence of documents often coincides with
absence  of  humanness.Their  symbolic  value,  therefore,  transcends  their  function.
Hence, on the one hand documents are the key for recognition and the guarantee against
fraud and illegal status; on the other hand they confer an inescapable personal “status”
that inevitably confers worth to individuals.
The non-essentialist  approach to gender  and gender  identity endorsed by the
Office of the Commissioner can also be said to be the product of a close collaboration
established  with  the  European  transgender  activist  network  (like  the  umbrella
organisation  Transgender  Europe  -  TGEU).  At  the  operational  level,  however,  it  is
difficult for the actors involved to translate this commitment into an institutional report,
such as the one issued in 2011. A significant reason for this incomplete endorsement of
a non-essentialist outlook on gender and gender identity derives from the difficulty in
bringing together  the  requirements  of  the  law and  the  disruptive  potential  of  queer
theory. In the work of the Commissioner, the transgender (person), while not treated as
the  medical  transsexual portrayed  by  the  ECtHR,  remains,  therefore,  still  partially
embedded in the binary system of gender, a system highly functional to the workings of
the law and the sole taxonomic language that the ECtHR understands and employs.
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Who is Speaking? Authorship, Narrative, and Respectability 
The process of the creation of LGBTI identities at the CoE is not solely determined by
specific linguistic choices of either the ECtHR or the Commissioner. Johnson (2012)
has argued that complainants wishing to persuade the ECtHR have actively adopted
narratives concerning the innateness of their homosexual sexual orientation. It can be
suggested, therefore, that complainants themselves decide to adapt strategically to the
language of the ECtHR, thus framing their “story” coherently with essentialist accounts
of  homosexuality  employed  by  the  judicial  institution.  In  describing  this  process,
however, Johnson does not explore the motivations triggering this complacency with the
ECtHR. Nonetheless,  he offers  interesting examples  that  illustrate  the complainants'
strategies. It was in Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (1981) that the ECtHR recognised
for  the  first  time  homosexuality  as  an  “essentially  private  manifestation  of  human
personality”  (Johnson 2012,  47).  From that  moment  onwards,  in  Johnson's  opinion,
plaintiffs have increasingly played the “essentialist” card in order to succeed with their
claims. He quotes statements such as 
“he had been consciously homosexual from the age of 14 years ” (Dudgeon v.
the UK, 1987: 118)
“he had realised at a young age that he was irreversibly homosexual” (Norris v.
Ireland, 1988: para. 33)
“the [applicant's] avowed homosexuality” (Fretté v. France, 2002: para. 37)
These  examples  show  how  much  the  essentialist  argument  has  permeated  the
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descriptive process at the ECtHR and how willing individuals have been to subscribe to
this process of essentialisation of their identities. Johnson's analysis, however, is limited
insofar as it seems to focus exclusively on the positive outcomes that this “strategy” has
engendered for gay identity politics. What he overlooks is the way in which this almost
passive subscription to the essentialist narratives of the ECtHR on sexual orientation has
resulted in counter-productive effects on the plaintiffs themselves, whose possibilities of
expression have been incredibly reduced.
Can the plaintiffs start speaking of themselves instead of being spoken of by
ECtHR?  What  if  all  those  “homosexuals”  and  “transsexuals”  of  whom the  ECtHR
speaks  could  start  describing  themselves  in  other  terms  for  the  purpose  of  their
recognition as viable legal subjects? Strategically speaking, Johnson (2012, 61) is right
when he  says  that  essentialism allows  one to  “articulate  a  form of  humanness  that
requires  permanent  protection”.  However,  it  is  important  to  ask  whether  this
essentialisation only works to the advantage of a limited group of individuals, namely
those that are able to mobilise resources, either in terms of cultural or material capital,
in order to make their claims, through strategic litigation26 for instance. 
A crucial question that is often overlooked is who can successfully resort to the
ECtHR. Is that the person who can narrate the story well or the person who can mobilise
material and immaterial support (NGOs or legal scholars) in order to bring the case to
Strasbourg? Whilst the possession of the appropriate cultural capital can be said to be
crucial in framing one's claim, essentialist strategies may facilitate the emergence of
specific claims, rather than others. More specifically, individuals who are able to present
themselves as having a non-ambiguous sexual orientation or gender identity may find it
easier  to  respond to  the  –  unspoken  –  expectations  of  the   ECtHR concerning  the
plaintiffs' identity. 
26 The meaning and analytical usefulness of this concept will be explored in the following section. 
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Johnson's  analysis,  however,  also  offers  the  occasion  to  shed  light  on  the
plaintiffs'  constant  effort  to  become  respectable  before  the  ECtHR.  Individuals  are
harnessed into normative (either hetero- or homonormative) structures that inform the
conceptual categories employed by the ECtHR and influence the narrative standpoint
adopted.  Highlighting  the  inborn  character  of  one's  homosexuality,  describing  one's
same-sex relationship in terms of stability and commitment, underlying one's suitability
as a parent/ foster carer of a child, showing one's good record as a member of the armed
forces, affirming one's intention to be(come) a man or a woman: these statements all go
in the direction of showing one's respectability as a key to receive entitlements in return.
Is it possible, though, to narrow down rights claims to a matter of entitlement? To some
extent, respectability and acquisition of privilege (rather than a right) can be seen as
participating  in  the  problematic  liberal  dream  of  infinite  autonomy  and  personal
freedom. 
The  Narration  of  Lesbian,  Gay,  and  Bisexual  Identities  at  the
European Court of Human Rights and at the Council of Europe
The case law of the ECtHR and the (political) work of the Council of Europe, in
particular  from the  second  half  of  the  nineties,  has  been  important  in  getting  the
discussion of the rights of LGBTI persons on the human rights agenda. The official
entrance into the domain of legitimate human rights discourses, however, has also led to
a taming of those radical claims formulated by various social movements in the late
sixties and seventies which questioned the very foundations of the nation-states, such as
their core institutions. As a consequence, these movements have been institutionalised
and have adhered to mainstream human rights language, rhetoric, and tactics. In this
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regard, Grigolo (2003, 1023) has described an existing “process of minoritisation within
a 'private'  juridical space of toleration”.  The  case law of the  ECtHR, as well  as the
practices of the CoE, shows the patterns of essentialisation and privatisation concerning
LGBTI persons. The following analysis highlights these patterns of essentialisation and
privatisation of sexuality and gender, but it also compares and contrasts the case law of
the ECtHR with the practices of the Commissioner. 
The  European  Convention  On  Human  Rights:  Instruments  of
Interpretation and their Shortcomings 
An analysis of the  case law of the ECtHR must be preceded by a preliminary
introduction to the interpreting criteria employed by the ECtHR and to other crucial
concepts.  These  are  fundamental  for  understanding  how  the  ECtHR  reasons  and
assesses  the  violations  to  the  Convention,  but  they also show how the  ECtHR,  the
complainants, and the third-parties position themselves within the judicial process. The
first preliminary observation to make is the one concerning the possibility of resorting
to the ECtHR. This is only possible, in fact, after all the domestic remedies have been
exhausted, under Article 26 ECHR. 
As has already been discussed in the methodology chapter, it is significant to
note that more than 90% of applications fail to be admitted before the ECtHR. In order
to be declared admissible, in fact, an application does not only have to satisfy some
technical requirements, it  also has to be rigorous and coherent. In this regard, third-
parties  are  acquiring  an  increasingly important  role  in  participating  in  the  litigation
before  the  ECtHR.  The  concerted  participation  of  various  NGOs  falls  under  the
framework of “strategic litigation” defined by ILGA-Europe, (one of these NGOs), as
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“being about using a legal case to advance the rights of LGBTI people, usually as a part
of a wider advocacy campaign”27. It is clear how the help of third-parties, in the drafting
of the complaint, helps in maximising the persuasive impact of the claim. Furthermore
NGOs put at the service of the complainants the specific know-how that human rights
NGOs  have  accumulated  during  their  years  of  activity.  In  order  to  succeed  in
Strasborug, concerted action and some investment, in terms of economic and cultural
capital, is indeed important. The direct consequence is that applications that can enjoy
the support of third-parties, and also of good lawyers in general,  are more likely to
succeed before the ECtHR because they can avoid either the procedural or substantial
mistakes in the drafting of the application. 
Furthermore, every judgement is articulated as a tripartite document in which the
applicant  makes  her/his  claims,  the  Government  responds  to  them,  and  the  ECtHR
operates  the  evaluation  and  assesses  the  merits  of  the  case  after  having  done  an
overview of the national legislation on the instant matter. This structure, however, does
not merely replicate the submissions of the parts, but it is the product of the ECtHR's re-
construction of the submissions. In this regard, the absence of hearings, unless special
circumstances  require  them,  shows  how the  judgement  is  the  written  product  of  a
synthesis that the ECtHR carries out in absence of a true “trial” in the Courtroom. 
In  deciding  on the  cases,  the  ECtHR employs  a  set  of  crucial  interpretative
criteria: the margin of appreciation, the consensus analysis, and the “living instrument”
principle.  In  relation to  these criteria,  Johnson (2012, 69-70) has suggested that  the
ECtHR  often  employs  them  without  consistency.  The  principle  of  the  margin  of
appreciation has its origin in Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1975) and it is based on
the notion that, in relation to particular issues, national authorities are better placed to
27 A Factsheet  on Strategic Litigation to  promote LGBTI Rights in Europe,  available at:  http://ilga-
europe.org/home/how_we_work/litigation/resources , accessed 30 April 2013. 
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evaluate the restrictive measures that are necessary in order to protect and ensure the
respect of the rights of their societies. Hence, in some cases, states are entrusted with a
high degree of autonomy in assessing whether an interference by national authorities
pursued a legitimate aim and whether it did it in a proportionate way. In relation to
issues touching on morality, such as sexuality, marriage, and so forth, this principle has
had a determinant impact in the case law of the ECtHR, which has always proved to be
extremely cautious in overstepping this margin of manoeuvre granted to member states.
 The second important principle is the “consensus analysis” based on an often
sketchy overview of the status  of national legislation in all  the member states on a
specific  matter.  As Johnson (2012,  77)  has  also reminded,  the  “consensus  analysis”
principle  seems to lack systematicity and methodological  coherence,  [and has] been
often  base[d]  on either  a  substantial  lack  of  data  or  on a  selective  use  of  the  data
gathered (Johnson 2012, 80-81). This implies, in turn, that the ECtHR may ground its
reasoning more on perceptions or reconstructions of the consensus on a specific topic,
rather than on legal overviews or sociological evidence on attitudes and perceptions in
the different member states' societies.
Thirdly,  the  ECtHR relies  on  the  “evolutive  principle”,  also  defined  as  the
“living  instrument  principle”  (Tyrer  v.  the  United  Kingdom,  1978).  This  principle
concerns the necessity, for the ECtHR, to interpret the Convention (ECHR) under the
light of present-day conditions, which is to say as an instrument that is malleable and
whose principles can be used in order to assess human rights violations in the present.
This  principle,  in  particular,  is  said  to  represent  that  “element  of  dynamism  and
development  that  represents  the  essential  characteristic  of  the  European  system  of
protection of human rights” (De Salvia 2006, 69). Similarly to the above-mentioned
principles, this principle also has a strong impact in the work of the ECtHR, especially
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when presumably “sensitive” issues are at stake, such as the objects of this research.
Taken together,  these three principles provide extremely useful guidance in order to
undertake the following analysis of the case law. 
Discriminating  Behaviours,  Discriminating  Identities:  Beyond
Essentialism, Privatisation and Victimisation?
Fighting discrimination on different grounds is a core preoccupation for human
rights  practitioners  and  institutions.  However,  laws  and  policies  to  combat
discrimination are often insufficient to protect individuals if these fail to address the
removal  of  structural  inequalities.  Furthermore,  some  forms  of  discrimination are
difficult to substantiate in juridical terms, often going, therefore, undetected. In relation
to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity,  the anti-
discrimination rhetoric may be said to only marginally tackle the problem. Beger (2004,
108) has well defined the rationale behind the promotion of effective anti-discrimination
legislation and other measures: 
this quest for anti-discrimination legislation is premised upon a particular
understanding of  society;  namely that  it  contains  a  variety of  diverse
minority-like  populations,  each  of  which  suffers  a  kind  of  antiquated
prejudice no longer tolerable in liberal democracies. The state or the pan-
European  institution  then  acts  as  a  neutral  protector,  facilitating  the
eradication  of  what  is  seen  to  be  individual  aberrations through  the
passage and enforcement of anti-discrimination measures (Beger 2004,
108).
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This  argument  highlights  the  way  in  which  considering  individuals  as  victims  of
discrimination crystallises  power positions, and renders individuals dependent on the
actions of institutions for their safety. The case law of the ECtHR, as well as the practice
of the Commissioner, seems to fall within this logic by which the dichotomy between
victim/perpetrator  is  strengthened.  This  section  analyses  some  of  the  major
developments  in  the  case  law of  the  ECtHR on  sexual  orientation,  such  as  the
decriminalisation of same-sex sexual practices (or of some specific practices such as
S/M  practices  or  group  sex),  the  equalisation  for  the  age  of  consent,  and  the
discrimination against LG personnel in the armed forces, from this perspective. 
The  first  complaints  to  reach  the  ECtHR  in  the  fifties  concerned  the de-
criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices28 between consenting men. However, it was
not  before  Dudgeon  v.  the  United  Kingdom  (1981)  that  the  ECtHR ascertained  a
violation of the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR) while rejecting the complaint
connected  to  a  violation  of  Article  14  ECHR on  discrimination.  Together  with  the
above-mentioned case, two other cases (Norris v. Ireland, 1988 and Modinos v. Cyprus,
1993)  are  of  interest  for  this  analysis. In  Dudgeon  v.  the  United  Kingdom  the
complainant alleged that the criminalisation of homosexual acts (mostly unenforced in
practice) in Northern Ireland constituted a violation of his right to respect of private life.
He also alleged a breach of the non free-standing article 14 ECHR, insofar as the above-
mentioned legislation was discriminatory against men29 in relation to both heterosexual
individuals and homosexual women (who were not criminalised for same-sex sexual
activity). 
28 For Johnson (2012, 19-20) these early complaints are important insofar as they help illustrate how the
reasoning of the Court (at the time of the Commission) has been built and consolidated over the years, in
particular in relation to its ontological approach to homosexuality. They are also useful in highlighting the
ways in which complainants have made use of certain “strategies” to advance their claims. 
29 In the national legislation the crime of “gross indecency” or “buggery” was only referred to men.
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The warp and weft of the judgement are the terms priva(cy) and morality,  It is
difficult, however, to say whether the two can be woven together without contradictions.
In the judgement, the ECtHR reiterated the importance of the “moral ethos of a society
as a whole” (Dudgeon v. the UK, 1981: para. 49) in order to evaluate the existence of an
interference in the enjoyment of Article 8 ECHR. This formulation points to the idea of
a community, to a common and shared moral legacy that the state has the duty to protect
and  preserve.  However,  in  the  judgement  the  ECtHR also  recognises  that  the  case
concerns a “most intimate aspect of private life” (Dudgeon v. the UK, 1981: para. 52).
Hence, if the “moral ethos” pertains to the public sphere, can it invade the presumed
privacy of sexual life? In its decision, the ECtHR ruled out that this “moral ethos” could
permeate the private sphere so deeply as to cause an interference in the sexual life of
consenting adults. It ascertained, therefore, a violation of the right to respect of private
life under Article 8 ECHR. At the same time, however, it did it in an ambiguous way
when it stated that:
Decriminalisation does  not  imply  approval  [my emphasis],  and a  fear
that some sectors of the population might draw misguided conclusions in
this respect from reform of the legislation does not afford a good ground
for maintaining it in force with all its unjustifiable features (Dudgeon v.
the UK, 1981: para. 61).
This passage highlights the philosophy of tolerance (Dudgeon v. the UK, 1981: para. 60)
that seems to foreground the reasoning of the ECtHR on these issues. The statement
“'decriminalisation'  does  not  imply  approval”  is  the  paramount  example  of  a
presupposition of a form of moral superiority by the ECtHR; a superiority that cannot
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only be traced back to the heteronormative matrix of the nation-states, but points more
broadly to the triangular relationship between a “guardian” (the ECtHR), a paternalistic
state, and the individuals.
Another interesting aspect of this judgement is the concept expressed by Judge
Matscher in his dissenting opinion. The ECtHR had found that no violation of the anti-
discrimination provision (Article 14 ECHR) subsisted in this case. The Judge concurred
with it, but added that the absence of a breach of the anti-discrimination article in the
case  of  the  criminalisation  of  male  homosexuality  could  be  ascertained  neither  in
relation  to  heterosexuality  nor  in  relation  to  female  homosexuality,  because  of  the
“genuine difference, of character as well as of degree, between the moral and social
problems raised by the two forms of homosexuality, male and female” (Dudgeon v. the
UK,  1981:  32).  Even  more  interesting  is  the  fact  that  he  did  not  specify  what  the
different “moral” and “social” consequences of either male or female homosexuality
were. It could be argued, that the Judge was implicitly associating male homosexuality
with the idea of penetration and, therefore, of dangerousness – an idea that is not evoked
by the harmless (invisible) homosexual woman. This rhetoric of “dangerousness” points
to the hidden power relations in the world of men, where only male homosexuality can
destabilise  society.  The  principle  of  non-discrimination  here  is  understood  to  be
applicable only in the presence of a victim  (Dudgeon v. the UK, 1981: 32). However, the
“homosexual” man is denied the status of victim30 since, in the first instance, he is taken
as a perpetrator. This example highlights the way in which the essentialist argument can
be  twisted:  the  “male  homosexual”  becomes  solely  identified  by  his  penetrative
potential,  his  subjectivity reduced to  sexual  behaviour.  The “female homosexual” is
30 Beger (2004, 115) argues that anti-discrimination policies participate in the reinstatement of the wrong
that  it  seeks  to  redress:  “(...)  the  protection  granted  participates  in  re-establishing,  as  injured  or
discriminate,  the  very  individual  subject  that  it  seeks  to  protect.  Anti-discrimination  involves  a
permanent leap in logic from identity as a marker of a group to the individual subject as a historically
injured subject”. 
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innocent and unarmed and this facilitates her erasure from the legal discourse. 
Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom  (1981) has many points of contact with the
subsequent  case law, especially with  Norris v. Ireland (1988) and Modinos v. Cyprus
(1993). Firstly,  in  Northern  Ireland,  Ireland,  and Cyprus,  theref  was  non-enforced31
legislation aimed at condemning male homosexuality. Secondly, in these cases the three
applicants were activists from gay organisations seeking to obtain de-criminalisation not
just in the practice (or in the policies), but also in the criminal law. As for the lack of
enforcement of criminal provisions, this aspect is interesting insofar as it determined a
situation of uncertainty that,  in the words of the applicants,  produced a  situation of
continuous  interference  in  their  right  to  private  life.  Maintaining  an  uncertain
enforcement  of  the  legislation  is,  evidently,  an  unspoken  disciplinary  technique.  It
points  to  the  regimentation  of  bodies  by  threatening  them  with  the  possibility  of
prosecution.  In  all  three  above-mentioned  cases,  the  applicants  alleged  a  strong
psychological distress (Dudgeon v. the UK 1981: para. 37; Norris v. Ireland 1988: para.
10;  Modinos v. Cyprus 1993: para. 7), later recognised by the ECtHR. The subtle, but
pervasive, state of uncertainty produced, indeed, a state of vigilance on the part of the
individuals and on the part of the State. 
Complementary to this aspect is the status of the applicants as human rights
activists who ascribed to themselves the status of victims. To claim the status of victim
one has to have suffered a personal injury, as there is no actio popularis available under
the ECHR. At the same time, they plaintiffs used their “activism” as a tool to demolish
the  (already  weakened)  national  legislation  on  homosexual  contact  between  adults.
Against  this  background,  the  ECtHR was  in  the  position  of  judging  the  degree  of
31 In  Modinos v. Cyprus, the Court notes that following Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, the Cypriot
Attorney General had not instituted any prosecution for homosexual conduct that could be in breach
of  Article 8 ECHR. The legislation, as in the case of Northern Ireland, however, remained on the
statute books.
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severity attained by the State's behaviour or acts. Privacy proved to be central in these
cases. Had it not been for the recognition that sexual activity was an “intimate” aspect
of one's life, no interference would have been detected. At the same time, the state can
indicate what is the standard for proper sexual intercourse between consenting adults.
This example illustrates the discretionary criteria employed by the ECtHR in deciding
whether states' actions amount to a violation of individuals' fundamental rights. In this
regard, the decision in  Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (1981) produced a successful
“domino  effect”  on  those  member  states  which  still  criminalised  some  forms  of
consensual sexual activities between individuals of the same sex, but it did not dismiss
the  principle  of  a  paternalistic  and  voyeuristic  gaze  of  the  state  monitoring  and
evaluating  the  appropriateness  of  some behaviours  as  having  not  just  personal,  but
social, consequences. 
The partial condoning by the ECtHR of the paternalistic and voyeuristic gaze
deployed  by  member  states,  is  also  evident  in  two  important  judgements:  Laskey,
Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom  (1997) and  A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom
(2000),  concerning respectively sadomasochistic  practices and group sex.  As for the
first,  the  circumstances  were  of  non-specified  number  of  men  (out  of  forty  four
participants) charged by British national authorities with offences including assault and
wounding (Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom,  1997: para. 8) for having
committed sadomasochistic practices32 that had been filmed over a period of ten years.
The applicants alleged a violation of the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR) that was
rejected by the ECtHR. The second case involved the seizure,  by police officers, of
video tapes at the applicant's house which depicted him engaging in sexual intercourse
32In the description of the Court these consensual practices included various forms of maltreatment of
genitalia, ritualistic beatings with bare hands or other instruments, as well as forms of branding that left
no serious injuries to the participants Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom 1997: para 8). 
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with up to four adult men. The charge against him was of “gross indecency”33. Before
the ECtHR, the applicant alleged a violation of Article8 ECHR and of Article 14 ECHR
in  conjunction  with  Article8  ECHR.  In  this  case,  the  applicant's  complaint  was
successful.
Califia (2000, 144), commenting directly on the decision in  Laskey, Jaggard
and Brown v. the United Kingdom (1997), has provided an interesting synthesis of the
relationship between the ECtHR and the complainants and the different positions they
may or may not occupy: 
homosexuals  and  transsexuals  have  convinced  ECHR to  see  them as
vulnerable minority groups which need protection from a bigoted state.
Sadomasochists  are  a  long way from winning a  similar  status,  partly
because we don't often think of ourselves that way, and don't represent
ourselves as such in front of the general public (Califia 2000, 144). 
Califia's statement highlights a strong polemical tone against “assimilationist” identity
politics based on the status of the “injured” victim. The statement is also crucial  to
understanding the failure of the above mentioned case before the ECtHR, where the
applicants alleged a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Since sadomasochists refuse to speak
about themselves as victims, the ECtHR is incapable of recognising a coherent narrative
of victimisation leading to a limitation of the public interferences of state authorities on
health and moral grounds. The refusal to be seen as victims entails a symbolic exit from
that negotiated terrain of subjectivity which is played out in the juridical pantomime
before the ECtHR. Furthermore, if the ECtHR finds legitimate the prosecution of the
33 For the Sexual Offences Act 1967, section 1(7) an act was not to be considered private if more than
two persons were taking part or were present. This only applied to “gross indecency” committed by
men. 
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member state under Article8 (2) ECHR for the purpose of protecting “health” (Laskey,
Jaggard  and  Brown  v.  the United  Kingdom,1997:  para.  50),  the  image  of  the
complainants as perpetrators, rather than victims, is more likely to represent the robust
interpretative framework for the judges.
  In the case of A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom (2000), instead, the narrative of the
complainant was successful in ensuring that he was perceived by the ECtHR as being a
victim of the state's interference by terms of Article 8 ECHR. This is, in the reasoning of
the  ECtHR,  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  although  the  acts  had  been  filmed,  the
complainant had shown a significant preoccupation for his anonymity (A.D.T. v. the
United Kingdom, 2000: para. 36). This request for anonymity seems to point directly to
the  vulnerability  of  the  complainant.  Therefore,  beyond  the  necessity  of  assessing
whether group sex fell within common moral standards of the member state, the ECtHR
implicitly made an evaluation on the inoffensiveness of the complainant who engaged in
activities which were “genuinely 'private'” (A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000: para.
37).  A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom is often compared in legal analysis (Grigolo 2003)
(Johnson 2102) with  Laskey and others v. the United Kingdom (1997), mainly for the
different margin of appreciation (narrower in the former, wider in the latter) afforded by
the ECtHR to the nation state, but also because the applicant had made clear that in the
seized  videotapes  no  trace  of  sado-masochistic  activity  was  recorded  (A.D.T.  v.  the
United Kingdom, 2000: para. 10), therefore implicitly suggesting that the ECtHR should
consider (or did actually consider) sado-masochistic activities as being more serious and
in need of closer scrutiny than group sex.
So far, this analysis has shed light on the issue of decriminalisation of same-sex
sexual activity, but it has also highlighted the centrality, in the work of the ECtHR, of
assessing the “victim status” of the complainant. While the Commissioner does not pay
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specific attention34 to decriminalisation (since it has been enacted across all member
states of the CoE) there are corollary issues relating to it that are addressed in his work.
In particular,  there is  an interest  in patterns  of criminalisation occurring outside the
borders of the CoE, in countries that still  criminalise some forms of sexual expression
and that, consequently, force individuals to flee from their homeland and seek protection
in Europe. In this case the narrative of victimisation is very powerful and the joint work
carried out together with the UNHCR goes in the direction of suggesting to member
states  to  improve  their  policies  concerning  asylum  claims  on  grounds  of  sexual
orientation and gender identity. In this regard, the Commissioner's commitment is very
strong, as it will be shown in the next chapter. 
The work of the Commissioner, in general terms, builds on the concept of the
presumed universal character of human rights as the following passage shows:
In debates on the human rights of LGBT persons it is sometimes assumed
that  the  protection  of  the  human  rights  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual  and
transgender people amounts to introducing new rights or 'special' rights.
This  line of  thinking is  misleading,  as  international  human rights law
clearly  recognises  that  all  human  beings,  irrespective  of  their  sexual
orientation or gender identity, are entitled to rights and freedoms deriving
from the inherent  dignity of the human person without  discrimination
(Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 2011, 35). 
This passage on the “sameness” and intrinsic equality of LGBT35 persons is interesting
34 He observes, nonetheless, that together with pathologising discourses on homosexuality and gender
identity,  criminalisation  partly accounts  for  the  reluctance  of  some member  states  to  address  the
specific human rights violation of LGBT persons (Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of
Europe, Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 2011, 25).  
35 The  “I”  for  “Intersexual”  has  not  been  included  since  it  does  not  appear  in  the  Commissioner's
comment. Although the difference may seem trivial, the inclusion or exclusion of a specific letter in
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if contrasted with the case law analysed so far. It is not difficult to affirm that the LGBT
persons  on  whom the  work  of  the  Commissioner  concentrates  are  far  from  being
sadomasochists or those engaging in group sex. This is not due to the Commissioner's
antipathy  towards  them,  but  to  the  way in  which  homosexuality  is  thought  of  and
spoken of, in institutional settings such as the CoE. At no point, during the process of
drafting  the  2011  report,  did  issues  of  sadomasochism  come  up.  Undeniably,
sadomasochistic  activities  do  not  represent  a  mainstream  human  rights  topic.
Nonetheless,  when  forms  of  regulation  of  private  consensual  sexual  practices  are
enacted,  human  rights  institutional  actors  are  required  to  engage  directly  with  the
possible human rights violations arising from these forms of regulation. Hence, while
decriminalisation of homosexuality may not be an issue at the CoE, sadomasochism is a
domain with which institutional  human rights actors have been reluctant  to  engage.
Such avoidance, clear in the case of the Commissioner, but not limited to his work, may
be read as a further indication of the necessity for normalising LGBTI individuals in
institutional human rights contexts. 
Because  of  his  peculiar  role  as  mediator  between  civil  society,  national
authorities,  and the  CoE,  the  Commissioner  grounds his  work  in  specific  strategies
aimed at  enhancing the persuasive character of his  actions or statements.  Implicitly,
therefore,  the  work  of  the  Commissioner  consists  of  an  effort  to  demonstrate  the
“sameness” of LGBT persons by implicitly constructing them as being normal. In this
regard, therefore, insisting on the “normality” of LGBTI persons is coherent with his
efforts to approach national authorities who may be reluctant to discuss topics of sexual
orientation and/or gender identity in the first place. It could even be argued that this is
possibly the only depiction of LGBT persons that is likely to convince reluctant member
states. Furthermore, it can also be seen as the depiction which is most congenial to the
the acronym has a strong symbolic value.
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more “liberal” member states. The Commissioner's implicit investment in narratives of
“normality” for LGBTI persons obviously does not discredit his image or diminish the
innovative  character  of  his  role.  Nonetheless,  the  adherence  to  a  process  of
normalisation  for  LGBTI  individuals  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  meaningful
diplomatic  negotiations  with  national  authorities  restates  the  creation  of  fictional,
respectable  rights-holders  whose  concrete  existence  remains  out  of  the  sight  of  the
various institutional actors.
Respectability is an undeniably important framework in the context of the human
rights of LGB persons. The case law of the ECtHR on the dismissal of members of the
armed forces (all in the United Kingdom) on grounds of their homosexuality, further
illustrates this point from a different perspective. Two cases, in particular, are analysed
here: Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom (1999) and Smith and Grady v.
the United Kingdom (1999). In both of the cases, all four applicants had been discharged
from the armed forces after extensive and intrusive investigations had been carried out
in  order  to  ascertain  the  applicants'  sexual  orientations.  As  a  consequence  of  their
dismissal, the four applicants alleged a violation of Article 8 ECHR and of Article 8 in
conjunction with Article 14. ECHR. This strand of case law is important, insofar as it
concerns the process by which, in the military, a denial of homosexuality is enacted by
means of the construction of a paradoxical “homosexual military subject”36 (Cooper in
Bell and Binnie 2000, 64). This process has inevitably led to the emergence of patterns
of disavowal,  secrecy,  and shame.  The  case law is  also important in relation to  the
crucial role of the military as the depository of national identity and pride. In fact, the
possibility of ascertaining the  respectability of LGB personnel as capable of “serving
the nation” acts as the access gate to the granting of  full citizenship status for lesbian,
36 This consists in the attempt within the military to enhance “sex talk” so that the creation of a public
dimension of homosexuality has as its direct effect that of confining this same aspect in the private
sphere, therefore paradoxically denying it. 
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gay, and bisexual persons.  
There are intersecting narrative lines in the above-mentioned two judgements. In
their  submissions37 all  the  parties  (the  applicants,  the  Government,  and the  ECtHR)
referred to the same ideas of excellence, professionalism, and security. The invisible red
thread that connects them is the notion of respectability for LGB persons as members of
the military. The reason for the discharge of lesbian, gay, or bisexual personnel in the
United Kingdom derived from the 1994 Guidelines that questioned the professionalism
of these members of the military. The Guidelines suggested that these individuals could
“damage the morale and unit effectiveness” (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. the UK, 1999:
para. 42), causing a breach in the protection of national  security. As a way to counter
this  argument,  all  of the four applicants in the two cases submitted their  records of
service as proof not just of their suitability, but of their excellence in their work. In its
assessment of the alleged violation of the right to private life, the ECtHR reinstated the
existence of such an excellent record of service for the applicants (Lustig-Prean and
Beckett v. the UK, 1999: para. 85 and Smith and Grady v. the UK 1999: para. 95). While
this is important for the ECtHR to ascertain whether the sole reason for their discharge
was  their  homosexuality,  it  nonetheless  represents  an  effective  way  to  affirm  that
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals in the military are capable of serving the country
in an irreprehensible way. The question therefore is: what if these individuals had had a
rather mediocre record of service? Would their claim have been as strong as it proved to
be before the ECtHR? 
The  logic  of  the  role-model,  by  which  exceptional  achievements  of  LGBTI
persons are  highlighted in  different  fields,  is  enlightening in  this  case.  LGBTI role-
models are identified in order to demonstrate and inspire other LGBTI persons, but
37 The judgements were issued on the same date (27 December 1999) and in them the Court substantially
replicates  its  arguments,  apart  from  the  specific  circumstances  of  the  cases  submitted  by  the
applicants. 
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implicitly also to show to the public their normality, their productive potential, as well
as their contribution to the society of which they are members. Applied to the above-
mentioned cases, this process reinstates, on the one hand, the importance of having an
effective and cohesive institution that  guarantees national  security,  and on the other
hand concedes publicly that LGB persons can be respectable soldiers, who do not lurk
suspiciously in the barracks trying to seduce their colleagues. This sanitised image of
LGB military personnel is even more significant if read against the background of the
unacknowledged and widespread phenomenon of rape in the military38 (of both female
and male personnel) documented, but not limited to, the United States39. Seen from this
perspective,  the issue  transcends  the  question  of  whether  a  right  of  the  ECHR was
violated in the specific instance, but points to the broader issue of how to understand the
role and “identity” of such an institution under the light of a more inclusive policy as far
as LGBT persons are concerned. 
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to provide a critical overview on some of the crucial
issues relating to sexual orientation that have been adjudicated by the ECtHR in the last
three decades. These issues include the criminalisation of consensual sexual activity, the
criminalisation of sado-masochistic activities, and the discrimination of LGB persons in
the army. Far from trying to provide an historical account of the evolution of the case
law of the ECtHR, the chapter has been built around the idea that these strands of the
case  law offer  an  incredible  opportunity  to  analyse  the  process  of  the  creation  of
“homosexual”  legal  subjects  in  Strasbourg.  This  analysis  has  been  preceded  by  a
38 See the 2012 documentary The Invisible War (directed by Kirby Dick).
39 Evidence suggests that this phenomenon also occurs in other countries, such as the United Kingdom:
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=22010, accessed on 24 April 2013.
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discussion concerning the linguistic choices of the ECtHR in relation to the description
of LGBT legal subjects. It has been argued in this regard, that the fact of privileging
certain terms, rather than others, can be understood in the context of an attempt, from
the part of this judicial institution, to give juridical legitimacy only to a portion of the
various forms of sexual and gender expression available to individuals. The chapter,
however, has not only considered the work of the ECtHR on these issues. It has, on the
contrary, also compared the work of this human rights Court with the independent work
of the Commissioner. While the Commissioner is a truly innovative figure who tries to
push  the  linguistic  and  legal  boundaries  set  by  the  ECtHR  on  homosexuality  and
transgenderism, he nonetheless participates – to an important extent – in a process of
normalisation of sexual and gender identities within the juridico-political sphere of the
CoE.  Nonetheless  in  his  role,  he  appears  to  be  far  more  receptive than  the ECtHR
towards the narratives of the LGBT persons themselves, beyond their legal status as
“plaintiffs”.
The  comparison  between  the  case  law of  the  ECtHR  and  the  work  of  the
Commissioner has, therefore, highlighted the existence of a fundamental framework of
creation of “respectable” LGB subjects informing the work of both of these human
rights actors, although with different modalities, different aims, and different outcomes.
This represents a key finding for this research, as it will be possible to analyse, in the
remainder of this study, the extent to which the narrative of “respectability” of LGBTI
persons permeates current European discourses on human rights, and how these present
a connection with the construction of specific models of “European citizenship”. This
chapter, therefore, is in continuity with the one that follows, which will begin with the
notion of “respectability” in order to analyse the case law of the ECtHR and the work of
the  Commissioner  on  the  issue  of  the  legal  recognition  of  same-sex  couples.  The
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following  chapter  will  take  the  themes  developed  in  this  section  further,  trying  to
establish a connection between the process of the creation of respectable “homosexual”
subjects and the economic, social, and political cornerstones of neoliberalism. 
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Chapter Six - The Privilege of Being Included: Same-sex Couples and
the Politics of Homonormativity
The recognition of same-sex partnerships and the right to marry for same-sex
couples  constitutes  one  of  the  most  divisive  human  rights  issues.  Easily
instrumentalised at the political level, the discussion on whether states should recognise
these relationships has been framed as either a threat for the “traditional heterosexual
marriage” or as breakthrough in the field of human rights. The reality is much more
nuanced, as the recognition of same-sex partnerships and the right to marry may also be
seen  as  entailing  a  substantial  process  of  normalisation  by  which,  those  who  were
formerly excluded from the enjoyment of some rights, are granted access to societal
institutions  such  as  marriage.  This  dynamic,  described  by  Duggan  (2003)  as
“homonormativity”  requires  a  portion of the formerly marginalised gay,  lesbian and
bisexual populaition to be included in institutions such as the army or marriage, thus
creating new lines of fracture between those who become part of society and a new
cohort of outcasts who fail to be included. 
In this regard, therefore, the introduction of same-sex partnerships or marriage
can reinforce the importance of heterosexual marriage as an institution in the first place,
rather than challenge it radically as Johnson (2012, 147) has suggested. By adopting the
analytical  framework  proposed  by  Duggan,  this  chapter  constitutes  an  attempt  to
critically appraise the  case law of the ECtHR and the work of the Commissioner for
Human Rights engaging with the concept of “family” applied to same-sex couples. The
objective is to demonstrate how the CoE indirectly promotes a neo-liberal paradigm of
equality for LGB persons whose crowning achievement is represented, in fact, by the
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acquisition of the “right to marry”. 
Same-sex  Couples  and  the  Re-definition  of  the  “Family”  in  the
Courtroom: an Incomplete Transformation?  
The situation of invisibility before the state and the law has been conceived by
individuals in same-sex relationships as a severe curtailment not only of their human
rights, but also of their citizenship status. The symbolic seal of state legitimation allows
individuals to enter the political community and become full and respectable members
of  society.  In  this  regard,  Butler  (2002,  17)  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  this
official  act  of  recognition  by which  individuals  accept  to  be  defined  by a  specific
lexicon which also directly affects the definition of their public identity. The lack of
recognition of same-sex partnerships and families is framed, therefore, as a denial of
political and social viability which relegates LGB persons to a position of subalternity
with respect to the rest of the population.
Historically, however, the emphasis on the recognition of same-sex relationships
is a relatively new phenomenon. Several authors have argued, in fact, that there has
been an important shift in the priorities of the LGB movement (Kandaswamy 2008;
Polikoff  2005).  The  movement  is  seen  as  having  abandoned  its  “longstanding
commitment to defining and evaluating families based on function rather than form,
distancing [itself]  from single-parents  and divorced families,  extended families,  and
other stigmatised child-rearing units” (Polikoff 2005, 918). The result of this shift has
been the promotion of a narrower human rights agenda based on a liberal-conservative
paradigm of equality and freedom. The consequence is an ambiguous strategy which
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simultaneously  contains  elements  of  both  heteronormative  and  homonormative
regulatory frameworks. Heteronormativity, in fact, is not completely neutralised by the
emergence  of  homonormative  dynamics  of  normalisation  of  LGB  individuals  into
societal institutions. In heteronormative terms, the heterosexual couple is described as
“white,  middle-class,  child  rearing  and  materialistic”  (Brandzel  2005,  196),  thus
constituting the terms of ultimate comparison for those non-heterosexual couples who
wish to become recognised. 
Hence,  far  from  being  mutually  exclusive,  heteronormativity  and
homonormativity work in synergy in order to promote a specific respectable image of
couples, regardless of their sexual orientation.  In the practice, this synergy can take the
form of  encouraging same-sex  couples  to  both  become like  “other  families”  whilst
simultaneously remaining distinct from them. One example,  in this  regard,  can well
illustrate the issue at stake in this case. In 2011, as part of an unfinished project about
LGBT families in Europe, I interviewed a British couple formed by two men and a
daughter  born  through  surrogacy.  When  asked  about  whether  they  felt  part  of  the
“LGBT community”,  the two men adamantly admitted that they did not want to be
associated with that kind of world. They described themselves as not being “partygoers”
or sharing the practices of socialisation commonly associated with the gay community
in London, the city where they lived. In fact – they commented – they felt they had
much more in common with other heterosexual families with children they met at the
nursery, rather than with the gay men socialising in a bar in Soho or Vauxall. Obviously,
the fact of feeling “detached” from the LGBT community does not represent a negative
fact in itself. However, the family narrative of this couple was inserted into a context of
relative wealth, in which the two were somehow perfecting the idea of a respectable,
clean-cut  same-sex couple with a  small  daughter.  It  is,  therefore,  by simultaneously
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positing  one's  similarity  and  difference  with  heterosexual  families,  that  same-sex
couples may carve for themselves a space of normality in which the obvious political
and social ramifications of adhering to an exclusionary institution such as marriage, are
inevitably de-problematised. 
In the socio-legal and legal scholarship in the last two decades, the predominant
framework  of  analysis  has  been  one  informed  by the  idea  that  the  ever-increasing
number of states worldwide offering the possibility to same-sex couples to validate their
relationship  before  the  law,  represented  a  clear  advancement  in  the  context  of  the
recognition  of  the  rights  of  LGB  persons.  The  emphasis  on  this  sort  of  linear
temporality,  evident  in  the  work  of  scholars  such  as  Waaldijk  (1994,  2000,  2003),
Wintemute (1997, 2001) and Johnson (2012) has been coupled with an intensification of
individuals' applications to national courts and to the ECtHR. At the level of the ECtHR,
in particular, this has resulted in a multiplication, in the last five years, of applications
concerning  the  interpretation  of  Article  12  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human
Rights on the right to marry and found a family by both lesbian and gay couples. On the
one hand,  applicants  have tried to  encourage the ECtHR to  adopt  a  more inclusive
interpretation of the wording of Article 12 ECHR, while on the other they have also
sought  to  transfer  their  request  to  become  respectable  from  the  national  to  the
international juridical and political  forum, making recourse,  therefore,  to a symbolic
investment in their intelligibility as bearers of human rights. 
Increasingly, the ECtHR is perceived by applicants both as a last resort and a
sounding board for  their  requests.  In  the past decades,  the ECtHR has  acted as  the
gatekeeper  of  the  concept  of  family  in  Europe,  substantially  upholding  the
heteronormative description of the concept of marriage. In the 1980s and in the 1990s,
LGB applicants  sought  to  challenge  the  formulation  of  the  provision  enshrined  in
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Article 12 ECHR and to connect it  with the “family life” limb of Article 8 ECHR,
without  success.  The  intensification  of  applications  on  this  issue  during  the  last
decade,40 however, has determined a renewed interest in the specific strand of case law
on the right to marry and found a family under Article 12 ECHR for individuals in a
same-sex relationship. This strand of case law, in particular, has acquired a systematic
character and the advent of concerted litigation has activated a process aimed at shifting
the balance in favour of a more inclusive interpretation of Article 8 ECHR and, possibly,
of Article 12 ECHR.
In this regard, the 2010 landmark case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria has seen the
ECtHR partially adopt new epistemological criteria in the interpretation of the concept
of “family”. The case concerned two men who were refused the right to marry by the
Austrian authorities, and consequently alleged a violation of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 8,  of Article 12 and Article  1 of Protocol  1 ECHR before the ECtHR.
Whilst  the ECtHR denied the existence of a violation of the above-listed articles,  it
nonetheless presented interesting arguments. In the first instance the ECtHR answered
in the negative to the applicants' request to read the wording of Article 12 ECHR “men
and women of marriageable age” in the light of present day conditions. Applicants had
resorted  to  the  linguistic  expedient  of  describing  men  and women  as  two  separate
categories in order to try to drive a wedge between the traditional concept of marriage
and the ECtHR's interpretation of it. Whilst this expedient was destined to fail in the
instant  case,  it  nonetheless  determined  an  ambiguous  positioning  of  the  ECtHR in
relation to the controversial definition of the concept of “family life” under Article 8
ECHR.
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria was the first case in which the ECtHR partially made
40 At the moment two applications are pending before the Court:  Chapin and Charpentier v. France,
Application  No.  40183/07,  lodged  6  September  2007,  and  Ferguson  and  Others  v.  the  United
Kingdom, lodged 2 February 2011. 
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a concession to the possibility that two persons of the same gender living together could
be considered a family. The terms on which that concession was made in this judgment
were,  nonetheless,  ambiguous.  The  ECtHR  simultaneously  winked  to  both
heteronormative and homonormative narratives. While the ECtHR conceded that same-
sex  couples  could  enjoy  “family  life”,  this  can  only  happen  provided  that  some
conditions  were  fulfilled.  In  this  regard,  the  intervention  of  non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) proved to be important, insofar as they sought to convince the
ECtHR that individuals in same-sex relationships were capable of forming “long-term
emotional and sexual relationships” (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010: para. 84). Whilst
on  the  one  hand couples  need  to  resort  to  the  rhetoric  of  commitment  in  order  to
demonstrate the solidity of their relationship, this quest for respectability as a “family”
also entails an outright exclusion for those couples whose relationship does not comply
with  the  set  standards  of  the  romanticised  vision  of  love.  Indirectly,  therefore,  the
NGOs' intervention can be seen as enhancing the homonormative narrative on same-sex
couples before the ECtHR.
Despite conceding that same-sex couples could be assimilable to a “family”, the
ECtHR  did  not  abandon  the  heteronormative  framework  of  analysis  of  marital
relationships, thus refusing to state that the right to marry and found a family applies
equally to all men and women regardless of their sexual orientation. In turn, this led to
an appraisal of the “family life” of same-sex couples according to criteria inherently
informed by heteronormative standards. Furthermore, this partial opening of the ECtHR
also  had  the  effect  of  implicitly  creating  a  hierarchy  between  different  “families”:
heteronormativity  indicates  the  form of  the  proper  “family”,  whilst  families  shaped
around the “homonormative” call to inclusion, represent a sub-optimal model of kinship
with respect to heterosexual marriage. Paradoxically, therefore, in  Schalk and Kopf v.
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Austria, the ECtHR admits that non-heterosexual couples can qualify as a “family”, but
nonetheless implicitly maintains a qualitative difference between them and heterosexual
families.
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria  is also interesting in relation to the exclusion from
the benefits and entitlements associated with marriage  received by same-sex couples.
The applicants,  in fact,  alleged a  violation of Article  1 of Protocol 1 ECHR on the
“peaceful enjoyment of possessions”, as well as a violation of Article 8 in conjunction
with Article 14 ECHR. In this case, the ECtHR had to evaluate whether it was possible
for the state to treat individuals in similar situations, namely same-sex and different-sex
couples, in a different way. In denying the existence of a violation of the above-listed
articles,  the  ECtHR made it  clear  that  a  wide  margin  of  appreciation is  granted  to
member states when “it comes to general measures of economic and social strategy”
(Schalk  and Kopf  v.  Austria, 2010:  para.  21).  Member  states  are,  therefore,  granted
discretion in deciding how to distribute benefits and entitlements, if this complies with
precise  socio-economic criteria  and objectives.  The ECtHR's  affirmation of  member
states' freedom in the allocation of resources and benefits, moreover, is coupled with an
important  distinction  introduced,  in  the  same  judgement,  between  the  various  legal
consequences  of  recognised  same-sex  partnerships:  material,41 parental42 and  other
consequences43 (Schalk  and Kopf  v.  Austria,  2010:  paras  32-34).  In  this  regard,  the
remainder of this  chapter will  thoroughly consider these various legal  consequences
with the objective of demonstrating how these are fundamentally framed to support a
41 “Material consequences cover (…) different kinds of tax, health insurance, social security payments
and pensions.  (…) This also applies  to  other  material  consequences,  such as  regulations on joint
property and debt, application of rules of alimony upon break-up, entitlement to compensation  on
wrongful death of partner and inheritance rights”, (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010: para. 32).
42 Parental consequences include the opportunity to undergo medically assisted insemination or to foster
or adopt children. (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010: para. 33).
43 “Other  consequences  include  the  use  of  the  partner's  surname,  the  impact  on  a  foreign  partner
obtaining a residence permit and citizenship, refusal to testify, next-of-kin status for medical purposes,
continued status as tenant upon death of the partner, and lawful donation of organs”. (Schalk and Kopf
v. Austria, 2010: para. 34). 
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liberal-conservative paradigm of marriage equality for same-sex couples based on the
notion of economic,  political  and social  privilege,  rather than mere enunciation of a
human right. 
The Commissioner for Human Rights of  the Council  of  Europe:  an
Independent Approach to the Recognition of Same-sex Couples?
Concepts  such  as  those  of  family or  marriage  represent  thorny  issues  for
international  human  rights  organisations  such  as  the  CoE.  Whilst  the  ECtHR  has
extensively engaged with various  claims by LGB applicants  in  relation to  the legal
recognition of their relationships, the openings by this judicial institution on these issues
have always been extremely cautious. Similarly, the political bodies of the CoE have
ambiguously recognised the existence of non-heterosexual forms of kinship with two
Recommendations. In their non-binding documents, the Committee of Ministers (CM)
(Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)5) and  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  (PACE)
(Resolution  1728(2010))  have only gone as  far  as  to  suggest that  states  are  free  to
extend  marriage  to  same-sex  couples,  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  imposing  such
recognition, or re-interpretation of the concept of “marriage”, on member states. 
In  comparison  to  both  the  judicial  and  political  bodies  of  the  CoE,  the
Commissioner can have more independence in articulating his position on the issue of
marriage equality for LGB persons.  In his  2011 report  the Commissioner  showed a
strong interest, although not preeminent, in the subject. At the time of the drafting of the
report,  during  which  these  ethnographic  observations  were  carried  out,  the
Commissioner  and his  staff  were  closely following the  work of  the  ECtHR, as  the
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judicial body had just issued  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria  (2010),  which was promptly
included in the section of the report dedicated to partnership and family life. 
In acknowledging both the ECtHR's and the CM's and PACE's position on the
matter, the Commissioner did not radically depart from these bodies' statements. On the
contrary,  he  found  a  nuanced,  and  therefore  not  explicit,  way to  endorse  marriage
equality. This is particularly visible in one of the Recommendations to member states
contained in his report:
[member states should] (e)nact legislation recognising same-sex partnerships by
granting  such  partnerships  the  same  rights  and  benefits  as  different-sex
partnerships or marriage, for example in the area of social security, employment
and pension benefits, freedom of movement, family reunification, parental rights
and  inheritance  (Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  the  Council  of  Europe
2011, 13). 
In  this  passage,  the  Commissioner  asked  for  a  recognition  equivalent  to  marriage
without,  however,  proposing  a  straightforward  equation  (same-sex  partnership  =
marriage). This convoluted formulation is not just a rhetorical exercise, as it enabled the
Commissioner to align himself with the other political bodies of the institution – the
CM and the PACE – but, at the same time, to send to member states a clear message
about  the  necessity  of  ensuring  equal  treatment  of  different  types  of  couples.  The
adoption  of  a  cautious  approach,  however,  was  also  visible  in  the  Commissioner's
activity  concerning  the  recognition  of  same-sex  relationships.  In  particular,  the
Commissioner  possessed  an  impressive  diplomatic  ability  in  effectively  raising
awareness with national authorities on these issues. One notable occasion, in which this
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ability became particularly useful,  was at  the official  launch report  in June 2011 in
Strasbourg. This official event was a gathering of different personalities, from delegates
of  national  governments,  national  judicial  institutions,  NGOs  activists,  as  well  as
representatives of the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the  United  Nations  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  and  the  Fundamental  Rights
Agency (FRA) of the European Union. 
From the way the event had been framed, it was possible to realise soon that the
focus  of  the  launch  was  to  be  on  issues  of  discrimination  (in  employment,  in  the
exercise  of  freedom of  expression  and  freedom of  assembly  and  association),  hate
speech and hate crime against LGBT persons, rather than marriage equality, let alone
parenting rights. It was almost as if all the participants in the room were aware of the
fact that the consensus on issues touching on kinship and family life was fragile. A low
profile  on  such  topics  was,  indeed,  chosen  for  the  event.  As  a  part  of  strategic-
diplomatic effort to bring to the table different actors from civil society, institutions and
governmental  and  non-governmental  actors,  the  Commissioner  tried  to  identify  a
“common denominator” that could serve as a first shared point of departure in order to
approach these issues – controversial for some member states – in the first place. It was
apparent that the issue of “family life” was a contentious one which could lessen the
likelihood of reaching broad convergence between the different parties involved. 
The Commissioner's work in the direction of “strategically” promoting the legal
recognition  of  same-sex  relationships  can  be  evaluated  in  relation  to  dynamics  of
homonormativity,  suggesting  the  existence  of  a  healthy,  happy,  monogamous
homosexual  couple.  Whilst  aimed  at  raising  awareness  with  member  states  on  the
necessity  of  finding  some  forms  of  recognition  for  non-heterosexual  couples,  the
strategy adopted by his office shows a substantial alignment with a homonormative call
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to  full  inclusion  of  same-sex couples  into societal  institutions.  There is,  in  fact,  no
critical  evaluation  of  the  exclusionary  social  and  economic  aspects  of  marriage  as
potentially creating new lines of division and worth between different groups of LGB
persons. Therefore, although the Commissioner is a truly independent figure inside the
CoE, his discourse remains nonetheless embedded in the dynamics of respectability and
“normality” of same-sex couples with respect to their heterosexual equivalents. In his
report  there was a strong suggestion that same-sex couples should receive the same
“rights and benefits granted to different-sex couples” (Commissioner for Human Rights
of the Council of Europe 2011, 9) without, however, questioning the criteria that govern
the allocation of these rights and benefits in the first place. Hence, the Commissioner's
crucial work in the direction of persuading member states to broaden their conception of
marriage  in  national  legislation  seems  to  follow  the  logic  of  the  concession  of  a
privilege to  a formerly excluded portion of the population,  rather  than a  radical  re-
configuration of kinship structures and policies of distribution of material resources. 
From their side, member states have great leverage in deciding to what extent
homonormativity can be used in order to  strengthen a  specific model  of citizenship
based on the co-optation of respectable same-sex couples. In this regard, each member
state may attach a particular value and a particular set of entitlements and privileges to
the institution of marriage, as well as a different ideological and political value. To this
extent, the call for a “normalisation” of same-sex couples on the part of international
human  rights  actors,  such  as  the  ECtHR or  the  Commissioner,  may be  favourably
welcomed by some member states whilst being opposed by others, because of a contrast
with  their  national  human  rights  agenda  or  with  national  interests.  It  is  important,
therefore, for the remainder of this chapter, to bear in mind the importance of national
interests – economic interests in specific cases of the next section, for instance – in the
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context of the process of “normalisation” of LGB persons in the social and political
national fabric. 
The Economics of Same-sex Marriage and the Promise of Privileges
From  a  neoliberal  perspective,  marriage  is  undeniably  associated  with  the
acquisition of specific economic benefits. The existence of these material advantages, of
course, partially overshadows the principle of formal equality heralded by many as the
main reason for the need for legal recognition of same-sex couples. Authors such as
Badgett  (2008)  and Black,  Sanders  and Taylor  (2007),  building  on Becker's  (1973)
analysis  of  the  economics  of  family,  have  explored  the  economic  principles
underpinning the choice of getting married for same-sex couples, identifying a series of
material gains that can be obtained through marriage. In this regard, other authors have
gone as far as to suggest the existence of a link between marriage equality for same-sex
couples and neoliberal political and economic policies. Scholars such as Kandaswamy
(2008), Fineman (2009), McCluskey (2009) and Eng (2010) have argued that the model
of equality sought by the proponents of same-sex marriage is fundamentally attuned
with a neoliberal concept of “autonomy”.
The idea of marriage equality, therefore, can be framed as an economic problem,
investing the choices of the spouses: how to pay less tax? How to legitimately receive
welfare benefits from the state? How is it possible to inherit from a partner without
significant losses in one's patrimony? Warner (1999) and Robson (2009), in this regard,
go as far as to suggest that the 'choice' to get married available to same-sex couples may
be dictated by a promise of a series of gains otherwise inaccessible to them without the
acquisition of a particular marital status. This aspect of marriage equality seems to call
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into question directly Weston's (1998) concept of “'families of choice”, which becomes
invested with issues of agency and symbolic and material power. Taylor (2009, 5) to this
respect, has suggested that it is necessary to also ask who can afford to make the choice
to have a family. Similarly, Spade (2011, 62) has argued that the narrow focus on the
issue of same-sex marriage risks overshadowing other structural factors of inequality: 
The framing of marriage as the most essential legal need of queer people,
and as the method through which queer people can obtain key benefits in
many  realms,  ignores  how  race,  class,  ability,  indigeneity  and
immigration status determine access to those benefits and reduces the gay
rights agenda to a project of restoring race, class, ability and immigration
status privilege to the most privileged gays and lesbians. 
In  contrast  with  Johnson's  (2012,  162)  definition  of  marriage  as  a  “vital  social
institution”,  Franke  (2006,  248)  has  argued  that  the  marriage  debate  is  often  a
“distraction” used to divert attention from the existence of broader and more complex
underlying political issues, such as entanglements of policies touching on race, class and
choices in domestic and foreign policy (Puar 2007). Marriage, in fact cannot always
represent the solution to redress some conditions of structural inequality. In this regard,
Brandzel  (2005,  188)  has  indicated  that  the  advantages  of  same-sex  marriage  are
tangible for the middle and upper classes, already possessing some forms of economic
security,  but  are  less  tangible  for  poor  or  socially  marginalised  same-sex  couples.
Therefore,  the mere focus on the importance of marriage for same-sex couples may
overshadow inequalities based on race, class, ability, education that have an undeniable
impact on life chances and personal development. To this extent, the  case law of the
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ECtHR on the opportunity for same-sex couples to access marriage can help to illustrate
the interrelationship between material and symbolic aspects of marriage. The three cases
chosen, C. and L. M. v. the United Kingdom (1989), Mata  Estevez v. Spain (2001) and
Karner  v.  Austria  (2003),  bring  to  the  forefront  issues  relating  to  the  economic
significance of marriage and to the benefits associated with it. 
C.and L. M. v. the United Kingdom offers interesting insights into the way the
material enjoyment of human rights may differ radically from the formal assertion of
universal principles. The case concerned an Australian national (the first applicant) who
gave birth to a daughter (the second applicant) via artificial insemination  and had been
living in a stable relationship with a British national in the United Kingdom. Since the
first applicant's employer did not confirm her permanent employment in the country,
both applicants (mother and daughter) were to be deported to Australia. After having
exhausted all internal remedies, the applicants lodged a complaint alleging the violation
of articles 8, 12 and 8 in conjunction with 14 ECHR. In its decision, the Commission
declared the application inadmissible.
Although  the  ECtHR  judged  the  relationship  between  the  two  women  as
qualifying as “private life” under Article 8, it denied that it could also qualify as “family
life”. Hence, for the purposes of British immigration law, it was not relevant whether
the applicants were enjoying private life in the United Kingdom if it could not also be
considered as family life:
the  Commission  finds  that  a  lesbian  partnership  involves  private  life,
within the meaning of Art. 8 (…) of the Convention. However, although
lawful  deportation  will  have  repercussions  on  such  relationships,  it
cannot, in principle, be regarded as an interference with this Convention
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provision,  given  the  State's  right  to  impose  immigration  controls  and
limits (C. and L. M. v. the United Kingdom, 1989). 
In this excerpt from the Commission's decision, national interests and national security,
broadly defined, appear quite prominent.  It is  also striking because the Commission
recalls the fact that, in previous cases, the ECtHR found instances in which Article 8
ECHR had been violated in relation to the deportation of individuals from countries
where their close family resided. However, in the instant case, two women and a child
living under the same roof were considered only capable of having a private – therefore
hidden from the public – life. 
In the decision, the Commission also maintained that immigration law had the
priority of protecting the traditional family, thus implicitly affirming the existence of a
trade-off between protecting the state and allowing individuals  to take advantage of
their  immigration  status.  The  narrative  concerning  a  “possible  fraud”  represented  a
concern also for the applicants, who tried to persuade the Commission that they did not
intend to take advantage of public funds, public housing or other benefits. On the one
hand, the applicants were trying to demonstrate the genuineness of their family project;
on the other hand, they were claiming a status of respectability with regard to possible
allegations of fraudulent conduct in the enjoyment of social and economic benefits. 
In the instant case the narrative of the “respectable couple” was crucial in the
construction of the applicants' complaint. The plaintiffs were advancing the argument
that  it  would  have  been  in  the  best  interests  of  the  child44 to  grow  in  a  “stable
monogamous relationship of two persons”, playing on the homonormative paradigm of
familial  normality.  However,  the  Commission  declared  application  inadmissible,
implicitly suggesting that the deportation of the applicant helped, to some extent,  to
44 Under principles 2 and 6 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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protect  both  the  traditional  (heterosexual)  family  and  national  interests.  Nothing  is
known about whether the applicants and C's partner were able to maintain or restore
their family life after the deportation to Australia. Yet, this situation is all too common
when  bi-national  couples  face  separation  because  of  immigration  policies.  The
possibility of accessing means and instruments, either material or symbolic, with which
to resort to the ECtHR in Strasbourg are crucial in these instances. Couples in similar
situations,  whether  heterosexual  or  homosexual,  may  not  necessarily  possess  the
cultural capital and economic means to seek justice and, even when they do, their claims
are screened with extreme severity, as demonstrated by the ECtHR's case law on scam
marriages (O'Donoughue v. the United Kingdom 2010).
C. and L.M. v. the United Kingdom suggests that it is difficult for the ECtHR to
sharply  distinguish  between  “private  life”  and  “family  life”,  partly  because  of  its
attempt  to  protect  (heterosexual)  marriage  as  a  privilege.  From  a  trans-historical
perspective, the cases of Mata Estevez v. Spain and Karner v. Austria further illustrate
the crucial importance played by economic issues in the context of the recognition of
same-sex couples before the ECtHR. The two cases concern respectively the request for
social  security  allowances  for  a  surviving  spouse  (Mata  Estevez  v.  Spain)  and  the
succession to a tenancy agreement after the death of the applicant's partner (Karner v.
Austria).  Considering  these  cases  jointly  helps  to  demonstrate  how  the  public
distribution of financial or economic resources is dependent on a specific interpretation
of  “family  life”.  Bringing  the  economic  dimension  of  marriage  to  the  forefront,
therefore, helps to investigate the hypothesis that the rationale for denying the right to
marry to some individuals could be motivated by the intention to maintain a system of
privileges, rather than by eminent ideological, moral or religious motives.
The right of member states to regulate issues that have a broad economic and
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social  significance  by  resorting  to  the  margin  of  appreciation  principle  has  been
extensively affirmed during the years by the ECtHR (and the Commission in the case of
Mata  Estevez  v.  Spain).  In  Mata  Estevez  v.  Spain  the  Commission  confirmed  its
previous case law (X. and Y. v. the United Kingdom 1983 and S. v. the United Kingdom
1986) excluding the possibility that  a  homosexual  relationship could fall  within the
notion of “family life” under Article 8 ECHR. In 2001 same-sex marriage was not yet
available  in  Spain,  leaving  same-sex  couples  without  legal  means  to  have  their
partnerships recognised. In declaring the applicant's claim for a violation of Article 8 in
conjunction  with  Article  14  ECHR  inadmissible,  the  Commission  found  that  the
difference  in  treatment  between  non-married  heterosexual  couples  and  same-sex
couples was not discriminatory, since the decision to limit the enjoyment of survivors'
pensions to married couples was aimed at pursuing a legitimate objective, namely “the
protection of the family based on marriage bonds” (Mata Estevez v. Spain, 2001: p. 5). 
The rhetoric of the “protection of the traditional family” forms also the bulk of
the ECtHR's decision in  Karner v. Austria.  There are, of course, differences with the
previous case. The first difference between Mata Estevez v. Spain  and Karner v. Austria
is the magnitude of the economic interests at stake: while the former concerned a social
policy (survivor's  pension),  the latter  involved the succession in a tenancy (hence it
could be argued that its national strategic economic importance was negligible). Karner
v. Austria, furthermore, is innovative from another perspective, namely the fact that, in
the judgment, the ECtHR conceded that “protecting the traditional family” was quite a
vague statement (Karner v. Austria 2003, para. 35). This has to be read in conjunction
with  the  marginal  importance  that  the  ECtHR attributed  to  the  issue  of  whether  a
homosexual relationship fell within the notion of either “private life” and or “family
life” under Article 8 ECHR. For the ECtHR, in fact, the alleged violation of Article 8
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ECHR was only to be analysed under the profile of the “right to respect for [one's]
home” (Karner v. Austria, 2003: para. 31).
The assessment of the principle of proportionality in the two cases, however,
shows the inconsistency of the ECtHR's approach. On the one hand, the ECtHR held
that is was proportional, in order to protect the traditional family, for a member state to
discriminate  against  individuals  in  a  same-sex  relationship  if  a  structural  social  or
economic policy was at stake (such as in Mata Estevez v. Spain). On the other hand, it
found it  disproportionate for states to enact such discrimination when there was the
danger  that  one  could  become  homeless  after  the  death  of  one's  partner.  Such  a
distinction appears problematic, as the discrimination would seem more significant if a
portion of the population was experiencing an outright exclusion from a structural and
economic policy without a robust justification for it. 
The three cases analysed so far highlight the existence of a preoccupation on the
part of member states to preserve the economic privileges attached to marriage and the
ECtHR  substantial  upholding  of  states'  claims  on  this  regard.  Same-sex  couples,
conversely, insist on an improvement in their financial and symbolic position but also
ask to be recognised as social and legal actors. In adopting this strategy aimed at gaining
formal equality, however, they implicitly contribute to the re-instatement of marriage as
an inescapable and fundamental societal institution which grants access to benefits and
entitlements.  From  a  broader  perspective,  wishing  to  be  included  in  exclusionary
institutions, such as marriage, may have a negative impact on those who do not wish to
marry, as Warner (1999, 108) has maintained. 
In his work, the Commissioner for human rights of the CoE has recognised the
existence  of  economic  implications  for  the  lack  of  legal  recognition  of  same-sex
couples.  In his  2011 report,  a dedicated section (“The Impact of Non-Recognition”)
numbers  the  challenges  encountered  by same-sex  couples  in  terms  of  financial  and
socio-economic issues. In its intentions, the section serves to illustrate the disadvantages
experienced by same-sex couples. However, it also implicitly restates the idea that the
solution to the existence of these disadvantages is to extend marriage to a formerly
excluded part of the populace. At no point is there a discussion on the extent to which
member  states  have  discretion  in  deciding  which  privileges  are  accessible  through
marriage. At a glance, therefore, it could be maintained that the Commissioner's work
on this issue follows a homonormative pattern in the recognition of non-heterosexual
kinship. Although the vulnerability, both material and symbolic, of LGBT persons is
thoroughly  acknowledged,  the  individuals  who  experience  these  difficulties  and
hardships are de-racialised, de-gendered and deprived of a specific connotation in terms
of social class. The Commissioner's suggestion to member states to broaden the concept
of marriage so as to include same-sex couples, therefore, does not aim at putting into
question the distributive issues around marriage that exist in different member states.
Rather, it points directly to the recognition of the symbolic value of this institution and
the strategic role that it fulfils within member states.
Becoming Respectable Parents: LGB Persons and Adoption
Often presented and framed as a corollary to the issue of marriage equality, the
recognition of  parental  rights  of  lesbian,  gay and bisexual  persons  has  come to the
forefront  in  political  and  legal,  national  and  international,  fora.  The  possibility  of
becoming parents for LGB persons, however, is inextricably bound to the existence of a
homonormative  conception  of  the  family.  In  this  regard,  Schroeder  (2004,  104)
describes how even non-heterosexual parenthood can become normalised:
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I do know that the normalising factor (…) is noticeable in MY life. (…) I
got more than my share of approval and attention. Hey, I was a lady with
a baby. My relationships with people changed (…). Even being a lesbian
didn't  throw most people off,  since I  was now a legitimate woman, a
MOTHER. At work, in the store, in the street, the moment anyone found
out  I  had  a  child,  I  was  accepted,  taken  for  granted  as  a  'normal'
individual. That I am lesbian, queer, was secondary. 
Schroeder's statement is deliberately polemical and it points directly to the notion of
respectability. More specifically, it suggests considering the extent to which the desire
for parenthood can be an assimilationist  move. In the last  decade,  there has been a
visible  acceleration  regarding  adoption  by lesbian,  gay  and  bisexual  persons  in  the
ECtHR's case law45. This notwithstanding the fact that neither international instruments
nor the  case law of the  ECtHR recognise a “right to adoption” (Di Lazzaro v. Italy
1997). In  order  to  successfully  articulate  their  claims  to  parenthood,  applicants  in
various cases have resorted to alleged violation of their right to respect for “family life”
under the terms of Article 8 ECHR, which also obviously implied a subsequent demand
for a re-definition of the concept of “family”. 
The first opening of the ECtHR in relation to the question of LGB parenthood
was in the landmark case of  Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal  (1999), in which it
was implicitly recognised that a lesbian, gay or bisexual parent could be as good as a
heterosexual  parent.  Contextually  the  ECtHR also  established a  dichotomy between
good and  bad examples  of  parenthood.  In  the  following years,  applicants  used this
45 The previous landmark case, although unsuccessful for the applicants, had been  Kerkhoven, Hinke
and Hinke v. the Netherlands (1992). On a similar note, also the request of a transsexual man to be
recognised as father failed before the Court in X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (1997). 
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dichotomy as their  point of departure in constructing a legal argument which would
persuade the ECtHR of their suitability as parents. The applicants' effort to recreate and
foster an idea(l) of respectability and irreprehensibility of LGB individuals as parents,
however, has been welcomed by the ECtHR's restatement of a model of “traditional
family life” that has left little space for the negotiation of given meanings. 
Strategic litigation on this issue has been intensified in the past few years, with
various human rights NGOs acting as  amicus curiae.  The result,  overall,  is that the
centrality  of  the  family  is  once  again  restated  by activists,  national  authorities  and
international  organisations  (such  as  the  CoE)  against  the  background  of  the
pauperisation and marginalisation of some families or other forms of kinship (working
class, with unemployed members and/or non-white, and/or mono-parental) that do not
match the spotless image of the modern family. Furthermore, during the last decade, the
case law of the ECtHR on adoption has been characterised by a marked inconsistency
which  will  become  more  evident  after  a  comparison  of  the  two  cases  concerning
respectively adoption by a single person (Fretté v. France, 2002 and  E.B. v. France,
2008) and the two cases concerning adoption by same-sex couples (Gas and Dubois v.
France, 2012 and X and Others v. Austria, 2013).  
Fretté v. France (2002) concerned the case of a single man who wished to adopt.
During  the  interviews  with  the  French  social  services,  the  man  had  avowed (the
ECtHR's words) his homosexuality. However, the French social services had refused the
man's  request  to  adopt.  After  having  exhausted  all  internal  remedies,  the  applicant
resorted  to  the  ECtHR alleging a  violation  of  Article  8  ECHR in  conjunction  with
Article 14 ECHR. In his application he maintained that regardless of the excellent report
by the social services as to his suitability as a parent, the French social services had
considered “his emotional and sexual lifestyle” (Fretté v. France, 2002: para. 10) as a
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decisive factor in the final decision to strike down his application.
In the ECtHR's analysis of Fretté v. France, the concept of the “best interests of
the child” appeared in a prominent position. The ECtHR was called to assess whether
the decision of the French social services was motivated by the intention of protecting
the “best interests of the child”. To undertake this endeavour, the ECtHR relied on the
existence of  contrasting opinions  within the  scientific  community (Fretté  v.  France,
2002:  para.  42) in relation to  the effects  on children of  adoption by gay or  lesbian
individuals. Given the existence of inconclusive scientific data, the ECtHR judged the
government's difference of treatment to be objective and reasonable and dismissed the
applicant's  complaint.  The  decision  reached  in  Fretté  v.  France  was  overturned,
however, in 2008.  E.B. v. France, also concerning a single lesbian woman wishing to
adopt, in fact saw the ECtHR ascertaining the existence of an infringement of Article 8
in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. 
Both Fretté  v.  France  and  E.B.  v.  France concerned  individuals  who  had
disclosed their sexual orientation. However, in the case of E.B. v. France, the applicant's
partner did not wish to be involved in the adoption process. In evaluating the case, the
French  social  services  had  brought  forward  two  main  impediments  as  to  E.B.'s
suitability as parent: on the one hand the lack of a paternal figure and on the other lack
of commitment on the part of her partner. Contrarily to  Fretté v. France,  however, in
this case the ECtHR gave more importance to the the test of the 'legitimate aim' pursued
by the French government. Departing drastically its 2002 judgement, the ECtHR denied
that  the  French government  pursued a  legitimate  aim,  namely the  protection  of  the
child's best interests, by rejecting the applicant's request to adopt merely on the basis of
inconclusive opinions of the “scientific community” on the impact on children's well-
being of having LGB parents. At a glance, it  appears obvious how, in fairly similar
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cases, the ECtHR made a quite different and inconsistent use of the experts' opinions. 
There  is,  however,   another  reason  why  the  two  judgements  need  to  be
compared;  namely  the  fact  that,  within  six  years,  the  ECtHR radically  revised  its
evaluation of what  it  meant  to protect the “health and rights of children” (Fretté v.
France, 2002, para. 38). This radical change in the ECtHR's approach foregrounds the
shaky  basis  on  which  the  ECtHR's assessment  may  be  based  in  relation  to  the
recognition of parenting rights of LGB persons.  Furthermore,  it  suggests  the use of
discretionary  criteria  employed  by  the  ECtHR when  assessing  the  existence  of  a
possible “European consensus” on these issues. Contrasting Fretté v. France with E.B.
v. France  highlights the lack of legal justification behind the ECtHR's 2002 decision
affirming that the French social services were right in considering Mr. Fretté  unsuitable
as an adoptive parent, and the consequent 2008 judgement by the same Court which
found Miss E.B. to be victim of discrimination in a similar situation to Mr. Fretté's. The
underlying  narrative  of  respectability,  in  terms  of  which  of  the  two  applicants  had
sought to persuade the ECtHR of their outstanding profile as adoptive parents, led to
different  outcomes  in  the  two  cases.  This  disparity  points  to  the  existence  of  an
inconsistent approach of the ECtHR's on the issue of adoption which may be based on
changeable  conceptions  about  good  and  bad  models  of  parenthood,  often  acquired
through scientific expertise whose ultimate reliability should also be scrutinised in the
courtroom. 
As  has  been  argued,  the  trajectory  of  the  ECtHR's  case  law has  been
characterised  by  an  often  incongruous  approach  to  the  issue  of  adoption  by  LGB
individuals. In fact, although in  E.B. v. France the ECtHR had implicitly admitted that
single LGB individuals were suitable to become parents, it demonstrated reluctance to
apply the same logic to same-sex couples. Gas and Dubois v. France (2012) and X and
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Others v. Austria (2013) are the two most recent cases concerning couples in which the
non-biological parent had made a request to gain full parental responsibility for their
partner's child. Once more, the joint analysis of these two cases serves to discuss the
inconsistency of the positions adopted by the  ECtHR on this topic, torn between the
need to preserve the heteronormativity of parenthood and the necessity to regulate non-
heterosexual parenthood within the boundaries of homonormative narratives.
In Gas and Dubois v. France the ECtHR recognised the existence of a “family
life”  between  the  applicants  (Gas  and  Dubois,  2012:  para.  37).  At  the  same  time,
however, it considered that under French law the possibility to grant simple adoption to
a  non-biological  parent  was  only  available  to  married  couples.  Hence,  the  ECtHR
dismissed the applicants' alleged violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14
ECHR. In adopting this position, the ECtHR also refused to uphold the applicants' claim
concerning the impossibility to get married in the first place, because of their sexual
orientation, as a discriminating factor. 
In this case again the “best interests of the child” occupied an important place.
However, the ECtHR had also emphasised the uniqueness of marriage as an institution
conferring a particular status. The applicants in  Gas and Dubois v. France,  however,
were not asking to get married (2012: para. 42). The applicants' lack of interest in opting
for the marital institution led to a short circuit in the reasoning of the ECtHR (Gas and
Dubois v. France, 2012: para. 42). In the ECtHR's comparison between themselves and
unmarried heterosexual couples the underlying question was why the applicants were
not seeking marriage, although they considered themselves to be a  family?  Why were
they advancing claims if they did not want to subscribe to social institutions? For the
ECtHR the adherence to  the familial  institution and parenthood could not be easily
decoupled. Also for this inability of conceiving kinship outside the boundaries of the
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state's recognition, the ECtHR affirmed that it was left to the member states to decide
the criteria to be employed in order to define a prospective adoptive parent.
As  had  already  happened  for  single  LGB individuals  wishing  to  adopt,  the
ECtHR enacted a swift change of approach in a short period of time. One year later, in
X and Others v. Austria (2013), the ECtHR practically overturned  Gas and Dubois v.
France. The case concerned a couple formed by two women. One of the applicants had
a  son  to  whom she  had  given  birth  without  being  married.  The  child's  father  had
recognised his paternity and had regular contact with the child. However, the biological
mother's female partner wanted to gain second-parent adoption. The Austrian Court had
refused to grant it because the child already had two parents and also because the two
women were not married (although marriage was not available for same-sex couples in
Austria). 
For the ECtHR the stable character of the applicants' relationship (X and Others
v.  Austria,  2013:  para.  26)  constituted  a  sufficient  reason to  declare  the  concept  of
“family life” applicable to the instant case.  Similarly to  Gas and Dubois v.  France,
however, the applicants had neither expressed interest  in entering a civil  partnership
(available  in  Austria  but  without  effects  upon  “second-parent”  adoption),  nor  in
marrying (not available in Austria for same-sex couples). 
How  has  the  applicants'  lack  of  interest  in  the  legal  recognition  of  their
relationship affected the ECtHR's judgement? It could be argued that the refusal to seek
a form of official recognition may have represented for the ECtHR a diminished level of
commitment on the part of the applicants. The lack of a strong sign of the applicants'
mutual  commitment  could  have  been  considered  by  the  ECtHR  as  weakening,  in
principle, the applicants' request to become parents. On the other hand, however, in X
and Others v. Austria (2013), the ECtHR reached a decision in favour of the applicants,
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by ascertaining a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. In the
judgement the ECtHR maintained that the two women had been discriminated against in
comparison  to  a  non-married  heterosexual  couple,  contextually  emphasising,  in  an
unprecedented way, the juridical necessity of recognising these type of families. This is
particularly interesting, as in its previous case law the ECtHR had always been reluctant
to  admit  the  existence  of  such pressing  need for  regulation  in  relation  to  same-sex
couples. It is, therefore, both striking and peculiar that the ECtHR's position in relation
to adoption claims by LGB couples has radically changed in the time frame of one year. 
X  and  Others  v.  Austria, however,  is  also  innovative  in  other  respects  of
particular interest for socio-legal scholars. In particular, the ECtHR made an interesting
use of sociological analysis in order to survey the issue of same-sex couples wishing to
adopt. In order to provide a socio-legal overview of the situation for LGB parents in the
47 member states, the ECtHR had offered a detailed description of comparative law on
the issue of  “second-parent”  adoption  but  had also  referred to  the above-mentioned
Commissioner's 2011 report. Such a reference signals the emerging awareness of the
ECtHR of having to pay more attention to the available sociological data on a specific
issue on which it is called to settle. In the case of adoption by same-sex couples, this
would  imply grounding its  reasoning  on  more  a  solid  sociological  basis  than  mere
abstract legal speculation on the value of “alternative families”. This opening operated
by the ECtHR also represents the proof that, in the context of the CoE, non-judicial
institutions such as the Commissioner,  can play an important role in supporting and
complementing the  judgements  of  the  ECtHR, especially when there is  a  swift  and
dynamic  evolution in  European societies  on some specific  issues,  such as  changing
attitudes  toward  same-sex  relationship,  and  the  emergence  of  alternative  models  of
kinship beyond the heteronormative framework. 
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The attention paid by the ECtHR on the issue of same-sex couples wishing to
adopt, however, is not unidirectional. The Commissioner and his team, in fact, at the
time of the drafting of the report were closely following the then pending case of Gas
and Dubois v. France (2012). There were, in the office, high expectations regarding this
particular case before the ECtHR. In fact, it was thought that a positive outcome for the
applicants could be used by the Commissioner to strengthen the legitimacy of the claims
contained in the report,  which could then be used to persuade national authorities to
enact  changes in  national legislation.  In the light  of the  ECtHR's reliance in  X and
Others v. Austria,  on the socio-legal work provided by the Commissioner, this aspect
appears  particularly  striking.  Whilst  the  ECtHR starts  to  realise  the  importance  of
sociological data in order to back up its decision to broaden the concept of “family life”,
the Commissioner needs the ECtHR's judgements in order to encourage member states
to revise their human rights agenda. Such a mutual relationship surely represents an
interesting development in the context of ECtHR-Commissioner cooperation, and could
form the object of future speculation. 
There is, however, another interesting aspect concerning this strand of case law,
namely the increasingly important third parties in the litigation process. Ten different
human rights NGOs, as well  as other actors,  intervened as  amicus curiae  in  X and
Others  v.  Austria.  This  aspect  is  likely to  become increasingly important,  given the
capability  of  different  non-governmental  actors  to  build  networks  and  share
information, as well as devising common European strategies in order to litigate both in
Strasbourg and in  national  Courts.  However,  the increasing reliance on this  type of
actor, also points to the phenomenon of a spasmodic necessity to seek regulation of
one's  status  predominantly  through  the  law,  which  falls  entirely  into  the  logic  of
homonormativity.  To  some  extent,  therefore,  strategic  litigation  could  bring  to  the
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forefront of the human rights agenda normative issues to the detriment of material and
structural problems connected with the lack of official recognition. 
Lastly, however, it is also necessary to point out the existence of other critical
aspects of the quest for adoption on the part of same-sex couples. This often under-
researched aspect is the one regarding the extent to which adoption may not be a neutral
process in the first place. As Smith (2009, 345) has argued, the insistence on the issue of
adoption  may hide  the  dynamics  of  economic  deprivation  that  bring children  to  be
placed in foster care or to be adopted. Smith offers the example of the United States and
maintains that a considerable number of the children there placed in foster care, for
instance,  have  not  experienced  abuses,  but  have  been  removed  from their  families
because of the inability of their parents to provide for them. For obvious reasons, the
data presented by Smith is not directly translatable into the European context. However,
Smith's  argument  is  powerful,  insofar  as  it  highlights  the  possibility  that  the  legal
“battle”  for  parenthood  may  become  almost  an  ideological  one  that  overlooks  the
structural  inequalities  that  lead  to  children  being  adopted  in  the  first  place.  In  the
context of a homonormative call to inclusion of same-sex couples, reflecting critically
on this possibility should be unavoidable as it would persuade those who are involved to
re-evaluate  their  desire  for  parenthood  and  to  promote  critical  reflections  on  the
implications of parenthood in relation to economic and social deprivation experienced
by the children who are the object of the adoption process. 
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been that of showing that the ECtHR case law
concerning the “family life” of LGB persons is  characterised by a strong degree of
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inconsistency in relation to who can qualify or not as being part of a “family” and that
this  assessment  is  often  informed  simultaneously  by  both  heteronormative  and
homonormative assumptions about a standard model of kinship. At the same time, there
are also cases, such as X and Others v. Austria, which are likely to have a strong impact
on national  audiences  and reverberations  at  the  legislative  level  in  various  member
states in the future. Whilst, the impact of the decisions of the ECtHR, therefore, should
not be underestimated in terms of developments across Europe; at the same time, the
analysis of these judgements has also suggested that the ECtHR adopts a quite narrow
framework for the definition of the “family”. It is undeniable that the domain of the law
fulfils the fundamental role of enabling individuals to acquire legitimation and become
intelligible (Beger, 2000, 265). For this reason, the legal construction of the concept of
the “family” transcends the boundaries  of the law and has profound implications in
social  terms. In this regard, there is a need for a critical assessment of the work of
human rights institutions such as the CoE – and of the ECtHR specifically – in order to
investigate  the  complicity  of  the  law  with  the  various  national  and  supra-national
interests at stake in relation to the recognition of same-sex partnerships. 
Recognising same-sex relationships seems to be particularly problematic from
the political, as well as financial and economic point of view. The analysis of the case
law of the ECtHR and the work of the Commissioner on this topic seem to confirm the
current configuration of these specific human rights claims as being inevitably linked to
the existence of precise economic positions of privilege for which individuals can or
cannot qualify. Following Duggan (2003) it has been argued, in relation to this aspect,
that the recognition of same-sex relationships entails the reinforcement, rather than the
weakening,  of  structures  of exclusion that  marginalise  LGB persons who cannot  be
subsumed  under  the  problematic  concept  of  “normality”.  It  has  furthermore  been
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suggested that the narrow focus on the issue of marriage equality for LGB persons in
the  European  context,  represents  a  good  illustration  of  the  neoliberal  concept  of
“autonomy”  whereby  the  family  becomes  the  primary  structure  of  reference  for
individuals  and a  self-sufficient  unit  perfectly integrated in  the globalised economic
landscape from which the state shies away. 
What should be discussed contextually to the inclusion of same-sex couples in
the familial institution, is why marriage is the only point of access to the enjoyment of
some benefits or privileges (Gómez in Motta and Motta 2011, 27) and it is not possible
to think about a fairer distribution of resources based on actual life conditions, rather
than  on  formal  prerequisites.  The  uncritical  endorsement  of  marriage  equality  risks
leaving the status quo unchallenged and unquestioned. Hence, without downplaying the
importance  for  same-sex  couples  to  have  their  relationships  legally  recognised,
exaggerating the symbolic importance of marriage equality for the attainment of full
equality is smoke and mirrors. 
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Chapter Seven - Between Liberty and Control: Expressing Identities, 
Repressing Gender, and Sexuality
The acquisition of visibility for LGBTI persons is a fundamental condition for
the inclusion in human rights discourses. Whilst on the one hand becoming visible may
entail recognition and increased acceptance, on the other it may also be accompanied by
a higher degree of vulnerability to hostility or violence. Becoming visible, moreover, is
intimately  connected  to  the  possibility  of  action  in  the  public  sphere.  The  political
significance of this process can be assessed through an analysis of a specific strand of
case law of the ECtHR and the work of the Commissioner on issues relating to freedom
of expression, freedom of association and assembly, and the rights of LGBT(I) asylum
seekers. 
The rationale for the choice of topics reflects the timeliness of these debates: in
Eastern Europe and in the Balkan countries, an increasing number of demonstrations
and  gatherings  organised  by  LGBT associations  are  taking  place  (Davydova  2012;
Gruszczynska 2012). Some of these have been banned by governments or disrupted by
violent – often racist and homophobic – counter-demonstrators. At the same time, an
increasing number of asylum seekers are framing their requests in terms of persecution
they have suffered in their home countries because of their sexual orientation or gender
identity. The thorny issue of their “credibility” as genuine asylum seekers has emerged
and is currently debated in different fora (Morgan 2006; Jenkins 2009). Alongside these
two  emerging  phenomena,  a  growing  number  of  applications  have  been  lodged  in
Strasbourg which have given the Court the opportunity to elaborate its  case law and,
indirectly, connect it to European exceptionalism on human rights. The Commissioner
has  also  engaged  thoroughly  with  these  issues  and  his  work  provides  interesting
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material for reflection. 
Contiguous to the themes illustrated above, is also the issue of the monitoring
and  sanctioning  of  homophobic  and  transphobic  hate  crimes  and  hate  speech,
specifically in relation to the extent to which  verbal or physical violence are seen to
curtail  the  possibility  of  “being  in  public”  for  LGBTI  persons.  Furthermore,  the
prosecution of hate crimes or hate speech is often considered as the main instrument to
redress specific forms of virulent discrimination and verbal and physical violence. This
chapter  will  consider  different  facets  concerning  the  expression  of  one's  sexual
orientation and/or gender identity, trying to identify and discuss both the shortcomings
of  the  current  approaches  of  maximising  participation  and  condemning
homo/transphobia,  as  well  as  the  broader  socio-political  implications  that  these
approaches present in relation to the formal framework of human rights protection of
the Council of Europe. 
Homonationalism,  the  Heterosexual  Nation,  and  the  Resurgence  of
Identity
Human  rights  discourses  are  articulated  in  a  world  characterised  by a  strict
policing of national  borders and a widespread paranoia about illegal  migration.  Yet,
these same human rights discourses are part of a universalist discourse about equality,
applicable, in theory, to every human being. Because of this tension, human rights are
undeniably political. In this regard Douzinas (2007, 56) has suggested that human rights
may have “ontological consequences” insofar as they can directly modify one's legal
status  or  impact  on daily life.  In  relation  to  the  recognition of  the  rights  claims of
LGBTI  persons,  these  consequences  are  exemplified  by the  existence  of  a  twofold
dynamic. On the one hand, these new rights-holders are admitted to become part of the
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nation. On the other hand, however, the political membership of these individuals is
instrumentally mobilised by nation-states beyond their own borders in order to foster an
image of themselves characterised by moral exceptionalism vis-à-vis other states. 
Human  rights  discourses  are  also  characterised  by  processes  entailing  the
racialisation  of  sexual  identities  or  the  sexualisation  of  racial  identities.  Apart  from
rendering individuals intelligible legally and socially, human rights are also at the heart
of the definition of the nation-state. LGBTI persons, in particular, become co-opted into
the political and legal domain and may indicate the tangible proof of a nation-states'
record in respect of human rights. Puar's concept of “homonationalism” (2007) offers an
interesting illustration of this complex phenomenon by which sexual identities can be
mobilised, in an arguably instrumental way, in favour of the nation-state and its liberal
political agenda. Originally conceived and applied in the context of the United States
and the international “war on terror”, homonationalism is defined as a “(...) brand of
homosexuality  [that]  operates  as  a  regulatory script  not  only of  normative  gayness,
queerness or homosexuality,  but also of the racial  and national norms that reinforce
these sexual subjects” (Puar 2007, 2). 
Homonationalism46 may be said to function as a mechanism of co-optation of
acceptable racialised segments of the queer population within the nation47. This operation
has the direct effect of defining who inevitably falls out of this definition and also those
subjects  who, as sexual-racial others (Puar 2007, 2), are in opposition to the virtuous,
integrated homosexual citizen48. Interestingly, homonationalist dynamics become more
46 According  to  Puar,  (2007,  51)  the  nation  is  strengthened  by  at  least  three  deployments  of
homonationalism :  a)  the  reiteration  of  heterosexuality  as  the  norm;  b)  the  fostering  of  national
homosexual  positionalities;  c)  the  emergence  of  a  transnational  discourse  of  U.S.  sexual
exceptionalism. 
47 Puar explains how homonationalism is  fundamentally a  way to proclaim liberal  attitudes towards
sexuality, without fundamentally questioning the structures of power, oppression, and discrimination
that participate in the functioning of the nation-state: “Thus the nation state maintains its homophobic
and  xenophobic  stances,  while  capitalising  on  its  untarnished  image  of  inclusion,  diversity  and
tolerance” (Puar 2007, p. 26).
48  Homonationalism seems to work almost as a two-way dynamic: on the one hand as a  centripetal
movement bringing the respectable and white segment of the queer population towards the core of the
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visible when the issue concerning the protection of the human rights of LGBTI persons
starts  to  be  recognised  as  legitimate  by  national  governments  or  international
organisations.  In  this  regard,  the  process  of  scapegoating of  the  Black,  Latino  and
Mormon communities after  the infamous Proposition n.8 was voted in California in
2008, well illustrates how the attempt to protect the human rights of a group can be
accompanied  with  the  potential  “demonisation”  of  other  groups.  More  specifically,
when the overwhelming majority of Californians voted against the reintroduction of the
right  to  marry  for  same-sex  couples  in  the  State,  various  liberal  lesbian  and  gay
commentators  started to  blame the Black,  Latino  and Mormon communities  for  the
negative result, on the presumption of the high level of religiosity in these communities.
While the numerous and problematic ramifications of this episode cannot be illustrated
in this context, what happened in California in 2008 poignantly illustrates what is at
stake  when  one  talks  about  “homonationalism”:  how  is  it  possible  to  catalyse  the
feelings of belonging to the state of newly admitted citizens such as LGBTI persons,
while simultaneously marginalising other citizens (or non-citizens) who are perceived as
a “threat” to the liberal state? 
The  introduction  of  this  framework  of  analysis  helps  to  explore  further  the
process of transnational mobilisation of sexualised and gendered identities. Adapted to
Europe,  this  framework  can  highlight  dynamics  of  the  racialisation  of  sexual  and
gendered identities happening in the context of the Council of Europe, both in the case
law of the ECtHR and, to a lesser extent, in the work of the Commissioner. In fact, in
Europe,  assumptions  about  the  “whiteness”  of  LGBTI  persons  are  not  uncommon.
LGBTI  citizens  who  belong  to  non-white  ethnic  groups,  or  migrants  and  asylum
seekers, are subjected to close scrutiny of their stories – often asked to “prove” that they
nation state; and on the other hand as a centrifugal movement which equally distances from that same
ideal  core of the nation-state non-respectable queer and non-queer altogether, according to blatant
racial lines. 
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are  truly  LGBTI.  Usually  believed  to  be  “heterosexual”  by  default,  individuals
belonging to these ethnic and/or religious groups, are often assumed to be inherently
homophobic  and/or  transphobic  by  virtue  of  their  cultural  background  or  religious
convictions. This gross simplification, of course, has profound implications. On the one
hand, it denies the possibility that some of these individuals may themselves be LGBTI.
On the other hand, labelling various ethnic and/or religious groups as “homophobic” or
“transphobic”, may directly lead to a mobilisation of white LGBTI persons inside the
nation-state against these presumed “homophobic” racial others. The result, in  in many
European countries discourses about the inherent homophobia or transphobia of specific
racial, ethnic and/or religious groups are proliferating, and are used instrumentally by
various political leaders. The case of the Netherlands, which will be briefly illustrated in
the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  represents  a  good  example  of  the  way  in  which  a
dichotomy is created between the liberal “LGBTI citizens” as opposed to those who are
believed  to  pose  a  real  threat  to  liberal  societies,  because  of  the  inherent  homo-
transphobia ascribed to them. 
“Homonationalism”,  however,  is  used  here,  beyond  the  mere  context  of  the
nation-state. It is applied, instead, to the difficult process of the creation of a European
sexual citizenship for the establishment of which outsiders need to be created. In the
following analysis, the two-fold ramifications of homonationalism in the context of the
Council  of  Europe  will  be  illustrated.  Firstly,  there  is  a  process  of  singling  out
homophobic/transphobic member states of the CoE as opposed to queer-friendly ones.
This is exemplified by the recent strand of case law of the ECtHR concerning freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly and association in some member states of the
CoE, especially in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Russian Federation. Secondly,
this model of sexual citizenship is also framed by the discourses and policy practices, as
194
well as public rhetoric, concerning the homophobic countries outside of Europe, as well
as the existence of non-tolerant racial  and/or religious minorities within the national
borders  themselves.  The  emerging  strand  of  case  law of  the  ECtHR  concerning
LGBT(I) asylum seekers illustrates this point. 
The “Pink Agenda” and European Citizenship:  Tolerant  Europeans
and Intolerant Others?
An emerging concept of European sexual citizenship needs to be supported by a
political  apparatus  that  fosters  an  ideal  of  cohesion  and  belonging  to  a  political
community. In this regard, it is possible to speak about a European “Pink Agenda” on
the  rights  of  LGBTI  persons  that  promotes  a  specific  kind  of  European  sexual
citizenship which is strongly homonationalist in nature. The “Pink Agenda” consists of
a set of legal, social, and political instruments employed both by nation-states and by
international human rights institutions, such as the CoE, to promote, in a proactive way,
specific LGBT(I) identities beyond the borders of Europe.  At the same time, it  also
helps  to  single  out  anti-LGBT(I)  positions  within  these  same borders.  This  process
results in a model of European sexual citizenship that creates sexual and racial others
while, simultaneously, allowing a limited portion of non-heterosexual/non-cisgendered49
people to become fully legitimised as part of the citizenry. 
The creation of the “Pink Agenda” on the rights of LGBT(I) persons on the part
of nation-states,  has  the purpose of  subtly exploiting the citizenship of these newly
included  subjects  in  order  to  articulate  national  political  discourses  vis-à-vis  other
national  actors.  This  process  not  only  takes  take  place  in  bilateral  foreign  policy
49 The word 'cisgender(ed)' is used in opposition to 'transgender' to define Individuals whose sexual and
gender identity is in accordance with the gender assigned at birth (Schilt and Westbrook, 2009).
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settings; it is also enacted in international fora, such as the Council of Europe, with the
aim of  “spotting”  non-compliant,  hence  by definition  homophobic and  transphobic,
states.  Furthermore,  far  from having repercussions  only on inter-state  relations,  this
process of inscribing LGBT(I) persons into the fabric of the nation also has profound
consequences for the ways in which they exercise their citizenship. Through access to
to institutions  such as  marriage or the army,  LGBT(I)  persons substantially become
normalised as queer citizens, rather than challenging the exclusionary character of these
institutions.  The  most  visible  implication  of  this  process  is  a  normalisation  of
national(ised) LGBT(I) identities that fosters new lines of exclusion and the emergence
of the  good [homosexual]  citizen (Smith 1994),  as  opposed to  the “citizen pervert”
described by Bell (1995). 
With the purpose of letting individuals fit  into the system, this  human rights
agenda inevitably creates lines of fracture between those who can afford to integrate and
those who remain at the borders of the normative sphere – both within the nation and
also in the international arena. The “Pink Agenda” can, in fact, be used as a yardstick in
order to measure the progress of other states (both members and non-members of the
CoE) in the context of the protection of the rights of LGBT(I) persons. This specific
human rights agenda, furthermore, is based on normalised LGBT(I) identities that are
de-racialised and deprived of class connotations. Furthermore, in order to function as a
mechanism of control of individuals, the “Pink Agenda” is embedded in a structural
strategy aimed at continuously creating the subject position of “the other” outside of the
geo-political borders of the continent. 
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Confessing One's Queerness: LGBTI Asylum Seekers and the Space of
Legal Acceptability
Asylum seekers can be described as a marginal, invisible group of people with
almost no entitlement in the country in which they reside, or in which they are detained
while they wait for their case to be heard. Their precariousness and vulnerability are the
result of political and legal regimes that regulate their entitlements and obligations on
foreign soil. Yet, the heavy scrutiny to which they are subjected can be de-humanising.
Every asylum seeker needs to be a good storyteller: the better the story, the more likely
it  will  be  considered  credible.  It  was  not  until  2008  that  the  United  Nations  High
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  issued  a  Guidance  Note  on  asylum  claims
related  to  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity  that  allowed  LGBT persons  to  be
recognised as asylum seekers, as members of a “particular social group” under the 1951
UNHCR  Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees  (“the  1951  Geneva
Convention”). 
In countries in which homosexuality, transgender identities, or cross-dressing are
criminalised, individuals may be subject to harassment, persecution, and violence, often
state-sponsored,  resulting  in  a  decision  to  leave  their  country  of  origin  and  seek
protection elsewhere.  While  it  is  necessary to include sexual  orientation and gender
identity among the legitimate grounds on which an asylum claim can be based, this
inclusion can also be instrumentalised politically. It is precisely with this ambiguity in
mind that Bracke (2012, 245) has talked about the “saving gays rescuing narrative”, by
which European states articulate a civilisational politics that posits tolerance of sexual
and gender diversity as a marker of the “civilised West” which enables these countries
to save persecuted queers around the world in the name of these civilisational values.
Torn between the need to create a global geography of “homo-transphobic countries”
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and protect those fleeing from fear and persecution, Europe (framed as both the EU and
the  CoE)  tries  to  capitalise  on  its  image  as  a  tolerant,  liberal,  and  queer-friendly
continent, not without ambiguities. When the Russian Federation criminalised the so-
called “gay propaganda” in 2013, both at the level of the CoE and the EU there were
strong counter-reactions aiming at emphasising the radical difference between Russia's
and  Europe's  human  rights  policies.  Similarly,  the  European  Union  often  criticised
countries like Iran for executing individuals accused of being gay, implicitly assuming
the  role  of  a  beacon  of  democracy,  freedom and  guarantor  of  human  rights  for  all
individuals. 
As a result  of this attempt to rescue persecuted queers,  individuals may find
themselves, paradoxically, in a vulnerable position: as the trophy of the West, yet treated
with suspicion when they have to substantiate their “gayness” in the asylum process
(Berg  and  Millbank,  2009,  200;  Bennett  and Thomas,  2013,  25-29).  Extensive  and
intrusive  questioning  is  not  uncommon  in  this  process  and  stereotypes  about
homosexuality and transgenderism often place the applicants in vulnerable positions
(Morgan 2006). Individuals may be asked uncomfortable questions about the nature of
their sexual relations or their preferred sexual practices, as well as being scrutinised in
cases in which they have married, or they have children, in order to divert attention
from  their  presumed  homosexuality.  Often  times,  moreover,  LGB  applicants  are
deported to their home countries with the suggestion that they should be '”discreet” and
avoid flaunting their homosexuality (Millbank 2009). 
When a claim is successful, however, it  can be said that the condition of the
“refugee” is far from being ideal, as it entails a problematic relationship with the nation.
As Butler and Spivak (2011, 6) have suggested, the condition of the refugee is one of
otherness with regard to the host state and their freedom is mostly illusory (Schuster
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2003).  Against  this  background,  the  “saving  gay  rescuing  narratives”  appear  as  a
powerful political instrument that can enhance European human rights exceptionalism
by essentialising homophobic others in non-Western contexts. The creation of “queer
refugees” allows the specular creation of the “queer citizen”. The dialectical relationship
between these two “strangers” is important insofar as it reinforces the heteronormative
character of the nation, while simultaneously providing a space of mild tolerance for the
others. 
The  role  of  the  CoE  in  the  enhancement  of  this  process  aimed  at  rescuing
persecuted queers worldwide is ambiguous. If in principle the political bodies of the
organisation, such as the Committee of Ministers (CM) and the Parliamentary Assembly
(PACE),  as  well  as  the  Commissioner  himself,  have  urged  member  states  to  take
seriously asylum applications  filed on the grounds of  sexual  orientation and gender
identity, in the courtroom the logic of suspicion prevails and great leverage is given to
the respondent states in assessing which asylum seekers' stories are credible. A limited
number  of  cases  have  been heard  by the  ECtHR in  which  the  applicants  alleged a
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, or punishment.50 In particular, the ECtHR has been called to evaluate whether
national  courts  had been wrong in  their  assessment  of  the criteria  to  determine  the
danger of persecution to which individuals were subjected in their home countries. The
focus in this section is not so much on the (negative) decision itself, rather than on the
fact that the judgements contribute to enhancing the idea of Europe as an actor to which
it is possible to turn to for “protection”.
The cases analysed here are  F. v. the United Kingdom (2004) and I.N.N. v. the
50 This allegation is based on the landmark 1989 case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, in which the
ECtHR declared that returning an individual to a country in which she/he would suffer a treatment
amounting to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment amounted to a violation of
Article 3 of the ECHR.
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Netherlands (2004),  both  concerning  two  male  applicants  from  Iran  who  reported
having fled the country because of the danger to them owing to their homosexuality.
Having both  already been subjected  to  harassment  and violence  on  the  part  of  the
Iranian police on several occasions, they had escaped to avoid harsher punishment such
as a death sentence.51 Together with a third case, Ayegh v. Sweden (2006), which touches
incidentally on the issue of homosexuality,  these two cases see the exposure of the
“hypervisible Iranian queer” (Shakhsari 2012), an increasingly popular stylised figure in
the repertoire of human rights violations. Both applicants, F. and I.I.N., anonymous for
fear of having their identities disclosed, staged a Foucaultian confession in the process
of avowing their  homosexuality.  They ascribed to themselves an identity that  might
render  their  asylum  claim  successful.  In  recalling  their  experiences  of  abuse  and
violence, the instances in which they have been raped by police officers, and the climate
of fear in which they have led their lives, they confessed and exposed their humanity in
all  its  vulnerability before the ECtHR. The assessment  of their  credibility,  however,
remains crucial. 
What does a “persecuted Iranian queer” look like? While it was primarily the
responsibility of the national authorities (the British and the Dutch) to decide whether
the applicants' stories fitted the “typical” confession of the Iranian homosexual, it was
the duty of the ECtHR in Strasbourg to verify whether these authorities were right in
their  assessment.  In  both  judgements  the  ECtHR  produced  an  extensive  array  of
arguments in order to assess the seriousness of the episodes recalled by the applicants. It
reached the conclusion that the national authorities were right:  neither F.  nor I.N.N.
were at risk of capital punishment were they to be returned to Iran. What is striking is
the dissonance between the personal experiences confessed by the applicants, and the
51 Sharia  law  in  Iran  officially  punishes  'sodomy'  with  capital  punishment  upon  production  of  the
testimony of four (male) witnesses (F. v. the United Kingdom, p. 3). 
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existence,  in  the background,  of  a  narrative of  Iran as  the  “grand prison and death
chamber for queers” (Shakhsari, 2012, 15). 
While  national  authorities  tried  to  demonstrate  how  in  reality  homosexual
behaviour is tolerated in Iran, rather than harshly punished, the ECtHR was called to
either uphold or dismiss the national authorities' findings. As a result, this narrative of
“homophobic versus homophile” countries is reinforced, by means of the work of the
ECtHR. Paradoxically, while the ECtHR stated that the conditions for queers in Iran
were not as bad as the applicants sought to demonstrate, at the same time, it reinforced
the dichotomy between the Western observer and the Oriental observed. It is not, hence,
solely the verdict of the ECtHR itself that matters, but the very process of scrutinising
the applicants' intimate confessions. It produces a logic of suspicion and stylisation of
sexual personages which are recognised as being alien to the citizenry of Europe but
which, at the same time, aspire to become sheltered in its midst. 
In deciding on these cases, the ECtHR embarks on two operations. On the one
hand  it  sees  the  individual  cases  through  the  lens  of  suspicion,  in  order  to  detect
possible  frauds  from non-genuine  asylum seekers.  On  the  other  hand,  it  implicitly
reinforces the moralising judgement between liberal countries that grant asylum and
illiberal countries that, because of their behaviour towards their citizens, force people to
seek asylum elsewhere. It becomes visible, therefore, how the work of the ECtHR may
indirectly  contribute  to  the  construction  of  a  common  European  identity  based  on
respect for human rights, from a higher moral perspective than that of the countries
whose  actions  it  is  called  to  evaluate.  As  Reddy (2008,  2859)  has  suggested,  it  is
possible  to  see  the  creation  of  legal  narratives  as  being  characterised  by  the  law's
“unique dependence on historical narratives – on narrating the history of a social group
as an inextricable aspect of the justice the law promotes”.  In this case, the ECtHR helps
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to maintain the abstract narrative on persecuted Iranian queers, while simultaneously it
gives more weight to the suspicions of national authorities regarding the genuineness of
the applicants' claims. The abstract symbol of the persecution – the Islamic Republic of
Iran – remains intact as a powerful reminder of what human rights violations look like
in practice. The persecuted, however, has not suffered “enough” in order to be admitted
to a privileged geo-political space such as that of tolerant and liberal Europe. 
Beyond the inevitable degree of continuity between the actions of the judicial
and the political bodies of the CoE, there are slightly different stances in relation to the
issue of LGBT asylum seekers. Non-judicial bodies such as the Committee of Ministers
(CM) or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council  of Europe (PACE) have issued
recent recommendations (Committee of Ministers 2010) and resolutions (Parliamentary
Assembly 2010), in which they called member states to recognise sexual orientation and
gender identity as legitimate grounds for an asylum claim. Both bodies emphasised the
“well-founded fear of persecution”, one of the tenets of the 1951 Geneva Convention,
and, hence, the necessity for the applicants to be credible in framing their asylum claim.
The irony is that the members of the CM and the PACE are also members of national
governments  that  systematically  scrutinise,  with  intrusive  questions,  those  same
applicants whose rights they are trying to protect in Strasbourg. 
Seen jointly, these two sides of the same coin reinforce the perception that in the
European arena of human rights, the “Pink Agenda” is more an ideological toolkit, than
a concrete working plan. If there was a genuine interest in defending individuals – either
citizens  or  non-citizens  –  from human  rights  abuses,  applicants  would  not  have  to
demonstrate a threat of death or an extreme punishment. Demonstrating the existence of
a potential danger to them as LGBTI persons, should be enough of a proof. The paradox
is,  therefore,  that  while  the  discourse  of  LGBT  refugees  enhances  “civilisational
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politics”  (Bracke  2012),  it  also hides  a  fundamental  aversion  to  migration  flows  in
Europe, which are considered to endanger the socio-cultural and economic stability of
the continent. The result is, therefore, the juxtaposition of a formal proclamation of the
need to  “rescue”  persecuted  queers  and the  enhanced protection  of  the  integrity  of
national borders. 
While the idea of American exceptionalism on human rights is well discussed in
the  literature  (Fitzpatrick  2003;  Ignatieff  2009),  the  idea  of  a  “European
exceptionalism” on human rights issues is less widespread. Nonetheless, it is a strong
rhetorical element in the construction of the concept of European citizenship.  In the
tailoring of this “us versus them” rhetoric, the role of international actors is crucial.
Moving away from the CoE and looking for a moment at the EU, statements such as the
one issued by the President of the European Council of the EU, Van Rompuy (2010), on
the occasion of the International Day Against Homophobia, indicate how LGBT issues
might  come to the forefront as a new – and problematic  – benchmark of European
civilisation: 
(…) discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation has ceased to
constitute a political cleavage,  and is enshrined in the EU's founding act and
statement of values.  It  is something that  distinguishes [my emphasis]  Europe
from many other parts of the world (Van Rompuy 2010). 
The  disturbing  aspect  of  this  statement  is  precisely  its  presumptuous  character  in
positing the respect of LGBT persons as a founding value of the EU. Van Rompuy
himself  must  know  that  these  issues  are  currently  highly  politicised  and  used,  by
national governments,  in order to promote their  queer-friendly image vis-à-vis other
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states. The emergence of this continental Euro-nationalist agenda on the rights of LGBT
persons seems to emerge as a concerted political effort to establish dichotomies in the
international  arena,  rather  than  from  a  genuine  commitment  to  achieve  substantial
equality of all citizens.
The discussion on the situation of LGBT asylum seekers, however, is not limited
to the ECtHR or the eminently political bodies of the CoE such as the Committee of
Ministers or the Parliamentary Assembly. The Commissioner52 has recognised, in his
2011 report,  the saliency of the issue of  asylum in the context  of the protection of
LGBTI persons and has called on member states to recognise sexual orientation and
gender identity as legitimate grounds on which to grant asylum without the requirement
for invasive tests.  The work of the Commissioner is  interesting from many aspects.
Firstly the section of the report concerning the situation of LGBT(I) asylum seekers in
the member states of the CoE was based on a close collaboration with UNHCR officers
in Strasbourg who could give insights on the agency's guidelines and their reception on
the  part  of  national  governments.  Secondly,  the  Commissioner  was  particularly
interested in the conditions under which asylum seekers' claims were assessed. In most
cases,  these  conditions  were  not  judged  by the  Commissioner  and  his  team to  be
acceptable  in  terms  of  respecting  the  dignity  and  rights  of  the  claimant.  The
Commissioner,  in  particular,  put  a  lot  of  emphasis  on the necessity for  training the
personnel in charge of assessing asylum claims in order to guarantee that individuals
were  questioned  in  a  sensitive,  appropriate,  and  non-judgemental  way.  The
Commissioner sought to highlight, specifically, the fact that every asylum seeker's story
may be informed by a different set of cultural, religious, or personal motivations that
may not immediately be legible to the officer in charge of the case. At the same time,
52 Commissioner for  Human Rights of  the Council  of  Europe,  2011,  Discrimination on Grounds of
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, p. 12. 
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however, an underlying distinction between the rhetoric of “us” and “them” was still
visible in the Commissioner's approach. While not as profound as in the work of the
political actors of the CoE such as the CM or the PACe, the work of the Commissioner
is still informed by a notion of Europe as a “safe haven” for LGBTI migrants in which
they can hope for a better future far from discrimination and violence. This notion, true
to a certain extent, certainly overshadows the existence of profound inequalities in the
treatment of LGBTI asylum seekers across the continent but, also, goes in the direction
of strengthening their “otherness” in relation to their host country. 
Whilst it can be maintained that the work of the Commissioner on this topic is
innovative it still remains informed by a degree of characterisation of asylum seekers as
the  “vulnerable  others”.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Commissioner's  work  is
important, insofar as it is aimed at raising the awareness of national authorities on the
necessity of broadening the spectrum of possibilities existing in narrating human rights
violations on the part  of “vulnerable subjects” such as LGBT(I) asylum seekers. To
some extent, moreover, this approach can be seen as being partially in opposition to the
idea  of  the “normalisation” of  LGBTI asylum seekers  who have to  respond,  in  the
context of their  claim, in a way that is intelligible to border authorities. Placing the
emphasis on the difference between claimants' accounts, rather than on their presumed
similarities, is more likely to counter the stereotypical image of the asylum seeker,  as
was the case for the archetypical “Iranian queer” described above in the analysis of the
case law of the ECtHR. Hence, while still embedded in the normalising narratives of the
CoE, the work of the Commissioner can be said to stand out in relation to the possibility
of broadening categories of gender and sexuality, trying to substitute stereotypes with
actual portrayals of real lived experiences of the individuals involved. This important
attempt,  however,  cannot  be  said  to  be  always  matched  with  an  equally  proactive
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attitude  of  national  authorities,  whose policies  often  remain  strongly informed by a
dynamic  of  systematic  suspicion  towards  asylum seekers'  stories  that  do  not  seem
convincing or  “credible”  enough in  relation  to  the  sexual  orientation  and/or  gender
identity  of  the  claimant.  This  is  particularly  true,  for  instance,  in  cases  in  which
applicants have been already been married or have children, or cannot furnish evidence
of having had prior homosexual experiences, or of having cross-dressed or lived as a
member of the chosen gender. 
Pride Goes East: Tales of Freedom from the “Other Europe”
The mobilisation  of  LGBTI identities  for  political  purposes  in  the  European
arena,  however,  is  not  only  used  in  the  process  of  singling  out  homophobic  and
transphobic countries outside Europe. Within the context of the CoE, the articulation of
specific human rights policies going under the name of the “Pink Agenda” also targets
member states in order to expose their structural lack of compliance with the most basic
human  rights  principles.  Some  of  these  rights  could  be,  for  instance,  the  right  to
freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) and to freedom of assembly and association
(Article 11 ECHR) in relation to the rights of LGBTI persons. A specific, relatively
recent, strand of  case law has emerged in Strasbourg concerning various instances in
which the rights protected by these articles have been violated by national authorities in
different member states. 
The last few years have seen a proliferation of events, and the establishment of
associations, connected with the defence of the rights of LGBT persons, particularly in
Eastern Europe.  These events  or  venues,  however,  have often become the object  of
attacks  or  limitations  of  their  activities  on  the  part  of  both  governmental  and  non-
governmental actors in the last decade (Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council
of Europe 2011). By means of outright bans, bureaucratic impediments, and/or failure,
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on the part of national authorities, to ensure the safety of the participants or members of
associations,  LGBT persons’ enjoyment  of  the rights  to  freedom of  expression,  and
freedom of assembly and association, have been seriously curtailed in these countries.
This  emerging  phenomenon,  while  genuinely  requiring  attention  from political  and
judicial actors both in domestic contexts and in the context of the CoE, can also be
prone, to a certain extent, to different forms of instrumentalisation. 
It  would  be  reductive  to  consider  the  “Pink Agenda”  as  only  encompassing
access to societal  institutions such as marriage or the army,  or rescuing “persecuted
queers” as discussed. This range of diverse queer-friendly policies and actions can be
said  also  to  help  the  cross-cultural  transposition  of  the  “Anglo-American  identity
politics” defined by Stychin53 (1998, 134). What is meant by this is the creation, across
various  European  cultural  contexts,  of  seemingly  “global  gays”  (Altman  1997)  or
queers. In this regard, therefore, it appears important to ask to what extent the emphasis
on the importance of Gay Pride Parades and similar events across member states can be
said to correspond to this process of transposition identified by both Stychin (1998), and
in different contexts, by Altman (1997). 
The  analysis  of  two  recent  judgments  of  the  ECtHR,  Bączkowski  v.  Poland
(2007) and  Alekseyev  v.  Russia (2010)  can  help to  shed some light  on the possible
existence of these dynamics. Since 2007 the ECtHR in Strasbourg has issued three54
judgements  on  the  banning  of  Gay  Pride  Parades  and  other  similar  events.  The
increasing number of applications is due mainly to the existence of a problem in the
enjoyment of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association in some
53 Stychin (1998, p. 135) comments on the “narrow” conception of sexual orientation within Europe:
“The historical and cultural specificity of sexual identities must also be considered. Within Europe
(however defined), the existence and role of lesbian and gay identities, and the relationship between
sexual acts and sexual identities, varies greatly. The experience of being a middle-class white gay,
professional man living in central London is a world apart from being a working class woman who
lives in rural Greece with another woman, or of being a married man who has sex with men in Spain”.
54 The third case is Genderdoc-M v. Moldova (2012).
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countries,  but  also  to  the  increasing  effectiveness  of  non-governmental  actors  at
networking and litigating strategically in order to achieve a political  goal before the
ECtHR. 
The  possibility  of  so-called  “sexual  minorities”  carrying  out  peaceful
demonstrations is often considered as a litmus test for countries needing to prove their
democratic character or for those aspiring to gain access to the EU (for instance in the
case of Serbia55). Gay Pride Parades in Eastern Europe become, therefore, invested with
a  symbolic  importance  as  markers  of  democracy  in  these  countries.  However,  this
strategic importance attributed to Gay Pride Parades is likely to oversimplify national
debates on these issues and favour the radicalisation of these debates and the occurrence
of political  backlashes in  order  to  counter  the various  attempts  of externally driven
“Europeanisation”56 (O'Dwyer and Schwartz, 2010, 222). 
In the two above-mentioned cases the Polish and the Russian authorities had
either  banned or  put  into place  administrative  impediments  aimed at  preventing  the
organisation of Gay Pride Parades or similar events. Both applications were successful
before  the  ECtHR,  as  it  was  ascertained  that  the  national  authorities  had  infringed
Article 11 ECHR. Beyond the verdict itself,  however, these two judgements include
other  interesting  characteristics.  In  Bączkowski  v.  Poland,  for  instance,  the  ECtHR
implicitly carried out a judgement on the democratic character of the Polish state and
society, by measuring the events in Poland against the background of a trio of well-
rehearsed  terms  from  its  previous  case  law that  describe  every  democratic  state:
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness (Bączkowski v. Poland, para. 63). The use of
these terms is far from merely representing a rhetorical exercise for the  ECtHR. The
55 The banning of the Gay Pride Parade in 2013 for the third year in a row sparked protest from the part
of the EU, as the country was getting ready to open EU membership talks with the organisation. 
56 O'Dwyer and Schwartz (2010: 222) define 'Europeanisation' as a process by which European norms
are internalised.
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term  broadmindedness is fundamentally ambiguous, because of its vagueness – what
does it mean to be broadminded? About what? It also points to a space, either physical
or  symbolic,  where  tolerance can  happen.  There  is  a  connection  between
broadmindedness and tolerance: in this space someone's presence can be endured, while
not necessarily accepted. It would be possible, hence, to imagine that the streets, the
squares  where  LGBT persons  gather,  are  considered  as  appropriate  urban  sites  of
tolerance. 
The concept of broadmindedness, however, is also connected to an evaluation of
Polish society in terms of being a “society that functions in a  healthy [my emphasis]
manner”  (Bączkowski  v.  Poland  2007: para.  62).  In  implicitly  defining  Poland  as
narrow-minded, the ECtHR places its emphasis on the malfunctioning of its society. The
implication is that its narrow-mindedness is caused by a democratically ill society that
prevents people from freely associating and marching in the street.  It is not the reach of
the  judgment  itself  that  is  at  stake  here,  namely  the  fact  that  banning  peaceful
demonstration  is  undemocratic,  but  rather  the  evaluative  process  that  the  ECtHR
embarks on, that brings to the forefront mechanisms of moral assessment and contrast
with 'established' democracies in the rest of the CoE. The picture is that of a dangerous
country: a society that does not function in a healthy manner is automatically associated
with the existence of a danger, a danger which does not exist in other 'democratic' states
where Gay Pride Parades take place. 
Another  interesting  aspect is  found in  the  comment  that  Johnson (2012,  18)
gives of ECtHR's definition of pluralism57.. The author in particular maintains: 
57 “pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of
cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, literary and socio-economic ideas
and concepts. The harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for
achieving social cohesion” (European Court of Human Rights, Baczkowski v. Poland, 2007: para. 62).
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the recognition of the importance of freedom of assembly on the grounds
of  'cultural  identity',  and  its  centrality  for  achieving  the  'harmonious
interaction of persons', in respect of sexual orientation was an important
first  step  in  expanding  the  Court's  Article  11  jurisprudence  on
homosexuality (Johnson 2012, 187). 
While this could be useful in order to define LGBT persons as a sort of “social actor”, at
the  same  time,  it  signals  the  incapability  of  the  ECtHR  of  understanding  sexual
orientation and gender identity as transversal aspects of individuals' lives that cross-cut
ethnicity, religion, class, age, and other characteristics. Homosexuality or queerness 'as
culture'  are  problematic  concepts,  especially  if  they are  employed  as  an  attempt  to
categorise a group of rights-holders. What is commonly considered as “gay culture” or
“subculture”,  is  a  specific  product  of  Western  –  and  especially  North  American  -
societies.  Hence, while the use of “cultural identity” in relation to LGBT persons is a
short cut for the ECtHR in order to broaden its concept of “pluralism”, it nonetheless
contributes  to  the  enhancement  of  a  socio-political  dichotomy  between  the  well-
protected LGBT Western Europeans and the oppressed LGBT Eastern Europeans.
Gay  Pride  Parades  are  increasingly  becoming  the  yardstick  to  measure  the
democratic character of European societies. This was evident not only in Bączkowski v.
Poland, but also by the more recent case of Alekseyev v. Russia, in which authorities had
banned the marches organised by the plaintiff, a famous Russian gay activist, for several
years.  It  is  telling  that  in  the  judgement,  the  ECtHR  reiterates  the  trio  of  terms
pluralism, broadmindedness and tolerance used in the previous judgement (Alekseyev v.
Russia, 2010: para. 70). This self-referentiality presents a strong normative character,
since it  reinforces the previous  case law and creates an effect of legal circularity.  If
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analysed  under  the  profile  of  the  emerging  “Pink Agenda”  on  the  rights  of  LGBT
persons,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  dynamics  of  qualitative  differentiation  between
Western/Eastern social practices in relation to the organisation of Gay Pride Parades are
sketched in the judgment. 
Furthermore,  throughout  the  text  there  is  a  pattern  of  “respectability”  that
emerges  in  both  the  arguments  of  the  plaintiff  and  those  of  the  ECtHR.  As  for
Alekseyev, he maintained in his written submission to the ECtHR that “the participants
had not intended to exhibit nudity, engage in sexually provocative behaviour or criticise
public moral or religious views” (Alekseyev v. Russia 2010: para. 82). This argument
seems to echo Davydova's (2012, 33) analysis, in which the author tries to distinguish
between  Eastern  European  Pride  Parades  and  the  “disturbingly  carnivalesque  and
glamorous Gay Pride Parades of Western European and North American cities”. The
sketching  of  this  difference  demonstrates  how,  in  Eastern  Europe,  activists
simultaneously  try  to  embrace and  resist the  cultural  heritage  of  Western  LGBT
movements. While Davydova (2012, 33) attempts somehow to  sanitise the image of
these events, at the same time, she recognises that Western partners (both institutional
and non-institutional)  are  crucial  in  the  organisation  and the  logistics  of  Gay Pride
Parades  and  rallies  in  Eastern  Europe.  In  recalling  the  organisation  of  the  2012
Lithuanian  Gay  Pride  Parade,  in  fact,  she  explains  how  some  of  the  Lithuanian
participants were prevented from physically taking part in the march, because half of the
number of spaces allocated by the Vilnius municipality (400 persons in total) were taken
up  by  guests  from  other  Baltic  and  international  LGBT  Associations,  foreign
ambassadors and members of the European Parliament. This small-scale episode shows
how, to a certain extent, the oversight of some of these events, may rest in the hand of
the more 'experienced' or more 'liberal' Western organisers and defenders of democracy. 
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The case of Alekseyev v. Russia is not an isolated episode regarding the rights of
LGBT persons  in  Russia.  It  can  be  said  to  represent  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  of  an
international confrontation between the country and Western states, in relation to the
harsh  stance  adopted  by  the  Russian  Parliament  and  President  Putin  against
homosexuality,  culminating  with  the  introduction  of  the  bill  banning   'homosexual
propaganda' in June 2013. While Russia had already been condemned in  Alekseyev v.
Russia, it continued to ban Gay Pride Parades after 2010, and its Parliament had tried to
introduce  the  above-mentioned  bill  in  the  national  legislation  on  several  occasions.
Russia was soon put under surveillance, particularly by the CoE (Johnson 2012, 191).
The political reach of this confrontation soon became evident, as the concerted efforts to
ostracise and silence Russian LGBT organisations and individuals were met with critical
comments from several European institutional actors, both at the EU and at the CoE. 
Some  comments  highlight  the  extent  to  which  reactions  to  the  Russian
crackdown on LGBT persons was framed, by Western European commentators, as an
item falling under the “Pink Agenda”. The Dutch member of the European Parliament,
Sophie in 't Veld (2012), who is very active on issues concerning the rights of LGBT
persons, stated: 
such  laws  are  simply  unacceptable;  if  Russia  isn't  serious  about
respecting the European Convention on Human Rights, it should simply
call the bluff and leave the Council of Europe altogether. And more than
statements, these grave human rights abuses must have consequences for
the EU-Russia relationship! (Sophie in 't Veld 2012)
in  't  Veld's  comment  is  clearly  intended  as  a  provocation,  as  membership  in  an
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organisation,  rather  than  the  exclusion  of  a  non-compliant  state,  is  deemed  more
efficacious in  persuading a  country like Russia to conform to norms (Jordan, 2003:
660). At the same time, in 't Veld also portrays a partial picture of the CoE and the EU
as institutions founded upon the respect of the rights of LGBT persons. At the time of
the accession of Russia to the CoE, in 1996, this was far from being the case. There was
no broad  consensus,  among  member  states,  on  the  importance  of  rights  relating  to
sexual  orientation  or  gender  identity.  It  was  only  from  the  2000s  that  systematic
attention started to be paid to these issues, by means of resolutions issued by the two
main political bodies, the CM and the PACE. The same could be said for the EU. 
Furthermore,  the  “Ban  the  Homosexual  Propaganda”  bill  becomes  the
paramount example of how far homophobia can go. Labelling Russia as homophobic
and transphobic has ambivalent results. On the one hand, it strengthens the dichotomy
between liberal (queer-friendly) and illiberal (homo/transphobic) members of the CoE.
At the same time, it is also likely to strengthen political resistance to values and norms
seen as being imposed on Russia (or on other countries) directly by the “West”. 
Even  the  rhetoric  used  to  condemn  the  bill,  contains  problematic  elements.
Andreas Gross58,  Special Rapporteur for the PACE, commenting on the “Ban the Gay
Propaganda” Bill, has stated: “by adopting it, the Duma would demonstrate its hostility
to social progress – joining those who, in the past, have argued for slavery or opposed
women’s right to vote”. This statement is problematic for at least two reasons. On the
one hand, because it associates Russia with a radical idea of backwardness, therefore
positing that liberal member states of the CoE are more advanced because they have
long ago abandoned practices assimilable to slavery, or impediments to the enjoyment
of political rights by women. On the other hand, this statement also contains a sort of
58 "PACE Rapporteur calls on Russian Duma not to support Law banning “Gay Propaganda”, available
at:          http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=8383,
accessed on 24th February 2013.
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psychological repression of  Europe's  fundamental role  in the slave trade in  the first
place. It masks Europe's history of discrimination behind the human rights violations
committed by “others”.  Gross' statement, therefore, is fundamentally paternalistic and
moralistic. In relation to this dynamic, Kulpa (in Kulpa and Mizieliñska 2011, 46) has
affirmed: "the hegemonic position of the 'West' in its supposed 'advancement' is taken
for granted, a trajectory of modernist civilisation set up. All Eastern Europe needs to do
is to 'catch up' with Western modernity, with the gracious help of the 'West'”. The result
of this harsh dialectic confrontation between two presumed geo-political blocks such as
a “West” and an “East”, highlights the existence of a  Euro-nationalist  response to a
fundamentally nationalist argument of the Russian Parliament against homosexuality.
This  full-frontal  confrontation,  however,  cannot  be said to  benefit  LGBT(I)  persons
neither  in  Western  or  in  non-Western  Europe.  Rather,  it  positions  LGBT(I)  persons
contemporaneously as  co-opted subjects in homonormative terms, and as  outcasts in
heteronormative terms, for instrumental political purposes. 
The  curtailment  of  freedom  of  expression,  and  freedom  of  assembly  and
association in Eastern and Central Europe, have been at the forefront of the work of the
Commissioner of Human Rights as well. The Commissioner has put a significant and
genuine effort into listening to the instances of the different local NGOs whose activities
were  seriously  impinged  on.  Furthermore,  at  the  office  of  the  Commissioner,  Mr.
Alekseyev, the Russian human rights activist and plaintiff in the above-discussed case of
Alekseyev v. Russia (2010), was a known figure. The Commissioner, and in particular
his adviser on LGBT(I) issues, Mr. Van Der Veur, had an incredible network of contacts
with activists in almost all  the member states,  including Mr. Alekseyev. This aspect
enormously facilitated the acquisition of first-hand knowledge, by the Commissioner,
on the situation in different critical contexts. 
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At the same time, however, at least in the case of the Russian Federation, not
even  the  mediation  of  independent  actors  such  as  the  Commissioner  managed  to
convince the Government to comply with Alekseyev v. Russia. Following the judgement
of the ECtHR, instead, the country  pursued a strong “backlash” towards LGB persons.
It  is  true,  at  the  same time,  that  the  Commissioner  has  constantly  raised,  with  the
authorities he has met, the issue of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and
association.  This  has  been  achieved  through  a  monitoring  of  the  developments  in
relation to this issue in different national contexts. His first viewpoint59 on this issue
dates  back  to  2006  when  bans,  in  cities  like  Moscow or  Riga,  had  occurred.  The
involvement of the Commissioner is part of his duty to monitor the situation in member
states, but also to point out violations of human rights standards. However, since there
exists a fundamentally political tension on issues concerning sexuality that cross-cut
member states, such a top-down approach may be perceived as an external imposition
(not just on the part of the Commissioner) and, therefore, lead to a stiffening of national
positions, such as in the case of Russia. A passage in the 2006 Commissioner viewpoint
highlights an important point in this respect: 
Politicians themselves are also key in this awareness campaign. Former
Canadian  Prime  Minister  Paul  Martin  set  a  good  example  when
welcoming the conference in Montreal:
“Today’s Canada is proud to espouse and promote the inherent values of
tolerance and inclusion.  I am certain you also share my hope that the
discussions  at  this  important  event  will  help  change  attitudes  in  our
society. You can take pride in your participation in this gathering, which
59  Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, “Gay Pride Marches should be allowed –
and protected” , available at: http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Viewpoints/060724_en.asp , accessed
30 April 2013. 
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demonstrates your solidarity and commitment to eliminating all forms of
discrimination related to sexual orientation” (Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Council of Europe 2006).
In quoting the former Prime Minister of Canada,  one of the countries that has been
heralding tolerance of LGBTI persons as a national value, the Commissioner implicitly
reinforces,  although maybe unconsciously,  the potentially divisive character of some
statements that may reinforce the us/them dichotomy in terms of queer- friendly and
non-queer friendly member states of the CoE. While the intentions of these statements
are often noble, their immediate effect is often politically challenging for the addressees,
who may perceive a direct critique to their human rights standards, and indirectly, to
their national identity. These dynamics appear increasingly influential in determining
sharp divisions between different sets of states which can be said to be respectful of the
rights  of  LGBTI  persons  and  those  who  are  not.  The  consequences  of  these  harsh
confrontations are often negative to the “vulnerable subjects” whose protection is at
stake,  thus  paradoxically  engendering  a  form  of  visibility  that  enhances  violent
backlashes  and  reactions  on  the  part  of  other  social  and/or  political  actors  at  the
domestic level. In the aftermath of this harsh confrontation between Russia and the so-
called “West”, there was an intensification of episodes of homophobic and transphobic
hate crime and speech. Furthermore, a strong rhetoric of Russian nationalism emerged
in connection to the presumed Western attempt to “export” homosexuality, which led to
a further marginalisation of the LGBTI population in Russia which is still ungoing at the
present moment. 
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Harmful Intentions: Interrogating Homophobic and Transphobic Hate
Speech and Hate Crime
Hate-motivated  violence  and  speech  against  LGBTI  persons  represent  an
emerging field of analysis for both human rights activists and human rights institutions.
From a theoretical perspective, these phenomena question directly the way in which the
“human” is constructed and who may be excluded from its definition. As has already
been shown, the work of Butler (2004 and 2009) has highlighted the way in which some
lives,  including  “queer”  lives,  may not  be  considered  to  be  grievable  and  how the
violence to which they are subjected can be denied. This argument is crucial in this
context, as it can be used to explore the way in which some violent acts or utterances are
framed, produced, and re-produced, in the linguistic form, in the juridical and political
field. Furthermore, the question of what counts as “human” can help one to understand
how the subjective positions of the “victim” and the “perpetrator” are created, and how
dynamics of de-humanisation of some individuals may take place. 
The Council of Europe is an interesting setting for this analysis. Although the
case law of the ECtHR on homophobic and transphobic hate crime and hate speech is
not particularly developed, there is a growing ferment both at the level of the political
bodies of the CoE (the CM and the PACE) and at  the office of the Commissioner,
concerning the possible strategies to adopt to counter violent demonstrations of hostility.
Apart  from  the  inescapable  question  of  how  to  eliminate  the  harm  inflicted  upon
individuals, both in a physical and symbolic way, the issue at stake in the debate on hate
crime and hate speech is the effectiveness of sanctioning measures and the impact that
they may have on structural conditions of deprivation, vulnerability, and discrimination
of LGBTI persons. 
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Some commentators, such as Butler60 (1997, 36) and Spade61 (2011, 85), display
a complex, often suspicious, attitude towards the inscription in the law of hate crime
and/or hate speech. In particular, these authors emphasise the existence of a problematic
gap between the level of the juridical and the political condemnation of these acts and
utterances.  From  this  perspective,  therefore,  strategies  merely  focusing  on  the
punishment of the “perpetrators” of these acts or utterances may be insufficient if they
are  not  supported  by  an  acknowledgement  of  their  historicity (Butler  1997)  or  a
structural account concerning the accessory conditions for these incidents to take place
(Spade 2011). 
Therefore, the problem with hate crime and hate speech does not only reside in
the  question  of  what  actually  counts  or  not  as  offensive  or  abusive.  While  the
mainstream LGBT(I) organisations work on the introduction of provisions in national
legislation (especially in the penal code) that consider homophobic and/or transphobic
intent  in  the  commission  of  a  fact/act  of  speech  as  an  aggravating  factor,  these
approaches seem to leave out the broader context in which such episodes maturate and
occur. Furthermore, they do not necessarily recognise the often existing connivances
between  different  state/non-state  actors  who  participate  (not  openly)  in  the  mutual
constitution of the dyad victim/perpetrator, thus crystallising the existence of a power
relation which is ultimately difficult to act upon. This analysis takes into account the
limitations of this approach to hate-motivated crime and speech against LGBTI persons
60 Butler  offers  an  extremely interesting analysis  of  the  issue  of  hate  speech  by calling  into  direct
question dynamics of power giving rise, in the first place, to offensive statements, or statements that
are  perceived  as  such.  The  utterances  of  hate  speech,  Butler  (1997,  27)  argues  “are  part  of  the
continuous  and  uninterrupted  process  to  which  we  are  subjected,  an  on-going  subjection
(Assujetissement)  that  is  the  very  operation  of  interpellation,  that  continually repeated  action  of
discourse by which subjects are formed in subjugation”. 
61 Spade's work and analysis of hate crime and anti-discriminatory legislative measures has to be placed
in context of his project of “Critical Trans Politics”, by which he seeks to open up the strategies,
beyond the mere legal framework, that could engender a substantive change in the quality of life of
transgender  persons.  While  his  focus  is  the  U.S.,  many of  his  arguments  have  a  much  broader
resonance in current debates on how best to protect “vulnerable” groups that are disproportionately the
target of violence in various instances. 
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not from a purely legal perspective but also considering the broader political and social
implications connected to this issue. 
A concise genealogy of the concept of “hate” can help one to understand the
controversial  limits  of  legislation  against  hate-motivated  crime  and speech.  Starting
from both psychological and sociological, as well as historical and political, accounts of
“hate”, it is possible to demonstrate its close relationship with notions of “power” on the
one hand, and its fundamental indeterminacy and slipperiness as an operational concept.
This analysis will also take into account the important role of emotions in the context of
the law. In this regard Karstedt (in Greco and Stenner 2008, 418) has argued that “legal
institutions  and in  particular  the  criminal  justice  system are  the  very institutions  in
society that are designed to deal with the most intense emotion and emotional conflicts,
with individual as well as collective emotions”. The acknowledgement of the role of
emotions in the context of criminal law (and therefore in the context of “hate crime” and
“hate  speech”)  can  help  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  these  emotions  can  also  be
detrimental  to  the  adjudication  of  justice,  when  the  rhetoric  of  victimisation  is  not
coupled  with an equally demanding effort  to  address  the  conditions  that  favour  the
occurrence of these events.
A discussion on the perpetration of “hate crimes” (as well as hate speech acts)
should take into account the issue of  motivation (Green, McFalls and Smith 2001, p.
482). The search for  motivation is important, in fact, as it sheds lights on the existing
link between one's  prejudice towards  either  a  “minority” or  “target  group”,  and the
actual commission of an act or the utterance of a statement. Motivation, therefore, is a
pre-existent and pondered element to the perpetration of the proscribed act/utterance. In
ruling out the possibility of an act/utterance that is the product of an accident, it brings
to the forefront the intention to harm. To this  extent,  therefore,  hate crime and hate
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speech are an expression of power with its ubiquitous potential to hurt.
At  the  same  time,  however,  the  concept  of  motivation,  beyond  the  most
immediate psychological roots, may also have broader sociological underpinnings. The
traditional  definition  of  hate  which  seems  to  focus  on  the  “intense  desire  for  the
annihilation of its object” (Royzman, Mccauley and Rozin in Sternberg 2005, 12) exists,
nonetheless, in an ambivalent relationship with the necessity of the survival of the target
in order to become the object of hate. Such ambivalence leaves room for a focus on
power  relations  and  imbalances  of  power  in  relation  to  the  articulation  of  the
victim/perpetrator dyad both within and outside the sphere of the law. 
However, a narrow focus on the micro-level or subjective domain of action is
not  sufficient  to  account  for  the way in which  these acts/utterances  take place in  a
broader social, cultural, and political context. Who decides what and when something is
offensive? Is it possible to have a universal definition of “hate crime” and “hate speech”
that actually also contemplates the description of the content or range of proscribed
facts/utterances? More narrowly, is it possible to speak about European definitions of
“hate crime” and “hate speech”? Green, McFalls, and Smith (2001, 486) suggest that
historical perspectives on hate crimes, for instance, may shed a different light on the
same act that is committed: “the manner in which societies define and debate hate crime
depends  on  their  political-cultural  tradition,  so  that  a  similar  occurrence  might  be
termed a racial  incident  in  Britain,  an attack on republican values  in  France,  and a
problem with refugee policy in Germany”. 
At the level of distinct nation-states, therefore, some events may be interpreted
in  different  ways,  not  just  on  the  grounds  of  a  presumably  “neutral”  political  and
cultural  tradition,  as   Green,  McFalls,  and Smith affirm,  but  also  depending on the
strategic and – maybe instrumental – use that states want to make of these events. Far
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from endorsing a cynical stance on the genuine efforts undertaken in order to tackle
violent  attacks  or  utterances,  this  section  will  try  to  analyse  anti-“hate  crime”  and
anti-“hate  speech”  policies  and  legal  instruments  from  a  critical  perspective.  This
outlook will be useful in considering to what extent legislative measures against hate
crime  and  hate  speech  may often  be  informed  by the  existence  of  hidden  political
agendas that aim to foster unequal distribution of chances and power between different
subjects or groups in the population. 
That's  Offending! Defining  and  Challenging  the  Concept  of  Hate
Speech
Defining “hate speech” may amount to a much more complicated operation than
merely trying to classify utterances according to the degree of injury that they cause to
individuals.  In  “Excitable  Speech”  Judith  Butler  (1997)  has  suggested,  somewhat
provocatively, that hate speech “becomes the legal instrument through which to produce
and further a discourse on race and sexuality under the rubric of combatting racism and
sexism” (Butler 1997, 97). Her argument calls into direct question the role of the law as
productive of hate speech in the first place. The question to ask, in the context of this
analysis, is whether a supra-national institution, such as the CoE, can have a productive
role in the definition of hate speech as a (punishable) phenomenon that can be tackled,
or, in defining what it is, do they deliberately operate a selection (as Butler suggests) of
what is held to be offensive or not? 
As has already been illustrated, hate speech and hate crime in relation to sexual
orientation  and  gender  identity,  have  been  addressed  only  very  recently.  The  first
comprehensive study of homo- and transphobic hate crime and hate speech has only
been undertaken by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)62 of the European Union in
62 Presenting  the  Findings  from  the  Largest-ever  LGBT  Hate  Crime  and  Discrimination  Survey,
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2013. Furthermore, while a significant number63 of judgments have been issued on the
possibility of “anti-gay” discourses falling within the scope of Article  10 ECHR on
freedom of expression, an explicit discussion on the presumed existence of homophobic
hate speech has only been addressed, by the ECtHR, in 2012 with the case Vjedeland
and Others v. Sweden.  This case is interesting insofar as it shows how difficult it is for
the ECtHR to contextualise and define hate speech in the first place.  Vjedeland and
Others  v.  Sweden  originated  in  Sweden  where  the  five  applicants  (belonging  to  an
organisation called National Youth) had distributed, in an upper secondary school, some
leaflets in students' lockers. These leaflets defined homosexuality as a “deviant sexual
proclivity”, as well as linking it to the diffusion of HIV and AIDS and to the attempt to
lobby in favour of paedophilia (Vjedeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012: para. 8). After
having  been  found  guilty  of  “agitation  against  a  national  or  ethnic  group”  by  the
Swedish  Supreme  Court,  they  submitted  an  application  to  the  ECtHR  alleging  a
violation  of  their  right  to  freedom  of  expression  (Article  10  ECHR).  The  ECtHR
ascertained the existence of interference on the part of the Swedish authorities with their
freedom of expression, but considered that this interference was a justified restriction
under paragraph 2 of Article 10 ECHR, motivated by the necessity to protect the “rights
and reputation of others” (Vjedeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012: para. 49).
In his analysis of the case, Johnson (2012, 179) has argued, by referring to the
dissenting  opinions  of  Judges  Spielmann  and  Nussberger,  that  the  ECtHR  has
substantially failed in its detailed definition of  what “offensive statements” are. The
passage Johsnson refers  to is  the following:  “(...)  although these statements  did not
directly recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and prejudicial
available  at:  http://fra.europa.eu/en/event/2013/presenting-findings-largest-ever-lgbt-hate-crime-and-
discrimination-survey , accessed 03 June 2013. 
63 One  important  case  to  this  respect  is  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  Jersild  v.  Denmark,
Application No, 15890/89, Judgment 23 September 1994.
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allegations”  (Vjedeland  and  Others  v.  Sweden,  2012:  para.  54). The  ECtHR  has,
therefore, adopted a very prudent approach in defining what can “directly incite to hate”
and what, instead, could be defined under the rubric of an “allegation”. Furthermore, in
judging  the  severity  of  the  act  of  distributing  leaflets,  the  ECtHR placed  a  strong
emphasis  on the intended audience for  the leaflets,  namely students (Vjedeland and
Others v. Sweden, 2012: para. 56).
This case shows how the question of language, and the semiotic of language, is
crucial in the definition and acknowledgement of “hate speech”. Does a combination of
specific words create offensive language? Can the utterance of some words determine
the likelihood that certain acts will be committed? In their concurring opinion on this
judgement, Judges Yudkivska and and Villiger (Vjedeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012:
p, 20) quote the U.S. constitutionalist  Bickel who, referring to hate speech, affirms:
“where nothing is unspeakable, nothing is undoable”. This quote invites one to reflect
on the possibility of adopting objective criteria  to  evaluate  the harmful  potential  of
words. This problem is akin to the one encountered in relation to Article 3 ECHR, and
the definition of the “degree of severity” that certain behaviours or utterances have to
attain  in  order  to  constitute  a  violation  of  the  above-mentioned  provision.  The
interpretation of the degree of severity that some behaviours may have attained can be
subjected to heavy scrutiny and, hence, be subtracted from the logics of “objectivity”. 
It is possible to affirm, therefore, that the definition of a homophobic “offence”
may partially depend on the interpretation of the judges of the ECtHR in this case. It is
important to ask, in this regard, why the ECtHR did not engage with the content of such
homophobic speech acts and has, instead, tried to skip the substantial analysis of the
“serious and prejudicial allegations”. It could be suggested that in relation to specific
issues,  such as  the  protection  of  the  right  to  freedom of  expression,  the  margin  of
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appreciation left to the States is particularly wide and a strong autonomy is given to
them to decide whether facts or acts are attuned to their specific national cultural and
political environment. This sort of “cultural relativism”, however, may sometimes serve
political purposes, rather than being motivated by a sincere desire to protect the rights of
individuals. 
It is, therefore, possible to read  Vjedeland and Others v. Sweden (2012) as an
attempt, on the part of the ECtHR, of substantially by-passing this thorny question and
leaving unchanged the margin of manoeuvre afforded to the states in deciding what
could be offensive or hateful under specific cultural circumstances. Obviously this does
not imply that an absolute discretion is afforded to member states. Yet, in contexts in
which  often  official  discourses  on  homosexuality  are  produced  in  accordance  with
different  nationalist,  religious,  as well  as political  actors,  it  is  easy to  see how hate
speech may be seen as imposing limitations on the exercise of a disciplinary power,
broadly  speaking,  that  regulated  mores  and  costumes,  as  well  as  promoting  –
predominantly at the formal level – freedom of expression. 
If so far the case law of the ECtHR on homophobic hate speech is only limited
to  Vjedeland and Others v.  Sweden  (2012) concerning homophobic hate speech, the
political  bodies  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  namely  the  PACE64 and  the  CM65 have
endorsed a zero-tolerance policy on hate speech and hate crime, at least in their official
acts. Often, however, scepticism about the usefulness and effectiveness of human rights
involves  a  recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  significant  gap  between  official
proclaimations made on these topics and the actual practice of human rights found in
64 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1728 (2010),  Discrimination on the
Basis  of  Sexual  Orientation  and  Gender  Identity,  available  at:  http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?
link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1728.htm  , accessed 04 June 2013. 
65 Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)5  of  the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, available at:  https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1606669 ,
accessed 04 June 2013.  
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member states of the CoE. In many instances, the official condemnation of hate speech
and hate crime, in fact, fails to be coupled with human rights strategies or policies that
address the factors contributing to the perpetration of some acts. There is, therefore, no
complete correspondence between the intention to eradicate violent acts and utterances,
and  the  efforts  undertaken  by  the  states  to  actually  address  the  social,  economic,
cultural, and political factors that allow this violence to take place. 
As  for  the  structural  factors  enhancing  the  creation  of  a  socio-political
environment  that  increases the chances  that  violent  acts  or speeches  are  made,  it  is
important  to  stress  that,  in  some  cases,  hostility  towards  a  specific  group  may  be
influenced,  among  other  factors,  by  unequal  chances  of  access  to  employment,
entitlements, and other forms of socio-economic support. Identifying minority groups as
“scapegoats” can be an easy strategy on the part of political parties, as well as other
organised groups. To this extent, merely intervening at the end of the causal chain, that
is to say once the hate speech or the hate crime has been perpetrated, is a superficial
countermeasure  and  a  palliative  for  a  situation  of  profound  frustration  and  social
malaise. It would be different if those acts and utterances were also placed in the context
of their occurrence. Human Rights campaigns and strategies aimed at combating anti-
Roma prejudices and violence, for instance, will have little effect if they are not coupled
with interventions  that  try to  address  poverty,  social  exclusion,  and marginalisation.
Similarly, trying to combat homophobic and transphobic violence without addressing
the ways in which gender non-conformity is still highly stigmatised and heterosexuality
is treated as the “default” characteristic, is problematic at the very least. Questioning the
gender  binary  or  discarding  the  heterosexual  matrix  of  society,  at  the  same  time,
requires a much stronger engagement at both a symbolic and operational level.
While the ECtHR does not have a direct say in what the state should do, it could
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nonetheless  begin  to  address  this  important  aspect  in  its  case  law.  This  approach,
however, requires a questioning, on the part of national institutions, but also on the part
of human rights institutions run by members of governments, of the way in which they
favour – or omit to condemn – the perpetration of injustices against some sectors of the
population on the part of other actors. The ways in which authorities may contribute to
enhancing these fractures may vary, ranging from differential allocation of economic
resources,  unequal  enforcement  of  criminal  sanctions,  and  through  an  unequal
distribution of conditions of security and insecurity across space and time. 
It could be anticipated, judging from the increasing attention paid to these issues
by different institutional and non-institutional actors, that issues of hate crime and hate
speech  will  be  increasingly  brought  before  the  ECtHR in  the  future,  leading  to  a
consolidation  of  the  case  law on  this  matter.  In  the  following  section,  concise
considerations on the concept of hate crime and possible future developments at the
ECtHR, and also the work of the Commissioner on these two topics, will be analysed.
In fact, it is possible to speak of a concerted strategy that the Commissioner has devised
in order to address both hate crime and hate speech in the context of his awareness-
raising  efforts.  Furthermore,  the  actions  undertaken  by  his  office  have  also  found
resonance in  the subsequent  work of  the Fundamental  Rights  Agency (FRA) of the
European Union that has undertaken the largest-ever survey on both themes in 2013.
This  collaboration  has  been  characterised  by  a  synergic  approach  to  the  “urgent”
problems that LGBTI persons are currently living with in Europe. The emphasis on the
existence of widespread patterns of violence is one of the prominent preoccupations of
these two actors and will be addressed in the remainder of the chapter. 
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The Limits of Legal Protection from Homo- Transphobic Hate Crime:
a Critical Assessment  
The recognition of homophobic and transphobic acts is a very recent political
and legal phenomenon.  It is suggested here, however, that specific power dynamics are
at work in the way in which institutional actors define the “victims” of these acts, and
the solutions they propose to address the problem. Far from dismissing the urgency of
preventing hate crimes or overlooking the problematic relationship between hate crimes
and state-sponsored violence against specific groups, this analysis seeks to shed light on
the ambiguities in the advocacy of anti-hate crime legislation. On the one hand, this
section of the analysis is aimed at showing how the creation of victims and perpetrators
follows a  logic of differential  empowerment  between them. On the other  hand,  this
research  also  indicates  that  there  is  a  minimisation  of  the  importance  of  structural
factors enhancing the likelihood of a hate crime to occur and placing some individuals
in  the  position  of  becoming  prone  to  harassment  or  other  forms  of  physical  and
psychological abuse. 
In the 47 member states of the Council  of Europe, there is no homogeneous
recognition of hate crime in the criminal law. Less than a half of the member states66
have provisions  that  condemn incitement  to  hatred  and violence  on  the  grounds  of
sexual  orientation,  and an  even smaller  number  of  states  considers  the homophobic
intent an aggravating factor. The figures are dramatically lower for transphobic intent or
incitement to hatred. This disparity across Europe highlights the existence of a problem
in the recognition of the gravity of the phenomenon. As Phillips and Grattet (2000, 567-
568)  have  suggested,  some  legal  categories,  such  as  “hate  crime”  are  of  difficult
definition in the domain of the law. In the process of “meaning-making” (Phillips and
66 Commissioner for  Human Rights of  the Council  of  Europe,  2011,  Discrimination on Grounds of
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, p. 52. 
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Grattet,  568),  in  fact,  social  factors  that  participate  in  such  a  definition  are  often
neglected  in  favour  of  a  purely  legal  account  of  the  production  of  legal  meaning.
Furthermore, while the national legislator may proscribe “hate crimes” in the criminal
law, it is up to the different Courts to fill this provision with content, by means of a
judgement on the extant case, potentially opening the way to different interpretations.
Transcending the domain of the nation-state, this dynamics can be applied to the
work of the ECtHR. To date, no complaints exist under this specific rubric, but it could
be anticipated that cases will reach the ECtHR in the future, thanks also to the efforts of
third-parties  (mainly  NGOs)  intervening  as  amicus  curiae.  The  challenge  will  be,
therefore, how to use the ECHR in order to encompass human rights violations resulting
from hate crimes for which the state has not provided adequate redress or protection. As
the situation stands now, in fact, neither hate speech nor hate crime could be connected
directly to any provision of the ECHR. Would it be possible to encompass hate crime
under the scope of Article 3 ECHR against torture? While it may seem adventurous to
frame this  issue  under  this  particular  angle,  such  speculation  is  needed  against  the
background of the increased attention to homophobic hate crime and hate speech. So
far, in fact, the Recommendations issued by the political actors at the CoE (the CM and
the PACE) predominantly target member states, and they take for granted the states'
willingness to improve the situation and effectively counter various forms of violence. 
It is important, however, to try to glimpse beyond the current situation and try to
anticipate whether the ECtHR will become a prominent actor in the fight against “hate
crime” or will act as an observer and adjudicator in the last instance. This presumably
predictable role of the ECtHR, however, should not to be confused as being the only
legitimate voice existing within the institution. Political actors such as the CM and the
PACE have an  important  role  in  the  “meaning-making” process.  At  the  same time,
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independent actors at the CoE, such as the Commissioner, may play an important role in
debating and broadening the concept  of hate  crime “from below”, trying to involve
human rights defenders and activists in the definition of the priorities and critical issues
to address at an institutional level. 
In  relation  to  the  issue  of  homophobic  and  transphobic  hate  crime,  the
Commissioner has devoted significant attention both in his 2011 report  and in other
public  statements  prior  to  this  publication.  As  has  already  been  illustrated  in  the
previous  chapter,  the  official  launch  conference  of  the  report  in  June  2011  was
characterised by a strong emphasis on the existence of extremely high rates of violence
(either  verbal  or  physical)  against  LGBTI persons  and also a  dramatic  –  and quite
paradoxical – lack of data across the 47 member states. The stubbornness with which
the  office  of  the  Commissioner  has  tried  to  collect  data  on  the  rates  of
homophobic/transphobic violence across the continent and to map different kinds of
incidents is surely admirable in light of the reluctance of many member states to collect
or share their figures. In this regard, the collaboration of the Commissioner with the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during the drafting of the
2010 Report, in order to gain such data, has undeniably contributed to putting in the
forefront the issue of how member states ensure protection from discrimination and
violence for LGBTI persons. 
This endeavour, however, has proved to be a difficult terrain of action because
of the problematic negotiations with national governments concerning the necessity to
alter their actions and strategies in order to eradicate hate crime. The Commissioner, in
fact,  had to strategically negotiate the necessity of giving a complete picture of the
phenomenon, with the necessity of not engaging in a “naming and shaming” of the
states  that  complied  the  least,  seemed  accomplices,  or  actively  engaged  in  the
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perpetration of these acts. It was very clear, during the drafting of the report, that the
“naming and shaming” had to be avoided. At the same time, however, there was also an
intention to be as comprehensive as possible in the analysis, and also recognise the work
of the different NGOs that had been consulted during the empirical research, and which
had contributed by pointing out the cases in which state actors had omitted to respond to
acts  of  homophobic  and  transphobic  violence  or  had  a  somewhat  indirect  form of
responsibility  in  their  perpetration.  The  dedicated  section  in  the  report  to  these
examples67 gives an account of some of the episodes which occurred in countries such
as Turkey, Austria, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. However, this very
sketchy summary is the result of both a lack of systematic data collection/provision on
the one hand, and the effort to avoid the exposure of some states standing out as being
“homophobic” on the other. 
There is, therefore, an impression of an uncomfortable juxtaposition between
different  sets  of data  which highlights  the embarrassing silence surrounding LGBTI
persons and violent acts perpetrated against them across the member states of the CoE.
This odd effect of juxtaposition shows the difficulty in categorising specific events as
“hate crimes”, depending on the national authorities that register them.  This difficulty
originated,  in  fact,  at  the level  of the single member states.  The slipperiness of the
concepts of “hate crime” and “hate speech” is, therefore, reflected also in the empirical
research carried out by the Commissioner meant precisely to fill this gap. Accounts of
different  NGOs throughout  Europe may flesh  out  different  episodes  as  being  “hate
crime” or “hate speech” while leaving others outside. Coupled with the reluctance of
authorities  to  categorise  such  episodes  as  being  motivated  by  homophobic  or
transphobic intent, it is possible to see how these become very unstable legal categories
67 Commissioner for  Human Rights of  the Council  of  Europe,  2011,  Discrimination on Grounds of
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, p. 54-56. 
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that need to be addressed in a critical and multi-dimensional way. 
Conclusion 
These brief considerations on the concepts of “hate crime” and “hate speech” are
far from providing a complete discussion of the issues at stake when violence motivated
by a prejudice, a bias, or a hostility towards a specific group or minority takes place.
These  issues  would,  in  fact,  deserve  a  much  more  thorough  and  in-depth  analysis.
However,  the intention has been that of highlighting how difficult and misleading it
could be to merely rely on the legal definition of such terms, as the reality of different
national contexts may hide a reluctance to recognise, define, and combat such types of
violence that call into direct question state actors. The 47 member states of the Council
of  Europe  represent  a  diverse  field  of  inquiry,  in  which  different  social,  cultural,
political, and legal factors play a role in the definition of specific human rights issues
and their consequent protection – or refusal to do so – on the part of institutional actors.
To  this  extent,  therefore,  while  it  is  not  possible  to  anticipate  whether  substantive
developments will take place at the level of the European Court of Human Rights on
these issues, it is nonetheless possible to discuss their strategic importance in terms of
constituting a  powerful  instrument  of  critique,  on the part  of more “queer  friendly”
states towards those states perceived as displaying patterns of homo- and transphobic
violence. Throughout the chapter an argument has been advanced regarding the
extent to which member  states (usually Western European) may be proactive in trying
to “set the pace” for other member states on their human rights policies and legislative
measures.  The  sets  of  issues  discussed,  ranging  from  freedom  of  expression,  of
association and assembly, the entitlements of LGBTI asylum seekers, and the emerging
issues of “hate crime” and “hate speech”, have in various ways highlighted the existence
of this tension between a “civilising West” and a “rest of Europe” that seems to be in
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need  of  being  civilised.  The  political  instrumentalisation  of  the  rights  of  LGBTI
persons, therefore, seems an inescapable dimension of analysis that sheds light on the
necessity of devising a more effective system of protection that gives more voice to the
individuals concerned, rather than leaving the monopoly of speech to institutional (both
national and international) actors on these human rights matters.
So far, the analysis has been limited to sexual orientation and the way in which it
is framed in the case law of the ECtHR and in the work of the Commissioner. However,
it would be inexact to consider sexual orientation and gender identity separately, since
in each individual there is an interpenetration of sexual orientation and gender identity.
Considering them separately would mean applying that compartmental view on human
rights, which has been criticised so far. At the same time, however, for the rigour of the
analysis  itself,  there  is  some  usefulness  in  distinguishing  the  case  law on  sexual
orientation from the one on gender identity. This does not rule out the possibility that
between these two strands of  analysis  exists  a  line  of  continuity or  some points  of
contact. In fact, as will become apparent in the next chapter, there are many similarities
in the construction of legal arguments by the ECtHR and the language employed. 
Similarly, the work on gender identity by the Commissioner is carried out in a
concerted way with that  concerning issues relating to  sexual  orientation.  Bearing in
mind such interrelatedness between sexual orientation and gender identity is crucial in
carrying  out  an analysis  that  also investigates  the  assumptions  on which the  binary
system of  gender  rests  and to  single  out  the  inconsistencies  or  shortcomings in  the
reasoning of both the ECtHR and other institutional human rights actors, such as the
Commissioner.  The  lack  of  a  substantial  questioning  of  the  binary  organisation  of
gender(s) can be said to be, in fact, one of the current limitations of the CoE's approach
to  issues  relating  to  gender  identity.  The following chapter  will  address  the  critical
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issues at stake in the attempts to go beyond the biological criteria of “gender” (both at
the legal and political level) and will identify the possible developments in the case law
of the ECtHR and in the work of the political bodies of the Council of Europe. 
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Chapter Eight - Disciplining Bodies through Indifference: Transgender
and Intersexual Persons Facing the Silence of the Law 
Gender and sex play a fundamental role in the description of what counts as
“human” and can be understood as both a descriptive and prescriptive category. In the
normative domain, these descriptive and prescriptive dimensions are deeply intertwined:
a  legal  subject  is  inevitably  gendered  and  with  specific  sexual  “characteristics”.
Particularly  in  relation  to  the  importance  of  possessing a  biological  sex,  in  his
introduction to the memoirs of Herculine Barbin68,  Foucault (Barbin 1980, VII) grasps
well the anxiety revolving around the quest for stable gender categories:
Do we truly need  a  true  sex?  With  a  persistence  that  borders  stubbornness,
modern  Western  societies  have  answered  in  the  affirmative.  They  have
obstinately brought into play this question of a 'true sex' in an order of things
where one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of the body
and the intensity of its pleasures (Barbin 1980, VII). 
Starting from the symbolic and material importance assigned to the determination of a
true “sex”, as well as the consequent attribution of a  gender and a gender identity69, this
chapter  offers  a  chance  to  explore  the  ways  in  which  transgender  and  intersexual
persons and their rights claims radically challenge the law by defying and destabilising
the binary categories of  male and  female. In this regard, the  case law of the ECtHR
offers  an  interesting  insight  into  this  problematic  relationship  between  gender  non-
68 Hercule Barbin was a French “hermaphrodite” living in the nineteenth century, whose memoires had
been found by Michel Foucault in the archives of the French Department of Public Health. 
69 Whittle (2002, 6) defines 'gender identity' as: “(...) the total perception of an individual about his or
her own gender.  It  includes a basic personal identity as a boy or girl, man or woman, as well as
personal judgments about the individual's level of conformity to the societal norms of masculinity and
femininity.”
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conforming individuals and the protection of human rights. A thorough discussion of the
rights of intersexual persons has not yet occurred in Strasbourg. It can be expected,
however, that interesting developments will take place within the CoE. 
As has been illustrated for the  case law on sexual orientation, language is an
important  instrument,  employed  by the  ECtHR,  for  the  definition  of  the  legitimate
rights-bearer. In its  case law, in particular,  the ECtHR exclusively employs the term
“transsexual”  (post-operative70,  willing  to  identify  with  one  gender),  thus  de  facto
denying legal subjectivity to the broader category of transgender persons. The exclusion
of those who have not irreversibly “crossed” the line of gender highlights the disruptive
potential that these forms of identification represent for the clear definitions of genders
within the domain of the law. Furthermore, this implicit erasure of transgender persons
in the case law of the ECtHR undeniably marginalises those individuals who refuse to
fall entirely into one gender category.
This chapter focuses on an analysis not just of the utterances, but also of the
“unsaid” of the ECtHR in relation to the rights of transgender and intersexual persons.
In the context of human rights, sometimes the “unsaid” speaks more loudly than clear
proclamations.  In  the  case  of  the  rights  of  transgender  persons  this  is  even  more
significant, given their long-standing social, political, and legal invisibility. However,
the obliteration of the existence of gender non-conforming individuals has also broader
implications for society as a whole, since it confirms the crucial importance of gender,
and the  anxiety connected with the compliance to  gender  norms,  that  invests  every
individual.
The analysis  of  the  case law that  will  comprise the object  of  this  chapter  is
70 The expression “post-operative” refers to individuals that have undergone different sets of irreversible
surgical  procedures,  aimed  at  modifying  their  secondary sexual  characteristics,  in  order  to  bring
coherence  with  their  preferred  gender.  They  may  involve  various  genital  surgeries,  as  well  as
sterilisation procedures. 
235
organised around three main axes. Firstly, the issue of the recognition of one's preferred
gender  is  approached,  with  a  thorough  socio-legal  and  semiotic  analysis  of  some
landmark cases such as B.v. France (1992), Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (2002) and
L. v. Lithuania (2007) as well as references to earlier  case law. Secondly, the analysis
will consider another strand of the case law of the ECtHR, touching on the relationship
existing  between  the  recognition  of  one's  gender  and  the  economic  and  financial
implications descending from such recognition (Van Kück v.  Germany,  Grant  v.  the
United  Kingdom  2006,  Schlumpf  v.  Switzerland  2009).  As  was  the  case  for  the
recognition of same-sex couples, it will be suggested that the recognition of specific sets
of rights for transgender persons has an undeniable, and often problematic, financial
dimension that directly calls into question the interests of the responding states. Thirdly,
time is devoted to the discussion of those cases, decided by the ECtHR, that deal with
the family life of transgender (transsexual) persons (Parry v. the United Kingdom 2006,
H. v. Finland 2012). These cases raise similar issues in relation to (hetero)normativity
that has already been encountered in the analysis of the  case law of the family life of
LGB  individuals.  While  talking  about  a  trans-normativity  (as  compared  to
“homonormativity”)  would  be  theoretically  adventurous,  at  the  same  time,  various
configurations of normativity for transgender persons can be explored in relation to the
recognition of different models of family. A separate sub-section will explore the socio-
legal aspect of the regulation of intersexual identities and traces possible profiles in this
field in regard to the role of the CoE.
This socio-legal analysis will also be coupled with observations undertaken at
the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE, who has carried out
extensive work on issues concerning the rights of transgender persons and, to a smaller
extent, on the rights of intersexual persons. The work of the Commissioner on the rights
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of transgender persons is fascinating and important, as it represents a true breakthrough
in  the  history  of  the  CoE.  By building  a  steady co-operation  with  the  network  of
European,  as  well  as  non-European,  transgender  activists,  the  Commissioner
demonstrates how it is possible to broaden institutional understandings of human rights
by giving  voice  to  human  rights  advocates.  The  limitations  and  constraints  of  this
approach will also be demonstrated, showing how the institutionalisation of transgender
activism may lead to new forms of normalisation within the context of the CoE.  
Blurring  the  Lines  of  Sex  and Gender:  a  Radical  Challenge  to  the
Law?
Transgender and intersexual experiences and identities are connected by a sort of
specular relation, according to Ben-Asher (2006, 55), in relation to the different roles
played  by  medical  intervention  and  expertise.  While  transgender  activists  seek  to
promote the right to have surgery performed (and recognised as necessary), intersexual
activists are lobbying for a moratorium on paediatric genital surgeries on intersexual
children and new-borns, seen as harmful and unnecessary (Chase 1998). While these
claims seem to be antithetical, they actually have in common the same goal: a radical
disruption of gender norms. In this  regard,  Butler (2004, 6) has suggested that both
interesexual and transgender persons “challenge the principle that a natural dimorphism
should be established at all costs”. 
In this overt challenge to the law, the body occupies a central position. As the
locus in which the “problem” can be said to have origin, it is, simultaneously, the place
where  a  solution  can  be  found.  As  such,  however,  the  body  is  also  the  object  of
continuous and incessant reconfigurations, both in the legal and in the social domain. As
Hyde (1997, 6) has maintained, there is no single understanding of the body:
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The very ease with which we construct the body as machine,  as property,  as
consumer commodity, as bearer of privacy rights or narratives, as inviolable, as
sacred,  as object of desire,  as threat to society,  demonstrates that there is no
knowledge of the body unmediated by discourse. And those constructions (…)
are never innocent (Hyde 1997, 6). 
Given  these  multiple,  and  sometimes  conflicting,  discourses  on  the  value  and
characteristics of bodies, it is important, for the purpose of this analysis, to understand
why  transgender  and  intersexual  bodies  are  seen  to  transgress  so  radically  the
boundaries of the normative, and why the regulation of bodies along the lines of the
sexual binarism, is a paramount preoccupation of both nation-states (Boyd 2006, 421)
and, by reflex, human rights actors, such as the CoE. 
The Normative Creation of Transgender Identities
The  creation  of  legal  transgender/intersexual  identities  serves  the  purpose  of
preserving  normative  structures  of  gender  and  ensuring  uniformity  and  compliance
(Garfinkel 2006, 158; Spade 2006, 136). The existence of a transgressor to the norms of
gender  symbolically  reinstates  the  importance  of  the  binary categories  of  male and
female.  Furthermore,  complying  with  the  tacit  norms  of  gender  guarantees  the
acquisition  of  legal  and  social  intelligibility  (Boyd  2006,  421).  Through  this
compliance, individuals are “read” as members of the desired – or ascribed, in the case
of intersexual  persons – gender.  Gender fulfils,  therefore,  various crucial  social  and
legal purposes. Rothblatt (1995, 58) has identified at least four reasons that justify such
tight classification:
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[the] allocation of rights and responsibilities;
[the] maintenance of civil order (morality);
[the] identification of its members;
[the] aggregation of demographic statistics (census);
All these functions provide a snapshot of the population and facilitate the distribution of
rights and responsibilities, as well as ensure the conservation of a stable social (and
moral)  order.  On the other hand, however,  it  has also been suggested that the strict
enforcement of gender norms is not as straightforward as it might seem. Faithful (2010,
102) has observed that the pervasive and imperative character of gender norms, as well
as the severity with which they are enforced, derives from a fundamentally shaky basis
on which they rest. Hence, the enforcement of gender norms is said to require “severe
regulation in order to ensure uniformity” and a constant policing on the part  of the
various institutional and non-institutional actors entrusted with this responsibility. 
The  pathologisation  of  transgender  identities  is  an  important  historical  and
medical  phenomenon,  whose  relevance  will  become  apparent  in  the  context  of
discussing the  case law. For this reason it is useful to make a quick reference to the
emergence of  this  as  a  healthcare issue.  It  was  only during the 1950s that  medical
professionals71 started  to  take  interest  in  the  definition  of  “transsexualism”  as  a
pathological  category.  To  these  early  categorisations  followed  an  inclusion  of
“transsexualism” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III (DSM), under the rubric of
“Gender Identity Disorders (GID)” which was only removed in the fifth edition issued
in  201272.  According  to  this  description  contained  in  the  DSM  III  and  IV,
71 David Cauldwell is the first to have used the term “transsexual” in 1949, while Harry Benjamin wrote
the first academic paper on “transsexualism” in 1953 (Whittle 2002, 21). 
72 Transgender activists had campaigned for the removal of transsexualism as GID in the DSM V which
could signify a departure from the pathologisation to which transgender persons were subjected. The
DSM V,  in  practice,  has  replaced  the  “GID” diagnosis,  with  a  diagnosis  of  “Gender  Dysphoria”
(incongruence  between  one's  experience  of  gender  and  gender  assigned  at  birth).  This  change,
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“transsexualism” was to be defined, substantially, as a mental illness. 
As will be discussed later, the issue of the pathologisation of transgender and
transsexual  persons  has  important  social  and legal  implications.  While  retaining the
diagnosis of “mental disorder” may be useful in some contexts such as when healthcare
procedures and reimbursements are concerned (Whittle 2002, 20), it may well prove to
be a  counterproductive approach under  other  profiles,  mainly because it  fosters and
reproduces  a  pathological  understanding  of  trans  identities  (Butler  2004,  76).
Furthermore,  medico-legal alliances are seen as being problematic (Sharpe 2002; Spade
2006;  Cruz  2010;  Davy  2011),  especially  when  the  boundaries  between  the
competences of the law and those of medicine become blurred (Sharpe 2002, 8; Spade
2008, 37) and medicine is invested with an authority that becomes quasi-normative.
It is precisely in relation to the interrelationship between the law and medicine
that a last set of considerations needs to be brought forward. An under-researched aspect
of the process that leads to having one's gender change recognised is the widespread
requirement  that  the  person  become  totally  sterile.  Surgery  leading  to  irreversible
sterility, as Whittle (2002, 162) has suggested, can be harmful and dangerous for some
people, because of existing health conditions or because of the invasive character of
some surgical interventions, such as hysterectomy, which satisfy the requirements of
national legislation without real benefit for the person concerned. While a great number
of transgender persons decide to undergo such procedures, others feel compelled to do
so by virtue of the requirements imposed by law in order to have one's official records
and  documents  amended.  Enormous  disparities  exist  in  national  legislation  across
Europe on change of gender and the controversial topic of compulsory sterilisation for
transgender persons, which has been framed as a human rights issue in front of the
however, is far from being unproblematic, as it raises other concerns in relation to litigation strategies
in the Courtrooms and in relation to healthcare provisions. 
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ECtHR (Sivonen 2011; Cojocariu 2013) and is starting to be debated in various fora. 
Gender Identity in the Case Law of the European Court of Human
Rights: Just Restating the “Normal”?
The  ECtHR has  been  a  real  battleground  for  the  rights  claims  advanced  by
transgender and transsexual persons during the last three decades. Sandland (2003, 201)
has argued, however, that rights to transgender persons still seem to be conceded by the
heterosexual majority according to a process of normalisation. This entails a subsequent
effort to “reinstate and affirm the proper” on the part of the ECtHR (Sandland 2003,
201). The analysis of different strands of case law on the rights of transgender persons
can  be  said  to  confirm  Sandland's  intuition  insofar  as  it  highlights  the  contorted
approach to  these  issues  that  the  ECtHR has  adopted,  also demonstrating  a  limited
knowledge of the sociological data available on the different experiences, identities, and
kinship and life arrangements of transgender persons across Europe. 
Recognising Gender, Normalising Individuals
It could be argued, provocatively, that the  case law of the ECtHR concerning
transgender persons is a case law on the “right to pass” as a member of the sex opposite
to the one assigned at birth, falling entirely within the boundaries of “liberal transsexual
politics” (2002, 502). Beyond the provocations, as well as the political implications of
the “passing strategy”, it is important to recognise how this discourse about being fully
accepted as a member of the preferred gender has strongly permeated the narratives of
the ECtHR. In this regard, narratives on one's preferred gender in the courtroom are
made the object  of close judicial  scrutiny according to  what  Sharpe (2002, 31)  has
described as the “hermeneutics of suspicion”73, aimed at verifying the authenticity of the
73 The “hermeneutics of suspicion” is an expression coined by Ricoeur (Pepa 2004) and indicates a way
of interpreting things aimed at unveiling the hidden political interests concealed by the superficial
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applicants' gender identity. 
This analysis tries to break from the traditional approach to the case law of the
ECtHR based on an assessment of the “evolution” of the judgements of this judicial
institution.  For  this  reason,  the  early  cases  decided  during  the  eighties74 have  been
omitted. The three chosen cases, instead, concern the legal recognition of the gender of
post-operative  transsexual  persons,  and  exemplify  very  well  that  process  of  hyper-
regulation and  erasure of  transgender  persons  described  by Spade  (2009,  289),  by
which  conflicting  legal  norms  and  administrative  policies  and  measures  create  an
“incoherent  regulatory  matrix”  that  renders  individuals  vulnerable  in  terms  of
discrimination,  violence,  and economic instability.  What is striking,  however,  is  that
while the ECtHR strongly calls on member states to solve the various implications of
this incongruence, it nonetheless reproduces this situation of vulnerability through its
judgements.
The first  of these cases,  B. v.  France  (1992), is  considered the first  partially
successful judgement in terms of the recognition of the right of trans(sexual) persons to
have their preferred gender recognised. After the failures of applicants in  Rees v. the
United  Kingdom  (1986) and Cossey  v.  the  United  Kingdom  (1990),  the  ECtHR
substantially  overturned its  previous  case  law on this  subject.  While  this  change  is
surely surprising, the most interesting aspect is the presence of a thorough speculation
on the authenticity of the applicant's transsexuality and a strong rhetoric of opposition
between “true” and “false” transsexual persons. It can be argued, in fact, that the above-
mentioned “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Sharpe 2002, 31) permeating the  case law of
the ECtHR on transgender rights is particularly strong in the instant case. 
The case concerned a male to female (MtF) post-operative transsexual person
level of a text. In Sharpe's use of this expression, the text is represented by the personal narratives of
transgender applicants. 
74 Rees v. the United Kingdom (1986), Cossey v. the United Kingdom (1990).
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who had undergone gender-confirming75 surgery in Morocco (vaginoplasty) and had,
consequently, sought amendment to her civil status in France, her country of origin. The
refusal to the amendment had been motivated by the French Court of Cassation, with
the  claim that  the  appellant  could  not  be  considered  as  a  “real”  transsexual  (B.  v.
France, 1992: para. 16) because she had not been under medical control in France that
could have confirmed the genuineness of her “transsexualism”. To this refusal, followed
B.'s application at the ECtHR, in which she claimed the violation of Articles 3, 8 and 12
ECHR. From the start, in the “background to the case” (B. v. France, 1992: para. 10) is
present a strong narrative of authenticity that permeates the applicant's self-presentation.
The applicant, in fact, explains how, since her early stages of life, she was perceived by
her brothers as a “girl” and how throughout the years she had been experiencing this
discrepancy between the assigned and the desired gender with extreme distress which
led to depression. The purpose of this narrative was to convince the ECtHR that her
claim was genuine and to counter “suspicions” as to what her true gender was. 
The strategy of the applicant, however, also pursued another objective. Prior to
B. v. France,  the ECtHR's  case law did not oblige member states to recognise one's
preferred  gender.  In  order  to  avoid  having her  case  dismissed,  the  applicant  had  to
convince the ECtHR that her case was innovative with respect to the past  case law.
Apart  from  highlighting  the  differences  between  the  French  and  the  British  legal
system76,  the  applicant  emphasised  developments  in  the  scientific  field  regarding
transsexualism77. Hence, B. combined her narrative of authenticity with a narrative of
rigorous scientific legitimacy. She constructed her legal intelligibility by referring to
two different sets of “truth telling” (one experiential, one scientific) that could respond
75 This terminology has recently been adopted by trans activists, as a more accurate way of describing
the process by which individuals alter their gender. 
76 All the cases previously decided by the Court saw the United Kingdom as respondent state. 
77 In particular the applicant refers to the fact that different strands of scientific research had put into
question the reliability of a person's chromosomal endowment in order to determine one's gender (B.
v. France, 1992: para. 46).
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to the ECtHR's request to prove the genuine nature of her identity. 
The  applicant's  narrative  eventually  proved  to  be  successful,  as  the  ECtHR
recognised the truthfulness of her claim and a violation of Article 8. While France did
not consider her as a '”true” transsexual, the ECtHR found that the applicant's “manifest
determination'” of wanting to be a transsexual (B. v. France, 1992: para. 55) was enough
to fall under the scope of Article 8. The ECtHR's formulation is interesting. By making
reference  to  the  applicant's  “manifest  determination”  the  ECtHR  opens  up  a  new
dimension that had been foreclosed up to that moment: that of the possibility of one's
self-determination.  However,  since  this  opening  can  be  potentially  dangerous,  as  it
could  trigger  a  consequent  recognition  of  “pre-operative”  transgender  persons,  the
ECtHR also needed to affirm, contextually, that the surgery had entailed an “irreversible
abandonment of the external marks of Miss B.’s original sex” (B. v. France, 1992: para.
55). The “manifest  determination”,  in this  case,  can be considered to be understood
within  the  context  of  “transsexual  liberal  politics”  (Roen,  2002)  as  a  sort  of
assimilationist  move in order to fit into a gender category rather than questioning it
radically. It would be inaccurate, however, to describe applicants as being deprived of
agency. In various instances, transgender persons may decide to narrate strategically
their  experiences  of  being  transsexual  or  transgender,  by  devising  strategies  that
minimise disruption of their daily lives (Spade 2006, 328).
The narrative of the “true transsexual” is an important and problematic one. In
the case just discussed, this model is articulated beyond the verdict of the ECtHR, as the
six  dissenting  judges  (Pinheiro  Farina,  Petitti,  Valticos,  Loizou,  and  Morenilla)
motivated their  opposition to the decision of the Court in terms of having not been
convinced about the genuineness of the applicant's transsexualism. In particular, Judge
Pinheiro Farina's78 intervention clearly adopts transphobic language: 
78 B. v. France (1992), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinheiro Farinha, para. 5. 
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As for the applicant (whom I will not refer to [in] the feminine, as I do
not know the concept of social sex and I do not recognise the right of a
person to change sex at will), he is not a true transsexual (Pinheiro Farina
1992). 
This statement is problematic under two profiles. On the one hand, it is contradictory.
How can Judge Pinheiro Farinha recognise a “true transsexual” if he does not recognise
the  right  to  change  one's  gender  in  the  first  place?  On  the  other  hand,  the  Judge
demonstrates a narrow-mindedness in wanting to delegate the discussion of what counts
as gender to the purely legal sphere (“I do not know the concept of social sex”). This
statement suggests that the sociological factors in the determination of gender identity
are completely overlooked by ECtHR. In this regard, the ECtHR shows a fragmented
and stereotypical  knowledge about  “proper” gender  and places the applicants in  the
position of having to “prove” their level of compliance to dictates of the sought-after
gender.  It  can be argued,  then,  that  the erasure does  not only involve pre-operative
transgender persons, but is a total obliteration of the experience itself of transgenderism
as  something  deprived  of  meaning  that  is  only  useful  insofar  as  it  determines  the
passage from one gender to the other. As the following cases will show, the approach of
the ECtHR is strongly permeated by this “hermeneutics of suspicion” coupled with a
strong effort at the normalisation of transgender identities. 
In  2002,  ten  years  after  B.  v.  France,  the  ECtHR,  recognised  formally  the
obligation on member states to recognise one's preferred gender regardless of biological
criteria. In Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (2002), to some extent rightly considered as
a  landmark  judgement,  the  obligation  for  member  states  to  rectify  documents  of
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individuals that wanted to change their gender was affirmed. This obligation, however,
was  formulated  in  a  way  that  allowed  member  states  to  apply  a  wide  margin  of
appreciation  in  setting  up  the  criteria  for  the  recognition  of  one's  preferred  gender.
Hence,  burdensome  requirements  such  as  surgery,  psychiatric  assessment,  and
compulsory sterilisation were not proscribed, leaving out the transgender persons who
refused to have their gender identity defined by medical intervention.  
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (2002) concerned a British applicant who had
not obtained the amendment of her gender on her birth certificate. In the opinion of the
applicant, the refusal to amend her birth certificate had entailed a level of disruption in
her life, particularly in relation to her right to marry, her employment, social security,
and state pension, as well as in relation to an episode of sexual harassment she had
experienced in her workplace. She alleged a violation of Articles79 8, 12, 13 and 14 of
the ECHR. The applicant's narrative touched on elements concerning her diagnosis of
transsexualism  and  the  ability  or  failure  to  “pass”  as  a  female  individual.  It  was,
furthermore, supported by an intervention by the British NGO “Liberty”, highlighting
the existence of sociological data that showed an increasing acceptance of transsexual
individuals80 (only  post-operative).  It  is  interesting  to  notice  how  pre-operative
transgender persons are erased not just by the ECtHR, but also by the intervening third
party, who could be seen as strategically focusing only on post-operative transsexual
persons for the sake of persuading the ECtHR. 
In  reading  Goodwin's  arguments,  the  impression  is  one  of  the  relative
powerlessness of the individual with respect to the omnipervasive character of the law
and of administrative procedures, rather than empowerment. Goodwin, as with many
79 Article 13 ECHR protects the right to an effective remedy before national courts; Article 14 ECHR is
the  non-free-standing  article  concerning  the  prohibition  of  discrimination.  It  is  not  free-standing
because  its  violation  can  only  be  claimed  in  conjunction  with  another  right  set  forth  by  the
Convention. Article 8 ECHR is the right protecting private and family life, while Article 12 ECHR
protects the right to marry and found a family. 
80 Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, para. 55. 
246
other transgender applicants, seems to stand, in relation to the law, in the same position
as the man in Kafka's (2005) “Before the Law”, who asks the gatekeeper whether he
would be granted “entry to the law” and receives the answer “it is possible (…) but not
now”.  In  fact,  although  the  ECtHR  in  the  instant  case  recognised  member  states'
obligation to rectify trans(sexual) persons' gender on official records, it overlooked the
existence of important collateral issues, such as the requirement of compulsory divorce
for  married  individuals  wanting  to  have  their  gender  amended,  or  the  compulsory
sterilisation of transgender persons, as Cojocariu (2013, 118) has  highlighted. 
The  vagueness  on  the  most  controversial  issues  relating  to  legal  gender
recognition could be said to stem from the ECtHR's crucial preoccupation with having
to preserve consistency within its  case law, trying not to depart from previous cases
without  a  “good reason”  (Goodwin  v.  the  UK,  2002:  para.  74),  rather  than  from a
thorough reconsideration of the legal and social status of transgender persons (either
pre-operative or  post-operative).  The ECtHR seems,  in  fact,  to  have  shied away,  in
Goodwin v.  the UK,  from justifying why the obligation for states to recognise one's
preferred  gender  only applied  to  “transsexual”  persons as  opposed to  “transgender”
(Cojocariu 2013, 118). To this extent, the ECtHR was adamant in denying that a “third
zone” between male and female (Goodwin v. the UK, 2002: para. 90) could be allowed.
This voluntary omission, this silence, equals an ontological erasure that has not been
lifted with subsequent judgements. 
Several  commentators  (Whittle  2002,  Sandland  2003,  Dembour  2005  and
Cojocariu  2013)  have  expressed  ambivalence  towards  the  judgement  and  sought  to
address  its  limitations.  They have  addressed,  in  particular,  the  reinstatement  of  the
binarism of gender that helps the ECtHR to shun all possible expansive interpretations
of the process of gender recognition as also encompassing “pre-operative” transgender
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persons. This approach has been read by both Sandland (2003, 192) and Dembour81
(2005, 40) as a demonstration of the “conservative” role of the ECtHR. 
Goodwin v.  the UK  (2002) established clear boundaries between “legitimate”
and “illegitimate” positions for transgender persons as human rights holders. This seems
to confirm Sandland's hypothesis that rights are afforded to transgender persons as a
“concession” of the majority. This aspect seems also to be confirmed by the ECtHR's
formulation on states' obligation to recognise gender:
society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable
individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity
chosen by them at great personal cost (Goodwin v. the UK, 2002: para. 90).
The most striking aspect of this passage is the fact that the ECtHR frames “society” as
being opposed to transgender persons, as if they were not part of it. This is even more
problematic since it is coupled with a rhetoric of “'tolerance” enacted by the benevolent
majority. Moreover, the vague reference about the distress encountered by transgender
persons in their quest for dignity (“at great personal cost”), also seems to contain an
element of compassion and paternalism in the wording of the judgement, contributing to
the  creation  of  hierarchies  of  “humanness”  between  cisgendered  and  transgender
individuals. 
Goodwin v. the UK (2002) has left many grey areas in relation to the process of
gender  recognition  by  member  states.  In  this  regard,  the  subsequent  case  of  L.  v.
Lithuania (2007) highlighted the existence of some loopholes existing in the legislation
of member states. The case, concerning a transgender applicant who was defined as
81 Dembour (2005, 41), however, is equally uncertain about whether a 'proactive' Court  could have been
equally, or more, dangerous than a “conservative” one. 
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“female” at  birth,  dealt  with the lack of provision in  Lithuania regulating access  to
gender-confirming  surgery.  The  applicant  had  received  hormonal  treatment  and
underwent a bilateral mastectomy. However, in Lithuania, no legislation regulated the
possibility of undergoing genital surgery. The applicant considered this legislative gap82
as  having  caused  distress  and  discomfort,  as  well  as  suicidal  tendencies.  In  his
application before the ECtHR he alleged a violation of Articles 3, 8, 12 and 14 ECHR. 
The  case  presents  various  interesting  aspects.  On  the  one  hand  the  ECtHR
decided to consider the application only in relation to the alleged violation of Article 8
ECHR the respect for “private life”. It dismissed, therefore, the public dimension of the
application,  that is to say the violation of the right to marry (Article 12 ECHR) or the
prohibition on discrimination (Article 14 ECHR), together with allegations of “inhuman
and degrading treatment” (Article 3 ECHR). This decision builds on the necessity for
ensuring that the applicant can “pass” as a man. Implicitly, the emphasis of the ECtHR
on this aspect of the application reinforces the aura of stigma and secrecy associated
with the process of gender transition.
In  the  instant  case,  the  ECtHR  considered  that  the  gap  in  the  Lithuanian
legislation regulating gender confirmation amounted to a violation of Article 8 ECHR.
The problem, however, was not the mere absence of regulation in the legal system. It
was, rather, the process of the erasure of transgender identity operated by the Lithuanian
legal system that should have been addressed. However, the ECtHR, by dismissing the
applicant's claim about the infringement of his right to marry (Article 12 ECHR) his
partner of ten years, contributed to enhancing this erasure of the transgender identity of
the  applicant.   This  part  of  the  complaint  was  considered  by  the  ECtHR  to  be
“premature” (L. v. Lithuania, 2007: para. 64), because of the lack of recognition of the
82 The  ECtHR had  already stressed  in  Goodwin  v.  the  UK (2002:  para.78)   the  importance  of  the
consistency between administrative and legal practices. Five years later, in L. v. Lithuania (2007),this
issue was addressed again by the ECtHR.
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applicant as a “man” for the purposes of law. Therefore, while it tried to push Lithuania
to  solve  the  inconsistency  existing  in  the  national  legislation  concerning  access  to
surgical procedures, the ECtHR contributed indirectly to reasserting and reinforcing the
importance of the sexual dimorphism of the spouses. Furthermore, labelling a ten-year-
relationship  as  giving  rise  to  a  “premature”  complaint,  ironically  echoes  the  main
character's fate in Kafka's short story. The man, in fact, is not refused entry to the law.
He is simply asked to wait, patiently. Maybe endlessly. 
The use of the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” offers further hints for
reflection on the “indeterminacy” of transgender persons' legal status. This doctrine, less
prominent in  L. v. Lithuania  (2007), permeates most of the ECtHR's  case law on the
rights of transgender persons and relates to member states' wide margin of discretion in
establishing the procedures for gender confirmation. While states have an obligation to
recognise one's preferred gender, the criteria to meet in order to be recognised are at the
total  discretion  of  the  member  state.  In  this  regard,  it  could  be  suggested  that  by
favouring an extensive use of the margin of appreciation doctrine, the ECtHR upholds,
rather than rejects, the existence of an inconsistency between administrative and legal
practice. This, in turns, gives great leverage to national governments in deciding the
terms of recognition for a “transsexual” person. 
Contested Reimbursements: Transgender Healthcare, Pathologisation
and the Enjoyment of Human Rights
The  preliminary  reference  made  in  this  chapter  to  the  issue  of  the
pathologisation of transgender identities becomes useful in introducing another strand
of the case law of the ECtHR. One of the issues arising in the court during these years is
the  one  concerning  the  extent  to  which  defining  “transgenderism”  as  a  medical
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condition can help those who want to undergo surgical procedures to have them paid for
by the public healthcare system or by their private insurance. Against the claim that
these  medical  treatments  may fall  under  the  category of  “cosmetic  surgery”,  Spade
(2008, 38) has claimed that there is a myth asserting that gender-confirming healthcare
is  not  “legitimate medicine”.  For Spade83 the lack of provision for  treatments (both
hormonal  and  surgical)  often  push  the  most  deprived  segments  of  the  transgender
population  towards  the  black  market  of  transgender  healthcare  or  to  participate  in
criminalised activities, such as prostitution (Spade 2008, 38). 
Cultural and economic capital play an important role in navigating the complex
socio-legal  reality  of  gender  recognition,  as  Davy84 (2011,  57)  and  Cojocariu  have
suggested  (2013,  122).  Beyond  the  question  of  ontological  visibility,  in  fact,  the
recognition  of  one's  gender  has  a  clear  impact  on  daily  life  and  on  life  decisions.
Surgical procedures to confirm one's gender, as well as other treatments may be very
expensive.  Should  the  state  pay  for  these  treatments?  Across  Europe  there  is  no
established consensus (Cojocariu 2013, 121) and the issue is particularly sensitive, as it
touches  both  on  the  individuals'  interests  and  on  states'  (and  private  companies')
interests. 
As  has  been  shown  in  relation  to  the  case  law of  the  ECtHR  on  sexual
orientation and the enjoyment of certain benefits, states are granted a wide margin of
appreciation when national socio-economic interests are at stake. Both cases examined
in this part of the analysis,  Van Kück v. Germany (2003) and  Schlumpf v. Switzerland
(2009), concern the request  to have gender-confirming surgery and other  treatments
83 Spade carries out his evaluations in the context of the United States where a universal  system of
healthcare, similar to that existing in many European countries, is not in place. Beyond the obvious
differences between these two contexts, it is nonetheless possible to find points of commonality, as
there are transgender persons who may not officially qualify for treatment in accordance with the
healthcare standards and may try to find alternative channels. 
84 Davy (2011, 57) suggests that the aesthetics of gender of transgender persons can be considered as a
'form of generative cultural capital'. 
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reimbursed  by both  private  and  public  healthcare  systems,  which  were  refused  by
domestic courts in the two countries of origin. 
In the discussion of these cases, the ECtHR cautiously tries to preserve states'
margin of appreciation on socio-economic issues while, at the same time, tries to make
some openings on the rights of transgender persons. In both cases the interplay between
the  law  and  medicine  is  fundamental  and  indissoluble,  as  medical  opinion  on  the
genuineness of the applicant's “transsexualism” is deemed crucial for national courts
and the ECthR itself.  In having a quasi-normative status,  medicine almost  seems to
prescribe  the  legal  measures  to  be  undertaken after  surgery or  other  treatments  are
performed. Since medicine has been granted a monopoly over the establishment of the
criteria to detect the “true” transsexual applicant, these criteria become automatically
translated  into  the  juridical  forum.  An  illustration  of  this  problematic  relationship
between the legal and the medical sphere is illustrated by the ECtHR's comment, in both
of the instant cases, on the fact that national courts had to avoid substituting themselves
with the medical authorities in determining whether some treatments were necessary for
transgender persons (Van Kück v. Germany, 2003: para. 54 and Schlumpf v. Switzerland,
2009: para. 57). 
How does this relate to the question of reimbursement? Paradoxically, the more
“pathological”  the  applicant  appears,  the  more likely it  is  for  the  reimbursement  of
medical  expenses to take place.  For this  purpose,  the medical  expertise proving the
existence of an “illness” is crucial.  In this regard, both national courts, and also the
ECtHR, widely employ Sharpe's (2002) “hermeneutics of suspicion”. In assessing the
claims  made  by  the  member  states'  Government,  the  ECtHR tries  to  ascertain  the
entitlement  to  reimbursement  by  virtue  of  the  applicant's  genuine transsexualism.
Framing transgenderism and transsexualism as an “illness”, however, has ambiguous
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social and legal effects, especially in relation to efforts aimed at de-stigmatising trans
identities. 
In both the above-mentioned cases the ECtHR recognised the violation of the
right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) of the applicants who had been prevented from
effectively  being  heard  before  national  courts  in  relation  to  their  requests  for
reimbursement.  Moreover,  the  ECtHR made  a  strong reference  to  the  necessity  for
“self-determination” (Van Kück v. Germany, 2003: para. 78 and Schlumpf v. Switzerland,
2009: para. 77). This statement, however, is far from meaning that transgender persons
could be granted recognition of their gender without having to undergo surgery. In fact,
the ECtHR explained the principle of self-determination85 as entailing the possibility for
the  individual  to  freely  opt  for  surgery  in  order  to  have  their  preferred  gender
recognised, rather than self-determining one's gender without surgical intervention. As it
was  for  Goodwin,  the  self-determination,  for  the  ECtHR,  only applied  to  decisions
falling  within  the  boundaries  of  the  normative,  excluding  de  facto  “pre-operative”
transgender persons. 
Moreover,  the  subtle  socio-economic  criteria  employed  to  ascertain  the
genuineness of transgender individuals contributes to enhancing the pathologisation and
stigmatisation  of  these  persons.  Equally,  this  also  pushes  transgender  persons  who
would like to undergo these medical procedures to frame their requests in pathological
terms, as if the rhetoric of compassion was the only instrument they have to convince
the judicial authorities that they are not “taking advantage of the system”. As it was for
lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons having to prove that they were not trying to gain
advantage from the welfare system, similarly, transgender persons have to rely almost
exclusively on the pathologising model of gender identity in order to gain their legal
85 The ECtHR specifies in Van Kück v. Germany (2003: para. 69) that the case law of the Court does not
present cases that deal with the issue of the right to self-determination per se. 
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and social intelligibility as human rights subjects. How is it possible to balance the need
to  de-stigmatise  transgender  identity  with  the  need  to  have  access  to  healthcare
treatments that are not extremely burdensome for individuals? The ECtHR does not
address  the  question,  limiting  itself  to  monitoring  the  access  gate  to  transgender
healthcare treatments.
In  another  strand  of  the  case  law concerning  the  issue  of  paying  pensions
according to the applicant's acquired gender, however, the ECtHR has recognised the
violation of socio-economic rights. In both Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (2002) and
Grant v. the United Kingdom  (2006), the ECtHR ascertained a violation of Article 8
ECHR. Both applicants had alleged that while they had paid female contributions, they
had been refused retirement at the age of 60 (until 2010 the retirement age for women in
the  United  Kingdom)  and  had  been  treated  as  males  for  the  purposes  of  pensions
payments.
The interesting aspect of these two judgements is that the ECtHR evaluated the
negative repercussions that would affect the general public if the pensions were to be
paid to the applicants at the female age for retirement. However, the language of the
ECtHR appears vague and abstract, without specifying the detrimental effects that the
recognition  of  the  applicants'  rights  would  entail.  The  expressions  employed  are
“concrete or substantial hardship or detriment to the public interest” (Goodwin v. the
UK, 2002: para. 91) and “unfairness to the general public” (Grant v. the UK, 2006: para.
24).  The  reach  of  these  expressions  is  clearly  ambiguous  and  could  be  used  and
interpreted differently by the ECtHR depending on the circumstances. In the two instant
cases the Court assessed that the level for damaging the “public” had not been reached,
consequently recognising the violation of the applicants' rights. The problem, however,
remains  in  theory,  whenever  the  ECtHR  is  called  to  strike  a  balance  between  the
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individual and the “public interests”, whose definition is highly debatable and may also
be interpreted differently across the member states of the CoE. 
Hence,  the shaky sociological (and legal)  reach of a concept such as “public
interests”, reflects the partial inadequacy of the epistemological criteria employed by the
ECtHR in its evaluation of the context in which the applicants' claims arise. In the case
of often socially and economically marginalised groups, such as transgender persons,
this process of weighting individual interests against public ones – as if transgender
applicants only had “individual” interests and were not part of the “public” – further
enhances  the  situation  of  social  estrangement  and  separation  that  gender  non-
conforming individuals experience. 
The Invisible Spouse: “Family Life” and Transgender Persons
Gender  is  an  unavoidable  element  in  the  definition  of  what  constitutes  a
“family” or what defines “parenthood”, as Flynn (2003, 212) has observed. Because of
this central role of gender, it is difficult for any judicial authority to make an exercise of
abstraction86 in  imagining  kinship  arrangements  that  contravene  the  rule  of  sexual
dimorphism  of  the  spouses.  The  ECtHR  makes  no  exception  to  this  lack  of
inventiveness  in  portraying  different  models  of  “families”.  Hence,  many  of  the
limitations of the ECtHR's approach to the question of the guarantee of the rights of
transgender persons are particularly visible in relation to the right to marry and found a
family guaranteed by Article 12 ECHR. In a time-frame of more than two decades, the
Court has always shown a certain reluctance in recognising the violation of Article 12
ECHR in relation to claims made by transgender applicants. This may be due to the fact
that the enforcement of gender dimorphism of the spouses is a way to patrol the borders
86 Robson (1998) describes two different views on gender identity adopted on the part of the Courts
when analysing cases concerning marriage rights of transgender persons. The former, the formalist
view, “relies upon formal relationships dictated by law”; the latter, the functionalist view, “emphasises
the functions as attributes or 'realities' that are deemed to be operative”.
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of the heterosexual institution of marriage from an “unnatural homosexual incursion”
(Sharpe  2002,  87).  The  Courts,  in  particular,  want  to  avoid  that  the  recognition  of
marriages that are not between two persons of the “same” biological sex, may be seen as
opening  the  door  to  same-sex  marriages  in  those  jurisdictions  in  which  this  is  not
possible. 
The family arrangements of transgender persons can be subjected to intrusive
and invasive scrutiny on the part of judicial authorities, and the authorities’ results are
often based on stereotypical ideas of the  “characteristics” of the family itself. As Hines
(2006, 354) has observed, little attention has been paid to the question of intimacy and
family relations in the context of gender transition from a sociological perspective. This
lack of interest  and knowledge can also be said to include the perspectives of legal
practitioners  and  judicial  authorities.  The  predominance  of  a  formalist  approach
(Robson 1998) in relation to gender identity and the right to marry is exemplified by
some  judgements  of  the  ECtHR.  Although  there  are  several87 cases  concerning
transgender applicants alleging the right to marry and found a family, this part of the
analysis will focus on the controversial question of compulsory divorce for individuals
who are already married at the time they decide to undergo gender-confirming surgery
and who live in member states in which same-sex marriage is not available.
Before starting a discussion of the relevant case law of the ECtHR on the issue of
divorce for transgender persons, a preliminary clarification must be made. The chapter
concerning the family life of LGB persons contained a strong element of critique of the
institution of marriage in the first place. The “defence” of marriage by state institutions
and – in some cases – by human rights institutions, has been described by the author of
this research as an attempt to foster an exclusionary conception of kinship which only
87 Rees v. the United Kingdom (1986), Cossey v. the United Kingdom (1990), Sheffield and Horsham v.
the United Kingdom (1998), Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (2002), L .v. Lithuania (2007), Cassar v.
Malta (2013), H. v. Finland (2012).
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encompasses  those  who  possess  the  material,  cultural  and  symbolic  resources.
Furthermore, the chapter on LGB family life strongly highlighted the economic – rather
than social – significance of marriage and the existence of state's interests in fostering
some types of marriages at the detriment of others. In this regard, the following analysis
concerning the imposition of divorce for a specific portion of transgender persons by
some member states of the CoE, may appear as a defence for the right of transgender
persons to marry. This is not the case, as the crucial argument of this chapter is not to
reiterate the exclusionary principles foregrounding the institution of marriage. Rather,
this  chapter  acknowledges  the  social  and  economic  limitations  of  marriage  as  an
institution,  and  moves  to  discuss  how –  within  the  boundaries  of  this  exclusionary
institution – further lines of distinction between viable and non-viable spouses arise.
Hence, this chapter does not contain a praise of marriage for transgender persons per se,
as much as it is an occasion to point out the inconsistency in the strategies of promotion
of  “normalcy”  for  those  who do not  fit  the  male/female  gender  dichotomy.  In  this
context, therefore, it is perfectly possible to uphold the claims made in relation to the
limitations  of  marriage  for  LGB  persons,  whilst  simultaneously  investigating  the
problematic configurations that the “right to marry” for transgender persons may take. 
In the literature (Sharpe 2002; Whittle 2002; Robson 2007; Cruz 2010) there has
been more attention paid to cases concerning the annulment (ab initio)88, rather than the
invalidation  of  marriages  in  which  one  of  the  spouses  is  transgender.  Rarer  is  a
discussion of the cases and socio-legal implications of those marriages which are not
dissolved  because  of  a  unilateral  decision  of  one  of  the  spouses.  The  issue  of
“compulsory  divorce”,  however,  is  extremely  interesting,  as  it  intersects  with  the
recognition of same-sex relationships. 
88 As in the infamous British case of  Corbett v. Corbett  ([1971] 2 All ER 33) in which the plaintiff
sought to have his marriage declared void because his partner was transsexual. 
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In Parry v. the United Kingdom (2006) and H. v. Finland (2012) the ECtHR had
to assess whether the requirement of divorcing in order to have one's preferred gender
recognised, constituted an infringement of the rights of the applicants. Could the ECtHR
corroborate the position of national governments (in this case the British and the Finnish
governments), forcing the individual to choose between two equally important rights,
namely the right to have one's private life respected (by means of the recognition of
one's preferred gender) and the right to marry (by means of respect for one's already
existing marriage regardless of the gender of the spouses)?
In both judgements, it appears obvious how the legitimate “borders” of marriage
are policed both in national courts and at the ECtHR. In Parry v. the United Kingdom
(2006) the ECtHR was confronted with the case of a married couple with three children,
in which one of the spouses had undergone gender-confirming surgery in order to be
recognised as female. While the couple intended to remain together, the only way to
have formal recognition of the acquired gender of the transgender spouse would have
been to dissolve their marriage, as British law did not allow same-sex marriages. The
application resulted in a claim for an alleged violation of several Articles of the ECHR,
among which were Article 8 and 12. In order to convince the ECtHR, the applicants
highlighted their condition as a “loving and married couple” (Parry v. the UK, 2006: 2)
as well as highlighting the religious importance of their marriage and the consequent
breach of Article 9 ECHR (Parry v. the UK, 2006: 6). The way in which the applicants
presented themselves before the ECtHR raises an important question: “are families with
trans persons socially assimilationist  and normative,  or counter normative?” (Pfeffer
2012, 77).
In their attempt to convince the ECtHR about their love and commitment, the
Parry spouses were, implicitly, trying to demonstrate to the ECtHR the “normality” of
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their  relationship.  Similar  to  cases  concerning  same-sex  couples,  couples  with  a
transgender spouse are subject to the heavy scrutiny of the Courts, aimed at ascertaining
whether these relationships can negatively affect marriage as an institution. While the
applicants rightly highlighted their high level of mutual commitment, they indirectly
participated  in  the  enhancement  of  the  concept  of  the  “proper”  family  before  the
ECtHR.  The  efforts  of  the  applicants,  however,  did  not  prove  to  be  sufficient  to
persuade the ECtHR, and the application was declared to be manifestly ill-founded. 
Regardless of the negative outcome for the applicants, it is interesting to analyse
the judgement in more detail. In verifying whether national authorities had struck a fair
balance  between  collective  and  individual  interests,  the  ECtHR  considered  the
prohibition of same-sex marriages existing in British law as requiring the applicants to
find an alternative arrangement:
(...) it is apparent that the applicants may continue their relationship in all its
current essentials  and may also give it  a legal status akin,  if  not identical to
marriage, through a civil partnership which carries with it almost all the same
legal rights and obligations. (Parry v. the UK, 2006: 10)
This passage highlights the extent to which the preservation of the legal order
(and of heterosexual marriage) is achieved by asking the applicants to seek a suboptimal
arrangement to make their relationship official once they had obtained a divorce. What
about  the  right  to  marry?  The applicants  maintained that  having a  “right  to  marry”
should also include the “right to remain married” (Parry v.  the UK,  2006: 10).  The
ECtHR, however, failed to answer this question and reinstated the principle by which
the Convention (ECHR) only protects the right between a man and a woman to get
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married. Hence, implicitly, if Parry decides to seek full recognition of her “new” gender,
she places herself and her partner outside the borders of heterosexual, therefore lawful,
marriage.
The  above-illustrated  case  seems  to  suggest  that  protecting  marriage  as  an
institution  by  forcing  some  (transgender)  individuals  to  divorce  is  clearly
disproportionate. In commenting on the issue of compulsory divorce for transgender
persons, Whittle (2002, 156) has maintained that marriages with a transgender spouse
have existed for awhile without causing substantial harm to society, the only problem
being that of modifying some administrative practices in relation to taxes and social
security arrangements. In the instant case, however, the ECtHR maintained that a state
could not be required to “make allowances for the small number of marriages where
both partners wish to continue notwithstanding the change in gender of one of them”
(Parry v. the UK, 2006: 12-13). The expression “make allowances” can be understood
here as implying that the state cannot be expected to derogate from the prohibition on
same-sex marriage, only because a small number of families have different  needs. As
for the previous judgements, the ECtHR reinstated in this case a hierarchy, in qualitative
terms, between heterosexual (legitimate) and non-heterosexual families (either same-sex
or with a transgender spouse). 
Parry  v.  the  United  Kingdom (2006)  shows  that  families  with  transgender
members  face  a  problem  of  invisibility  in  the  context  of  an  attempt  to  label  the
individuals as either being in a “heterosexual” or “homosexual” relationship for legal
purposes.  Hence,  the  denial  of  the  specificity  of  the  experience  of  couples  with  a
transgender spouse, can be said to go so far as representing a forced assimilation into
the heteronormative structure of society (Robson 2007, 59), where one has to prove the
adherence  to  the  institution  of  marriage.  At  the  same  time,  while  the  quest  for
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recognition and preservation  of  one's  relationship  is  legitimate and undeniable,  it  is
nonetheless important to question the role of the institution of marriage itself, which is
the main locus in which lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights advocates may
sign up to that “conservative egalitarianism” criticised by Spade (2011, 60). 
The discussion of the other judgement, H. v. Finland  (2012), further helps to
shed light on the existence of an important gap in the enjoyment of human rights on the
part of transgender persons. Two aspects, in particular, are addressed here.  The first
concerns the problematic relationship between the issue of “compulsory divorce” and
the regulation of same-sex marriages  in  the member states of the CoE. The second
concerns  the  existing  synergy  between  the  normative  domain  and  administrative
practices that render the fruition of human rights, on the part of transgender persons,
often only theoretical and incomplete, as was already shown in the beginning of this
chapter. 
In the case of H. v. Finland, (2012), the applicant, registered as male at birth, had
been  married  to  a  woman  for  seventeen  years.  After  having  undergone  gender-
confirming surgery, she made a request to obtain an amendment of her identification
number that ratified her female gender. As it  was for Parry,  the obtaining of such a
change  could  only happen  provided  the  applicant  had  obtained  a  divorce  from her
spouse. Unwilling to bring her legal relationship to an end, the applicant claimed before
the ECtHR a violation of both Articles89 8 and 14. The ECtHR ascertained that there had
not been a violation of the Convention. This negative outcome led the applicant to ask
that the case should be heard by the Great Chamber. However, in its final judgement,
the Great Chamber upheld the Court's decision. 
As has already been hinted at, the relationship between the issue of “compulsory
divorce”  for  transgender  persons  and  the  recognition  of  same-sex  marriage  is
89 The ECtHR decided, in the course of the hearing, to evaluate a complaint also under Article 12 ECHR.
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particularly  problematic.  Sharpe  (2002,  2)  has  suggested  that  the  behaviour  of  the
Courts deciding on the validity of marriages in which one of the spouses is transgender
(or transsexual), is characterised by a “judicial anxiety”, namely a fear that the judicial
recognition  of  these  marriages  would  constitute  an  expedient  to  allow  same-sex
marriages. In this  case the ECtHR has considered the recognition of one's preferred
gender and the possibility of remaining married after gender-confirming surgery, to be
two  mutually  exclusive  rights.  In  fact,  their  contemporary  fruition  seems  to  be
considered, by both the Finnish government and the ECtHR, as entailing the existence
of a same-sex marriage. In the referral to the Great Chamber, the legal representatives of
H. contested the fact that the ECtHR had not considered the status of the legislation in
the  rest  of  the  member  states,  thus  refusing  to  consider  alternative  solutions  not
entailing compulsory divorce for the spouses, available in at least 24 member states of
the CoE (Cojocariu and Vandova 2013, 4). 
The striking aspect of this judgement is the fact that, in order to avoid a “domino
effect” that would affect the protection of the “traditional institution of marriage” (H. v.
Finland, 2012: para. 48), the ECtHR went as far as saying that the dissolution of the
applicant's marriage served the purpose of defending the general interests. Is it possible
to protect marriage in general terms by imposing the cessation of a right that has already
been enjoyed? In this regard, the decision of the ECtHR seems to descend directly from
that “judicial anxiety” described by Sharpe. 
Another  interesting  aspect  is  the  fact  that  in  evaluating  the  case  of  H.,  the
ECtHR made  an  assumption  about  the  sexual  orientation  of  the  applicant  and  her
partner.  This,  however,  raises  a  question:  is  a  spouse's  change of  gender  enough to
radically transform the nature and form of a marriage from heterosexual to homosexual?
In its reasoning, the ECtHR implicitly evaluated the affective and sexual behaviour of
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the spouses as being inevitably conditioned, if one could argue that, by the “lack” of the
fundamental  prerequisite  for marriage:  sexual  dimorphism. However,  dimorphism in
itself  cannot  guarantee  the  heterosexual  character  of  marriage  or  sexual  intercourse
between  spouses.  As  Butler  (2004,  54)  also  reminds  us,  it  would  be  necessary  to
disentangle gender from sexuality, as the fact of having a gender does not necessarily
entail that one engages in sexual activity. The ECtHR, however, automatically ascribed
to  the  applicant  the  legal  position  of  same-sex  spouse,  placing  her  outside  the
boundaries of the “traditional marriage”.  In its judgement,  therefore,  the ECtHR has
proved to be incapable of thinking beyond the categories of heterosexual/homosexual
marriage,  thus  substantially  downsizing  the  rights  available  to  couples  with  a
transgender spouse.
H. v. Finland (2012) is also useful in providing hints of reflection on the process
of hyper-regulation and erasure indicated by Spade (2009, 289). As a disciplinary and
regulatory technique, this two-fold process creates a situation of vulnerability for the
social and legal subject. From a Foucaultian perspective, as Spade has suggested, it is
not the mere introduction of certain juridical norms that act as a regulating mechanism
of  the  social  order.  Rather,  it  is  the  juxtaposition  of  these  norms  with  other
administrative  practices,  inconsistent  with  the  former,  that  are  more  efficacious  in
pushing individuals to internalise important rules such as the binarism of gender or the
heteronormative character of the institution of marriage. In  H. v. Finland  (2012) the
applicant had to choose between two equally important rights in order to obtain the
social and juridical recognition of her gender identity. Presenting the applicant with an
aut aut places her in a situation of vulnerability with respect to the enjoyment of her
rights, and drastically reduces her choices to two equally problematic alternatives. On
the one hand, invisibility as an intelligible subject before law and society; on the other
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hand,  ceasing to be in a valid marriage with her spouse. These two forms of invisibility
are equally destabilising as they deny a part of her social and juridical subjectivity. H. v.
Finland  (2012), therefore, seems to confirm the conservative character that Sandland
(2003, 192) and Dembour (Shaw and Ardener 2005, 40) ascribed to the ECtHR. It is
possible to say that in the future the ECtHR will be unwilling to modify its attitude and
may, therefore, keep on operating through “strategic positionings” (Sandland 2003, 192)
with respect to issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. 
A last interesting reflection on this case is the one concerning the existence of a
semiotic short circuit that concerns the ECtHR and the concept of the “spouse”. In the
ECtHR's evaluation of the case of H., the spouse can no longer be recognised as such if
the  signified  has  changed  and  does  not  correspond  any more  to  the  signifier.  This
semiotic short circuit gives rise to a paradox that invests the meaning of marriage itself.
Paradoxically, the “traditional marriage” is protected by asking  those that subscribed to
the institution  and contributed to  the accrual  of  its  symbolic  and material  value,  to
divorce because they have placed themselves outside of the boundaries of the institution
to which they have signed up. In this regard, it could be asked, borrowing from Butler's
vocabulary, “what marriages are viable?” What marriages are worth protecting and what
marriages can be rendered invisible and obliterated? The answers to these questions
remain unanswered, but some reflections on how to address this problem can be found
outside  the  purely legal  sphere,  as  the  work  of  the  Commissioner  on  the  rights  of
transgender persons seems to suggest. 
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Defining  the  Rights  of  Transgender  Persons  at  the  Office  of  the
Commissioner
Since the 2000s discussion on the rights of transgender persons has ceased to be
the monopoly of the judicial work of the ECtHR and has become more prominent in
other institutions of the CoE, such as its political bodies (the CM and the PACE) but
also at the office of the Commissioner. In particular, with the advent of Commissioner
Hammarberg in 2005, these human rights issues have received an incredible boost and
several  interesting  developments  have  occurred.  In  2010,  when  the  ethnographic
observation for this research was carried out at his office, a difference was palpable
between the ECtHR's approach and the Commissioner's opinion on human rights issues
concerning  transgender  persons.  On the  one  hand,  the  ECtHR had expressed  many
reservations  on  the  possible  outcomes  of  a  recognition  of  one's  preferred  gender
regardless of biological criteria.  On the other hand, the Commissioner was trying to
completely disentangle the question of the recognition of gender from the established
medico-legal normative narratives. 
The Commissioner, in particular, interpreted his work as requiring an effort to
bridge the gap between the ECtHR and civil society. This endeavour was pursued by
favouring  the  emergence  of  a  constant  dialogue between legal  actors,  human rights
activists, and national authorities. It can be argued that the rights of transgender persons,
together  with  the  rights  of  Roma  people,  were  the  items  at  the  forefront  of  the
Commissioner's  working agenda.  The Commissioner  himself  made clear,  on several
occasions, that the time had come to address some among the “most neglected” human
rights issues. Apart from highlighting the existence of an informal hierarchy between
different  categories  of  rights-holders  within the CoE,  this  statement  illustrates,  once
again, how the CoE participates in the construction of human rights issues according to
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the logic of the “single-issue” strategy, as if there could not be, for instance, a Roma
person who also identifies as “gay”, or “transgender”. This approach, of course, is not
confined  to  the  work  of  the  Commissioner,  as  it  permeates,  broadly,  human  rights
discourses in general. 
The first significant act the Commissioner undertook in the direction of raising
awareness  on  the  discrimination  experienced  by  transgender  persons  was  the
publication, in 2009, of an Issue Paper entitled “Human Rights and Gender Identity”.
For this publication, the team of the Commissioner had sought close collaboration with
various transgender activists across Europe. The aim was that to furnish an account, as
accurate as possible, on the real experiences of discrimination that transgender persons
were facing in Europe. When I arrived in the office, they asked me to read the paper and
asked me what I thought of it. They told me that, although it could have been improved,
they were really happy with the result, since it was one of the first attempts, within the
institution, to bring to the forefront these human rights issues. This effort was even more
significant, given the fact that in the paper the Commissioner was strongly advocating
the de-pathologisation of  transgender  identities.  As the analysis  of the  case law has
indicated,  this  remains  one of  the  most  problematic  issues  for  the  ECtHR.  Seeking
guidance and building relationships of trust with transgender human rights activists was
an innovative and successful move on the part of the Commissioner, who was able to
gain first-hand accounts and expertise on issues that  had been, in  fact,  substantially
overlooked in the various political fora concerning human rights up to that point. 
It was, in particular, the attention to the perspective of the “story telling” that
proved to be a successful element in the work of the Commissioner on the rights of
transgender  persons.  Whenever  narrating  the  struggles  and  problems  faced  by  a
particular group, the status of “outsider” is not always beneficial, as it can be perceived
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by the stakeholders as a non-authentic perspective.  What does a cisgendered person
know about the problems and discrimination encountered by a transgendered person? I
could clearly perceive this preoccupation in the office of the Commissioner. They were
trying  to  “get  the  perspective  right”  and to  have,  as  much as  possible,  an insider's
perspective.  Building  close  collaborations  with  various  actors,  especially  with
associations such as TGEU (Transgender Europe) and GATE (Global Action for Trans
Equality),  as well  as scholars working in the field,  proved to be crucial  in order  to
construct  the  right  narrative.  In  this  regard,  in  particular,  the  fact  that  the
Commissioner's Adviser on LGBTI issues, Mr. Dennis Van der Veur, had relationships
of collaboration with LGBTI activists from almost all of the 47 member states of the
CoE,  was an incredibly helpful  element  in  achieving this  goal.  The purpose of  this
collaboration was to help the Commissioner address the issues that mattered the most to
transgender activists – and supposedly transgender persons more broadly – by using the
correct language. The issue of the language employed was, indeed, crucial. I remember
the preoccupation of the team in trying to ensure that the language was as sensitive and
respectful as possible to the multitude of transgender experiences. As I was doing the
editing of some of the texts of the report, one of my tasks was that of making sure that
the  language  was  consistent  and respectful  of  LGBTI persons.  Far  from talking  of
transsexuals, as the ECtHR is used to doing, the Commissioner adopted a more nuanced
linguistic  vocabulary,  finely  attuned  to  the  vocabulary  that  transgender  activists
themselves would adopt. I would tend to think that because the Commissioner's team
also interacted repeatedly with the activists who defined the issues at stake regarding
“transgender” persons, that interaction would have made it almost impossible for them
to go back to the medicalised vocabulary employed by the ECtHR. In this regard, the
possibility of defining the “subject” of human rights from the stakeholder's perspective
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helped the activists to strategically bring transgender identities to the core of European
human rights discourses in order to give them an unprecedented visibility. 
The  Commissioner's  intention  to  establish  a  structured  and  consistent
collaboration with transgender actors was pivotal, in a sense, in order to get “unspoken”
permission to speak on behalf  of transgender persons and adopt their  perspective. It
could  also  be  perceived  as  a  way to  create  an  alternative  narrative  on  transgender
experiences  within  the  CoE,  whose  human  rights  strategies  are  overwhelmingly
associated  with  the  judgements  issued by the  ECtHR.  In  trying  to  provide  a  more
“human” account of transgender persons, the Commissioner was indeed trying to bridge
a  gap  between  the  judicial  discourse  on  transgender  persons  and  the  reluctance  of
member state to engage on these topics. I attributed this effort, in part, to the intention
of overcoming the stigma surrounding transgender persons still existing within the CoE
itself.  While  this  may  well  have  been  my  impression,  I  felt  that  somehow  the
Commissioner  was  venturing  into  a  domain  which  had  been  overlooked  by  the
institution up to that point. In this regard, his actions went in the direction of raising
awareness  with  member  states'  authorities,  but  also,  it  could  be  argued,  within  the
institution itself.  At the same time,  however,  in  gaining the permission to  speak on
behalf of transgender persons themselves, it could be asked whether the Commissioner
was  speaking  for  all  of  them  or  whether  the  accounts  proposed  by  the  NGOs
contributing to the Commissioner's report only represented the views or experiences of
a portion of the European transgender population.
As for the specific issues raised by the Commissioner, the bulk of his work on
the rights of transgender persons consisted of persuading the member states of changing
national policies negatively affecting these individuals in various instances of daily life.
The emphasis on the de-pathologisation, in particular, was on the one hand aimed at
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fostering  more  respect  and protection  of  transgender  persons,  but  on the  other  was
framed in  a  way that  did not  rule  out  the  right  of  access  to  medical  treatment  for
transgender persons that wished to undergo these procedures. At the same time, the
Commissioner also placed a lot of emphasis on the issue of transphobic hate crime and
hate speech, trying to gather information on this topic and on the data across Europe. He
was  genuinely motivated  by his  awareness  that  the  marginalisation  and violence  to
which  transgender  persons  were  subjected  was  intolerable.  I  remember  several
occasions in which I was told,  by my superior,  that the Commissioner had received
letters from transgender persons that described the discrimination to which they had
been subjected. From the denial to board a plane because of identity documents, to lack
of medical treatment or situations of economic marginalisation, the Commissioner had
access  to  first-hand  accounts  of  what  it  meant  to  be  discriminated  against  as  a
transgender  person  in  Europe.  My  perception  was  that  of  a  profound  intellectual
commitment on the part of the Commissioner to these issues, as if it was crucial for him
to leave the office at the end of his mandate knowing that he had contributed to shifting
the perception of transgender issues both at the level of member states and within the
CoE itself. 
Was the  Commissioner  happy with the  body of  transgender  case  law of  the
ECtHR? As  I  have  suggested,  there  seemed to  be a  strong divergence  between the
position of the Commissioner and the position of the ECtHR. The latter, that has been
crystallised during the last three decades, is of course the product of judicial exercises
aimed at fostering both respect for human rights but also consistency within the system
of the ECHR itself. The Commissioner, on the contrary, as an independent figure, can
adopt more pragmatic positions on various human rights issues that take into account
not just the form that human rights take, but also their practical implications in daily
269
life. In particular, in the case of the Commissioner, the close relationship that developed
with transgender networks of activists and scholars has allowed a process of exchange
of information and expertise aimed at reducing the gap between the theory of human
rights and the real experiences of the subject bearers of those rights. 
The 2011 Report issued by the Commissioner on discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation and gender identity in member states confirmed the Commissioner's
priorities  as  to  respect  of  the  rights  of  transgender  persons.  In  the  report,  the
Commissioner built on the 2009 Issue Paper to systematically address the shortcomings
of the level of protection afforded to transgender persons across Europe, and he did so
in order to generate a debate with national authorities and stakeholders, as well as local
activists in the 47 member states. The report was perceived, by these non-institutional
actors, in particular, as an instrument of leverage and influence to wield on national
authorities which could finally help to “open” their eyes and encourage them to realise
the  conditions  of  structural  marginalisation  and  socio-economic  deprivation  under
which some individuals were living. 
The Commissioner had a broad and all-encompassing perspective on the rights
of  transgender  persons  that  rendered  him particularly  well-regarded  by  transgender
activists themselves. His open approach and willingness to engage with all the issues
presented  by  the  activists  meant  that  he  could  easily  gain  the  trust  of  these  non-
institutional actors. The building of such relationship of trust is, indeed, one of the most
valuable assets developed during his term in office and a fascinating example of how
narratives of human rights can be transformed outside of the legal sphere. One of the
Commissioner's strengths was that he was willing to put at the centre of attention issues
that really mattered for these activists: healthcare assistance for imprisoned transgender
persons or for asylum seekers, problems relating to discrimination in housing, family
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life, and parenting rights. While, in fact, the most debated topic is the recognition of
one's preferred gender, little attention is paid to the multiple difficulties faced in day to
day life  by different  transgender  persons,  who may lack  the  social,  economic,  and
cultural  capital  needed  in  order  to  lessen  the  circumstances  in  which  they  can  be
discriminated  against.  The work of  the  Commissioner,  in  this  regard,  has  definitely
raised the standards  of  attention  on this  topic  in  the  institution,  as  the issue  of  the
protection of the rights of transgender persons has made more of an official entry on the
political agenda of the institution. 
The crucial role of the Commissioner in bringing to the forefront transgender
issues  and daring to  speak of  rights  beyond the gender  binary is  definitely a  brave
attempt. As an independent figure, the Commissioner enjoys, in general, more freedom
in deciding which topics need priority over others. Hence, he has called on states to
allow  gender  transition  regardless  of  the  performing  of  surgery,  to  stop  forced
sterilisation, and to end the practice of “compulsory divorce” for those who are married
and wish to change their gender. All these suggestions made to member states do not
find an echo in the case law of the ECtHR. They are, therefore, an exclusive initiative of
the Commissioner that tries to persuade states by offering them the tangible proof, in his
report, on the reasons why some practices, policies, or laws go against the rights of a
portion of the population. This discrepancy between the positions of the Commissioner
and the judgements of the ECtHR prompts one to ask how it is possible to have, in the
same institution, different positions on the same issue? If the Commissioner and the
ECtHR express different ideas on a topic, what is the official position of the CoE on that
particular matter? Given the overwhelming political importance of the ECtHR, it is easy
to say that it is the judicial perspective that prevails, by virtue, one could presume, of its
authoritativeness and solemnity. 
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Moreover,  differently  from  the  approach  taken  with  sexual  orientation,  in
relation  to  issues  concerning  the  rights  of  transgender  persons,  the  position  of  the
Commissioner seems to stretch beyond the concept of normativity and focuses more on
the respect of the individual's bodily and emotional integrity. It can be argued, therefore,
that if the Commissioner articulated his action within the context of homonormativity
when talking about lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals, he was willing to endorse a
more queer perspective on issues pertaining to gender identity that necessarily pose a
challenge to the gendered organisation of the legal system. This perspective did not rule
out a substantial reproduction of the framework of “transsexual liberal politics” (Roen
2002) with regard to specific issues. Nonetheless, it represented a real breakthrough in
the context of the human rights narratives of the CoE. 
The  acknowledgement  of  the  existence  of  “queer  issues”  on  the  part  of  the
Commissioner  has surely had positive effects,  as it  has enabled a dialogue between
actors at the CoE and national authorities on these issues. One good illustration of the
successful collaboration between the Commissioner and national authorities has been,
for  instance,  the  approval  of  a  Portuguese  law  in  2011  that  included  the
recommendations made by the Commissioner in 2009 with his Issue Paper on Gender
Identity90.  Following  the  efforts  of  activists  and  the  collaboration  with  the
Commissioner, Portugal removed the mandatory requirement of medical procedures in
order  to  have  one's  gender  amended  or  the  requirement  of  compulsory divorce  for
married transgender persons. This achievement shows how strong the power of leverage
of the Commissioner can be if articulated as part of a broader effort for civil society. 
At the same time, however, the importance of gender for the legal and social
domain remains so crucial that,  in order to glimpse a significant change in the way
90 ILGA-Europe,  Gender Identity  Legislation Signed by the President,  04 March 2011,  available at:
http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/guide_europe/country_by_country/portugal/Gender-identity-
legislation-signed-by-the-President, accessed 01 March 2014. 
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gender  influences  one's  ability  to  claim  rights,  more  time  needs  to  pass  and  more
knowledge needs  to  be articulated in  relation to  the dynamics  that  produce and re-
produce hierarchies of bearers of rights in the broad context of Europe and in each
specific national context. Notwithstanding this, the role of institutions, such as that of
the Commissioner, productively engaging in a dialogue with civil society, are likely to
catalyse and speed up this process, as can be argued in relation to the emerging debate
on the rights of intersexual persons which will be the object of the last section of this
chapter. 
Intersexuality and Gender Categories: Ticking the Right Box
One does not do gender for oneself “but always with/for another” (Butler 2004,
1).  The  price  to  pay  when  one  does  not  do  gender  “correctly”  is  often  social
marginalisation and lack of recognition in various spheres of life. Struggles in order to
do gender “correctly” may concern different groups of individuals. Intersexual persons,
in  particular,  face  important  problems  in  the  social,  political,  and  legal  domains.
Intersexuality  is  a  complex  phenomenon  concerning  individuals  born  with
chromosomal, gonadal, and anatomical characteristics that appear in contrast to given
notions of male and female gender. The estimates about the percentage of the population
with  an  intersex91 condition  vary92 significantly (Fausto-Sterling  2000,  51;  Davidian
2011,  4).  Similar  to  the  process  of  medicalisation of  transgender  identities,  medical
evaluation and intervention is a fundamental element in the definition of the concept of
“intersexuality”, which can be historically located in the XIX century in Europe. The
medicalisation  of  intersexual  identities  has  entailed  the  proliferation  of  surgical
91  Fausto-Sterling (2002, 52) lists the different types of intersexual conditions, the most statistically 
common being the Turner Syndrome, the Klinefelter Syndrome, the Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, 
the Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome and the 5 Alpha Reductase Hermaphroditism. 
92 Fausto-Sterling (2000, 51) gives a figure of 1.7% of the population, while Davidian (2011, 4) talks
about different authors providing estimates between 4% and 0.0018% of the population. 
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procedures  aimed  at  “normalising”   new-borns  in  order  to  redress  what  is  usually
defined  as  a  “psycho-social  emergency”  (Chase  1998,  302).  Ambiguous  gender
characteristics are, in fact, deemed to entrain important psycho-social consequences in
the lives of both the parents and the children. For this reason, surgical procedures are
seen  as  the  remedy  for  bringing  coherence  between  aesthetics  and  gender.  Some
authors, however, have pointed out that both in the case of transgender and intersexual
persons,  medical  interventions  are  motivated  and  deeply  shaped  by  dynamics  of
“phallocentrism”  (Sharpe  2001,  621;  Ehrenreich  and  Barr  2005,  121),   positing
masculinity – hence the  phallus – as being superior to femininity.  This approach is
practically translated into surgical intervention on intersexual children primarily aimed
at  enabling  the  subjects  to  live  a  heterosexual  life  and  engage  in  heterosexual
relationships (either being able to “penetrate” or “being penetrated” sexually). 
The issue of intersexuality, however, is far from being confined to the medical
sphere, as there are undeniable legal profiles concerning the rights of the new-born and
children that undergo these procedures. As Kessler (1998, 32) has argued, in fact, the
reason why surgical interventions are performed is  not because genital  ambiguity is
detrimental to the child's life, but because it is deemed to be “threatening to the infant's
culture”. Moreover, the paradox of the medical treatment, and the cultural and social
outcomes  of  genital  surgery on  interesexual  children,  is  that  it  restores  a  fictitious
natural status quo, so that:
intersex bodies that are produced in nature are seen as unnatural, while
reconstructed  bodies  produced  with  human  technology  are  seen  as
“natural”, even when they bear little similarity to “normal” human bodies
(Ehrenreich and Barr, 118).
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The problem with corrective surgical procedures may be, furthermore, that they present
significant health risks for the child (Davidian 2011, 8) in addition to the fact that the
bodily integrity of the child (and future adult) is compromised in order to restore a “true
sex”.  Oftentimes  individuals,  in  growing  up,  experience  a  psychological  discomfort
with  the  gender  assigned  with  the  surgery,  as  well  as  an  irreversible  loss  of  the
possibility to experience sexual pleasure.
From the legal perspective, the issue of the parents' consent (Parlett, Weston-
Scheuber 2004, 376) to surgery seems to be coming to the forefront when talking about
the rights of children. While Bird (in Hermer 2007, 261) goes as far as saying that these
surgical interventions represent a violation of Article 19 of the Convention of the Rights
of  the  Child  (CRC)93,  the  reality  in  facts  is  that  there  are  neither  international  nor
national legal instruments that address this issue, and doctors performing these medical
interventions  act  out  of  their  beliefs  in  relation  to  the  “true  sex”  of  the  new-born
(Fausto-Sterling  2000,  48).  There  is,  therefore,  a  legal  silence  –  an  “unsaid”  –
surrounding  the  lives  of  intersexual  persons  whose  rights  claims  are  difficult  to
articulate in the existing human rights arena. It could be argued that the stronger the
pressure to conform to gender norms, the stronger the erasure of intersexuality that is
carried  out.  Davidian  (2011,  21)  has  highlighted  the  necessity  of  considering  the
usefulness of corrective surgery in conjunction with reflections on the extent to which
intersexual babies are considered to be “human” within a human rights framework: 
(…) provides a way for calling into question what counts as reality and human
life and remaking that reality. Asserting rights through legal means is a way of
93 Article  19  recites  “States  parties  shall  take  all  appropriate  legislative,  administrative,  social  and
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental  violence, injury or
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation”. 
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intervening in  the socio-medical process by which the human is  defined and
articulated, subjecting it to renegotiation and imagining it differently (Davidian
2011, 21). 
It  is,  hence,  precisely  this  lack  of  imagination  about  “what  counts  as  human”  that
currently informs legal theory and practice concerning gender and gender regulation. Is
one human only insofar as the “right” sexual organs have the right shape, size, and
function? Framed in these terms, the question is pressing and requires legal and political
answers.  Beyond the absence from human rights  discourse,  in  fact,  there is  also an
undeniable  political  and  social  obliteration  of  intersexual  and  transgender  persons
altogether.  As  for  intersexual  persons  this  marginality  is  of  a  greater  symbolic
magnitude, given the fact that, to date, an extremely limited number of national courts94
have dealt with issues related to parents'  consent to surgery (Davidian 2011; Larson
2011, 225), thus reducing the public fora in which these important human rights issues
can be raised and debated. 
In  relation  to  these  issues,  there  are  some  developments  in  Europe95 and,
particularly, at the Council of Europe. As of October 2013, the Parliamentary Assembly
of the institution (PACE) has adopted a Resolution (Res. 1952(2013)) on the “Children's
Right to Physical Integrity” which also addresses other issues such as female genital
94 The most famous case, described by Davidian (2011), is that concerning an opinion of the Colombian
Constitutional  Court  in the judgment SU-337/99 which disputed the parents' absolute authority in
consenting to a corrective surgery on an 8-year-old child.  In Europe, the European Commission and
ILGA  Europe  report  two  cases  in  Germany.  (http://www.ilga-
europe.org/media_library/ilga_europe/publications/reports_and_other_publications/ec_trans_intersex_
report_cover  
95 In 2013, the German Parliament also passed a law that allowed the registration of a child as having
“indeterminate” gender at birth, particularly for intersexual children. This law, however, was criticised
by LGBTI activists, who affirmed that the provision was not coupled with an opening up of the rights
that individuals registered as “non-gendered” could enjoy, such as the right to marry or the possibility
of having insurance. See: Viloria, H. (2013) Op-ed: Germany's Third Gender Law Fails on Equality,
The  Advocate,  available  at:  http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2013/11/06/op-ed-germany
%E2%80%99s-third-gender-law-fails-equality. Accessed 28 February 2014. 
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mutilation (FGM)96, circumcision of boys for religious reasons, as well as other medical
treatments performed on children. Although the Resolution is not binding on member
states,  it  signals  the  emergence  of  an  unprecedented  interest  in  the  issue  of
intersexuality. The overarching principle put forward by the PACE, is that of the ”best
interests of the child”. These interests, as have been briefly illustrated, are difficult to
define as far as the issue of intersexuality is  concerned, and tend, sometimes,  to be
confused with broader societal interests in relation to the perpetuation of the gender
binary.  One  passage  of  the  Resolution,  in  particular,  is  particularly  interesting,  in
relation to the PACE's call for member states to:
ensure  that  no-one  is  subjected  to  unnecessary  medical  or  surgical
treatment that is cosmetic rather than vital for health during infancy or
childhood, guarantee bodily integrity, autonomy and self-determination
to persons concerned, and provide families with intersex children with
adequate counselling and support 97.
Surprisingly, in the document the language employed is very close to the language used
by intersexual activists themselves. In the first place the distinction between  cosmetic
and vital surgery allows one to reflect on the climate of “emergency” surrounding the
decisions  on  corrective  surgery  and  the  social  pressure  experienced  by  parents  of
intersexual  children.  The  second  important  aspect  is  the  recognition  of  a  right  to
autonomy  and  self-determination  that  takes  precedence  over  the  necessity  of
96 The issue of FGM in particular had been compared to the treatment of intersexual children as an
example of a different approach to the notion of 'bodily integrity' of children. Chase (1998) Kessler
(1998) and Ehrenreich and Barr (2005), in particular, had maintained that there was hypocrisy in the
West  considering  these  two  issues  that  rendered  FGM  unacceptable  but  allowed  surgeries  on
intersexual babies as legitimate. 
97 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council  of Europe,  Resolution 1952(2013) on  Children's Right to
Physical Integrity, 3 October 2013, § 7.5.3.
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establishing the proper gender as soon as possible. In this regard, the parental authority
with relation to the decision to perform these surgical interventions seems to be put into
question.  Thirdly,  the Resolution also highlights the need for informing and helping
parents more efficaciously. Lack of information or support, in fact, may significantly
hamper the ability of the parents to make sensible decisions in their long-term interests.
It is important to observe, however, that the decision of the PACE of putting together
different issues such as surgery on intersexual new-borns, FGM, and circumcision can
be  quite  problematic  as  these  issues  are  often  invested  with  different  political
connotations on the part of different actors (Chase 1998).
In relation to the issue of intersexuality and the rights of the children concerned,
the action of Commissioner Hammarberg can be said to be sensitive and well-informed.
However, while he wanted to include a discussion of these issues in the report he issued
in 2011, the overwhelming lack of knowledge and discourses on issues of intersexuality
in the European arena of human rights made it very difficult for him and his team to
approach the issue systematically. At the time of the drafting of his 2011 report, there
was an attempt to  gather  information and a  collaboration between the Office of the
Commissioner  and  the  NGOs  “Transgender  Europe”  and  “ILGA-Europe”  was
established.  Notwithstanding  these  efforts,  however,  it  was  not  possible  to  gather
enough information to be included in the final version of the report. In the office there
was a strong feeling of impotence in relation to what could be done to raise the issue. In
contrast with the high degree of awareness on the importance of the issue, there was
little margin of action and few empirical instruments that could be used in order to fill
this gap in knowledge. Although the 2013 PACE Resolution represents an important
improvement in the direction of recognising the rights of intersexual persons, changes
will not be effective if they are not coupled with an effort to re-think the role of gender
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in European societies, as a factor that limits personal expression in various fields of life
and often  represents  an  obstacle  to  the  fulfilment  of  one's  personality and personal
integrity. 
Conclusion
This  chapter  has sought  to consider  the complicated issue of  gender  identity
from a socio-legal perspective. In trying to encompass as many facets as possible of the
complex body of human rights claims of transgender and intersexual persons, it  has
proposed an analysis that departs from the traditional legal overview of the case law of
the ECtHR, adopting instead a “cluster” approach by which the most critical  – and
partially unresolved – problems currently existing in this case law are broken down in
order to highlight the sociological value of the debates happening in Strasbourg. Far
from being an exhaustive analysis from the point of view of the “evolution” of the body
of rights, the chapter has sought to provide hints for reflection in relation to the ultimate
question of how the concrete articulation of “humanness” requires a simplification of
the real world and a circumscription of the entitlements of specific segments of the
population  in  order  to  respond  to  dynamics  of  categorisation  and  regulation  of
individuals. Moreover, as will be shown in the concluding chapter, what happens in
Strasbourg cannot be seen as being merely the judicial  exercise of a ghostly supra-
national human rights Court such as the ECtHR. On the contrary, it plays a crucial role
in the definition of tangible models of citizenship that work both at the domestic and at
the  European  level,  therefore  translating  that  process  of  “ascription  of  humanness'”
from a socio-legal to a socio-political domain. 
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Chapter  Nine  -  The  Multisexual  Citizen:  Challenging  the  Existing
Framework of Human Rights Protection in Europe
The analysis carried out for this research, on the case law of the ECtHR and the
work of the Commissioner for Human Rights regarding issues of sexual orientation and
gender  identity,  has  shown the  two sides  of  the  protection  of  human  rights  on  the
European  continent.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  a  judicial  body,  the  ECtHR,  which
predominantly promotes a rigid understanding of LGBTI identities as being exclusively
shaped by the rights claims advanced. On the other hand, there is an independent body,
the Commissioner, whose work engages, not without limitations, but sociological data
and knowledge about LGBTI persons throughout the continent in order to encompass
the multiple facets of human rights violations that may not be perceived in purely legal
terms. The juxtaposition of the work of the Court and that of the Commissioner has
made it possible to reflect on the two-fold dynamics at play. Firstly, LGBTI identities
are normalised and the individuals are assimilated into the social fabric of the different
European nation-states; and secondly, the recognition of these presumably new actors of
human rights leads to the emergence of new lines of exclusion for those who cannot be
subsumed under the current paradigms of human rights, because of their challenge to
normative models of kinship, gender norms, or societal institutions more broadly. 
A further layer of complexity in this process of recognition of human rights is
represented  by the  ambiguous relationship  of  LGBTI persons  with  the  international
legal,  political  and social  arena.  While  nation-states  remain  the  main  enforcers  and
guarantors of human rights (Bhabha 1999, 12), at the same time the idea itself of human
rights,  in  its  universal  aspiration,  transcends these  national  borders.  In  the  previous
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chapters there has been an acknowledgment of the inconsistency between a global – or
preferably Western – abstract discourse on LGBTI rights, and the practical articulation
of these claims at both the level of the ECtHR and the office of the Commissioner for
Human Rights  of  the Council  of  Europe.  The work carried out  has  highlighted the
existence of a tension between the specific location of the human rights subject in a
spatial,  legal,  cultural,  social  and  political  context,  and  the  broader  –  and  often
unacknowledged – problematic narratives of universalisation of the “human being” as
the de-materialised, trans-historical object of legal and sociological speculation. 
It would be reductive, however, to narrow down the scope of this research to a
descriptive analysis of the role of these different actors of the Council of Europe in the
construction  and  promotion  of  specific  liberal,  rights-centred,  LGBTI  identities  and
their circulation across the European continent. Rather, it is essential to point out the
necessity  to  connect  their  work  to  the  emergence  of  models  of  European  sexual
citizenship,  whereby  the  concept  of  “Europe”  is  not  limited  to  the  context  of  the
European Union, but has a broader reach; that is to say the one represented by the 47
member states of the Council of Europe. Looking beyond the borders of the European
Union is useful insofar as it allows one to understand the extent to which human rights
claims relating to sexual orientation and gender identity fall within the process of the
“globalisation  of  human  rights”  described  by  Stychin  (2004,  951),  through  which
human rights standards become a sort of civilisational benchmark that is used to assess
nation-states' progress. Therefore, by focusing on the emergence of a “European sexual
citizenship” it  is  possible to describe the process by which,  at  the continental  level,
narratives about what counts and who does not count as an “LGBTI citizen” can  be
interpreted both as giving rise to a neoliberal, standardised model of citizenship and as
allowing  the  emergence  of  more  critical  forms  of  citizenship  in  which  multiple
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allegiances, spatial locations and forms of identifications are at play.
While discussions of  good and  bad queer citizenship have ignited the debate
both  in  the  United  States  (Smith  1994;  Warner  2000;  Phelan  2001;  Duggan,  2003;
Franke 2006) and in Europe (Richardson 2000; Bell and Binnie 2004; Stychin 2004),
the  focus  on  citizenship  could  appear  to  some  to  be  anachronistic,  as  individuals'
allegiances are increasingly shifting and are less and less attached to the nation-state
(Soysal 1994; Turner and Isin 2002; Balibar 2004; Stychin 2004). Although patterns of
globalisation and the emergence of the international human rights regime  seem to have
facilitated – and somehow catalysed – the erosion of states' sovereignty (Bhabha 1999,
11; Sassen 2002, 288), human rights nonetheless remain enforced at the national level
and work as the “key opening up [of] the political realm of full citizenship” (Stychin
2000,  968).  This  element  is  crucial  in  the  articulation  of  social,  political  and  legal
subjectivity, as it allows inclusion or exclusion from the polity or from other national
communities. As Bhabha (1999, 13) has observed, in fact: 
given  the  escalation  in  migration,  transnational  relationships,  dual
affiliations and regional associations, the relationship between the nation-
state and citizen's rights is as much a question about who is not included
within the notion of citizenship, as it is about the 'hallmarks' or attributes
of citizenship itself (Bhabha 1999, 13). 
The existence of multiple trajectories, in individuals' lives, which cross-cut the mere
possession of a passport, hence represents both a factor related to the deconstruction of
citizenship and also an instrument that strengthens the importance of it as an access gate
to socio-political and economic privilege. 
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Moreover,  as has already been briefly hinted at,  the emergence of alternative
modalities of citizenship is partially informed by the existence of an informal geography
of states that are compliant with human rights principles and states that are not. The fact
that supranational institutions such as the EU and the CoE foster an appealing idea of
“Europeanness” is far from being a harmless operation. On the contrary, it presents huge
political and social implications. One practical illustration of this tendency could be, for
instance,  the  multiplication  of  the  so-called  “Rainbow  Maps”  drawn  by  LGBTI
associations such as ILGA or by governmental organisations such as the EU and the
CoE, which show the progress achieved in different fields of human rights protection
(e.g. maps showing countries that allow same-sex couples to marry, adopt and so forth).
Although these maps obviously respond to the necessity of monitoring and providing a
continental  overview  on  the  degree  of  protection  of  LGBTI  persons  in  different
countries, they are also problematic. Apart from offering a simplified and dichotomic
division between virtuous and non-virtuous states, they also narrow down the concept of
“human rights” to a set of measurable criteria or policies whose implementation is taken
as  automatically  entailing  an  immediate  improvement  in  the  life  of  the  individuals
concerned. In this regard, a mechanistic understanding of human rights decoupled from
a  critical  appraisal  of  the  political  and  social  conditions  favouring  the  emergence,
implementation  and  circulation  of  specific  sets  of  rights  and  identities  fails  to
acknowledge the constructed character of human rights as a presumably coherent and
well-bounded universal body of principles. 
As a result of this simplified process of monitoring human rights compliance, the
predominant focus of commentators, on piecemeal legislation, policy-oriented strategies
for  the  protection  of  human  rights,  or  single  judgements  by  either  national  or
international courts (such as the ECtHR), overshadows the complex normalising and
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disciplinary role of the law – and of international human rights institutions such as the
CoE – in defining LGBTI persons as a homogeneous group of individuals in need of
protection.  This does not  mean that policies  or legal  provisions aimed at  improving
people's lives are redundant or trivial. Rather, it suggests that the focus on realising a
framework  of  formal  equality  for  LGBTI  persons,  unaccompanied  by  a  critical
discussion of the very criteria employed to define human rights holders – and citizens as
a consequence – represents only a partial outlook on patterns of injustice, inequality and
marginalisation. 
In this regard, this final chapter is conceived as a space in which to take further
the  findings  of  the  substantive  analysis  and  establish  a  connection  between  the
protection of the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe and the possibility of thinking
about  citizenship  in  a  way that  radically  transcends  the  national  dimension  of  this
institution. Moreover, this discussion also aims to challenge the current paradigms of
sexual  and gendered  citizenship  as  rigidly framed socio-political  instruments  whose
usefulness  is  mostly  limited  to  the  acquisition  of  certain  gains,  privileges  and
entitlements, rather than being a way to access the political arena as fully participating
members of a polity in the Arendtian sense. This necessity for “action” is understood as
being in continuity with the claim advanced by Stychin (2000) and Duggan (2003), who
have highlighted  how,  paradoxically,  the  concession  of  some human  rights  to  LGB
persons  –  in  particular  the  possibility  of  getting  married  –  has  led  directly  to  a
depoliticisation98 of the gay movement.  
In  order  to  discuss  a  “multisexual”  paradigm  of  citizenship  that  transcends
national borders and is informed by a dynamic appropriation of labels, identities and
98 Stychin (2000, 965) describes the problem of the depoliticisation of the gay movement in a poignant
way: “it becomes far too tempting for the 'citizen gay' to consume human rights and then withdraw
from any kind of progressive politics, especially when those who have bestowed the rights are also
pursuing  policies  that  are  eviscerating  the  human  rights  of  others  on  issues  from  migration  to
counterterrorism”. 
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identifications, citizenship will be posited as a performative and transformative practice,
rather than as a static endowment of some individuals within nation-states. Europe is an
extremely interesting setting in which to conduct such research, precisely because of the
relatively  high  level  of  political  integration  –unparalleled  elsewhere  –and  the
simultaneous existence of a myriad of multiple lines of allegiances99 and identities that
destabilise both the concept of the nation-state and the concept of Europe itself. This
multidimensional,  layered,  and ever-changing model  of  European citizenship – with
obvious problematic political contours – is understood here as a challenge to the current
framework  of  sexual  and  gendered  citizenship,  which  is  narrowly  tailored  around
specific rights claims that frame the individual as a “passive” rather than an “active”
agent.
Citizenship as a Performative and Transformative Act: Beyond Static
Conceptions of Socio-legal Subjectivities
Understood as a practice (Oldfield 1990, 79), citizenship becomes a precarious
endeavour. The line between being a good or bad citizen, in fact, may prove to be very
thin when actions, behaviours or even identities are under scrutiny, and individuals may
be required to demonstrate their adherence to the functioning principles of the political
community to which they belong or which they aspire to join. As Patton (1993, 148) has
suggested: “competing rhetorics of identity interpellate individuals to moral positions
that carry with them the requirements for action. Identity is an issue of deontology, not
ontology;  it  is  a  matter  of  duties  and ethics,  not  of  being”.  This  close  relationship
99 Sassen (2002, 279) claims that it is precisely the existence of multiple allegiances of individuals that
“parallel the devaluation of nation-state-based sovereignty”. 
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between citizenship and the possibility of action, implies that, as far as LGBTI persons
are concerned, it is possible to draw a line between a  good queer citizen (tax payer,
married, child-rearing, patriot, productive) and a bad queer citizen (polyamorous, kinky,
HIV-positive,  with  an  ambiguous  gender  presentation,  or  at  the  margins  of  societal
institutions). The dyad citizenship-action also appears relevant to the situation of those
individuals who cannot participate in citizenship (economic migrants, asylum seekers,
“persecuted queers”) and whose presence is perceived as both a symbolic threat to the
demo-economic stability of the nation, as well as a powerful interrogation of the limits
and function of citizenship itself  in a  globalised world.  In  directly interrogating the
extent to which citizenship can be a practice, rather than a nominal entitlement, the bad
queer citizens and the  queer non-citizens directly challenge conceptions of citizenship
that rest on static membership of a polity, and suggest a configuration of citizenship as
simultaneously transformative and performative.
The idea of a “performative model of citizenship” can clearly be traced back to
Butler's (1990, XV) concept of the “performativity” of gender, insofar as it implies “(...)
not  a  singular  act,  but  a  repetition  and  a  ritual,  which  achieves  its  effects  through
naturalisation in the context of a body, understood, in part,  as a culturally sustained
temporal  duration”.  The  existence  of  a  specific  temporality  of  “being  a  citizen”
contributes  to  rendering  citizenship  performative.  In  fact,  it  is  always  possible,  by
means of one's actions, behaviours or self-ascribed identities, to cross the line between
good/bad  citizenship  or  to  fall  short  of  qualifying  as  a  citizen  in  the  first  place.
Furthermore, while the attributes of citizenship are enunciated in the abstract, it is the
enactment of actions that concretely shapes citizenship. This continuous enactment and
creation of citizenship happens thanks to the performance of those small daily acts that
confirm one's right to belong to the national community.
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The idea of creating citizenship by endlessly performing it may be considered to
sit well with the existence of an ideal of progress in the recognition of the rights claims
of LGBTI persons in juridical and political fora. In fact, the trajectory of achievements
in  relation  to  the  human  rights  of  LGBTI  persons  in  the  Western  context,  from
Stonewall onwards, can be seen as slow progress by which former outlaws enact a sort
of ascension to the acceptable ranks of citizenship, thanks to the acquisition of specific
sets of rights (marriage, the right to non-discrimination, adoption, gender confirmation
surgery,  and  so  forth)  and  an  attached  status  of  respectability  within  the  political
community. 
An  illustration  of  the  trajectory  of  progress  regarding  the  human  rights  of
LGBTI persons is the already mentioned “law of small change” (Waaldijk 2003), which
posited  a  smooth  transition  from  the  decriminalisation  of  sexual  activity  to  the
recognition of same-sex marriages and adoption rights, by the LGB citizen who could
climb up the ladder of citizenship and try to reach the optimum of social recognition as
a married, child-rearing individual. As for transgender and intersexual persons, instead,
the idea of a (irreversible) trajectory of transition from one gender to the other, could
also  be  seen  as  entailing  a  sort  of  “improvement”,  as  if  the  fact  of  inhabiting  an
ambiguous gendered space could be associated with a bad practice of citizenship. 
The idea of “progress” can also be applied to those LGBTI “non-citizens” who
seek some form of limited recognition of their human rights entitlements on foreign
soil. The case of LGBTI asylum seekers, in this regard, is particularly telling, as the
kind of extensive questioning they have to undergo in order to be considered credible
can be seen as an attempt to assimilate them, albeit in a very limited way, to the good
citizenry with which they will be allowed to live in the host state. The experiences of
these “outsiders” who have to demonstrate in different ways that they are worthy to
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receive citizenship, point to the fact that citizenship should be articulated as something
more than simply the prize for “good citizens”. Because individuals perform acts of
citizenship  on  a  daily  basis,  by  engaging  in  the  community  in  which  they  live,
contributing to the economic prosperity of a specific country through their work, or
sharing  cultural  affiliations  with  a  country  of  their  choice,  citizenship  should  be
understood more as a bottom-up process than as a top-down concession. 
Moreover, thinking about citizenship as a performative practice breaks with the
idea  of  citizenship  as  a  static  mark  in  a  person's  life.  It  entails  both  an  idea  of
precariousness and the possibility of continuous transformation and multiple crossing,
from one gender  to  another  at  different  points  of  one's  life,  or  from one gendered
erotico-sentimental  relationship  to  another,  closely tied  to  strategic  repositionings  in
terms of race,  ethnicity,  class or ability/disability status and age.  Citizenship can be
done differently at different stages of one's life, due to the various stages of life and
possible changes in circumstances (economic, personal, political or social) in one's life.
In order to preserve her/his membership of the community, therefore, the citizen adjusts
her/his practices to the changing circumstances, in order to make sure that she/he does
not cross the line of “bad citizenship”. 
Rather  than  merely  being  symbolised  by  obtaining  a  passport,  the  fact  of
“having” citizenship means having an agentic role, one by which duties and rights –
human rights – can be not only exercised but also questioned and rephrased, as in the
model of “radical democratic citizenship” proposed by Mouffe100 (1992). Mouffe,  in
particular,  suggested  that  identities,  which  are  themselves  the  product  of  multiple
allegiances,  are  active  sites  of  political  struggle,  and  citizenship  is  far  from being
conceived of as a passive status characterised by the acquisition of some entitlements.
100 Chantal Mouffe (1992, 235) gives a definition of citizenship as: “(...) an articulating principle that
affects the different subject positions of the social agent (…) while allowing for a plurality of specific
allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty”. 
288
Clearly,  this  way  of  understanding  citizenship  is  in  opposition  to  neo(liberal)  and
widespread  conceptions  of  citizenship,  which  posit  the  individual  as  entirely  self-
sufficient and, to some extent, also atomised and highly problematic for sociological
analysis, as Dahlgren (2006, 268-269) has suggested: 
the individual is seen implicitly as emerging as a fully-formed citizen,
devoid of social  bonds, out of some sociocultural  black box, ready to
play his or her role in democracy. Citizenship becomes an activity where
'no experience is necessary'; there is a sense in which the citizen is just
'acting naturally'  in pursuing their  own interests  (Dahlgren 2006, 268-
269).
Dahlgren's description of neoliberal citizenship is fascinating and compelling, insofar as
it calls into question the issue of the “naturalness” of citizenship, as if one, by default,
possesses an identity and gives shape to specific forms of civic behaviour that result in a
good  performance  as  a  citizen.  This  discourse,  of  an  “inborn”  way  of  inhabiting
citizenship, can be said to be attuned to the idea of the universality of human rights
principles. Both assumptions start,  in fact, from the idea that there is an identifiable
“core”  that  describes  both  the  citizen  and the  human  rights  holder.  Discarding  this
deterministic  view  about  a  prototype  of  the  citizen/rights  holder  allows  for  a  de-
essentialised and temporally multidirectional, as opposed to temporally linear, approach
to  LGBTI  identities  and  the  process  of  the  negotiation  of  legitimate  socio-legal
positions. The rights-holder, as well as the citizen, do not exist in perfect autonomy and
isolation,  but construct their  multiple identities in connection with others. From this
relational aspect of identity-building descends the necessity of adapting human rights to
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the intricate trajectories of individuals' personal lives and stories, even if this signifies
adding a further layer of complexity to the existing architecture of human rights and to
the rules for obtaining citizenship.  
Moreover,  performing one's citizenship may also entail a continuous crossing
between lines of good and bad citizenship not only to call into question the parameters
by  which  good and  bad citizens  are  assessed,  but  also  to  challenge  the
instrumentalisation  of  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity  as  new  civilisational
yardsticks employed to evaluate, across borders, different nation-states and their human
rights agendas. This reconfiguration of citizenship in radical terms, however, cannot be
confined solely to  models  of  citizenship based on nationality,  as the increasing and
relentless globalisation of LGBTI identities requires the adoption of a broader socio-
political and geographical perspective that sheds light on the creation of trans-national
solidarities and forms of identification under the structure of an emerging “European
sexual citizenship”. 
European  Sexual  Citizenship:  a  Concept  in  Continuous
Transformation
In their  discussions about an emerging “European Citizenship” most scholars
have used the European Union as a reference (Helfer 1991, Tassin 1992, Bhabha 1999,
Painter 2002, Stychin 2000, 2001 and 2004, Todorov 2010). The European Union is
seen as the privileged locus for the analysis of new forms of citizenship. It is detached
from  the  nation-state  by  virtue  of  its  unique  attempt  to  constitute  a  trans-national
political  community based on shared (European)  values.  As Stychin has highlighted
(2004, 963) “the EU becomes the civilised version of nationhood, while simultaneously
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transcending the idea of nationhood”. If on the one hand the EU acquires its legitimacy
from its member states, on the other hand it sets the ambitious goal of producing a
synthesis of the European Geist. For this research, however, the framework of the EU
has been deemed to be, relatively, too narrow. 
From a political perspective, it could be argued that the Council of Europe as an
analytical framework is less significant than the EU, because of its lack of instruments
in fostering a political community (Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes 2005) and that the EU
should  be  preferred  when  discussing  the  concept  of  “European  citizenship”.
Nonetheless, it could also be argued that the idea of “Europe” and “Europeanness” can
be better grasped by understanding them as an aspiration, rather than an acquired fact or
a mere by-product of the freedom of movement enjoyed by citizens of the European
Union. Moreover, the fact that the EU, in contrast to the CoE, was not founded for the
protection of human rights, makes it more of an economic organisation that struggles to
develop a unified political identity, than a transnational community that finds profound
agreement  on  specific  sociocultural  and  political  values.  While  the  creation  of  a
“political Europe” remains the EU's ultimate goal, strong resistance still exists on the
part  of the various member states. On the contrary,  because of its  specific focus on
human rights, the CoE shows interesting dynamics in terms of the attempt to create a
“European moral community”. Overwhelmed by the necessity of integrating the various
member states’ economies, especially in times of economic crisis, the EU sometimes
seems not to mobilise enough resources to discuss how to build a common political
identity. Furthermore, broadening the spectrum of analysis beyond the borders of the
European Union allows one not only to perceive more neatly the divide between moral
and immoral European states in relation to issues pertaining to gender and sexuality, but
also to critically discuss the concept of “Europe” as polysemic and subject to continuous
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change. 
Currently, the image of Europe as the continent with the most efficient system of
human rights protection in the world, thanks to the role of the ECtHR, is also, indirectly,
boosted by the recognition of LGBTI persons as legitimate human rights actors. Human
rights  can  be  considered  to  be,  on  the  one  hand,  a  fundamental  element  in  the
construction of a peculiar European identity and, on the other hand, a crucial factor in
the emergence of  a  model  of  sexual  citizenship  (Grundy 2005,  393).  This  two-fold
process shows how human rights directly inform European exceptionalism with regard
to both human rights in general and matters concerning sex, sexuality, and gender more
specifically. The result of this intersection between these two strands of exceptionalism
is the emergence of a “European Sexual Citizenship”, characterised by the centrality of
the recognition of human rights for LGBTI persons as an access gate to full membership
of these individuals in the political community of “Europe”. 
Retrospectively, it can be argued that a certain idea of “Europe” is omnipresent
in  the  analysis  carried  out  for  this  research.  Both in  the  various  judgements  of  the
ECtHR and in the work of the Commissioner, there is a precise idea of “Europe” in the
background that directly or indirectly informs the evaluations expressed by these actors
in relation to human rights violations in different member states. As has been shown in
relation  to  the  case  law of  the  ECtHR on  freedom of  expression  and  freedom of
assembly and association of LGBTI persons, European democracies are encouraged to
function in a “healthy manner” and to display signs of tolerance and broadmindedness.
These requirements of open-mindedness and tolerance are also found in the  case law
concerning  the  rights  of  transgender  persons  in  relation  to  the  recognition  of  their
preferred  gender,  where  the  general  public  is  encouraged  to  adopt  a  more  tolerant
attitude towards those who “transgress” the boundaries of sex and gender. 
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In this regard, therefore, “Europe” ceases to describe a geo-political area and
becomes a prescriptive and normative idea, almost an aspiration. Hence, in order to
truly become “European”, some countries have to embark on a process that radically
transforms their legal, social and political structures101. This process, however, not only
invests the national institutions, it also informs LGBTI persons' attitudes as well, insofar
as it implicitly requires them to become more “European” by adopting specific sexual
and gendered identities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersexual. The
aspiration to become “European”, therefore, is part of a broader and overarching process
of construction of European citizenship, by which both states, and individuals in these
states, are promised entrance into the European arena, provided that they fulfil certain
criteria in terms of respect for human rights. Human rights, therefore, become the core
of a European identity, insofar as they play the role of a “fault line on which Europe's
internal and external borders are being inscribed” (Bhabha 1999, 21). If one considers
the rights of LGBTI persons as the latecomers into this European panorama of human
rights,  it  is  easy to  see how they can  be effectively mobilised,  together  with  other
strands of human rights discourses, in order to foster an even more rigorous concept of
“Europeanness”. 
The  concept  of  “European  sexual  citizenship”  obviously  retains  an  Anglo-
American matrix, insofar as it is the direct product of post-Stonewall discourses on the
need  to  acknowledge  and  protect  the  human  rights  of  LGBTI  persons.  This
universalising discourse,  however,  has been met with a variety of reactions,  ranging
from cautious endorsements to outright backlashes against these presumably externally
imposed human rights agendas. In this regard, Stychin (2004, 951) has maintained that
101 It  should not be forgotten that membership in the Council of Europe is a formal pre-requisite for
accession  into  the  European  Union  and  that  respect  of  human rights  is  one  of  the  pillars  of  the
Copenhagen Criteria used to assess eligibility of candidate member states in order to join the EU
(Börzel and Risse, 2004).
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the  most  effective  results  in  terms  of  the  recognition  of  human  rights  have  been
achieved in  cases  in  which  activists  have  been able  to  debate  these  issues  in  local
politics, rather than by adopting a top-down approach that has taken for granted the
universality of human rights. He illustrates this point by referring to examples from
countries like Romania or Zimbabwe, in which activists have tried to connect issues
relating to  sexual  orientation and gender  identity to  a national  common past.  These
strategies, for Stychin (2004, 954), respond to a need to counter the movement of the
globalisation of sexual identities that is built upon a hegemonic Western matrix. The
analysis  carried  out  for  this  project  has  tried  to  highlight  the  extent  to  which  the
protection of the human rights of LGBTI persons in Europe presents several limitations,
insofar as it is heavily indebted to civilisational discourses that favour the establishment
of a neoliberal model of European citizenship across the continent, by positing respect
for the rights of the individual as a self-sufficient unit, cut off from the broader social
context in which the persons are embedded. 
Thus, promoting the recognition of the rights of LGBTI persons across Europe
without engaging in political dialogues that go beyond the “us versus them” rhetoric is,
at best, a civilisational endeavour, devoid of traits that favour the opening-up of a debate
on  what  “European  citizenship”  should  be  in  practice  for  individuals  across  the
continent. In this regard, therefore, it is necessary to unpack the concept of “European
sexual citizenship” and re-discuss some of the entitlements that this concept entails,
such as access to marriage and adoption, and irreversible transition from one gender to
the other,  which serves a very narrow (neo)liberal agenda and does little to address
structural  problems,  such  as  intersecting  forms  of  inequality  and  discrimination
connected to the attribution to individuals of various categories of gender, race, class
and economic status, and ability or disability which, consequently, give rise to endemic
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forms of socio-economic and socio-political vulnerability. It is precisely the idea of a
“one-size-fits-all”  model  of  the  recognition  of  human  rights  that  is  applied  blindly
across the European continent that runs counter to the idea of Europe itself as an ideal
forge in which concrete and dynamic forms of transnational solidarity are put into place
against the atomising tendencies of economic and financial globalisation. 
Current rights-based discourses on the equality of all individuals often have the
limitation of approaching different  strands  of inequalities  as if  they were watertight
compartments in individuals' lives and as if one could embark on a description of a neat
geography of differences. Such a limitation can also be found in relation to emerging
discourses on the rights of LGBTI persons. For instance, even if marriage were open to
all same-sex couples in the 47 member states of the CoE, it would prove beneficial to
those couples who already have some economic and cultural capital to benefit  from
through access to such an institution, while their inclusion implicitly traces new lines of
exclusion  for  different  portions  of  the  population.  Similarly,  the  harmonisation  of
legislation  on  gender  recognition  across  the  different  states  would  not  reduce  the
existence of transphobia, sexism or violence. Rather, it would scratch the surface of the
problem without  addressing  the  root  causes  of  discrimination  and  hostility  towards
those who seem not to comply with gender norms.
It is precisely for this reason, therefore, that the fact of adopting a conception of
“Europe”  as  an  entity  that  continuously  questions  its  own  borders,  is  an  excellent
occasion to also question the very content that Europe as a socio-political entity should
have, trying to break away from the creation of a self-sufficient, perfectly liberal and
productive European citizen. Hence, it is the combination of the right to freely express
one's  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity,  together  with  the  possibility  of  freely
expressing  other  aspects  of  one's  life  (not  necessarily  crystallised  in  terms  of
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“identities”)  and  other  sets  of  socio-economic  rights,  which  has  the  potential  to
engender  a  dialogue  on the  role  and reach  of  a  European citizenship  that  is  really
considered valuable and meaningful by individuals (Stychin 2004, 292). 
Multisexual Citizenship as a Challenge for the Protection of Human
Rights in Europe 
The analysis of the  case law of the ECtHR and the work of the Commissioner
regarding issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity has suggested that it is
not  enough  for  LGBTI  persons  in  Europe  to  become  the  passive  recipients  or
beneficiaries of human rights entitlements embedded in a neoliberal socio-economic
framework. This principle of the passive reception of rights lessens the possibilities of
debating the content and reach of human rights provisions as being connected to other
spheres  of  individuals'  lives.  Hence,  the  need  to  consider  a  multisexual  model  of
citizenship stems from the necessity to recognise the embodied and multidirectional
trajectories of the life of individuals. This implies that crafting or “performing” one's
citizenship as an LGBTI person means, in the first place, contributing to reshaping and
building  Europe  as  a  community  with  variable  boundaries  and  numerous  –  and
potentially  shifting  –  combinations  of  sexual  and  gendered  identities.  The  role  of
LGBTI persons is particularly important in this regard, because it touches on sex and
gender, upon which social control, power and sovereignty are based, and can also be
crucial in the process of admitting that the mere recognition of rights does not entail
automatic entrance into the domain of citizenship (Phelan 2001, 147). Upgrading one's
citizenship status from “second-class” to “first-class” can be seen as merely entailing
access to a set of privileges, rather than the possibility of shaping one's citizenship by
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truly recognising the equality of LGBTI persons. 
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars from various fields, (Yuval-
Davis 1999, Painter 2002, Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003, Grundy and Smith 2005) have
engaged in the definition of models that break with the traditional mono-dimensional
conception  of  citizenship,  in  order  to  recognise  the  various,  sometimes  conflicting,
factors that account for the creation of the “citizen”. In most cases, the new models that
have been proposed start from the recognition of different geographical, political and
sociological layers that participate in the emergence of the modern citizen and, in some
cases, they also touch on issues of sex, sexuality and gender (Grundy and Smith 2002).
The concept of “Europe” plays a fundamental role here, as it is referred to by various
scholars in order to demonstrate how current accounts of citizenship are increasingly
detached from the nation-state and develop according to transnational trajectories. 
Through  an  acknowledgement  of  the  process  of  the  “globalisation  of  same-
sexualities as identities” described by Stychin (2004, 951), it is possible to explore the
intersection between new conceptions of European citizenship and new conceptions of
sexual citizenship that are multi-layered. In their study on multiscalar citizenship and
LGBT politics in Canada, Grundy and Smith (2002, 390), for instance, have pointed out
how  LGBT  activists  tend  to  perform  citizenship  differently  at  different  local  and
national scales102 and at the same time they question the horizon of the nation-state as
the sole arena in which to talk about citizenship in the first  place.  In their  account,
citizenship is understood to be adaptive to circumstances and constantly in flux, since it
can be attuned to different contingent exigencies, particularly in relation to the notion of
space and the crossing of borders. 
The idea of “scale” is particularly relevant in the context of this research and in
102 The authors define the concept of “scale” as socially constructed through state processes, rather than
being a geographical given (Grundy and Smith 2002, 391). 
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the formulation of a “multisexual” conception of citizenship, because it points to the
fact  that  individuals  may  perform  their  gendered  or  sexual  citizenship  differently,
sometimes even inconsistently, in different spaces or at different times. For instance,
concepts such as that of “coming out” or “passing” or the concept of what constitutes
“private life”, which have been addressed in the previous substantive chapters of the
analysis, necessitate an interrogation of the interrelationship between space, time and
citizenship, insofar as they involve decisions that individuals make in their daily lives in
relation to actions that are socially and politically relevant to themselves and others,
such as endorsing an identity that may be associated with a specific set of rights claims
or  that  can  be  used  to  fulfil  a  certain  social  role  (parent/spouse).  Furthermore,
phenomena  such  as  “coming  out”  or  “passing”  strategies,  or  shifting  notions  of
“privacy”, may also be adopted selectively, depending on the usefulness of concealing
or revealing one's sexual orientation or gender identity in the given circumstance. 
One interesting illustration of the possibility of enacting sexual and gendered
citizenship  performatively  and  at  various  “scales”  is  represented  by  the  issue  of
disclosing one's gender identity. For individuals who identify as transgender or whose
gender differs from the one assigned at birth, the disclosure of gender identity may not
be relevant at all “scales”. In the context of healthcare provision, disclosing one's status
as  transgender  could  be  helpful  in  obtaining  reimbursement  for  specific  medical
expenses. In relation to one's marital or parental status, instead, one's gender identity
should not become determinant in the allocation of specific rights to each and every
person. Therefore, an individual may strategically make use of the identitarian label of
“transgender”  to  obtain  a  legitimate  benefit,  while  adopting  more  open-ended  self-
descriptions in other spheres of life (e.g. when defining personal relationships, when
undertaking parenting duties and so forth). Similarly, when considering the claims of
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LGBTI asylum seekers,  attention should be paid to  the fact that individuals are  not
always open about their sexuality across time and space, so it is not possible to ask someone
to “prove” her/his gayness in order to rule out possible frauds. Individuals’ experiences
of sexuality may not entail full disclosure, or the existence of “proof” of one's sexual or
romantic engagement. In situations of danger, individuals may dissimulate or hide their
sexual orientation and/or gender identity, negotiating at different “scales” or levels their
public  identity  and  their  membership  of  specific  political  and  social  communities.
Recognising the complexity and, sometimes, the incongruity of individuals’ experiences
in the exercise of their citizenship is, therefore, crucial, in order to ground human rights
in something other than the mere attribution of one-size-fits-all labels that open up the
possibility of receiving specific entitlements. 
If one wants to elaborate in more detail on the concept of “scale”, citizenship
could  be  conceived  of  as  being  “multisexual”  whenever  the  individual  has  the
possibility of enacting different combinations of gender and sexuality depending on the
circumstance and the relevance that these aspects have for the actions performed. Far
from being merely a form of promotion of one's self-interests, the fact of being able to
adjust one's identity to the specific circumstance, can be linked to the possibility of
participating in the fate of a community, rather than finding oneself in a community as
an outsider.
Moreover, since citizenship has already been posited in this chapter as a practice,
it is easy to see how this variable geometry of gender and sexuality fits with a model of
citizenship that departs from the consideration of subjective and identitarian positions –
such  as  “lesbian”,  “gay”,  “bisexual”,  “transgender”  or  “intersexual”  –  as  pre-given
labels to which only one type of behaviour or one prototype of law-abiding citizen may
correspond. Painter (2002, 93)  considers Europe as the perfect place to imagine new
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forms of citizenship that dissolve that intimate relationship with the nation-state and
recognise  the  convergence  of  different  spatial  dimensions,  as  well  as  simultaneous
membership of what he calls “various non-territorial social groups” (Painter 2002, 93),
such as religions,  sexual minorities,  or ethnic diasporas. Painter's intuition is that of
dismantling the myth of a “unified European identity” (Painter 2002, 94), a problem that
has also been the basis of Balibar's (2004) and Todorov's (2010) speculation regarding
the specific characteristics that should form a “European identity”. The alternative to the
endless enumeration of criteria to define “Europeanness” is the recognition of Europe as
continuously in flux and difficult to capture in a single snapshot. In this regard, issues of
sexuality  and  gender  become  crucial  to  understand  emerging  models  of  citizenship
involving a re-sizing of the importance of the nation-state as the sole actor of human
rights  and  citizenship.  This  is  not  only  because  of  the  performative  character  of
sexuality and gender (Butler 1990), but also by virtue of their potential as vehicles of
power and regulation (Foucault 1978). A citizen (or a wannabe citizen) who embraces
various sexual orientations and/or gender identities simultaneously – or in fact none of
them –directly challenges the state, insofar as they displace the attribution of a specific
identity as a marker of one's societal role. When this same individual also claims for
her/himself the fact of belonging to various political, cultural or religious communities
she/he takes the challenge further, contributing to the deconstruction of the ideal type of
what a citizen should look like in a given nation-state.
Furthermore, this intention to decouple citizenship from crystallised sexual and
gendered conceptions of citizenship, presents the advantage of revealing how the system
of  protection  for  human  rights  in  relation  to  the  recognition  of  LGBTI  persons  as
legitimate human rights subjects, rests on a fixed set of assumptions about individuals'
lives,  which  are  seen  as  being  characterised  by  events  such  as  getting  married,
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becoming parents, receiving benefits, or fitting (irreversibly) into the appropriate gender
category.  In this regard, both national citizenship and human rights practice tend to
rigidly  articulate  individuals'  identities.  This  common  attempt  to  rigidly  articulate
subjective  positions  can  be  traced  back  to  the  common  regulatory  and  disciplinary
functions that  both citizenship and human rights  fulfil.  For this  reason, proposing a
multi-dimensional  conception  of  citizenship  can  also  help  to  discard  a  system  of
protection  of  human  rights  that  establishes  a  perfect  correspondence  between  the
provision of the law and the recipients of such provision, without addressing the broader
socio-economic  and  political  context  in  which  human  rights  violations  occur.  For
instance, many individuals in the same position as C. and L. M. v. the UK, are deported,
notwithstanding the fact that they may be (or they may claim to be) in long-standing
same-sex  relationships  that  are  not  officially  recognised  by  the  law.  Whether  their
claims can be verified or not should not be of paramount importance. Rather, what is at
stake is that often those who are to be deported may also be in the most vulnerable
economic and political position, by being deported to a home country that may not offer
them the same quality of life (in terms of protection from homo/transphobia) or work
opportunities.   Hence,  in  cases  like  this,  it  should  not  become burdensome for  the
individual to demonstrate that she/he has the right to enjoy her/his “family life”.  The
system of human rights protection in place should encompass those who present fewer
credentials  or  have  weak claims,  since  the fact  that  they find themselves  in  such a
vulnerable legal position may well be the reason why they need to be protected the
most, as with the figure of the “Arendtian refugee”.  
The proposals advanced in this chapter in relation to a “multisexual citizenship”
are  closely  linked  to  the  work  of  Stychin  (2004),  among  others.  One  passage,  in
particular, is crucial to understanding how the combination of European citizenship and
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sexual citizenship can represent a new possibility, of envisioning individuals as active
participants in the construction of a more dynamic and politically engaged Europe, in
which rights are discussed, rather than only being claimed:
the possibilities of European citizenship lie in the potential to synthesise rights
and belonging, in the creation of opportunities for democratic contestation in the
interstices between liberal rights, the disciplinarity of the free market, and across
differences between and within national identifications (Stychin 2004, 299).
It is possible to suggest that in order to realise the “democratic contestation” that he
advocates, it is more appropriate to take the Council of Europe, rather than the European
Union, as the legitimate domain of action for individuals across the continent. More
specifically,  some  new  forms  of  European  sexual  citizenship  that  build  on  the
importance of the recognition of human rights, can be tried out by contributing to a call
to strengthen the sociological competences of the institution, whose work is currently
dominated  by  a  strictly  legal  framework.  While  the  judicial  role  of  the  ECtHR is
fundamental and immensely valuable, it is somehow reductive to consider this as the
main and sole instrument to promote the respect of human rights in Europe. It is true
that the Court is starting to take into account the work of the Commissioner in order to
ground  its  decisions  on  more  solid  sociological  facts,  such  as  in  the  2013  case
concerning adoption by a same sex couple in Austria (X. and Others v. Austria). At the
same  time,  however,  it  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  posit  that  the  ECtHR  has
thoroughly acknowledged the need for a shift in its rigid legalistic approach, which still
constitutes the bulk of its action. 
Furthermore,  in  order  to  counter  the  phenomenon  of  European  (Western)
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exceptionalism with regard to human rights, which may lead to new forms of cultural
imperialism (Linklater 2002, 317), it is necessary to allow individuals, in the different
geo-political  and social  contexts,  to have a say on the human rights  campaigns and
initiatives that  are  promoted.  Processes of consultation with both local  activists  and
human rights observers could be beneficial  in order to rephrase the “vocabulary” of
human rights, following a bottom-up perspective. The instrumental use of the concept of
the universality of human rights, in this regard, should be minimised by the CoE. The
existence  of  these  subtle  hidden  political  objectives  undermines  the  presumed
genuineness  and  universal  applicability  of  those  principles  that  are  set  forth  and
continuously restated  by the  different  bodies  of  the  organisation,  among  which  the
ECtHR surely plays a unique role. 
The Rights of LGBTI Persons in Europe: the Need for a New Agenda
or of a New Approach to Inequalities?
In  his  book  “the  End  of  Human  Rights”,  Douzinas  (2000)  called  for  a
transformation of the role of human rights beyond the current instrumental use that is
made of them by different political actors. Far from having the intention of describing
human rights as superfluous or obsolete, Douzinas'  critique of the current system of
protection of human rights rested on the idea of an ongoing process of debasement, for
merely political purposes, of human rights' ideal moral reach and required a thorough
reconsideration of both their role and the means by which human rights are promoted,
protected and guaranteed. A call similar to Douzinas' is echoed in this research: human
rights  should  be  advocated  and  strengthened,  but  beyond  political  appropriation.  If
subtracted from the colonising logic of petty political calculations, human rights are
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valuable because of their potential to be used as living instruments to monitor patterns
of injustice and inequality and to articulate proposals for social change. They should,
however, rest on a less defined vision of the human being and be more flexible in order
to accommodate the lives of individuals. 
During  the  last  three  decades,  the  slow  but  steady  appearance  on  the
international  “stage”  of  human  rights,  of  new human  rights  actors  that  (directly  or
indirectly) challenge the norms of heterosexuality and the duality of gender, has resulted
in a new vital push for the theory and practice of universal human rights. In fact, it has
introduced the necessity for a profound reconsideration of two of the major tenets of
modern  societies:  sexuality  and  gender.  The enormously disruptive  character  of  the
rights  claims  of  these  new  human  rights  actors  has  almost  taken  the  shape  of  a
theoretical  earthquake,  insofar  as  it  has forced legal  scholars  to question the rooted
heterosexual character of the nation, as well as the role and function of various societal
institutions (kinship,  marriage,  the army,  the nation)  in  the light of the existence of
former gender or sexual outlaws. The radical potential associated with the emergence of
these new human rights actors, however, can be said to have been underestimated by the
new actors themselves who, to some extent, have acquiescently subscribed to a model
of recognition of their rights – also conceived as a way to gain access to full citizenship
– that has posited them as passive recipients of benefits or entitlements, rather than as
active  protagonists  in  the  critical  process  of  questioning  the  heterosexual  and
cisgendered foundations of the nation and societal structures. 
Precisely because of this predominant passive framework of the articulation of
legal and social subjectivities by these actors, which is clearly visible in the construction
of LGBTI identities by both the ECtHR and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the
CoE, the current research has engaged in a quest for alternative models of citizenship.
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These models of citizenship acknowledge the reality of multiple allegiances and forms
of identification that individuals experience during their lifetime. 
Furthermore, these new modalities of citizenship permit a radical re-conception
of the role of human rights in ensuring the acquisition of the “privilege” of citizenship
both within and outside the boundaries of the nation-state. On the one hand, the classic
paradigm sees human rights and citizenship as being in a univocal relationship with the
nation-state as the sole source of legitimacy, protection and recognition. On the other
hand, to radically abandon the horizon of the nation-state in favour of a universalist
model of human rights or a cosmopolitan model of citizenship can harbour the danger
of promoting new forms of cultural or political imperialism. This clear tension, between
the national and the transnational dimensions of human rights and citizenship, cannot be
resolved merely by an abstract exercise of political will by the actors concerned. On the
contrary,  the tension can only be solved if  actors continuously re-enact and perform
those acts of citizenship, which can, precisely by virtue of their incessant repetition,
favour the crystallisation of new cross-dimensional models of belonging to different
spatial, social and political realities. By continuously acting as citizens who cross the
lines of sex, gender and heterosexuality, together with a whole constellation of other
ethnic,  religious and multi-national affiliations,  LGBTI persons can truly change the
content of “European citizenship and identity” from within. 
Moreover,  it  is  also  possible  to  broaden the  perspective  so as  to  encompass
Tassin's (1992, 189) suggestion to consider entrance into the public sphere of citizenship
as “elective” rather than “native”. This proposal to abandon a conception of citizenship
that  builds  on  a  natural  derivation  of  one's  membership  of  the  (national)  political
community,  allows  the  inclusion  of  those  individuals  that  do  not  possess  the
characteristics to become citizens in the first place, such as LGBTI asylum seekers and
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economic migrants. Using the example of Europe as an illustration of the possibility of
discarding the national model of citizenship, Tassin (1992, 189) is adamant in proposing
a model of European citizenship that breaks away from the univocal correspondence
between  the  individual  and the  nation-state,  and  places  significant  emphasis  on  the
notion of “choice”. Choice is understood in terms of the possibility, for each person to
“select” their citizenship and, hence, participate in the decisions concerning the destiny
of that community.  
It may appear odd to link Tassin's notion of “choice” to the situation of LGBTI
asylum seekers or economic migrants who cannot qualify as citizens in the first place.
However,  it  is  precisely because  of  the  fact  that  their  rights  claims  are  not  evenly
recognised  across  the  international  arena,  that  their  case  is  the  most  significant  in
illustrating the usefulness of broadening the concept of citizenship so as to encompass
an element of “choice”. In fact, it appears more significant to start from the periphery in
order to illustrate what needs to be changed at the core of the current system by which
rights are granted and citizenship is recognised. As this research has shown, LGBTI
asylum  seekers  or  economic  migrants  are  often  treated  with  suspicion  by  their
prospective host states,  because of  the possibility of “fraud” that  they can enact  by
claiming to have undergone persecution in their home country on the grounds of their
sexual  orientation  or  gender  identity.  Their  ambiguous position  as  both  “unwanted”
guests and a symbol of the intrinsic benevolence of Europe, creates a situation in which
they  oftenembody  the  situation  of  figurative  “statelessness”,  insofar  as  they  are
unwilling to endorse their home countries' citizenship but, at the same time, they do not
meet  the  criteria  to  become members  of  the  host  states'  political  communities.  The
strengthening of “Fortress Europe” only exacerbates the creation of outsiders who are
denied the possibility of participating in the fate and decisions of a political community
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that perceives them as “threats” or “impostors”, while simultaneously instrumentalising
politically their presence and experiences on the national soil.  
Connecting the situation lived by LGBTI asylum seekers and economic migrants
to the lack of an element of “choice” in the definition of one's citizenship is necessary in
order to understand the limitations of the concept of citizenship in the first place. When
some  passports  are  deemed  to  be  more  valuable  than  others  and  some  sexual
orientations, gender presentations, religious, ethnic or racial profiles, and class statuses
are more valued than others for the acquisition of citizenship it becomes imperative to
ask  whether  it  is  possible  to  introduce  an  element  of  “choice”  into  the  concept  of
citizenship. If applied to the context of Europe, in which human rights are at the core of
the continental identity, it becomes even more pressing to ask, to what extent European
(sexual) citizenship can be constructed on specific notions of racial, economic, sexual
and gender privileges. The recognition of the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe, and
their access to full national and European citizenship, requires a radical interrogation of
the dynamics that make membership of the political community possible. Why is that
possibility  of  political  action  that  Hannah  Arendt  advocated,  only  reserved  for  an
extremely tiny minority that possesses all of the moral, economic, cultural and social
characteristics to be a “good” citizen? Is it possible for Europe to praise itself and its
achievements by tacitly luring others to have the same aspirations, while simultaneously
denying  them access?  Is  it  not  precisely  Europe's  ability  to  absorb  difference  that
constitutes both its  uniqueness and its potential? Why not, then, dare to allow these
“differences” to speak for themselves in deciding what type of citizens  different people
wish to become?
Equally, in terms of the performativity of citizenship, it is possible to suggest
that the repeated acts of those LGBTI non-citizens that reside in a host state, be they
307
asylum seekers or economic migrants, constitute a new challenge to the static notion of
national citizenship still largely in place. By selectively choosing, within the host state,
which elements of LGBTI identities they want to appropriate for themselves, together
with other identitarian traits connected to ethnicity, language, religion, culture, or other
forms of belonging, these individuals demonstrate that citizenship can be continuously
done from below, because it  can be mobilised in order to obtain formal recognition
beyond  the  description  of  what  a  citizen  ought  to  be.  What  if  the  ideal  space  of
citizenship was conceived of as a domain in which self-determination could be realised
beyond both communitarian and liberal models?  This possibility, of course, would be to
consider  “choice”  as  something more  than  neoliberalism considers  it  to  be:  a  mere
possibility of choosing for oneself in order to pursue one's interests. Under these terms,
the process of choosing one's citizenship, therefore, cannot be equated to the “flexible
citizenship” of the diasporic Chinese economic elite described by Ong (1991), in which
individuals adopt a strategic and opportunistic attitude towards citizenship because of
the  changing  political  and  economic  conditions.  Rather,  the  notion  of  “choice”
employed here takes political action as a fundamental aspect, as it connects it to the
possibility of also advancing one's human rights claims as an agent rather than as a
recipient. Giving more voice to those who are part of or wish to be included in the
citizenry,  also represents a countermeasure to the phenomenon by which individuals
become entrenched in sectarian positions, while they lose the existence of a “common
fate” or refuse to define what a common fate should be in the first place. 
Hence, debating the rights claims of LGBTI non-citizens and LGBTI citizens in
the context of the Council of Europe brings an immense contribution to the definition of
European (sexual) citizenship as a phenomenon that  not only concerns the so-called
“sexual  minorities”,  but  also  appeals  more  broadly  to  the  whole  of  the  European
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population.  The  intricate  relationship  between  citizenship  and  human  rights  claims
relating to sexuality and gender is not merely the interest of a minority. Sexuality and
gender inform everyone's citizenship and contribute to shaping one's participation in
different spheres of public life. In fact, far from being confined to the private sphere,
sexuality and gender  have a public dimension that also informs one's  way of doing
citizenship. If the material and symbolic membership of Europe is also measured by the
degree to which human rights are respected and promoted, then sexuality and gender
need to be included in this discussion, but clearly not as instruments in order to foster
exclusionary models of Europe based on moral exceptionalism. 
The  discussion  of  alternative  models  of  citizenship  that  admit  a  plurality  of
sexual and gender positions, together with other layers informing one's identity as a
citizen, can be transformative for the definition of “Europe” in the first place. A more
dynamic conception of citizenship would help to conceive of Europe as something more
than an economic space with bland dynamics of social and political cohesion. In this
regard, the work of the Council of Europe can be strategic, insofar as the institution can
dissociate itself from its current image as a distant and bureaucratic giant, and can start
to employ instruments to attune its work more finely to the complexity of the lives of
the  individuals  across  the  continent.  The  ability  to  respond  to  this  transformative
challenge could also, potentially, lead to the accrued prestige of this institution as a true
interlocutor for individuals across the continent on matters of human rights protection. 
Moreover, the rights claims of those who appropriate the label of “LGBTI” for
themselves,  need  to  be  decoupled  from mechanistic  notions  of  both  “equality”  and
“freedom”,  which narrow down the possibility of having one's  rights  recognised by
becoming equal to heterosexual and cisgendered counterparts or as free as them. It is
this  sort  of  comparative  endeavour  on  which  human  rights  theory and practice  has
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embarked,  up  to  this  moment,  which  has  simplistically  blurred  the  lines  between
becoming a subject of human rights and becoming an actor of human rights. 
As  has  been  illustrated  in  the  analysis  carried  out  for  this  research,  the
recognition of LGBTI persons' formal equality or formal freedom (accessing societal
institutions on an equal footing, having one's privacy respected, being tolerated because
of one's status as a member of a minority), does very little to favour a re-discussion of
the reasons behind the existence of structural inequalities. To be treated equally as gay
in  the  workplace  while  gaining  a  wage  below  the  subsistence  level  should  not  be
perceived solely as an instance in which the person's sexual orientation is at stake. To
ask for the recognition of one's equality while disregarding the other intersecting factors
that contribute to the definition of a situation of inequality is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory.
A piecemeal approach to the protection of human rights does little to improve, in real,
material terms, the life of the individual concerned. 
The  human  rights  not  only  of  LGBTI  individuals,  but  more  broadly  of  all
individuals,  need  to  be  understood  beyond  the  current  predominant  framework  of
formal  equality  and  freedom,  which,  very  often,  serves  narrow  interests  in  both
domestic  and  international  politics  and  only  scratches  the  surface  of  the  structural
inequalities affecting LGBTI persons.  If  coupled with the attempt to build forms of
transnational citizenship, such as in the case of Europe, the recognition of the current
limitations of the system of protection that is in place helps to seize the momentum in
order  to  bring  to  the  table  alternative  models  that  give  more  space  to  “European
citizens”, to debate the real human rights struggles that matter to them in terms of how
their  lives  can  be  improved.  This,  in  turn,  allows  one  to  distance  oneself  from an
abstract formulation of human beings as all being born equal and free, and requires a
political  and  social  engagement  with  the  roots  of  inequality  in  a  continent  that
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increasingly  and relentlessly builds  its  reputation  on  its    record  of  protection  and
respect for human rights standards. 
While the  case law of the ECtHR represents an incredible instrument to foster
common European standards of human rights and its analysis allows one to unveil many
of the social and cultural policies at play in the construction of human rights subjects in
the first place, it should not be taken as the sole crowning achievement of all human
rights struggles of LGBTI persons in Europe. The delivery of the ECtHR's judgements
is currently taken as the most authoritative source on the continent, regarding what the
human rights standards should be in the 47 member states of the CoE. However, it is far
from being an all-encompassing perspective that takes into account the multi-faceted
aspects of complex issues such as marriage, parenting, gender expression and gender
presentation, as well as sexual behaviour and sentimental relationships. The significant
bulk of the work produced by the ECtHR on issues relating to sexual orientation and
gender identity should be complemented by paying more systematic attention to the
social  fabric  in  the  different  member  states  from which  these  human  rights  claims
originate. While the law requires simplification and categorisation in order to function
and ensure equal treatment, it is nonetheless true that the current predominant legalistic
approach  that  it  adopts  in  relation  to  rights  claims,  paradoxically,  often  strips  the
individuals of the dignity and integrity that the law seeks to protect, by reducing them to
a shapeless and voiceless crowd.
Bringing to the surface the ways in which human rights institutions, such as the
CoE, rely on the simplification of the experiences of sex and gender in daily life, and
their  multiple intersections with many other characteristics and conditions, serves to
establish a fruitful critical dialogue with these institutions, and can also help activists in
framing  their  requests  to  these  institutions  so  as  to  ground  their  action  on  a  more
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accurate sociological basis rather than merely on neoliberal stereotypes about same-sex
families, same-sex parents, sexual behaviour, gender conformity, and so forth. A process
of rebalancing the way in which human rights are constructed and advocated, would be
precisely aimed at establishing a synergy between the black letter of the law and the
extremely variable and fluid object of inquiry of sociological scholarship on gender, sex
and  sexuality.   This  endeavour  is  not  merely  an  ideal,  since  the  work  of  the
Commissioner,  although  limited  in  its  reach  so  far,  has  demonstrated  that  such  a
negotiation is possible, and that the judgments of the ECtHR can be enriched by being
complemented by contributions from sociological research. 
The field of the rights of LGBTI persons represents a perfect location in which
this experience of “pioneering” new forms of human rights advocacy and protection can
be tried out. Because of their peripheral position in the panorama of international human
rights, the rights claims of LGBTI persons also represent the most vivid example of how
often the acquisition of legal, social and political intelligibility is enacted through the
existence of a compromise that curtails the possibility of self-determination. Moreover,
the process by which “new” human rights actors are allowed into the international and
domestic arenas also sheds light on the crucial process of the reconfiguration of forms
of  citizenship  and  socio-political  belonging  in  a  European  continent  that  currently
hesitates  between  two ambiguous  positions  in  world  politics:  on  the  one  hand,  the
possibility of becoming a tranquil international moral hegemon, and on the other, that of
acting as a reluctant but assertive international political actor. 
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